[Defendant] Defendant 1 and 2 others
[Appellant] The Defendants
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Kang Young-gu and 9 others
[Judgment Below] Daejeon District Court Decision 2010No618 Decided May 14, 2010
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed.
[Reasoning] The grounds for appeal (to the extent that the supplementary appellate brief submitted after the expiration of the period for submitting the grounds of appeal supplements the grounds of appeal) are examined as follows.
1. As to the grounds of appeal regarding the Defendants' violation of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법)
A. As to the violation of the principle that the indictment alone should be considered (공소장일본주의)
The principle that the indictment alone should be considered is the principle that, in principle, when a prosecutor institutes a public prosecution, the prosecutor must submit only the indictment itself and must not attach documents or other materials that could give rise to prejudgment by the court regarding the case, or cite the contents thereof (Article 118, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (형사소송규칙)). The prohibition on listing, in the indictment, facts other than those required by statute that could give rise to prejudgment by the court—the so-called "prohibition on stating other facts"—is also included within the content of this principle. Whether the principle that the indictment alone should be considered has been violated must be determined specifically in the case at hand, based on whether, in light of the type and content of the crime stated as the charged facts, the contents of the documents or other materials attached to or cited in the indictment, and the facts stated in the indictment beyond what is required by statute, could give rise to prejudgment by the judge or jury such that it could hinder the judge or jury in grasping the substance of the criminal facts (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2009Do7436, decided October 22, 2009, etc.).
Among the portions of the charged facts regarding the violation of the State Public Officials Act in this case, the parts that the Defendants point out in their grounds of appeal appear merely to clarify the motive and circumstances that led the Defendants to engage in "collective action for a purpose other than public duty" under Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act, and thus such statements cannot be deemed to violate the principle that the indictment alone should be considered by setting forth grounds that could give rise to prejudgment by the court.
The court below, having proceeded to a determination on the merits regarding this portion of the charged facts against the Defendants on the same rationale, acted properly, and there is no error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the principle that the indictment alone should be considered, as argued in the grounds of appeal. This part of the grounds of appeal is without merit.
B. As to collective action under the State Public Officials Act
(1) Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution (헌법) provides that "public officials shall be servants of the entire people and shall be responsible to the people." As such, public officials are in a special position bearing responsibility to work for the public interest as servants of the entire people. Accordingly, public officials bear the responsibility to faithfully perform their duties in accordance with the Constitution and statutes for the benefit of the entire people, and the public nature, fairness, faithfulness, and neutrality of public officials' duties must be guaranteed. To realize this, the Constitution, unlike for ordinary citizens, imposes restrictions on the fundamental rights of public officials, such as by guaranteeing the right to organize, etc., only to those public officials designated by statute among workers who are public officials. The fact that Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act provides that "public officials shall not engage in labor movements or other collective action for purposes other than public duty," thereby restricting public officials' freedom of speech and press and freedom of assembly and association, and prohibiting collective action by public officials for purposes other than public duty, is because collective action by public officials has the potential to hinder the pursuit of the interests of the entire people by representing the interests of the group of public officials, and this provision stipulates one of the duties arising from the special status of public officials as servants of the entire people (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2003Hun-Ba51, etc., decided August 30, 2007).
However, Article 21, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression by providing that "all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and press, and freedom of assembly and association." Freedom of expression is a fundamental right for human beings to maintain their dignity, and this applies equally to public officials. As noted above, in the case of public officials, there is a need to restrict freedom of expression more than for ordinary citizens in light of their status and the nature of their duties; however, even in such cases, restrictions must not be uniform and blanket merely on grounds of public nature or necessity. Even where grounds for restriction exist, limits must be set, and the freedom of expression being restricted must be weighed against the public interest that the restriction seeks to protect. Even where restriction is deemed unavoidable and is imposed, such restriction must be limited to the minimum extent possible and must not infringe upon the essential content of the right. Accordingly, even though the main text of Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act provides somewhat comprehensively and broadly for "collective action for a purpose other than public duty," this does not mean all collective action taken by public officials for any purpose other than public duty; rather, considering comprehensively Article 21, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, the constitutional duties required of public officials and teachers, the purpose of the State Public Officials Act which embodies these duties, and the duty of good faith and duty of devotion to duty under the State Public Officials Act, it should be interpreted as meaning "collective action for a purpose contrary to the public interest that has effects such as neglect of the duty of devotion to duty" (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do2310, decided February 14, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 2003Do2960, decided April 15, 2005, etc.).
However, the Constitution, in Article 7, Paragraph 1, provides that public officials are servants of the entire people, and further, in Article 7, Paragraph 2, provides that "the status and political neutrality of public officials shall be guaranteed as prescribed by statute." Accordingly, public officials must pursue the public interest from a politically neutral position, and to this end, must not only be independent from political forces pursuing particular partisan interests, but also bear the constitutional duty not to engage themselves in acts that influence or could influence the political neutrality of the performance of public duties. Article 65 of the State Public Officials Act and Article 57 of the Local Public Officials Act (지방공무원법), which prohibit political activities by public officials, and Article 9, Paragraph 1, Article 60, Paragraph 1, Article 85, Paragraph 1, and Article 86, etc. of the Public Official Election Act (공직선거법), which prohibit public officials from engaging in election campaigning or acts influencing elections, are all provisions realizing this principle.
Furthermore, the Constitution guarantees the political neutrality of education by providing, in Article 31, Paragraph 4, that "the independence, professionalism, political neutrality, and university autonomy of education shall be guaranteed as prescribed by statute." The political neutrality of education is a fundamental constitutional principle for guaranteeing the independence and autonomy of education by excluding political and partisan intervention and domination over education. To secure this, while teachers' status must be guaranteed so that they are not subjected to improper influence contrary to the essence of education by political forces, etc., teachers also bear the duty to reject such influence and to maintain political neutrality (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 89Hun-Ga106, decided July 22, 1991). Accordingly, teachers must present opposing ideologies and political views fairly and objectively so that students are not absorbed into biased ideologies or political views but instead grow into democratic citizens, and this political neutrality of education must be autonomously secured under the responsibility of teachers. Accordingly, the Framework Act on Education (교육기본법) confirms that political neutrality of teachers is a natural prerequisite for securing the political neutrality of education, by providing that education shall not be used as a means for propagating political, partisan, or personal bias (Article 6, Paragraph 1), and that teachers shall not instruct or incite students to support or oppose a specific political party or faction (Article 14, Paragraph 4). The political neutrality of teachers must be maintained not only within the educational field but also outside it. In particular, since the activities of elementary and secondary school teachers who educate minors—who have not yet formed independent worldviews or political views and who are highly sensitive, imitative, and receptive—have a direct and significant impact on students even when such activities occur outside the educational field, elementary and secondary school teachers must be mindful that their activities outside the educational field are also part of the latent curriculum, and must take care that political neutrality is not undermined.
