[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant]
[Judgment Below] Daejeon High Court Decision 2012Reu231 Decided May 9, 2013
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning the claim for division of property is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Daejeon High Court. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Regarding the Claim for Consolation Money
The court below, citing the reasoning of the first instance judgment, found that the primary responsibility for the breakdown of the marital relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant lay with the Defendant, who irreparably damaged the trust between the spouses through violence and infidelity, and accordingly ordered the Defendant to pay consolation money to the Plaintiff. Upon examination of the record, the above determination by the court below is deemed justified and acceptable, and there is no error in violation of the principles of logic and experience that exceeds the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence.
2. Regarding the Claim for Division of Property
A. The system of division of property provided for in Article 839-2 of the Civil Act (민법) is a system whose primary purpose is the liquidation and distribution, at the time of divorce, of property accumulated through the joint efforts of both spouses during the marriage. Therefore, such property becomes subject to division regardless of in whose name it is registered or who manages it (see Supreme Court Decision 96Meu1397 Decided June 11, 1999; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2010Meu4071, 4088 Decided June 20, 2013, etc.).
Meanwhile, the retirement benefits provided for respectively under the Act on the Guarantee of Workers' Retirement Benefits (근로자퇴직급여보장법), the Public Officials Pension Act (공무원연금법), the Military Pension Act (군인연금법), and the Private School Teachers and Staff Pension Act (사립학교교직원연금법) have, in addition to their character as social security benefits, the character of deferred wages and of compensation for meritorious and faithful service (see Supreme Court Decision 95Nu7529 Decided September 29, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 94Da36186 Decided October 12, 1995, etc.). Moreover, receipt of such retirement benefits requires working for a certain period, and if the cooperation of the other spouse is found to have contributed to such work, the retirement benefits may likewise be regarded as property accumulated through the joint efforts of both spouses and thus subject to division of property.
However, with regard to this matter, the Supreme Court has heretofore maintained the position that while retirement pay already received by one spouse who had already retired at the time of divorce is subject to division of property (see Supreme Court Decision 94Meu1584 Decided March 28, 1995), where a spouse is still employed and has not yet retired at the time of divorce, absent special circumstances such as the retirement date and the amount of retirement pay to be received having already been fixed, the mere probability that he or she will receive retirement pay in the future cannot be included in the property subject to liquidation as future retirement pay; rather, it is sufficient to take into account such probability of future receipt of retirement pay merely as one of the other circumstances necessary in determining the amount and method of division under Article 839-2, Paragraph 2 of the Civil Act (see Supreme Court Decision 94Meu1713, 1720 Decided May 23, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 98Meu213 Decided June 12, 1998, etc.). It appears that the reason the Supreme Court has heretofore taken the above position is that, where a spouse is still employed and has not yet retired at the time of divorce, it is difficult to calculate the retirement pay to be received in the future because the time of retirement is unknown, and the possibility cannot be excluded that the person may fail to receive all or part of the actual retirement pay due to a change of circumstances such as the company's bankruptcy, disciplinary dismissal, or sentencing to punishment, and it was judged that equitable division of property is still possible even if such matters are merely taken into account as other circumstances.
B. Of course, since a retirement benefit claim becomes actualized upon the occurrence of the cause for payment, namely retirement (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da17754 Decided September 14, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 2013Du26552 Decided April 24, 2014, etc.), it inevitably carries a certain degree of uncertainty or possibility of change at the time of divorce. However, excluding the retirement benefit claim from the subject matter of division of property and merely taking into account the possibility of its future receipt as one of the other circumstances necessary for determining the amount and method of division of property does not accord with the purport of the property division system, whose essence lies in liquidating and distributing, upon divorce, the property relations formed by the spouses during the marriage, and is unjust in that it also runs contrary to substantive fairness between the parties. This is all the more so in consideration of the following points.
(1) In reality, there are far more cases in which retirement benefits are normally received, and if a retirement benefit claim is entirely excluded from the subject matter of division of property on the ground of such uncertainty or possibility of change, this is more likely to result in an inequitable outcome. In particular, compared with a case where retirement occurs before divorce, a significant disparity arises, which may in effect compel the parties to postpone the timing of divorce until receipt of retirement benefits, notwithstanding the breakdown of the marital life.
(2) Where a retirement benefit claim is excluded from the subject matter of division of property and merely taken into account as one of the other circumstances, there is no clear standard as to the actual extent to which it should be taken into account, and where there is no other property to divide, division of property may not be possible at all, making it difficult to guarantee equitable division of property.
(3) Other property recognized as subject to division of property is also subject to future fluctuation in its economic value, albeit to varying degrees, and in particular, claims inherently carry the possibility of non-performance in the future.
