Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 90도2310

Violation of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법위반)국가공무원법위반

Decided1992. 02. 14. Court대법원Worker (teacher) won — acquitted (근로자 승소)
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

This case addressed whether a teacher's participation in a teachers' council (교사협의회) constituted a 'labor movement' or prohibited 'collective action' under the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법). The Supreme Court (대법원) acquitted the defendant, holding that the council was a voluntary organization aimed at improving internal educational matters rather than an unlawful labor movement. The Court found that since the defendant's activities occurred on holidays or outside working hours, there was no breach of the duty of devotion to official duties.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA public school teacher participated in a teachers' council formed to discuss and improve internal educational issues.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court acquitted the teacher, ruling that the council was a voluntary organization, not an unlawful labor movement or collective action under the State Public Officials Act.
  • LessonPublic officials' off-duty participation in voluntary professional groups is not automatically illegal 'collective action' unless it interferes with their duty of devotion to official duties.
Issues
  • Interpretation of 'labor movement (노동운동)' under Article 66 of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법)
  • Scope of 'collective acts for purposes other than public duties' under the State Public Officials Act
  • Legal characterization of teachers' council (교사협의회) activities
Key reasoning

The Supreme Court ruled that 'labor movement (노동운동)' under Article 66 of the State Public Officials Act must be narrowly interpreted to mean the exercise of the three constitutional labor rights (근로삼권)—organizing, collective bargaining, and collective action. It held that a teachers' council, formed voluntarily to address internal educational issues, is fundamentally different in nature from a labor union. The Court further held that 'collective acts for purposes other than public duties' must be interpreted consistently with the Constitution, limited to acts that neglect the duty of devotion to official duties in a way that harms the public interest. Because the defendant's activities took place outside working hours, no such breach occurred.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

가. The "labor movement" prohibited under Article 66 of the State Public Officials Act (國家公務員法) must be interpreted as meaning the three labor rights in their constitutional and labor-law sense—namely, the right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to collective action—in light of the relationship between the Constitution and the State Public Officials Act, and in light of the fact that our Constitution, while guaranteeing the three labor rights separately from the freedoms of assembly and association, contains a constitutional restriction applicable to public officials only with respect to the three labor rights. The right to organize that is restricted refers to the right of subordinate workers to form, join, and engage in activities in a labor union, which is an economic association organized by such workers vis-à-vis their employer for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and the like. Furthermore, "collective action for matters other than public duties" under the same Act does not mean any and all collective action taken by public officials for any matter that is not a public duty; rather, comprehensively considering Article 21(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association, the principles underlying the Constitution, the purpose of the State Public Officials Act, and the duties of good faith and devotion to duty under the State Public Officials Act, it must be restrictively interpreted to mean "collective action that has such effects as neglect of the duty of devotion to duty, undertaken for a purpose contrary to the public interest."

나. The ○○ Teachers' Association, or its subordinate body, the △△ Teachers' Association, with which the defendant was associated, appears to be a voluntary organization of teachers formed to point out and advocate for the improvement of internal problems and contradictions in education, such as opposition to the expanded implementation of supplementary classes, issues concerning Teachers' Day, and calls for teachers to withdraw from the Korean Federation of Education Associations (대한교련). Even assuming that the ○○ Teachers' Association engaged in activities such as publicizing to teachers the necessity of establishing the Korea Teachers and Education Workers' Union (전교조), such activities alone cannot be regarded as constituting, in themselves, an act of establishing a labor union or the ordinary activities of a labor union merely by virtue of that expressive conduct. Therefore, none of the defendant's acts can be found to constitute a "labor movement" as set forth in item 가 above. Moreover, the defendant's holding of the representative assembly and standing committee meetings of the ○○ Teachers' Association, the speech given at a lecture, and the drafting and distribution of the newsletter of the △△ Teachers' Association were all carried out on holidays or outside working hours, and there is no other evidence showing that the defendant neglected the duty of devotion to duty for a purpose contrary to the public interest. Accordingly, this is a case holding that the defendant cannot be found to have engaged in "collective action for matters other than public duties" as set forth in item 가 above.