Therefore, while freedom of political expression must be guaranteed even for teachers who are public officials, in light of the constitutional spirit declaring the political neutrality of public officials and the political neutrality of education as discussed above, and the purpose of related statutes, such freedom of political expression is inevitably subject to restriction within a certain scope, and this is a limitation that teachers who are public officials, whose status is guaranteed by the Constitution, must accept. Moreover, where an act of political expression by a teacher who is a public official is carried out on a large scale and collectively while foregrounding the teacher's status, an evaluation is required that takes into account the ripple effect such act would have on the educational field and on society.
Accordingly, where an expressive act collectively engaged in by teachers who are public officials falls under a specific political activity prohibited for public officials under individual statutes such as the State Public Officials Act or the Public Official Election Act, or where it clearly manifests political bias or partisanship, such as by directly expressing support for or opposition to a specific political party or political force, and thereby can be found to reach the level of creating a direct risk of infringing the political neutrality of teachers who are public officials, such act departs from the proper role of a teacher who is a public official, constitutes an act contrary to the public interest, undermines discipline concerning the duties of a public official or harms the essence of public duty, and thus constitutes neglect of the duty of devotion to duty. It is therefore reasonable to view such act as falling under "collective action for a purpose other than public duty" prohibited under Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act.
Whether a particular act reaches the level of creating a direct risk of infringing political neutrality cannot be determined uniformly, and must be determined by comprehensively considering the special nature of the status of public officials and teachers, for whom the Constitution requires political neutrality, together with various circumstances related to the act in the specific case, such as the motive or purpose of the act, its timing and circumstances, the political and social background at the time, the content and manner of the act, and whether there was any connection with a specific political force.
(2) First, as to the First Statement of the Current Situation (1차 시국선언).
(A) Examining, in light of the legal principles set forth above, the facts ascertainable from the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted by the court below regarding the First Statement of the Current Situation, the following is found.
① At the time of the First Statement of the Current Situation, statements on the current situation criticizing the government's policies and state administration, which were then controversial, and demanding reform of state affairs, were being made across various sectors of society nationwide, beginning with the statement issued on May 28, 2009 in the names of 100 members of society, followed by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (전국민주노동조합총연맹, hereinafter the "KCTU") issuing its own statement of the current situation on June 9, 2009.
② In response, the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union (전국교직원노동조합, hereinafter the "KTU") also recognized this situation, and on June 9, 2009, held the 360th Central Executive Committee meeting (composed of headquarters officials such as the chairperson, senior vice-chairperson, vice-chairpersons, policy director, secretary-general, editorial director, and the heads of provincial and municipal branches nationwide, who make decisions by unanimous vote of all members) with Defendant 1 in attendance. At this meeting, based on an explanation of the political situation stating that, in connection with the by-election scheduled for October 2009 and the local elections scheduled for 2010, it was important to maintain the current momentum, and that sector-specific campaigns of struggle, etc., were necessary; and on an agenda item stating that, given the high likelihood that demands from citizens, labor organizations, etc., would erupt starting from the nationwide rally commemorating the June 10 Uprising, "a form such as a statement of the current situation is necessary in terms of building an anti-Lee Myung-bak front," the KTU resolved to promote a statement of the current situation regarding the June political situation (hereinafter the "First Statement of the Current Situation") with the participation of 10,000 teachers, and planned and executed this by having KTU headquarters and its 16 branch organizations nationwide have union members and non-union teachers participate in the First Statement of the Current Situation. The Defendants performed the executive tasks in this regard as the branch chairperson, senior branch chairperson, and practical staff in charge of administrative affairs of the KTU Daejeon Branch, respectively.
The text of the First Statement of the Current Situation included content pointing out and criticizing problems with education policy, including the increased burden of private education expenses, entrance-exam-oriented competitive education, and educational polarization. However, it primarily contained content using expressions such as "abuse of state power reminiscent of the military dictatorship era" to argue that the investigations related to the candlelight vigils and the PD Diary program were unreasonable investigations; that the fire that occurred at the Yongsan District 4 demolition site in January 2009 was also the result of reckless suppression by the police; that national development projects and North Korea policy were mistaken policies; and to criticize these matters, asserting that due to self-righteous management of state affairs, democracy was facing a crisis, and that future-oriented values such as people's livelihood, ecology, and peace were also under threat, such that the survival of the people and the future of the nation were facing overall danger; that national resistance was occurring in response to this; and expressing the hope that the unfortunate history of a government being abandoned by the people would not be repeated, while urging a complete overhaul of state administration.
This constitutes a matter in which the officials of KTU headquarters and branches, harboring a clear political intention of influencing elections or building an anti-current-administration front, borrowed the form of a statement on the current situation to unilaterally and negatively evaluate and attack the exercise of state power and major policies from a biased standpoint, thereby exceeding the bounds of political neutrality and collectively and clearly asserting opposition to the specific political force leading the administration of state affairs.
③ The First Statement of the Current Situation was planned and promoted in an organized manner using the organizations of KTU headquarters and branches so that a large number of teachers, including KTU union members, would participate in signing the statement within a short period of time, and the KTU, despite the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology's request for restraint, proceeded to have teachers participate in signing the statement, and further, the KTU chairperson and Central Executive Committee members held a press conference to publicly announce the statement, and the KTU newsletter published a specific list of the teachers who signed it, thereby revealing the status of the teachers and engaging in collective action directed toward the outside world.
④ In the case of elementary and secondary school teachers, unlike university faculty, for whom joining political parties and engaging in election campaigning is permitted, joining political parties and engaging in election campaigning is prohibited (Article 22, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Political Parties Act (정당법); Article 60, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the Public Official Election Act), such that their duty of political neutrality is reinforced. This stems from the fact that, unlike university education, elementary and secondary school teachers must educate students in accordance with statutes (Article 20, Paragraph 3 of the former Elementary and Secondary Education Act (초·중등교육법), prior to amendment by Act No. 10914 of July 25, 2011), and their function is generally to convey generally accepted basic knowledge, such that the essence and content of the duties, working conditions, and influence over students differ between elementary and secondary school teachers and university faculty. Accordingly, even if statements of the current situation were made at national and public universities around the same time, the First Statement of the Current Situation cannot be evaluated on the same footing as such statements.
⑤ Furthermore, the Defendants encouraged not only KTU Daejeon Branch union members but also non-union teachers, in the school setting, to participate in the First Statement of the Current Situation with the above content, and led a large-scale signature campaign; it cannot be denied that such acts carry the risk of causing disruption to teachers' performance of their public duties and of transforming schools into venues for political discourse, thereby affecting students' educational environment.
(B) Comprehensively considering the various circumstances noted above—the purpose of planning and promoting the First Statement of the Current Situation, its timing and circumstances, its content, the special nature of the status of elementary and secondary school teachers, the manner in which it was promoted, and its resulting impact—it is ultimately reasonable to view the Defendants' acts, conspiring with other KTU officials in connection with the First Statement of the Current Situation, as clearly expressing opposition to a specific political force by collectively exercising an intention to obstruct, or critical influence over, major government policy decisions and implementation, with a clear political purpose or intention, and as clearly manifesting political bias or partisanship to the extent of infringing the political neutrality of teachers who are public officials and the public's trust therein, or creating a direct risk of such infringement.