(4) Even before retirement, a worker may receive an advance settlement of retirement pay for the continuous period of service if the requirements under Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the Act on the Guarantee of Workers' Retirement Benefits are met, and generally, once retirement occurs, the worker is entitled to receive retirement benefits within 14 days therefrom; in this sense, a retirement benefit claim is not substantially different from an ordinary claim without a fixed time of performance, and considering that Article 12 of the same Act provides for preferential payment of retirement benefits and that Article 44 of the same Act provides for criminal punishment of an employer who violates the duty to pay retirement benefits, it may rather be considered that the likelihood of performance is greater than that of an ordinary claim.
C. In light of the purport of the property division system as described above and the various circumstances noted, even if one spouse has not yet actually received retirement benefits because he or she is still employed at the time of divorce, a retirement benefit claim, which already potentially exists at the time the fact-finding court concludes the oral argument in the divorce proceeding and whose economic value is capable of realistic evaluation, may be included in the subject matter of division of property; specifically, the amount equivalent to the retirement benefits expected to be received if the person were to retire at the time the fact-finding court concludes the oral argument in the divorce proceeding shall become the subject matter thereof.
Insofar as the Supreme Court's prior decisions, as noted above, held to the effect that where one spouse is still employed and has not yet retired, his or her retirement benefits cannot be included in the subject matter of division of property, and it is sufficient merely to take into account the possibility of future receipt thereof as one of the other circumstances necessary for determining the amount and method of division, all such decisions are hereby modified to the extent that they conflict with the view expressed in this Decision.
D. According to the record in this case, it can be seen that: (1) the Plaintiff, born in 1970, has been working as a private school teacher from around 1992 to the present, and, as of July 29, 2011, the estimated lump-sum retirement payment was 86,014,920 won and the estimated retirement allowance was 24,927,350 won; (2) the Defendant, born in 1970, has been serving as a researcher at a government-funded research institute from around 2001 to the present, and, as of July 13, 2011, the estimated retirement pay was 39,601,000 won, with the mandatory retirement age being 61; (3) aside from the retirement benefit claims, the Plaintiff's net assets amount to 54,721,327 won and the Defendant's net assets amount to 233,453,784 won; and (4) the Defendant, both in the proceedings below and in the grounds of appeal, has been requesting that the retirement benefit claims be divided based on the above estimated retirement benefit amounts. According to the legal principles set forth above, both the Plaintiff's and the Defendant's retirement benefit claims may be subject to division of property; specifically, the amounts equivalent to the estimated retirement benefits that each would receive if he or she were to retire at the time the fact-finding court concludes the oral argument prior to the finalization of the divorce may be included in each party's active assets, and division of property may be carried out either by liquidating this together with other property in a single, comprehensive manner, or by an appropriate and reasonable method equivalent thereto.
Nevertheless, the judgment below, contrary to the foregoing, excluded the Plaintiff's and the Defendant's retirement benefit claims from the subject matter of division of property on the ground that it is sufficient merely to take into account the possibility of future receipt thereof as one of the other circumstances necessary for determining the amount and method of division of property, and this constitutes an error in the judgment resulting from a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the subject matter of division of property.
3. Regarding the Claim for Designation of Parental Authority Holder and Custodian
Parental authority, including custody of children, is both a right and a duty of the parents and directly affects the welfare of the minor child. Therefore, in determining which parent should be designated as the holder of parental authority and custodian of a minor child when the parents divorce, all factors must be comprehensively considered—including the child's gender and age, the existence of the parents' affection for the child and their intention to raise the child, the existence of economic capacity necessary for child-rearing, the degree of intimacy between the parents and the child, and the child's own wishes—so as to reach a determination in the direction most conducive and suitable to the growth and welfare of the child (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Meu1458, 1465 Decided May 13, 2010, etc.).
In light of the above legal principles and the record, the designation by the court below of the Plaintiff as the holder of parental authority and custodian of the children who are the subjects of this case is deemed justified and acceptable, and there is no error therein arising from a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the designation of a holder of parental authority and custodian.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning the claim for division of property is reversed without examining the remainder of the grounds of appeal, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination; the remainder of the appeal is dismissed. This Decision is rendered as set forth in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the case.
Chief Justice Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice), Justice Yang Chang-soo, Justice Shin Young-chul, Justice Min Il-young (Presiding Judge for Report), Justice Lee In-bok, Justice Lee Sang-hoon, Justice Kim Yong-deok, Justice Park Bo-young, Justice Ko Young-han, Justice Kim Chang-seok, Justice Kim Shin, Justice Kim So-young, Justice Cho Hee-dae