Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 97누8076

Revocation of Reconsidered Decision on Remedy for Unfair Labor Practice (부당노동행위구제재심판정취소)부당노동행위구제재심판정취소

Decided1998. 05. 22. Court대법원Worker (Union) won
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

This case concerns the War Memorial Service Association's (전쟁기념사업회) refusal to engage in collective bargaining with its labor union, and its chairman's remarks urging the union to dissolve, which the court found to constitute an unfair labor practice (부당노동행위). The court held that the employer's refusal to bargain—based on grounds such as disputing the union president's membership eligibility and claiming insufficient understanding of business affairs—was not justified. It further found that the chairman's speech was an act of domination and interference (지배개입) intended to suppress union activities.

Key takeaways
  • CaseIncident: The War Memorial Service Association refused the labor union's request for collective bargaining, and its chairman made remarks urging the union to dissolve.
  • OutcomeResult: The court ruled that the employer's reasons for refusing bargaining were not justified, and that the chairman's remarks constituted an unfair labor practice aimed at suppressing union activities.
  • LessonLesson: Employers must not refuse collective bargaining without objectively reasonable grounds, nor make statements urging a union's dissolution.
Issues
  • Whether the employer's refusal to engage in collective bargaining was justified
  • Whether the union president's membership eligibility was validly disputed
  • Whether the employer's remarks constituted unlawful domination and interference (지배개입) with union activities
Key reasoning

The Supreme Court found that the employer failed to demonstrate any objectively legitimate reason for refusing collective bargaining (단체교섭 거부). Reasons such as questioning the union president's membership status or claiming inadequate preparation to negotiate did not meet the threshold of a justifiable excuse under labor law. In addition, the court determined that the chairman's public remarks urging dissolution of the union were made with the intent to intimidate and weaken the union's activities. Such conduct was deemed an unlawful act of domination and interference (지배개입) with the organization and operation of the labor union, constituting an unfair labor practice under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] The unfair labor practice provided for in Article 39, Item 3 of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda to Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) (구 노동조합법) is established not only where the employer refuses or neglects collective bargaining without any reason, but also where, even though the employer believed that there was a justifiable reason for refusing collective bargaining or that it had bargained in good faith, it is objectively determined that there was no justifiable reason and that the bargaining was conducted in bad faith. Whether there was a justifiable reason is to be determined according to whether, in light of the union's bargaining representative, the bargaining time, place, and matters demanded by the union, and its bargaining attitude, etc., it is deemed, in light of social norms, difficult to expect the employer to fulfill its duty to bargain collectively.

[2] In a case where the head of the labor union of the War Memorial Service Corporation (전쟁기념사업회) held the position of Level-3 curatorial officer, immediately subordinate to the head of the Curatorial Department, and, while directing his subordinates and conducting the primary evaluation of employees at Level 6 or below under him, the department head, as the secondary evaluator, ultimately held the authority and responsibility for such evaluation, and the union head's direction of subordinates was merely to assist the department head, and the union head had not been delegated authority and responsibility from the War Memorial Service Corporation over the determination of working conditions such as personnel affairs, wages, welfare, and labor management, the court held that the union head did not fall under the category of "employer" or "a person who always acts on behalf of the interests of the employer" as provided in Article 3, proviso, Item 1 of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda to Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) (구 노동조합법), and therefore it could not be deemed justifiable for the Corporation to refuse to respond to the union's demand for collective bargaining on the ground that the union head lacked the qualification to be a union member.

[3] While it is self-evident that an employer has the freedom of speech to express its opinions through speeches, in-house broadcasts, notices, letters, and the like, where, considering the circumstances, place, content, and method in which such expression was made, as well as its effect on the organization or activities of the labor union, an intent to dominate or interfere with the organization or operation of the labor union is recognized, this constitutes an unfair labor practice as provided in Article 39, Item 4 of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda to Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) (구 노동조합법).

[4] In a case where, amid conflict between the War Memorial Service Corporation (전쟁기념사업회) and its labor union arising from the union members having filed a criminal complaint against the Corporation's chairman, among others, on charges of occupational embezzlement, the chairman, at a year-end ceremony, addressing all employees, stated to the effect that, given the nature of the Corporation's organization, a labor union ought never to have come into being; that all of them, including himself, were "workers" (vis-à-vis the Ministry of National Defense, the supervisory authority); that he believed there were limits to union activities given the nature of the Corporation's organization; and that he hoped there would be no continued disputes leading to the situation where resignations would have to be obtained from all employees and the workforce refilled through open recruitment, the court held that such statements constituted an unfair labor practice under Article 39, Item 4 of the former Trade Union Act (repealed by Article 3 of the Addenda to Act No. 5244 of Dec. 31, 1996) (구 노동조합법).