Accordingly, the Defendants' First Statement of the Current Situation departs from the proper role of a teacher who is a public official and constitutes an act contrary to the public interest, undermining discipline concerning the duties of a public official or harming the essence of public duty, and thus constitutes collective action involving neglect of the duty of devotion to duty; it is therefore reasonable to view this as falling under "collective action for a purpose other than public duty" prohibited under Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act.
(3) Next, as to the Second Statement of the Current Situation and the Rally of Condemnation.
(A) ① Examining, in light of the legal principles set forth above, the facts ascertainable from the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted by the court below regarding the Second Statement of the Current Situation, the following is found.
Immediately after the First Statement of the Current Situation was announced, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and the provincial and municipal superintendents of education responded strongly by filing complaints against 88 KTU officials who had led the statement for violation of the State Public Officials Act, and by requesting the provincial and municipal offices of education to discipline the teachers involved.
In response, the Defendants and other officials who had led the First Statement of the Current Situation held the 361st Central Executive Committee meeting and branch meetings on June 28, 2009, and adopted a "Plan for Defending Freedom of Expression and Countering Disciplinary Action Against the KTU Statement of the Current Situation," resolving to engage in various types of struggle activities in opposition to the government's policy of filing complaints and imposing discipline. The main content thereof was as follows: ㉠ Converting KTU headquarters into a struggle headquarters system to organizationally carry out roles such as disseminating the current situation to labor unions, education-related organizations, civic and social organizations, progressive organizations, and religious organizations, and building a joint response posture; ㉡ Holding a press conference on June 29, 2009 in front of the Cheongwoon-Hyoja-dong Community Service Center (formerly the Cheongwoon-dong Office), then moving to Cheong Wa Dae (the Presidential Office) to deliver a letter of protest, and organizing protest statements by allied organizations; ㉢ Holding a National Teachers' Resolution Rally at Seoul Station on July 5, 2009 with the participation of over 3,000 union members; ㉣ Holding emergency temporary branch executive committee meetings at each branch to carry out branch-level struggle activities, with the struggle headquarters conducting a protest sit-in demanding action by the National Human Rights Commission, and the KTU chairperson holding a sit-in at symbolic locations in conjunction with street classrooms, candlelight vigils, etc.; ㉤ Organizing and announcing, from June 29, 2009 to July 15, 2009, a Second Teachers' Statement of the Current Situation (hereinafter the "Second Statement of the Current Situation") with the participation of up to 30,000 or more people, including participants in the First Statement of the Current Situation, demanding the defense of democracy, the guarantee of freedom of expression, and the cessation of the suppression of statements of the current situation; and ㉥ Holding, on July 19, 2009, a joint protest rally with the maximum possible participation of public officials and teachers (later promoted as the "Rally Condemning the Suppression of Teachers' and Public Officials' Statements of the Current Situation," hereinafter the "Rally of Condemnation").
Pursuant to the above resolution, the KTU sent emails to KTU-affiliated teachers on June 30, 2009 requesting their participation in the Second Statement of the Current Situation, and distributed the text of the Second Statement of the Current Situation. The Defendants held meetings of the Daejeon Branch Executive Committee, etc., to deliberate on the matters to be executed pursuant to the above resolution, thereby sharing the significance and direction of promotion of the Second Statement of the Current Situation, notifying Daejeon Branch teachers of the text of the Second Statement of the Current Situation handed down from KTU headquarters, actively inducing them to participate by signing, and transmitting the list of signature participants to KTU headquarters by around July 16, 2009. Meanwhile, in accordance with the resolution to maximize the number of participants in the Rally of Condemnation, the Defendants included such content in the training materials for Daejeon Branch chapter heads and distributed these materials, and posted on the Daejeon Branch's website a poster for the Rally of Condemnation listing civic and social organizations and various opposition parties as co-organizers, thereby encouraging participation in the rally, and actively promoted and executed the matters to be carried out pursuant to the above resolution. On July 19, 2009, at around 14:00, the KTU chairperson and approximately 20 union members read out a press statement at Seoul Plaza containing content stating that "the KTU will continue efforts to confirm the legitimacy of the statement of the current situation and will wage a vigorous struggle to withdraw the complaints and disciplinary actions," and announced the text of the Second Statement of the Current Situation in the name of 28,634 teachers.
Although the text of the Second Statement of the Current Situation does not directly and specifically address the political issues asserted in the First Statement of the Current Situation, it criticizes the government's response measures on the premise of the legitimacy of the First Statement of the Current Situation. In light of this, and considering that the purpose of the officials of KTU headquarters and branches, who resolved upon and carried out various struggle activities including the Second Statement of the Current Situation as described above, was to defend the legitimacy of the First Statement of the Current Situation—which they had promoted imbued with political bias or partisanship—on the premise of its legitimacy, and considering that the text of the Second Statement of the Current Situation also asserts that the government's measures are reminiscent of military dictatorship or constitute an abuse of state power that destroys the basic order of democracy, it is reasonable to view that the officials of KTU headquarters and branches, including the Defendants, also had a clear political purpose and intention with respect to the promotion of the Second Statement of the Current Situation.
Furthermore, since the 361st Central Executive Committee of the KTU resolved to build a joint response posture with labor unions, civic and social organizations, progressive organizations, etc., and to engage in various types of collective struggle activities, and accordingly decided to hold the Rally of Condemnation as a joint rally of public officials and teachers together with the Second Statement of the Current Situation, with the announcement of the Second Statement of the Current Situation and the Rally of Condemnation taking place on the same day, the Second Statement of the Current Situation must be viewed as having been planned and executed in connection with a series of processes, including holding the Rally of Condemnation—whose political bias or partisanship is clear, as discussed below—and participating in the nationwide rally.
Moreover, in light of the period over which it was promoted, the number of teachers who participated in signing it, and the manner of its announcement, the ripple effect and impact of the Second Statement of the Current Situation on society and the educational field cannot be considered smaller than that of the First Statement of the Current Situation or the Rally of Condemnation.
② Comprehensively considering the above various circumstances, the Defendants' act of leading the Second Statement of the Current Situation, in conspiracy with other KTU officials, must, like the act of actively leading the First Statement of the Current Situation and the Rally of Condemnation, be considered as clearly manifesting political bias or partisanship to the extent of creating a direct risk of infringing the political neutrality of teachers who are public officials. This departs from the proper role of a teacher who is a public official, is contrary to the public interest, undermines discipline concerning the duties of a public official or harms the essence of public duty, and thus constitutes neglect of the duty of devotion to duty, falling under "collective action for a purpose other than public duty" prohibited under Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act.
(B) ① Examining, in light of the legal principles set forth above, the facts ascertainable from the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence lawfully adopted by the court below regarding the Rally of Condemnation, the following is found.