Full text (English, AI translation) 8,642 chars

[Defendant] Defendant
[Appellant] Prosecutor
[Lower Court Decision] Chuncheon District Court Decision 90No430, rendered on August 30, 1990

[Order]

The appeal is dismissed.

[Reasoning]

We examine the grounds of appeal raised by the prosecutor.

1. As to Ground of Appeal No. 1

The court below rendered its judgment premised on the correctness of the first instance judgment, which had distinguished each of the acts of the Defendant that had been acquitted from each of the acts that had been found guilty, treating them as separate acts and thus as concurrent crimes in substantive competition. Upon examination of the record, it appears that the acts for which acquittal was rendered were not, as argued by the defense, a series of preparatory acts for the acts for which conviction was rendered such that they should have been prosecuted as each constituting a single comprehensive crime; rather, they appear to have been prosecuted as mutually independent and separate charges. Accordingly, the argument that the judgment below erred in its legal understanding regarding the number of crimes is without merit.

2. As to Ground of Appeal No. 2

Our Constitution (헌법), while guaranteeing to all citizens the right to dignity and worth as human beings and the right to pursue happiness (Article 10), guarantees, as a specific means of ensuring that workers, who are economically disadvantaged, may secure a life worthy of human beings, the right of workers to organize, to bargain collectively, and to act collectively (the "three labor rights") (Article 33, Paragraph 1), while also providing a restriction (Article 33, Paragraph 2) limiting the enjoyment of these three labor rights, in the case of public officials who are workers, to only those public officials designated by statute.

Meanwhile, Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법), based on the above constitutional restriction concerning the three labor rights of public officials, provides that "public officials shall not engage in labor movements or other collective acts for purposes other than official duties..." and Article 84 of the same Act provides that public officials who violate the above provision shall be punished by imprisonment or a fine.

As to the concept of "labor movement" under the above State Public Officials Act, it should generally be considered that where a given positive statutory provision restricts a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution, the meaning of that restriction must be examined in light of the fundamental spirit underlying the guarantee of that right; and in particular, where the provision in question is a penal provision, it is required that its meaning be made clear so that the boundaries of punishable conduct are made explicit (the principle of nulla poena sine lege). Generally speaking, the concept of "labor movement" is a comprehensive and ambiguous term used in ordinary social parlance, and there is a risk that the boundaries of the conduct prohibited thereby may become unclear. In light of the relationship between the Constitution and the State Public Officials Act, and in light of the fact that our Constitution guarantees the three labor rights separately from the freedoms of assembly and association while placing a constitutional restriction on public officials only with respect to the three labor rights, the term "labor movement" under the State Public Officials Act must be interpreted to mean the three labor rights as a constitutional and labor-law concept, namely, the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to act collectively; and the right to organize that is restricted refers to the right of subordinate workers to form, join, and engage in activities within a labor union, which is an economic association organized vis-à-vis the employer for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and the like.

Upon examination of the record, the ○○ Teachers' Council and its subordinate organization, the △△ Teachers' Council, referred to in the judgment below, appear to be voluntary associations of teachers formed for the purpose of pointing out internal problems and contradictions within education—such as opposition to the expansion of supplementary classes, issues concerning Teachers' Day, and calls for teachers to withdraw from the Korean Federation of Education Associations—and asserting improvements thereto; and there is no material whatsoever in the record to support the proposition that these organizations had the character of an act of forming a labor union for the purpose of improving working conditions, or of activities thereof.

Even assuming that the ○○ Teachers' Council engaged in activities such as publicizing to teachers the need for the establishment of the Korea Teachers and Education Workers' Union (전교조) as set forth in the judgment, such activities alone cannot be deemed, by virtue of the expressive act itself, to constitute the act of establishing a labor union or the ordinary activities of a labor union.

Accordingly, the Defendant's above acts related to the ○○ Teachers' Council do not fall within the scope of the prohibited "labor movement."

Furthermore, Article 66 of the State Public Officials Act restricts not only "labor movements" but also "collective acts for purposes other than official duties," and this provision, owing to the comprehensiveness and breadth of that concept, raises questions in relation to Article 21, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association even to public officials.