Full text (English, AI translation) 8,807 chars

[Plaintiff, Appellant] Korean War Memorial Foundation (Attorney Kim Kwang-jeong, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 96Gu31842 rendered on April 25, 1997

[Order]

The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

[Reasoning]

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the refusal of collective bargaining

The unfair labor practice prescribed in Article 39, Subparagraph 3 of the former Trade Union Act (Nodongjohapbeop) (before its abolition by Act No. 5244 on December 31, 1996; hereinafter referred to as the "Act") is established not only where the employer refuses or neglects collective bargaining without any reason, but also where, even if the employer believed that there was a justifiable reason for refusing collective bargaining or that it had faithfully engaged in collective bargaining, it is objectively determined that there was no justifiable reason and that the collective bargaining was conducted in bad faith. Meanwhile, whether there is a justifiable reason shall be determined based on whether it is deemed, in light of social norms, difficult to expect the employer to perform its duty of collective bargaining, comprehensively considering the union's bargaining representative, the bargaining time and place requested by the union, the bargaining agenda, and the union's bargaining attitude, among other factors.

The provision of Article 3, Proviso, Subparagraph 1 of the Act prohibits the participation in a trade union of an employer or a person who always acts on behalf of the employer's interests, in order to secure the independence of the trade union. As lawfully found by the court below, Non-party 1, the head of the labor union of the Korean War Memorial Foundation (hereinafter referred to as "the instant union"), was a Grade 3 curatorial officer, one rank below the head of the Curatorial Department, who directed his subordinate staff and conducted the first-level evaluation of staff of Grade 6 or below under him. However, since the department head, as the second-level evaluator, ultimately held the authority and responsibility for such evaluation, and Non-party 1's direction of subordinate staff was merely auxiliary to the department head, and since there is no fact that he was delegated authority and responsibility from the Plaintiff regarding the determination of working conditions such as personnel affairs, wages, welfare, and labor management, Non-party 1 does not fall under an employer or a person who always acts on behalf of the employer's interests as prescribed in Article 3, Proviso, Subparagraph 1 of the Act. Therefore, it cannot be deemed justifiable for the Plaintiff to have refused to comply with the instant union's request for collective bargaining on the ground that Non-party 1 was not qualified to be a union member.

Furthermore, according to the facts established by the court below, in response to the request for collective bargaining made on January 31, 1996 by the National Federation of Professional and Technical Trade Unions, the superior labor organization to which the instant union had delegated bargaining authority, designating February 5 of the same year as the bargaining date, the Plaintiff notified that the bargaining would be postponed to the end of that month on the ground that the newly appointed Secretary-General had not yet fully grasped the affairs of the office, and thereafter, around that time, again refused to bargain on the ground that the instant union had, on its own, adopted a resolution of dissolution on February 23 of the same year. However, said resolution of dissolution was adopted at an extraordinary general meeting held in the afternoon of February 23, during working hours, with the assistance of the Plaintiff's General Affairs Department Head and others who encouraged union members to attend; this meeting followed an earlier extraordinary general meeting convened for February 22 by Non-party 2, the former deputy head of the union who had already withdrawn from the instant union on February 4 of the same year, upon a notice of convocation issued on February 17, which failed for lack of quorum, and a subsequent meeting postponed to the morning of the following day, which likewise failed for lack of quorum. Thereafter, the notification of union dissolution submitted to the head of Yongsan-gu Office on February 27 was returned on March 5 of the same year on the ground that the said extraordinary general meeting had not been lawfully convened. The ground that the Plaintiff's Secretary-General had not yet fully grasped the affairs of the office is merely an internal matter of the Plaintiff and cannot be deemed, in light of social norms, a reason making it difficult to conduct collective bargaining; and since the resolution of dissolution of the union was adopted at an extraordinary general meeting convened by a person lacking the legitimate authority to convene it, and is therefore void, it likewise cannot be deemed justifiable for the Plaintiff to have refused collective bargaining on the ground that the union had been dissolved.

Therefore, since all of the above grounds asserted by the Plaintiff lacked objective justification, the series of acts by the Plaintiff refusing or delaying collective bargaining, continuing from the time of the instant union's initial request for collective bargaining, constitute an unfair labor practice as prescribed in Article 39, Subparagraph 3 of the Act. The judgment of the court below to the same effect is correct, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning unfair labor practices as alleged in the grounds of appeal. Therefore, the allegation in the grounds of appeal on this point cannot be accepted.