As noted above, the Rally of Condemnation was promoted together with the Second Statement of the Current Situation as one of various types of collective acts aimed at defending the First Statement of the Current Situation—which had been promoted imbued with political bias or partisanship—and struggling against the government's response measures thereto. It was held from 16:00 to 17:00 on July 19, 2009, immediately after the announcement of the text of the Second Statement of the Current Situation, at Seoul Station Plaza, with the participation not only of KTU members and members of various public officials' labor unions, but also some opposition party representatives, some lawmakers, and the KCTU chairperson, among others, and was conducted as a preliminary event to the "Second National Rally for the Restoration of Democracy and the Rescue of People's Livelihoods," which was organized and held by opposition parties such as the Democratic Party and the Democratic Labor Party, as well as labor circles and various social organizations that were then taking a critical stance toward government policy.
Moreover, during the Rally of Condemnation, the KTU chairperson delivered a speech stating, "Let us, public officials, teachers, and all citizens combine our strength to judge the current government," and participants wore paper hats or waved picket signs bearing content that strongly criticized government policy, similar to the First Statement of the Current Situation, while chanting slogans together; the content of the assertions and the manner of expression at the Rally of Condemnation far exceeded the level of the First Statement of the Current Situation.
② Comprehensively considering these circumstances, the Defendants' act, in conspiracy with other KTU officials, of promoting and participating in the Rally of Condemnation—in which political forces with clear partisanship, such as organizations that had taken a critical stance toward government policy and opposition parties confronting the government, participated, and in which political assertions and actions, including references to judging the current government, were collectively carried out—must be considered as directly expressing opposition, in connection with that specific political force, to another political force leading opposing major policies, and as clearly manifesting political bias or partisanship to the extent of creating a direct risk of infringing political neutrality.
Accordingly, the Defendants' acts related to the Rally of Condemnation likewise depart from the proper role of a teacher who is a public official, are contrary to the public interest, undermine discipline concerning the duties of a public official or harm the essence of public duty, and thus constitute collective action involving neglect of the duty of devotion to duty, falling under "collective action for a purpose other than public duty" prohibited under Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act.
(4) Accordingly, the court below's determination finding the Defendants guilty on all charges of violation of the State Public Officials Act by collective action in connection with the First Statement of the Current Situation, the Second Statement of the Current Situation, and the Rally of Condemnation is proper, and there is no error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the prohibition of collective action under the State Public Officials Act, as argued in the grounds of appeal. This part of the grounds of appeal is without merit.
2. As to the grounds of appeal regarding Defendant 1's violation of the Act on Assembly and Demonstration (집회 및 시위에 관한 법률)
A. As to hosting an unreported outdoor assembly
(1) An "assembly" subject to protection and regulation under the Act on Assembly and Demonstration (hereinafter the "Assembly and Demonstration Act") means "a temporary gathering of a specific or unspecified plurality of persons at a certain place for the purpose of forming a joint opinion and expressing it to the outside world" (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do1649, decided July 9, 2009, etc.), and Article 2, Item 3 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act defines the "host" of an assembly as "a person or organization that holds an assembly or demonstration in its own name and under its own responsibility."
Joint principal offenders under Article 30 of the Criminal Act (형법) refers to two or more persons jointly committing a crime, and joint principal offense is established where there is both the subjective element of intent to jointly participate and the objective element of the actual commission of the crime through functional control of the act based on joint intent (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Do4792, decided November 9, 2001, etc.).
Accordingly, the "host" of a demonstration requiring advance reporting under Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act means a person who advocates for and holds, or leads, the demonstration, or a person who plans, organizes, and puts the demonstration into execution; and a person who conspires to carry out an unreported outdoor assembly or demonstration through intent to jointly participate and functional control of the act based on joint intent cannot escape liability as a co-principal by conspiracy for the act of hosting an unreported outdoor assembly or demonstration by another co-offender, even if that person did not directly participate in the specific act of execution (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do2821, decided September 29, 2011, etc.).
(2) Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles, the court below's determination—for the reasons stated in its judgment—that the assembly held on June 29, 2009 (hereinafter "the assembly in this case") constitutes an outdoor assembly subject to the reporting obligation under the Assembly and Demonstration Act, and that Defendant 1, in conspiracy with participants in the KTU's 361st Central Executive Committee, hosted the assembly by sharing in the acts of execution, and its determination finding Defendant 1 guilty of violating the Assembly and Demonstration Act by hosting an unreported outdoor assembly, are proper, and there is no error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the meaning of an "assembly" or the "host" of an assembly under the Assembly and Demonstration Act, as argued in the grounds of appeal. This part of the grounds of appeal is without merit.
B. As to failure to comply with a dispersal order
(1) The Assembly and Demonstration Act, in Article 6, Paragraph 1, Article 20, Paragraph 1, Item 2, Paragraph 2, and Article 24, Item 5, imposes a reporting obligation on a person intending to host an outdoor assembly or demonstration, requiring such person to submit a report containing certain matters to the chief of the competent police station between 720 hours and 48 hours before commencing the outdoor assembly or demonstration, while providing that, for an outdoor assembly or demonstration for which such report has not been made, the chief of the competent police agency may, following certain procedures, order its dispersal, and that participants who fail to disperse without delay despite receiving such a dispersal order shall be punished.
The purpose of the Assembly and Demonstration Act in establishing such a prior reporting system for outdoor assemblies and demonstrations is to ascertain in advance the nature and scale, etc., of an outdoor assembly or demonstration through the report, thereby protecting lawful outdoor assemblies or demonstrations while also preventing in advance any risk to public peace and order arising therefrom, and preparing measures to jointly maintain public peace and order (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Do3974, decided October 23, 2008, etc.).
However, as noted above, Article 21, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, including demonstrations, as a fundamental right. This freedom of assembly is a fundamental right whereby individuals may freely and collectively express their opinions and assertions without intervention or coercion by state power, and is an element of individual personal development as well as an essential component of a representative, free, democratic state. Accordingly, just as Article 21, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution declares that "no permit shall be recognized for assemblies," a permit requirement for assemblies cannot be permitted under any circumstances, and restrictions on freedom of assembly can likewise only be justified where truly necessary for the protection of other important legal interests. In particular, the dispersal of an assembly should, in principle, be permitted only where there exists a clear and direct danger to the legal interests of others or to public peace and order (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do13846, decided October 13, 2011; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2000Hun-Ba67, decided October 30, 2003, etc.).
Comprehensively considering the constitutional value and function of freedom of assembly, the constitutional spirit declaring the prohibition of permits for assemblies, and the purpose of the reporting system discussed above, the significance of the reporting requirement lies in providing administrative agencies with specific information regarding the assembly so as to cooperate in maintaining public order, and it must not be transformed into an application seeking permission for the assembly. Therefore, the mere fact that a report was not made cannot lead to the conclusion that the outdoor assembly or demonstration falls outside the scope of constitutional protection and is thus impermissible to hold.
