[원고, 상고인] Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd. (현대건설 주식회사), Litigation Representatives: Attorney Lee Jae-hu and 3 others
[피고, 피상고인] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission (중앙노동위원회위원장)
[피고보조참가인] Intervenor Assisting the Defendant
[원심판결] Seoul High Court Judgment 1992.4.23., Case No. 91Gu7301
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed.
The case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
1. Judgment on Ground of Appeal No. 1 by the Plaintiff's Litigation Representatives
The so-called "transfer between companies" (전적), whereby an employee is moved from the enterprise by which he was employed to another enterprise and made to perform work for that other enterprise, constitutes either a mutual rescission of the employment contract with the previously employed enterprise combined with the conclusion of a new employment contract with the enterprise to which the employee is to be transferred, or an assignment of the employer's status under the employment contract. Therefore, unlike a reassignment or transfer (전근 or 전보), which is a personnel move within the same enterprise, such a transfer between companies, absent special circumstances, becomes effective only with the consent of the employee. This is because the employer's right to use and dispose of the employee's labor for business purposes, which the employer holds as the manager of the enterprise, is acquired only through the employment contract with that employee; apart from that contractual relationship, the employer cannot be regarded as having the authority to unilaterally dispose of the employee's labor. Moreover, in light of the fact that Article 657(1) of the Civil Code (민법), which appears to be a mandatory provision, provides that an employer may not transfer his rights to a third party without the consent of the employee, the consent of the employee must be obtained.
However, the reason why the employee's consent is required as an element of such a transfer is to prevent the disadvantage that the employee might suffer as a result of the change in the entity holding the right to direct the work in the employment relationship. Where affiliated companies of various types of business and industry form a corporate group and conduct economic activities with unity in matters such as capital, composition of executives, working conditions, and business operations, and where personnel exchanges between the affiliated companies within that group have been conducted routinely and customarily and frequently, in the same manner as reassignments or transfers within a single enterprise, then transferring an employee employed by a company within that group to another affiliated company, even though the employer's legal personality formally changes, may in substance be difficult to regard as a change in the entity holding the right to direct the work. Accordingly, it should be held that if the employer has obtained the employee's comprehensive consent in advance (either at the time the employee joined the company or during the course of employment) regarding such transfers within the corporate group, the employer may effectively transfer the employee to another affiliated company without obtaining the employee's consent on each occasion.
However, according to Article 22 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) and Article 7, Item 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the employer is required, at the time of concluding the employment contract, to specify to the employee working conditions such as wages, working hours, place of employment, and the duties to be performed. In light of the purpose of this provision, which is designed to protect employees by taking into account the employee's dependency on a specific enterprise, it should be interpreted that where an employer obtains the employee's comprehensive prior consent regarding transfers within a corporate group, the employer must specify the enterprise to which the employee is to be transferred (this may include multiple enterprises) and must obtain the employee's consent after specifying the basic working conditions, such as the duties to be performed at that enterprise.
Even if, as argued in the grounds of appeal, the Hyundai Group (현대그룹), to which the Plaintiff company belongs, established a General Planning Office to oversee personnel supply and demand at the group level for the purpose of smoothly coordinating personnel supply and demand among affiliated companies and carrying out efficient personnel policies, and recruits employees collectively, then, after completing new employee training, assigns them to each affiliated company in consideration of each affiliated company's personnel needs and the individual's wishes; and even if the Intervenor Assisting the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as the "Intervenor") joined the company after having heard and known about personnel transfers between affiliated companies before being employed by the Plaintiff company; and even if the Plaintiff company has provisions in its employment rules and collective agreement allowing personnel transfers of employees to affiliated companies, such circumstances alone are insufficient to find that the Plaintiff company specified matters concerning the transfer and obtained the Intervenor's comprehensive prior consent thereto.
According to the relevant evidence and the record, the court below's finding and determination—that even though there have been considerable inward and outward transfers of employees between the Plaintiff company, which belongs to the Hyundai Group, and other affiliated companies, this is insufficient to find that such transfers have been established as a customary practice acknowledged as a normative fact by most of the employees belonging to the Plaintiff company—is justified and acceptable, and it cannot be said that the judgment below contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning labor-management practice as argued in the grounds of appeal.
The argument amounts to nothing more than criticizing the court below's selection and evaluation of evidence and its fact-finding, which fall within the exclusive authority of the court below, or attacking the judgment below—based on facts that contradict those found by the court below—for allegedly misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the transfer of employees between affiliated companies under a large-scale corporate group. This argument cannot be accepted.