2. As to the point of domination or interference

While it is self-evident that an employer has the freedom of speech to express opinions through speeches, in-house broadcasts, posted notices, letters, and the like, where, comprehensively considering the circumstances, place, content, and method in which such expression was made, as well as its effect on the organization or activities of the trade union, an intent to dominate or interfere with the organization or operation of the trade union is recognized, an unfair labor practice as prescribed in Article 39, Subparagraph 4 of the Act is established (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu636 delivered on December 10, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 94Nu3001 delivered on December 23, 1994, etc.).

According to the record, it can be seen that on December 5, 1995, the members of the instant union jointly filed a criminal complaint with the investigative authorities against Non-party 3, the Chairman and representative of the Plaintiff, and others, on charges of occupational embezzlement, thereby escalating the conflict between the Plaintiff and the instant union into a criminal matter. Under these circumstances, as lawfully found by the court below, Non-party 3, at the year-end ceremony on December 29, 1995, addressing all employees, stated to the effect that a trade union, which should never have come into existence given the nature of the Plaintiff's organization, had been formed; that all of them, including himself, were "workers" (vis-à-vis the Ministry of National Defense, the supervisory authority); that, given the nature of the Plaintiff's organization, there were limits to union activities; and that he hoped there would be no recurrence of disputes leading to the need to receive resignations from all employees and refill the positions through open recruitment. Such statements clearly manifested an attitude of denying the instant union while simultaneously instilling in the employees a sense of insecurity regarding their status—namely, that their employment status could be deprived if union activities continued—thereby chilling union activities. It is sufficiently recognized that this was intended to affect the organization and activities of the union. Therefore, the court below's determination that the above speech constituted an unfair labor practice as prescribed in Article 39, Subparagraph 4 of the Act is justifiable, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning unfair labor practices as alleged in the grounds of appeal. The allegation in the grounds of appeal on this point likewise cannot be accepted.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiff, the losing party. It is so decided as per Order, with the unanimous consent of the participating Justices.

Justice Jeong Gwi-ho (Presiding Justice), Park Jun-seo, Kim Hyeong-seon (Justice in Charge), Lee Yong-hun

【판결요지】

[1] 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 부칙 제3조로 폐지되기 전의 것) 제39조 제3호가 정하는 부당노동행위는, 사용자가 아무런 이유 없이 단체교섭을 거부 또는 해태하는 경우는 물론이고, 사용자가 단체교섭을 거부할 정당한 이유가 있다거나 단체교섭에 성실히 응하였다고 믿었더라도 객관적으로 정당한 이유가 없고 불성실한 단체교섭으로 판정되는 경우에도 성립한다고 할 것이고, 한편 정당한 이유인지의 여부는 노동조합측의 교섭권자, 노동조합 측이 요구하는 교섭시간, 교섭장소, 교섭사항 및 그의 교섭태도 등을 종합하여 사회통념상 사용자에게 단체교섭의무의 이행을 기대하는 것이 어렵다고 인정되는지 여부에 따라 판단할 것이다.

[2] 전쟁기념사업회 노동조합의 조합장이 학예부장의 차하위자인 3급직 학예담당관으로 그 부하직원을 지휘하고 그 휘하의 6급 이하 직원에 대한 1차적 평가를 하지만, 부장이 2차 평정권자로서 그 평정의 권한 및 책임은 궁극적으로 부장에게 귀속되고, 부하직원의 지휘도 부장을 보조하는데 지나지 아니하며, 인사, 급여, 후생, 노무관리 등 근로조건의 결정에 관한 권한과 책임을 전쟁기념사업회로부터 위임받은 점이 없다면, 위 조합장이 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 부칙 제3조로 폐지되기 전의 것) 제3조 단서 제1호에 정한 사용자 또는 항상 그의 이익을 대표하여 행동하는 자에 해당하지 아니하므로, 위 사업회가 위 조합장은 노동조합원이 될 수 있는 자격이 없다는 이유로 당해 조합의 단체교섭요구에 응하지 아니한 것은 정당하다고 볼 수 없다고 한 사례.

[3] 사용자가 연설, 사내방송, 게시문, 서한 등을 통하여 의견을 표명할 수 있는 언론의 자유를 가지고 있음은 당연하나, 그것이 행하여진 상황, 장소, 그 내용, 방법, 노동조합의 운영이나 활동에 미친 영향 등을 종합하여 노동조합의 조직이나 운영을 지배하거나 이에 개입하는 의사가 인정되는 경우에는 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 부칙 제3조로 폐지되기 전의 것) 제39조 제4호에 정한 부당노동행위가 성립한다.