Accordingly, even though Article 20, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act makes an unreported outdoor assembly or demonstration subject to a dispersal order without separately prescribing additional requirements for dispersal, a dispersal order may be issued under this provision only where the outdoor assembly or demonstration has caused a clear and direct danger to the legal interests of others or to public peace and order, and punishment under Article 24, Item 5 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act may be imposed only for failure to comply with a dispersal order that meets such requirements. If, contrary to this, it were interpreted that an outdoor assembly or demonstration could be dispersed merely on the ground that it was unreported, this would in effect operate the prior reporting system for assemblies as if it were a permit system, thereby infringing freedom of assembly, and would therefore be improper. Even if Article 20, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act is interpreted restrictively as set forth above, the normative force of the prior reporting system can be sufficiently secured merely by punishing, under Article 22, Paragraph 2 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act, the host of an outdoor assembly or demonstration who fails to fulfill the reporting obligation.
(2) In light of the above legal principles, the portion of the court below's reasoning holding that a dispersal order could be issued merely on the ground that the assembly in this case was an unreported outdoor assembly cannot be deemed proper.
However, according to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts are found: approximately 20 KTU officials, including Defendant 1, held the assembly in this case without a report, in front of the Cheongwoon-Hyoja-dong Community Service Center in Jongno-gu, Seoul, at around 14:05 on June 29, 2009, in order to protest the education authorities' action of filing complaints against teachers who had participated in the First Statement of the Current Situation; under Article 11, Item 2 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act, outdoor assemblies and demonstrations are prohibited without exception within 100 meters of the boundary of Cheong Wa Dae, and the site of the assembly in this case, the Cheongwoon-Hyoja-dong Community Service Center, is not far from Cheong Wa Dae; the participants in the assembly in this case, holding picket signs and chanting slogans using microphones and speakers, attempted, under the pretext of delivering a letter of protest, to break through the police officers deployed at the assembly site and proceed toward Cheong Wa Dae, an absolutely prohibited assembly location; the head of the security section of the Jongno Police Station, having been delegated the authority of the chief of the Jongno Police Station, blocked the march, whereupon the assembly participants occupied the sidewalk and staged a sit-in protest; and the said head of the security section, having followed the procedures prescribed by the Assembly and Demonstration Act, ordered dispersal.
In light of the circumstances of the holding and location of the assembly in this case as described above, the actual course of the assembly's progress, and in particular the fact that the assembly participants, having failed in their attempt to extend the assembly location to a place where outdoor assembly or demonstration was prohibited, occupied the sidewalk instead, it can be found that the assembly in this case caused a clear and direct danger to public peace and order. Accordingly, Defendant 1's act of failing to comply with the dispersal order constitutes a violation of Article 24, Item 5 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act.
(3) Therefore, although there is a partially improper aspect to the court below's reasoning on this point, its conclusion—finding the dispersal order in this case lawful and finding Defendant 1, who failed to comply with it, guilty—is proper, and there is no error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning dispersal orders under the Assembly and Demonstration Act that affected the judgment, as argued in the grounds of appeal. This part of the grounds of appeal is also without merit.
3. Conclusion
Accordingly, all appeals are dismissed, and judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order. This judgment reflects the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating, except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Park Il-hwan, Justice Jeon Su-an, Justice Lee In-bok, Justice Lee Sang-hoon, and Justice Park Bo-young regarding the portion concerning violation of the State Public Officials Act in connection with the Defendants' First and Second Statements of the Current Situation, the dissenting opinion of Justice Shin Young-cheol regarding the portion concerning violation of the State Public Officials Act in connection with the Defendants' Second Statement of the Current Situation, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Jeon Su-an regarding the portion concerning violation of the Assembly and Demonstration Act by Defendant 1's failure to comply with the dispersal order.
4. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Park Il-hwan, Justice Jeon Su-an, Justice Lee In-bok, Justice Lee Sang-hoon, and Justice Park Bo-young Regarding the Portion Concerning Violation of the State Public Officials Act in Connection with the Defendants' First and Second Statements of the Current Situation
The majority opinion views even the Defendants' acts of involvement in the First and Second Statements of the Current Situation as violations of the State Public Officials Act, but this is incorrect.
A. Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act provides that "public officials shall not engage in labor movements or other collective action for purposes other than public duty." As the majority opinion points out, this provision stipulates one of the duties arising from the special status of being a public official, because collective action by public officials has the potential to hinder the pursuit of the interests of the entire people by representing the interests of the group of public officials.
Here, "collective action for a purpose other than public duty" does not mean all collective action taken by public officials for any purpose other than public duty; rather, the Supreme Court has already clearly held that this must be given a restrictive interpretation, considering comprehensively Article 21, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association, constitutional principles, the purpose of the State Public Officials Act, and the duty of good faith and duty of devotion to duty under the State Public Officials Act, as meaning "collective action for a purpose contrary to the public interest that has effects such as neglect of the duty of devotion to duty."
B. The gist of the portion of the charged facts in this case concerning violation of the State Public Officials Act in connection with the statements of the current situation is that "the Defendants, in conspiracy with KTU officials and teachers supporting the statements of the current situation, etc., were involved in the First and Second Statements of the Current Situation, including by leading a signature campaign among union members of the KTU Daejeon Branch." The following facts are lawfully found by the court below or are ascertainable from the record in connection with the First and Second Statements of the Current Situation: (1) The overall content of the text of the First Statement of the Current Situation denounced the exercise of investigative power in a specific matter as an abuse of state power, criticized major policies then being pursued by the government, and urged reform of state affairs. Its concluding expression was that "we strongly urge the current government to completely overhaul state administration and restore the trust of the people." (2) The overall content of the text of the Second Statement of the Current Situation criticized the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology's disciplinary policy in connection with the First Statement of the Current Situation as an unconstitutional abuse of state power, demanded its withdrawal, and asserted the legitimacy of the statement of the current situation. It also demanded that teachers be guaranteed freedom of expression and that the government communicate with the people. It did not contain political assertions. (3) The First and Second Statements of the Current Situation were carried out by the following method: KTU headquarters drafted the text of the statement and sent it to the branches; the branches sent the text of the statement and signature forms to the chapters; thereafter, KTU headquarters compiled the list of teachers who had signed the text of the statement, and then announced the text of the statement and posted the text and the list of signatories on its website. (4) Around the time of the First and Second Statements of the Current Situation, numerous statements of the current situation were announced across various sectors of society nationwide, beginning with the statement issued on May 28, 2009 in the names of 100 members of society demanding an apology from the government.
C. The Defendants' acts of involvement in the First and Second Statements of the Current Situation cannot be deemed to violate Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act as discussed above. The reasons are as follows.
(1) For an act to violate Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act, it must first be "an act for a purpose contrary to the public interest." Here, the meaning of "contrary to the public interest" is comprehensive, abstract, and relative, such that its content is difficult to objectively ascertain through the ordinary interpretation of the law enforcement agency; accordingly, in order to avoid conflicting with the principle of clarity under the principle of legality in criminal matters and to harmonize with the freedom of expression guaranteed under the Constitution, it must be given a restrictive interpretation, and the purpose of Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act as discussed above can serve as a standard for such restrictive interpretation. Ultimately, the existence of a "purpose contrary to the public interest" should be recognized only where, in a case in which the interests of the entire people and the interests of the group of public officials conflict, the collective action at issue represents the interests of the group of public officials in a manner that hinders the pursuit of the interests of the entire people, thereby significantly undermining the people's trust in the performance of public duties, or infringing the essence of the democratic and professional public official system.