Freedom of expression, including freedom of assembly and association, is a fundamental right necessary for human beings to preserve their dignity, and this holds equally true for public officials. While in the case of public officials, given the nature of their status and duties, a greater necessity for restriction may be anticipated as compared with ordinary citizens, even in such a case the restriction must not be uniform and blanket merely by reason of the public nature or necessity thereof; and even where grounds for restriction exist, the limits of such restriction must be set by weighing and balancing the freedom of expression being restricted against the public interest sought to be protected by such restriction (the principle of comparative balancing), and even where restriction is determined to be unavoidable, it must be confined to the minimum degree necessary (the principle of minimal restriction), and the essential content of that right must not be infringed.

If so, since "collective acts for purposes other than official duties" under the State Public Officials Act cannot be deemed to mean every collective act performed by public officials for any purpose other than official duties, in order to interpret the above statutory provision in a manner restrictively construed so as to conform with the Constitution, it must be construed narrowly—taking into comprehensive account the above constitutional provisions, constitutional principles, the purpose of the State Public Officials Act, and the duty of good faith and the duty of devotion to duty under the State Public Officials Act—as meaning "a collective act undertaken for a purpose contrary to the public interest, which has the effect of, among other things, neglecting the duty of devotion to duty."

Upon examination of the record, each of the Defendant's acts—namely, holding the ○○ Teachers' Council's delegates' assembly and standing committee meetings, delivering a speech at a lecture, and drafting and distributing the newsletter of the △△ Teachers' Council—were all carried out on holidays or outside of working hours, and there is no material from which it can otherwise be found that the Defendant acted for a purpose contrary to the public interest, or that the Defendant neglected the duty of devotion to duty as a result of such collective acts. Accordingly, it is difficult to conclude that the Defendant engaged in "collective acts for purposes other than official duties." The judgment below, having ruled to the same effect, is proper, and it cannot be said that there was any error in the judgment below of misunderstanding the legal principles of the State Public Officials Act as argued by the defense; accordingly, this argument is without merit.

2. Accordingly, the opinions of the participating Justices being unanimous in dismissing the appeal, it is so ordered as set forth in the Order.

Justice Park Man-ho (Presiding Justice), Justice Park Woo-dong, Justice Kim Sang-won, Justice Yoon Young-chul

【판결요지】

가. 국가공무원법 제66조에서 금지한 ‘노동운동’은 헌법과 국가공무원법과의 관계 및 우리 헌법이 근로삼권을 집회, 결사의 자유와 구분하여 보장하면서도 근로삼권에 한하여 공무원에 대한 헌법적 제한규정을 두고 있는 점에 비추어 헌법 및 노동법적 개념으로서의 근로삼권, 즉 단결권, 단체교섭권, 단체행동권을 의미한다고 해석하여야 할 것이고, 제한되는 단결권은 종속근로자들이 사용자에 대하여 근로조건의 유지, 개선 등을 목적으로 조직한 경제적 결사인 노동조합을 결성하고 그에 가입, 활동하는 권리를 말한다고 할 것이며 또한 같은 법상의 ‘공무 이외의 일을 위한 집단적 행위’ 는 공무가 아닌 어떤 일을 위하여 공무원들이 하는 모든 집단적 행위를 의미하는 것은 아니고 언론, 출판, 집회, 결사의 자유를 보장하고 있는 헌법 제21조 제1항, 헌법상의 원리, 국가공무원법의 취지, 국가공무원법상의 성실의무 및 직무전념의무 등을 종합적으로 고려하여 ‘공익에 반하는 목적을 위하여 직무전념의무를 해태하는 등의 영향을 가져오는 집단적 행위’ 라고 축소해석하여야 할 것이다.