[4] 당해 전쟁기념사업회 노동조합의 조합원들이 위 사업회의 회장 등을 업무상횡령혐의로 고소함으로써 위 사업회와 당해 조합간의 갈등이 일어난 상황 속에서, 위 회장이 종무식상에서 전직원을 상대로 위 사업회 조직의 성질상 태어나지 말아야 할 노동조합이 생겼으며, 자신을 포함한 우리 모두가(감독관청인 국방부에 대하여) 노동자인 것이고, 위 사업회 조직의 성격상 노조활동에는 한계가 있다고 보며, 계속하여 분쟁이 야기되어 전직원으로부터 사표를 받고 공개채용으로 다시 충원해야 하는 일이 없기 바란다는 취지로 발언한 것이 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 부칙 제3조로 폐지되기 전의 것) 제39조 제4호 소정의 부당노동행위에 해당한다고 본 사례.

【참조조문】

[1] 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 부칙 제3조로 폐지되기 전의 것) 제39조 제3호(현행 노동조합및노동관계조정법 제81조 제3호 참조)

[2] 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 부칙 제3조로 폐지되기 전의 것) 제3조(현행 노동조합및노동관계조정법 제2조 제4호 (가)목 참조)

[3] 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 부칙 제3조로 폐지되기 전의 것) 제39조 제4호(현행 노동조합및노동관계조정법 제81조 제4호 참조)

[4] 구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호 부칙 제3조로 폐지되기 전의 것) 제39조 제4호(현행 노동조합및노동관계조정법 제81조 제4호 참조)

【참조판례】

[1] 대법원 1998. 1. 20. 선고 97도588 판결(공1998상, 636) / [2] 대법원 1989. 11. 14. 선고 88누6924 판결(공1990, 51) / [3] 대법원 1991. 12. 10. 선고 91누636 판결(공1992, 529), 대법원 1994. 12. 23. 선고 94누3001 판결(공1995상, 691)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 2,985자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고, 상고인】 전쟁기념사업회 (소송대리인 변호사 김광정)

【피고, 피상고인】 중앙노동위원회 위원장

【원심판결】 서울고법 1997. 4. 25. 선고 96구31842 판결

【주 문】

상고를 기각한다.

상고비용은 원고의 부담으로 한다.

【이 유】 상고이유를 판단한다.

1. 단체교섭 거부의 점에 대하여

구 노동조합법(1996. 12. 31. 법률 제5244호로 폐지되기 전의 것, 이하 '법'이라고 한다) 제39조 제3호가 정하는 부당노동행위는, 사용자가 아무런 이유 없이 단체교섭을 거부 또는 해태하는 경우는 물론이고, 사용자가 단체교섭을 거부할 정당한 이유가 있다거나 단체교섭에 성실히 응하였다고 믿었더라도 객관적으로 정당한 이유가 없고 불성실한 단체교섭으로 판정되는 경우에도 성립한다고 할 것이고, 한편 정당한 이유인지의 여부는 노동조합측의 교섭권자, 노동조합측이 요구하는 교섭시간, 교섭장소, 교섭사항 및 그의 교섭태도 등을 종합하여 사회통념상 사용자에게 단체교섭의무의 이행을 기대하는 것이 어렵다고 인정되는지 여부에 따라 판단할 것이다.

법 제3조 단서 제1호의 규정은 노동조합의 자주성을 확보하기 위하여 사용자 또는 항상 사용자의 이익을 대표하여 행동하는 자의 노동조합에의 참가를 금지하고 있는바, 원심이 적법하게 인정한 바와 같이, 전쟁기념사업회노동조합(이하 이 사건 조합이라고 한다)의 조합장인 소외 1은 학예부장의 차하위자인 3급직 학예담당관으로 그 부하직원을 지휘하고 그 휘하의 6급 이하 직원에 대한 1차적 평가를 하지만, 부장이 2차 평정권자로서 그 평정의 권한 및 책임은 궁극적으로 부장에게 귀속되고, 부하직원의 지휘도 부장을 보조하는데 지나지 아니하며, 인사, 급여, 후생, 노무관리 등 근로조건의 결정에 관한 권한과 책임을 원고로부터 위임받은 사실이 없다면, 위 소외 1은 법 제3조 단서 제1호에 정한 사용자 또는 항상 그의 이익을 대표하여 행동하는 자에 해당하지 아니하므로, 원고가 위 소외 1은 노동조합원이 될 수 있는 자격이 없다는 이유로 이 사건 조합의 단체교섭요구에 응하지 아니한 것은 정당하다고 볼 수 없다.