(2) First, ① the contents of the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation (시국선언) have already been examined above; ② looking at the motives or purposes behind the Defendants' involvement therein, as clearly shown in the facts charged, the 1st Statement on the Current Situation came about because the Defendants became involved after the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union (전교조) resolved to issue a statement criticizing the current government's policies and demanding reform of state affairs, while the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation was intended to protest the disciplinary action taken against teachers who had participated in the 1st Statement and to assert freedom of expression; ③ the circumstances leading to these statements arose in a context where similar statements on the current situation were being issued by various sectors of society; and ④ the situation that unfolded amounted to nothing more than publicizing the statement, compiling the list of teachers who signed it, and announcing and posting it together with the statement.
Synthesizing these various circumstances, the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation, made in the course of similar statements being issued, were nothing more nor less than an expression of criticism of or opposition to the government's policies or conduct of state affairs on specific issues, coupled with a demand for improvement, or a demand that freedom of expression related thereto be guaranteed. Such a demand is, in itself, nothing but the exercise of freedom of expression, a fundamental right guaranteed to every citizen under the Constitution, and it is common knowledge that such freedom of expression constitutes a fundamental premise of the free democratic basic order pursued by the Constitution. Accordingly, this cannot be viewed as representing the interests of the group comprising "teachers belonging to the KTU or teachers who joined in the Statement on the Current Situation" as the subjects of the statement, nor can representing such interests be considered an obstacle to the pursuit of the interests of the entire citizenry; and in light of the social conditions at the time the statements were issued and the level of civic awareness of our people, it cannot be said that this significantly undermined public trust in the performance of official duties or infringed upon the essence of the democratic and professional civil service system. In other words, the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation cannot, by any measure, be regarded as acts done for a purpose contrary to the public interest. In this respect, they differ from the act of participating in the condemnation rally after the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation.
(3) It appears that the majority opinion judges the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation to be "acts for a purpose contrary to the public interest," primarily on the ground that they constituted a collective expression of political views in violation of the duty of political neutrality of public officials. However, the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation were merely an expression of opposition to or criticism of specific government policies or the exercise of particular public authority, and a demand for improvement thereof, rather than opposition to any specific political group or faction; therefore, even if they happen to coincide in view with certain political groups or forces, absent special circumstances showing that they were made for the purpose of condemning or supporting a specific political group, it should not readily be concluded that they violated the public official's duty of political neutrality (moreover, the record shows that, prior to the 1st Statement on the Current Situation, the KTU obtained legal advice to ensure that the statement would be made within lawful bounds, and revised the draft of the statement accordingly). The State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법), apart from Article 66, Paragraph 1, separately prohibits "political campaigning" or "political activity" by public officials in Article 65, and provides for punishment of violations thereof in Article 84; the fact that the prosecutor did not indict the Defendants' involvement in the Statement on the Current Situation as such "political campaigning" or "political activity" is itself not without significance.
Considering that the State Public Officials Act separately prohibits and punishes "political campaigning" or "political activity" by public officials in this manner; further, that "political activity" by "teachers' labor unions" is separately prohibited under Article 3 of the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Teachers' Labor Unions (교원의 노동조합 설립 및 운영 등에 관한 법률) (for reference, that Act contains no penal provision for violations thereof); and that university professors, who are likewise educational public officials, are legally permitted to engage in various political activities—even if the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation could be assessed as acts contrary to the public official's duty of political neutrality, that alone should not be regarded as immediately constituting "an act for a purpose contrary to the public interest" prohibited under Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act. If it were otherwise, the result would be an unjust expansion, under Article 66 of the State Public Officials Act, of the "political campaigning" or "political activity" enumerated as prohibited under Article 65 of that Act.
(4) As such, the concept of "an act for a purpose contrary to the public interest" is subject to inherent limitations arising from the purpose of Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act; moreover, unless such an act also satisfies the separate requirement of being "a collective act that brings about an effect such as neglect of the duty of devotion to one's duties," it cannot be deemed an act prohibited under Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act.
However, the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation amounted to nothing more than sending the statement drafted at KTU headquarters to its branches and chapters, compiling the list of teachers who signed it, and then announcing and posting it; this was done outside the educational field and had nothing to do with the curriculum, being directed at the general public, and although the signature campaign to encourage teachers' participation was conducted among teachers working at schools, there is no evidence of any conflict arising in that process. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation infringed upon students' right to receive instruction or caused any disruption to educational administration such as teachers' performance of their duties (nor can any concern of abstract infringement or disruption be found, let alone actual infringement or disruption).
Furthermore, although the Minister of Education, Science and Technology requested restraint from participating in the Statement on the Current Situation before the 1st Statement was issued, and the Defendants did not comply with this request, since, as noted above, there is no unlawful element in the 1st Statement on the Current Situation, it cannot be found that the Defendants neglected their duty of devotion to their duties merely because they did not comply with such a request.
In conclusion, for whatever reason, the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation cannot be viewed as acts that bring about an effect such as neglect of public officials' duty of devotion to their duties, and in this respect too, they are clearly distinguishable from the act of participating in the condemnation rally after the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation.
라. As noted above, the Defendants' acts of involvement in the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation fall within the scope of protection afforded by freedom of expression, a fundamental right indispensable to the existence and development of a democratic state.
In representative democracy, in order for the will of the state formed through representative institutions to genuinely reflect the will of the people, it is very important to form a public forum in which citizens can freely express their political opinions and thereby discuss national policy. Such a public forum must be a voluntary space in which citizens, regardless of their respective circumstances, interests, status, or social position, can freely participate and resolve public discourse through dialogue and communication. If such a space fails to be activated, forcing reliance solely on institutionalized media, it will be difficult for representative democracy to function properly.
The 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation were an expression by teachers of their critical opinions at a time when critical public opinion had formed regarding the government's major policies and conduct of state affairs; the purpose they pursued was to demand that the government respect public opinion and reflect it in policy, and this is precisely the kind of assertion and act that a democratic state should properly accept into its public forum. Nevertheless, it would be utterly unjust to exclude this from the constitutional scope of protection for freedom of expression merely because the subjects making the expression were a group of teachers who are public officials (and in this case, not all of the Defendants were even public officials), and merely because, insofar as it concerns public discourse, it inevitably has a somewhat "political" character, by pointing to that inevitable character.
마. In sum, the Defendants' acts of involvement in the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation do not constitute "an act for a purpose contrary to the public interest" that would make them a collective act prohibited under Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act, nor are they "a collective act bringing about an effect such as neglect of the duty of devotion to one's duties"; therefore, they do not fall within "collective action for purposes other than official duties" prohibited under that provision.