나. 피고인이 관련한 ○○교사협의회 내지 그 산하인 △△교사협의회는 보충수업 확대 실시 반대, 스승의 날 문제, 교사들의 대한교련 탈퇴촉구 등 교육 내부의 문제와 모순점들을 지적하거나 그 개선을 주장하기 위한 교사들의 임의단체인 것으로 보이고 설사 ○○교사협의회가 전교조 설립의 필요성을 교사들에게 홍보하는 등의 활동을 하였다고 할지라도 그러한 활동만으로 그 표현행위 자체가 노동조합의 설립행위 내지 노동조합의 통상활동이라고 볼 수없으므로 피고인의 각 행위는 위 "가"항의 노동운동에 해당한다고 볼 수 없고 또한 피고인이 행한 ○○교사협의회 대의원대회 및 상임위원회 개최, 강연회에서의 연설, △△교사협의회 소식지의 작성, 배포는 모두 휴일이나 근무시간 이외에 이루어졌고 달리 공익에 반하는 목적을 위하여 직무전념의무를 해태하였다고 볼 자료가 없으므로 피고인이 위 "가"항의 ‘공무 이외의 일을 위한 집단적 행위’를 하였다고 볼 수 없다고 한 사례.

【참조조문】

가.나. 국가공무원법 제84조, 제66조 제1항

【주문】·【이유】 전문 2,842자 · 펼쳐 보기

【피 고 인】 피고인

【상 고 인】 검사

【원심판결】 춘천지방법원 1990.8.30. 선고 90노430 판결

【주 문】

상고를 기각한다.

【이 유】 검사의 상고이유를 본다.

1.상고이유 제1점에 대하여

원심은 제1심이 무죄선고한 피고인의 각 판시 소위를 유죄선고한 각 판시 소위와 각 별개의 행위로 구별하여 이를 실체적 경합범으로 보고 판단한 제1심판결이 정당함을 전제로 하여 판단하고 있는바, 기록에 의하면 무죄선고된 판시 각 소위가 소론의 지적과 같이 유죄선고된 판시 각 소위에 대한 일련의 준비행위로서 각 포괄적일죄로 기소된 것이라고는 할 수 없고 상호 독립된 별개의 공소사실로 기소된 것으로 보여지므로 원심판결에 죄수에 관한 법리오해의 위법이 있다는 논지는 이유 없다.

2. 상고이유 제2점에 대하여

우리 헌법은 모든 국민의 인간으로서의 존엄과 가치권, 행복추구권(제10조)을 보장한 위에 경제적 약자인 근로자들이 인간다운 생활을 확보할 수 있도록 하는 구체적인 방법으로 근로자의 단결권, 단체교섭권, 단체행동권(제33조 제1항)을 보장하고, 다만 공무원인 근로자는 법률이 정하는 자에 한하여 위의 근로3권을 가지도록 제한하는 규정(제33조 제2항)을 두고있다.

한편 국가공무원법 제66조 제1항은 공무원의 근로3권에 대한 위 헌법 제한규정에 기초하여 「공무원은 노동운동 기타 공무 이외의 일을 위한 집단적 행위를 하여서는 아니된다 … 」고 규정하고, 동법 제84조는 위 규정에 위반한 공무원에 대하여 징역 또는 벌금형으로 처벌토록 하고 있다.

이에 위 국가 공무원법상의 ‘노동운동’의 개념에 대하여 보건대, 무릇 어떤 실정법규가 헌법상의 기본권을 제한하고 있는 경우에는 그 기본권보장의 근본정신에 비추어 그 제한의 의미를 고찰하여야 할 것이며 특히 그것이 형벌법규인 경우에는 그 의미를 명확히 하여 그 처벌의 한계를 명료하게 할 것이 요구되는바(죄형법정주의 원칙), 일반적으로 ‘노동운동’이라는 개념은 포괄적이고 애매한 사회통념적 용어로서 그에 의하여 금지되는 행위의 한계가 불분명하여질 위험성이 있으므로 헌법과 국가공무원법과의 관계 및 우리 헌법이 근로3권을 집회, 결사의 자유와 구분하여 보장하면서도 근로3권에 한하여 공무원에 대한 헌법적 제한규정을 두고 있는 점에 비추어 국가 공무원법상의 ‘노동운동’은 헌법 및 노동법적 개념으로서의 근로3권, 즉 단결권, 단체교섭권, 단체행동권을 의미한다고 해석하여야 할 것이고, 제한되는 단결권은 종속근로자들이 사용자에 대하여 근로조건의 유지, 개선 등을 목적으로 조직한 경제적 결사인노동조합을 결성하고 그에 가입, 활동하는 권리를 말한다고 할 것이다.