2. Judgment on Ground of Appeal No. 2
The court below found the following facts: that the Intervenor was employed as a Grade 4 general staff member through the Hyundai Group's general open recruitment on January 7, 1985, and had worked for approximately five years as a member of the in-house magazine team belonging to the Plaintiff company's Integrated Public Relations Office, which handles public relations work for the entire Hyundai Group; that in the personnel action scheduled for around March 1990, the Intervenor was expecting a promotion to assistant manager (대리) upon completing five years of service; that on February 14, 1990, Non-party 1, the head of the Integrated Public Relations Office, in a meeting with the Intervenor, conveyed the Plaintiff company's policy that, as part of a rotational placement plan among in-house magazine staff of affiliated companies aimed at correcting complacent work practices among such staff, Non-party 2, one of the in-house magazine staff of the Plaintiff company, would be exchanged with Non-party 3, an in-house magazine staff member of the affiliated company Hyundai Motor Service Co., Ltd. (현대자동차서비스주식회사), and transferred to that company, while the Intervenor would likewise be exchanged with Non-party 4, an in-house magazine staff member of Kumkang Development Industry Co., Ltd. (금강개발산업 주식회사, hereinafter referred to as "Kumkang Development"), and transferred to Kumkang Development, and requested the Intervenor to comply with this decision; that the Intervenor, citing concerns about his promotion prospects, clearly expressed his refusal and immediately submitted a letter of resignation; that despite the Intervenor's firm refusal to accept the transfer, the Plaintiff company issued the transfer order to Kumkang Development effective the following day, February 15; that around that time, the Intervenor was persuaded by the aforementioned Non-party 1 and Non-party 5, the department head in charge of the in-house magazine at the Integrated Public Relations Office, that the transfer to Kumkang Development would not hinder his promotion to assistant manager and that his duties at Kumkang Development would be the same as at the Plaintiff company, namely, editing the in-house magazine; that on February 15, the Intervenor went to Kumkang Development together with Non-party 5, but upon being told by Non-party 6, the personnel officer at Kumkang Development, that a promotion within the year would be difficult at Kumkang Development, the Intervenor again refused the transfer and immediately returned to the Plaintiff company, reporting for work at the Plaintiff company from the following day; that meanwhile, Kumkang Development, in accordance with the Plaintiff company's request for the Intervenor's transfer, on March 3 issued an appointment for the Intervenor, recognizing his service record at the Plaintiff company, as a Grade 4, Step 23 employee assigned to the Busan Team of the Business Development Office, retroactive to February 15; that the Intervenor, who had been reporting for work at the Plaintiff company, was given no work at all by the Plaintiff company and, being concerned that his refusal of the transfer order might become grounds for disciplinary or other sanctions, reluctantly decided to comply with the transfer order for the time being; that on March 6, the Intervenor completed retirement procedures with the Plaintiff company, including settlement of severance pay, while reporting for work at Kumkang Development and preparing and submitting employment documents such as an employment contract and a written pledge; that the Intervenor, upon later discovering that the department to which he was assigned—the Busan Team of the Business Development Office—was, unlike at the Plaintiff company, in charge of duties related to the opening and operation of department stores, and moreover that the staff of the Busan Team would be required to relocate to Busan after four or five months, protested against the personnel order and did not report for work; that the Intervenor began reporting for work at Kumkang Development from March 12 and worked as a member of the Busan Team of the Business Development Office until around May 11, when he filed an application for relief against the personnel order with the Seoul Metropolitan Regional Labor Relations Commission; and that Kumkang Development, after the Intervenor filed the said application for relief, on June 12 urged the Intervenor to withdraw the application and reassigned him to the in-house magazine editing office, and then on July 20 again issued a transfer order reassigning the Intervenor to the affiliated company Kumkang Planning Co., Ltd. (금강기획 주식회사).
Having found these facts, the court below determined as follows: even though the Intervenor submitted employment documents such as an employment contract and a written pledge to Kumkang Development and worked at Kumkang Development for approximately two months until the filing of the application for relief in this case, in light of the circumstances under which the Intervenor received the transfer order from the Plaintiff company and submitted the aforementioned employment documents to Kumkang Development or worked there, this was merely a temporary means of maintaining the status quo while the Intervenor found it difficult to determine whether the personnel order was lawful and had not yet decided with certainty whether to comply with it; therefore, such circumstances alone are insufficient to find that the Intervenor consented to the transfer order.
However, even according to the facts found by the court below itself, the Intervenor, having decided to comply with the transfer from the Plaintiff company to Kumkang Development, completed the procedure for retirement from the Plaintiff company on March 6, 1990, and prepared and submitted documents to take up employment at Kumkang Development, and thereafter worked normally at Kumkang Development for as long as two months, from March 12 to around May 11. Therefore, absent special circumstances—such as the Intervenor having expressed an intention to reserve his consent to the transfer during that process, or having been threatened that refusal of the transfer would result in disciplinary or other sanctions, thereby being compelled to make the transfer against his will—it accords with logic and the rules of experience to view the Intervenor's aforementioned conduct as having been undertaken on the premise of consent to the transfer. As indicated by the court below, the mere circumstances that the Plaintiff company assigned no work at all to the Intervenor and that the Intervenor was simply concerned that refusing the transfer might become grounds for disciplinary or other sanctions are insufficient to conclude that the Intervenor merely went through the transfer procedures as a temporary means of maintaining the status quo, without consenting to the transfer.
Nevertheless, the court below determined, for the reasons set forth in its judgment, that the Intervenor could not be found to have consented to the transfer order. Therefore, the judgment below contains an error of misinterpreting the intention [of the parties] or violating the rules of evidence and thereby erroneously finding the facts, and it is clear that such error affected the judgment. Accordingly, the argument pointing out this error is well-founded.
3. Therefore, without rendering a judgment on Ground of Appeal No. 3, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, all Justices concurring, and it is so ordered as set forth in the Order.