The court below erred in judging that even the Defendants' acts of involvement in the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation violated Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act, thereby committing an error of law in misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the meaning of "collective action for purposes other than official duties" under that provision of the State Public Officials Act. Accordingly, the judgment below, which found all of the charges in this case guilty, should be reversed in its entirety.
This is set forth as a dissenting opinion.
5. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Shin Young-cheol on the Portion Concerning Violation of the State Public Officials Act Related to the Defendants' 2nd Statement on the Current Situation
I concur with the majority opinion regarding the violation of the State Public Officials Act related to the Defendants' 1st Statement on the Current Situation, but I dissent from the majority opinion regarding the violation of the State Public Officials Act related to the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation.
가. As pointed out in the majority opinion, the 1st Statement on the Current Situation was clearly motivated by considerably political concerns, the timing of the statement was directly linked to the political situation, and the content of the statement undermined the political neutrality that public officials and teachers must observe. In particular, in light of the purpose of the Political Parties Act (정당법) and the Public Official Election Act (공직선거법), which impose a stricter duty of political neutrality on teachers at elementary, middle, and high schools than on university faculty, although the Defendants' acts were limited to the expression of collecting collective signatures for the statement and announcing it, I find that their leading involvement in mobilizing participants for the statement constitutes collective action for purposes other than official duties, which is prohibited by the State Public Officials Act.
나. However, in many respects—including the course of events leading to it and its content—the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation cannot be said to have exceeded the bounds of expression permissible for educational public officials, or to constitute collective action for purposes other than official duties in violation of the duty of political neutrality.
The 2nd Statement on the Current Situation was not planned and carried out together with the 1st Statement on the Current Situation as a single series of acts from the outset, but was separately pursued after the 1st Statement, in protest against the government's hardline policy of filing complaints against and imposing heavy disciplinary sanctions on the KTU officials who had led the 1st Statement. In light of these circumstances, although the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation was made as a follow-up procedure to the 1st Statement and premised on the legitimacy of the 1st Statement, its primary motive or purpose was, after all, to demand the withdrawal of criminal complaints or disciplinary measures against the teachers, and it is difficult to find that it had any political intent or purpose similar to that of the 1st Statement on the Current Situation.
Looking at the content of the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation, it consists, in essence, entirely of criticism of the government's hardline response and educational policy in general, and a demand that teachers' freedom of expression be guaranteed. Although the statement contains a portion criticizing the government's response by comparing it to the military dictatorship era of the past, this is merely a rhetorical exaggeration, and is insufficient to conclude that the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation expressed a one-sided and biased political view in the same manner as the 1st Statement on the Current Situation.
The majority opinion views the case where officials of the KTU headquarters and branches, such as the Defendants, who were actively involved in the 1st Statement on the Current Situation, were also involved in the 2nd Statement, as having pursued the acts related to the 2nd Statement with the same political intent or purpose revealed in the acts related to the 1st Statement. However, as discussed above, since the motives or background of the 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation, and the content and purport of each statement, differ, the legal assessment of the two should also differ.
다. The majority opinion also focuses on the fact that the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation was resolved together with the condemnation rally at the 361st Central Executive Committee meeting of the KTU, and thereby judges that the 2nd Statement should be viewed as having been planned and carried out in connection with a series of processes including participation in the condemnation rally and the national people's rally, which clearly bore political bias or partisanship, and therefore that the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation also carries political bias or partisanship.
However, although both the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation and the condemnation rally were planned and pursued in response to the government's hardline measures against the 1st Statement on the Current Situation, the subjects who led them and the course of their progression differ, and the content asserted therein is also qualitatively different; therefore, the two should not be assessed identically merely because they were resolved on the same occasion. That is, the legal assessment should differ between an act in which teachers, who are public officials, independently and autonomously announce their opinion in the form of a statement on the current situation in order to express their demand for withdrawal of disciplinary action, and an act of participating in an actual rally in connection with a specific political force to directly express opposition to and condemnation of the government.
Meanwhile, looking at the content of the charged facts, it appears that the prosecution indicted the Defendants' acts related to the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation and their participation in the condemnation rally as a single crime; however, the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation is not merely a premised fact or preparatory act for the participation in the condemnation rally, but itself constitutes a significant part of the single crime. Accordingly, even if a guilty verdict is rendered as to the act of participating in the condemnation rally, which is another act constituting the single crime, this portion should be reversed if the charged facts related to the acts concerning the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation cannot be found guilty.
라. In conclusion, the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation should properly be regarded as an ordinary-level expression of opinion demanding the withdrawal of criminal complaints or disciplinary measures against teachers who participated in the government's 1st Statement on the Current Situation; therefore, it is difficult to view the Defendants' acts related to the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation as collective action bringing about an effect such as neglect of the duty of devotion to one's duties for a purpose contrary to the public interest, which is prohibited under the State Public Officials Act as "collective action for purposes other than official duties."
That being so, among the charges of violation of the State Public Officials Act against the Defendants in this case, the portions concerning the 1st Statement on the Current Situation and the condemnation rally should be found guilty, but the portion concerning the 2nd Statement on the Current Situation should be found not guilty; nevertheless, the judgment below, which found all of these guilty, committed an error of law affecting the judgment by misunderstanding the legal principles concerning collective action under Article 66, Paragraph 1 of the State Public Officials Act. Accordingly, the judgment below, which recognized the violations of the State Public Officials Act related to the Defendants' 1st and 2nd Statements on the Current Situation and the condemnation rally as concurrent crimes or a single crime and imposed a single sentence, must be reversed in its entirety.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion.
6. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Jeon Soo-ahn on the Portion Concerning Defendant 1's Violation of the Assembly and Demonstration Act (집회 및 시위에 관한 법률, hereinafter "집시법") by Failure to Comply with a Dispersal Order
The majority opinion's restrictive interpretation of Article 20, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act, which allows a dispersal order to be issued for an unreported outdoor assembly or demonstration, to the effect that a dispersal order may be issued only where the outdoor assembly or demonstration has clearly and directly caused a danger to the legal interests of others or to public peace and order, is proper, in accordance with prior Supreme Court precedent and the views of the Constitutional Court. However, it is difficult to understand why the majority opinion, while premising its reasoning on such legal principles, nevertheless finds that the assembly in this case gave rise to a direct and clear danger to the legal interests of others or to public peace and order, for the following reasons.
가. Freedom of assembly is the freedom to be together with others and to express opinions collectively; it prevents individuals from being isolated from others and the social community by state power, while also enabling citizens to influence the formation of public opinion by collectively expressing their opinions and views, and thus, together with freedom of expression, is an indispensable element for maintaining the constitutional order. Freedom of assembly also functions to ensure that the rights, interests, and views of minority groups are reflected in state affairs by providing minorities with the opportunity and means for collective expression of opinion in a society governed by the principle of majority rule.