그리고 원심이 확정한 사실에 의하면, 원고는 이 사건 조합으로부터 교섭을 위임받은 상급노동단체인 소외 전국전문기술노동조합연맹이 1996. 1. 31. 일자를 같은 해 2. 5.로 지정하여 한 단체교섭요구에 대하여, 신임 사무총장이 업무파악을 다하지 못하였다는 이유로 같은 달 말로 연기하자고 통보한 뒤, 그 무렵에 이르러서는 이 사건 조합이 같은 달 23. 스스로 해산결의를 하였다는 이유로 다시 교섭에 불응하였는데, 위 해산결의는 이미 그 전인 같은 해 2. 4. 이 사건 조합을 탈퇴한 부조합장이던 소외 2가 같은 달 17. 자로 소집공고를 하여 개최한 같은 달 22.의 임시총회가 정족수 미달로 무산되고, 다음 날 오전으로 연기된 임시총회 역시 정족수가 미달되어, 같은 날 오후 원고의 총무부장 등의 조합원 참석독려 등 도움을 받아 근무시간 중에 개최된 임시총회에서 이루어졌고, 그 뒤 같은 달 27. 용산구청장에게 제출된 조합해산신고서는 같은 해 3. 5. 위 임시총회가 정당하게 소집되지 아니하였다는 사유로 반려되었는바, 원고 사무총장의 업무파악이 끝나지 않았다는 사유는 원고의 내부 사정에 불과한 것으로 사회통념상 단체교섭을 행하기 어려운 사유라고 할 수 없고, 조합해산결의는 정당한 소집권한이 없는 자에 의하여 소집된 임시총회에서의 결의로서 무효라고 할 것이므로 조합이 해산되었다는 이유로 원고가 단체교섭에 불응한 것도 역시 정당하다고 볼 수 없다.

따라서 모두 객관적으로 정당한 이유가 없는 위 사유들을 내세워, 이 사건 조합의 최초 단체교섭요구시부터 계속된 일련의 원고의 단체교섭거부 또는 지연행위는 법 제39조 제3호에 정한 부당노동행위에 해당한다고 할 것이니, 같은 취지의 원심의 판단은 옳고, 거기에 상고이유로 주장하는 부당노동행위에 대한 법리오해의 위법이 있다고 할 수 없으므로 이 점에 관한 상고이유의 주장은 받아들일 수 없다.

2. 지배개입의 점에 대하여

사용자가 연설, 사내방송, 게시문, 서한 등을 통하여 의견을 표명할 수 있는 언론의 자유를 가지고 있음은 당연하나, 그것이 행하여진 상황, 장소, 그 내용, 방법, 노동조합의 운영이나 활동에 미친 영향 등을 종합하여 노동조합의 조직이나 운영을 지배하거나 이에 개입하는 의사가 인정되는 경우에는 법 제39조 제4호에 정한 부당노동행위가 성립한다고 볼 것이다(대법원 1991. 12. 10. 선고 91누636 판결, 1994. 12. 23. 선고 94누3001 판결 등 참조).

기록에 의하면, 이 사건 조합의 조합원들이 연명으로 1995. 12. 5. 원고의 대표자인 회장 소외 3 등을 업무상횡령혐의로 수사기관에 고소함으로써 원고와 이 사건 조합간의 갈등이 형사문제로 비화된 사실을 알 수 있고, 이러한 상황 속에서, 원심이 적법하게 인정한 사실과 같이, 위 소외 3이 1995. 12. 29. 종무식상에서 전직원을 상대로 원고 조직의 성질상 태어나지 말아야 할 노동조합이 생겼으며, 자신을 포함한 우리 모두가(감독관청인 국방부에 대하여) 노동자인 것이고, 원고 조직의 성격상 노조활동에는 한계가 있다고 보며, 계속하여 분쟁이 야기되어 전직원으로부터 사표를 받고 공개채용으로 다시 충원해야 하는 일이 없기 바란다는 취지로 발언한 것은, 이 사건 조합을 부인하는 태도를 명백히 함과 동시에 조합활동이 계속되는 경우 직원의 신분이 박탈될 수도 있다는 신분상의 불안감을 느끼게 하여 조합활동을 위축시킴으로써 조합의 조직과 활동에 영향을 미치고자 하는 의도임이 충분히 인정되므로, 원심이 위 연설행위를 법 제39조 제4호에 정한 부당노동행위로 판단한 것은 정당하고, 거기에 상고이유로 주장하는 부당노동행위에 대한 법리오해의 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다. 이 점에 대한 상고이유의 주장 역시 받아들일 수 없다.

3. 그러므로 상고를 기각하고 상고비용은 패소자인 원고의 부담으로 하기로 관여 법관들의 의견이 일치되어 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 정귀호(재판장) 박준서 김형선(주심) 이용훈

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