[Plaintiff, Appellant]
[Defendant, Appellee] Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service (근로복지공단)
[Judgment Below] Gwangju High Court Judgment 2007Nu1674, decided December 4, 2008
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. The court below, comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted, found the following facts: the Plaintiff's wife, the deceased Nonparty 1 (born November 27, 1977; hereinafter "the Deceased"), joined Nonparty 2 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "the Company"), a company manufacturing and assembling electronic products, on May 3, 2006, and worked there; on July 6, 2006, at around 22:00, after finishing overtime work, she boarded the company commuter bus to go home, and at around 22:20, while inside the commuter bus, she suffered a seizure and was transported to a hospital, but was already dead by the time of arrival; the autopsy result presumed the cause of the Deceased's death to be "psychogenic sudden death"; the Company operated on a five-day workweek, with weekday working hours from 08:00 to 16:50, but at the beginning and end of each month, workload typically increased, requiring the factory to operate an additional 4.5 hours per day for several days, and when 4.5 hours of overtime operation occurred on a weekday, work ended at 22:00; after joining the Company, the Deceased was assigned to the parts supply team of the switch assembly department for electronic products, where her duties involved loading approximately 80 kinds of parts onto a hand-cart or carrying them by hand from the materials warehouse to the assembly line; one or two days before the Deceased's death, she mistakenly failed to deliver parts to the necessary location in time, causing the operation line to be halted for three hours, for which she was reprimanded by her supervisor; during the 10 days before the Deceased's death, she did not work overtime for four days from June 26 to June 29, 2006, worked 4.5 hours of overtime on June 30, worked 4 hours of special overtime on Saturday, July 1, took a day off on Sunday, July 2, and then worked 4.5 hours of overtime for four consecutive days from July 3 until the day of her death, July 6; the Deceased was normally of an amicable and lively personality; and the Deceased had been diagnosed with arrhythmia on October 24, 2003, and had taken medication for the arrhythmia, but discontinued taking it after January 10, 2006. Based on these findings, the court below considered that: apart from her arrhythmia, the Deceased was healthy, lively, and active; her arrhythmia was in a state that did not interfere with daily life even after she stopped taking medication from January 10, 2006; her work duties, consisting of loading about 80 kinds of parts onto a hand-cart or carrying them by hand from the materials warehouse to the assembly line, were not of a nature likely to cause mental or physical overwork; although the Deceased worked 4.5 hours of overtime for four consecutive days up to the day of her death, she had rested sufficiently beforehand, having had the previous Sunday off and having worked only 4 hours on Saturday, such that the overtime work alone could not be deemed to have caused chronic physical or mental overwork; and although the Deceased, due to her own work error one or two days before the incident, caused a three-hour production halt and was reprimanded by her supervisor, and her colleagues had to work 4.5 hours of overtime that day to make up for the production shortfall, it was difficult to find, in light of the Deceased's ordinarily amicable personality, that she would have suffered severe mental stress from these circumstances alone. Comprehensively considering the foregoing, the court below determined that it was difficult to view the Deceased as having suffered overwork or excessive stress to the degree of causing psychogenic sudden death, and therefore no proximate causal relationship could be recognized between the Deceased's death and her work, and accordingly held that the Defendant's disposition in this case was lawful.
2. However, the judgment below cannot be upheld as it stands, for the following reasons.
Under Article 4, Subparagraph 1 of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법; before its full amendment by Act No. 8373 of April 11, 2007), "occupational accident" means an injury or illness arising from and caused by an employee's performance of duties in the course of work; accordingly, there must be a causal relationship between the work and the illness that caused the death. However, even if the primary cause of the illness is not directly related to the performance of duties, if at least work-related overwork or stress was superimposed on the primary cause of the illness and thereby induced or aggravated the illness, a causal relationship between them should be recognized. Such causal relationship need not be clearly proven in a medical or scientific manner; even where it may be inferred, in light of all the circumstances, that there is a proximate causal relationship between the work and the illness, such proof shall be deemed to have been established. Moreover, this includes cases where an underlying or pre-existing illness, which would normally permit normal work performance, was rapidly aggravated beyond its natural progression due to excessive workload or other work-related causes. In such cases, whether there is a causal relationship between the work and the illness or death should be determined not on the basis of an ordinary average person, but on the basis of the health and physical condition of the employee in question. Furthermore, where the nature of the overwork is such that it would be difficult for an ordinary person to endure, and it is revealed that the person had an illness or constitutional factor that carried a risk of death, then, absent any special circumstance shown to have been another inducing cause of death apart from the overwork, it accords with empirical and logical rules to presume that the death resulted from work-related overwork and the physical factor (see, e.g., Supreme Court Judgment 98Du16873, decided February 9, 1999; Supreme Court Judgment 2006Du17956, decided February 28, 2008).
In light of the facts lawfully found by the court below and the following circumstances appearing in the record: ① the duties that the Deceased performed at the Company involved sorting approximately 80 kinds of parts, supplying them in a timely manner to the necessary operation lines, and checking for and requesting the supply of parts that were insufficient—work which, given its nature, would likely have been difficult for the Deceased to fully adapt to, having been employed for only a little over two months; ② Cho Chun-hwa, the production team leader and the Deceased's supervisor, stated during the Defendant's industrial accident investigation that the duties assigned to the Deceased could be difficult for a new and inexperienced employee, and that the Deceased was not among the quicker employees in grasping her work compared to others; ③ the Deceased had been solely a homemaker without prior work experience before taking this job, and thus likely experienced greater difficulty adapting to work compared to others with prior work experience; ④ the Deceased worked 4.5 hours of overtime for four consecutive days before her death (amounting to more than 12 hours of work per day), and on the day of her death as well, after finishing overtime work at around 22:00 and boarding the commuter bus to go home, she suffered a seizure inside the bus and died; ⑤ one or two days before her death, the Deceased mistakenly failed to deliver necessary parts in time, causing the operation line to halt for three hours, for which she was reprimanded by her supervisor, and her fellow workers had to work additional overtime as a result—circumstances which, even taking into account the Deceased's ordinarily amicable and lively personality, are likely to have imposed considerable psychological burden and stress on the Deceased, who had only begun working at the Company a little over two months earlier—it may be considered that, in light of the Deceased's health and physical condition, the Deceased suffered overwork due to an excessive workload or experienced stress due to a work-related mistake. Furthermore, it is a medical opinion that overwork and stress can be an inducing cause of psychogenic sudden death, and no special circumstance can be found suggesting any other inducing cause of death apart from overwork or stress. Given these circumstances, even if the Deceased's pre-existing illnesses, arrhythmia and cardiomegaly, were unrelated to her work, it may be inferred that the above overwork and stress aggravated the pre-existing illness beyond its natural rate of progression, causing the Deceased to suffer psychogenic sudden death, or that they were superimposed on the pre-existing illness to cause the psychogenic sudden death.
Therefore, the court below's determination that the Deceased's death does not constitute an occupational accident, for the reasons stated in its judgment, involves a failure to fully examine the evidence and a misapprehension of facts in violation of the rules of evidence, or a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning occupational accidents under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법), which constitutes an unlawfulness that affected the judgment.
3. Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. This Decision is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Lee Hong-hoon (Presiding Justice), Kim Young-ran, Kim Neung-hwan, Cha Han-sung (Justice in Charge)