기록에 의하여 살펴보면 원심판시의 ○○교사협의회 내지 그 산하인 △△교사협의회는 보충수업확대실시 반대, 스승의 날 문제, 교사들의 대한교련탈퇴촉구 등 교육 내부의 문제와 모순점들을 지적하거나 그 개선을 주장하기 위한 교사들의 임의단체인 것으로 보이고 그것이 근로조건의 향상을 목적으로 한 노동조합결성행위 및 그 활동으로서의 성격을 가지고 있다는 점에 관하여는 이를 인정할 만한 아무런 자료가 없다.

설사 ○○교사협의회가 판시 전교조 설립의 필요성을 교사들에게 홍보하는 등의 활동을 하였다고 할지라도 그러한 활동만으로 그 표현행위 자체가 노동조합의 설립행위 내지 노동조합의 통상활동이라고 볼 수는 없다.

따라서 ○○교사협의회와 관련한 피고인의 위 각 행위는 금지되는 ‘노동운동’에 해당되지 아니한다.

나아가 국가공무원법 제66조는 노동운동뿐만 아니라 ‘공무 이외의 일을 위한 집단적 행위’도 제한하고 있는데, 이는 그 개념의 포괄성, 광범위성으로 인하여 공무원에 대하여도 언론, 출판, 집회, 결사의 자유를 보장하고 있는 헌법 제21조 제1항과 관련하여 논란의 여지가 있다할 것이다.

집회, 결사의 자유를 포함한 표현의 자유는 인간이 그 존엄성을 지켜 나가기 위한 기본적인 권리이고 공무원에 대하여도 이는 동일한 것인바, 공무원의 경우 그 지위나 직무의 성질에 비추어 일반국민보다는 이에 대한 제약의 필요성이 예상될 수 있으나 그 경우에도 그 공공성이나 필요성을 이유로 하여 일률적, 전면적으로 제한하여서는 아니되며 제한의 사유가 존재하는 경우에도 그 한계를 설정하여 제한되는 표현의 자유와 그 제한에 의하여 보장하려는 공익을 서로 비교, 형량하여(비교, 형량의 원칙) 제한이 불가피하다고 판단되어 제한하는 경우에도 최소한의 정도에 그쳐야 할 것이고(최소한 제한의 원칙)그 권리의 본질적인 내용을 침해하여서는 아니되는 것이다.

그렇다면 국가공무원법상의 ‘공무 이외의 일을 위한 집단적 행위’가 공무가 아닌 어떤 일을 위하여 공무원들이 하는 모든 집단적 행위를 의미하는 것은 아니므로 위 법규를 헌법합치적으로 제한 해석하기 위하여는 위와 같은 헌법규정, 헌법상의 원리, 국가공무원법의 취지, 국가공무원법상의 성실의무 및 직무전념의무 등을 종합적으로 고려하여 ‘공익에 반하는 목적을 위하여 직무전념의무를 해태하는 등의 영향을 가져오는 집단적 행위’라고 축소해석하여야 할 것이다.

기록에 의하면 피고인의 각 행위 즉, ○○교사협의회 대위원대회 및 상임위원회개최, 강연회에서의 연설, △△교사협의회 소식지의 작성, 배포는 모두 휴일이나 근무시간 이외에 이루어졌고 달리 피고인이 공익에 반하는 목적을 위하여 한 것이고 그 집단적 행위로 인하여 직무전념의무를 태만히 하였다고 볼 자료를 찾아볼 수 없으므로 결국 피고인이 ‘공무이외의 일을 위한 집단적 행위’를 하였다고도 해석하기 어렵다. 같은 취지로 판시한 원심판결은 정당하고 거기에 소론과 같이 국가공무원법의 법리를 오해한 위법이 있다할 수 없으므로 논지는 이유 없다.

2. 그러므로 상고를 기각하기로 관여 법관의 의견이 일치되어 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 박만호(재판장) 박우동 김상원 윤영철

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