However, since this freedom of assembly presupposes the use of outdoor places or roads, harmonization with other legal interests is necessary, and for this purpose prior reporting is required; but such reporting is tolerated only as the imposition of a duty of cooperation intended to enable administrative agencies, such as the police, to coordinate conflicts between multiple assemblies and to prepare measures necessary for maintaining public peace and order, so that the assembly may proceed peacefully or freedom of assembly may be fully realized; the framework of the current statutory scheme is such that assemblies and demonstrations are, as a general and fundamental matter, guaranteed (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Full Bench Decision 2007Hun-Ba22, decided May 28, 2009). Accordingly, even in the case of an unreported assembly, in light of the purpose of the reporting requirement, freedom of assembly should be guaranteed unless the assembly is one that cannot be permitted, and it should not be restricted beyond that scope merely on the ground that there was no prior report.
Also to be considered in the specific application of the law is the fact that the duty to report an assembly is imposed on the organizer of the assembly, and sanctions for failure to comply with that duty likewise fall upon the organizer, whereas dispersal of an assembly seriously restricts freedom of assembly by requiring all persons participating in the assembly to comply with the dispersal order. This is because dispersal of an assembly is tantamount to prohibiting the assembly itself, and prohibition of an assembly constitutes a final and complete restriction on freedom of assembly.
That being so, while a dispersal order for an unreported assembly should, as set forth in the majority opinion, be permitted only where a direct, clear, and present concrete danger to the legal interests of others or to public peace and order arises from the assembly, it is above all important that this standard be strictly applied in individual cases where the legality of a dispersal order for such an unreported assembly is at issue, and it should not be applied in such a way that mere probability of danger arising is treated as satisfying the above standard.
나. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the judgment of the first instance, the following facts may be found: this assembly was held to protest the government's action of filing complaints against teachers who participated in the 1st Statement on the Current Situation, with only about 20 participants; the assembly participants shouted slogans using microphones and speakers and attempted to proceed toward Cheong Wa Dae on the pretext of delivering a letter of protest, but exercised no violence or physical force; their assembly did not leave the sidewalk or obstruct vehicular traffic; only after the chief of the security section of Jongno Police Station requested dispersal and blocked their march did the assembly participants sit down on the sidewalk in protest, but they did not actively exercise physical force against the police, and the sit-in protest did not cause any disruption to traffic; and of the approximately 50 minutes during which the assembly took place, the time spent attempting to proceed toward Cheong Wa Dae and passively resisting the police who blocked them by sitting on the road was only about 15 minutes.
In light of these facts, although this assembly was an unreported assembly, it cannot be regarded, in its scale or content, as an assembly incapable of maintaining order; in fact, the assembly proceeded in a peaceful atmosphere until the police blocked the participants' march toward Cheong Wa Dae, and the participants' response to the police's obstruction was limited to passive resistance and clearly did not, in that process, cause disruption to order such as traffic disruption; accordingly, it cannot be said that this assembly gave rise to a direct danger to the legal interests of others or to public peace and order, or that such danger clearly existed.
다. It appears that the majority opinion places weight on the fact that this assembly was held not far from Cheong Wa Dae, a place where outdoor assemblies and demonstrations are prohibited, and that the assembly participants attempted to proceed toward Cheong Wa Dae, in assessing that this assembly satisfied the requirement of danger to the legal interests of others or to public peace and order.
However, the right to select and determine the place of assembly, together with the right to determine for oneself the time, method, and purpose of the assembly, is the essential element of the conduct guaranteed as freedom of assembly and demonstration, and among these, the choice of assembly location is closely related to the opinion sought to be expressed through the assembly and the intended recipient of that expression, and is determined with the intention of effectively achieving the purpose of the assembly; it is thus difficult to speak of freedom of assembly without freedom to choose the location.
However, although Article 11 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act prohibits assemblies and demonstrations at specific locations, such as "a place within 100 meters of the boundary of the Presidential Residence," this is a restrictive provision that is tolerated to that extent because the probability of causing a conflict with, or leading to infringement of, other important legal interests such as the smooth performance of official duties and the guarantee of physical safety at such locations is generally overwhelmingly high (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Full Bench Decision 2000Hun-Ba67, decided October 30, 2003); accordingly, a uniform and blanket prohibition of assembly in circumstances where the presumed danger of infringement of such legal interests is not highly, or at least considerably, likely cannot be recognized as legitimate regulation based on the above provision.
The circumstances cited by the majority opinion—namely, that Cheongwoon-Hyoja-dong Community Center, the location of this assembly, is not very far from Cheong Wa Dae, or that the participants attempted to proceed toward the vicinity of the prohibited location—alone cannot establish that a direct and clear danger arose to important legal interests such as the performance of official duties or the guarantee of safety at a specific location; and to disperse in advance, and thereby completely prohibit, an assembly or demonstration held not at the location prohibited under the Assembly and Demonstration Act—i.e., "a place within 100 meters of Cheong Wa Dae"—but at a place merely close thereto, based solely on concern regarding the variability or unpredictability inherent in the general nature of assemblies, without any such danger having actually arisen under the specific circumstances, cannot be tolerated by any measure.
In the end, the majority opinion is improper in that, contrary to the legal principle it professes, it relaxes and applies the standard so that a dispersal order may be issued based on mere probability of danger arising. The legal principle declared by the Supreme Court has meaning only when it is actually applied as the standard for resolving disputes in specific cases. If the dispersal order for this assembly is deemed lawful as in the majority opinion, this is, in the end, no different from applying the legal principle that a dispersal order may be issued for an unreported assembly based on mere probability of danger arising, and thereby the legal principle set forth by the majority opinion inevitably loses its meaning.
Moreover, since the court below did not regard whether a direct and clear danger to the legal interests of others or to public peace and order had actually arisen as a requirement for a dispersal order, it consequently did not properly examine whether this assembly actually fell into such a case. In such a case, as a matter of principle, the Supreme Court should point out that the court below's interpretation of the law was erroneous and remand the case so that the court below, as the fact-finding court, may examine the facts; it is difficult to understand why the majority opinion, instead, examines the facts relevant thereto itself and seeks to maintain the conclusion of dismissal of the appeal.
라. In sum, since the dispersal order issued by the competent police chief to the participants in this assembly, including Defendant 1, merely on the ground that it was an unreported assembly, did not satisfy the requirements therefor, it cannot be considered lawful; therefore, even though Defendant 1 did not comply with it, he cannot be punished under Article 24, Item 5 of the Assembly and Demonstration Act. Contrary to this, the judgment below, which found the dispersal order for this assembly lawful merely on the ground that it was an unreported assembly and found this portion of the charged facts guilty, committed an error of law in misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the requirements for an unreported assembly and a dispersal order under the Assembly and Demonstration Act, thereby erring in both its interpretation and application. The judgment below should be reversed on this point as well.
For the foregoing reasons, I am unable to concur with the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice), Justices Park Il-hwan, Kim Neung-hwan, Jeon Soo-ahn, Ahn Dae-hee, Yang Chang-soo, Shin Young-cheol, Min Il-young, Lee In-bok, Lee Sang-hoon, Park Byung-dae, Kim Yong-deok (Justice in Charge), Park Bo-young