Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 95누7130

Revocation of Reexamination Decision on Remedy for Unfair Reassignment (부당전직등구제재심판정취소)부당전직등구제재심판정취소

Decided1996. 04. 12. Court대법원Employer won
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

When a company merged its automobile maintenance division into another company, it reassigned a maintenance worker back to his original workplace, a shipyard. The Supreme Court held that this reassignment was a legitimate exercise of the employer's personnel authority based on business necessity, and dismissed the worker's request for relief.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA company merged its car maintenance division into another firm and reassigned a maintenance worker back to his original shipyard workplace.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court ruled the reassignment lawful, as it was based on legitimate business necessity and did not require the worker's consent.
  • LessonEmployers may reassign workers without consent when organizational restructuring genuinely eliminates their original position, provided the reassignment is not abusive or retaliatory.
Issues
  • The scope and limits of an employer's authority to reassign or transfer employees (전보·전직 발령권)
  • Whether employee consent is required for reassignment when the employee's job duties and work location were specifically fixed
  • Whether disciplinary procedures under the collective bargaining agreement must be followed when dismissal is based on grounds specified therein
Key reasoning

Under Korean labor law, decisions on employee transfers or reassignments (전보·전직) fall within the employer's managerial discretion (인사권) and are valid as long as there is a legitimate business necessity and the action does not constitute an abuse of rights. When a business division is merged or dissolved such that the worker's original post no longer exists, the employer may reassign the worker to another appropriate position even without the worker's consent. The court found that the reassignment in this case was driven by genuine organizational necessity following the merger of the maintenance division, not by any improper or retaliatory motive. Therefore, the reassignment did not amount to unfair treatment requiring the worker's prior consent.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] Transfer or reassignment of an employee in principle falls within the authority of the employer as the holder of personnel rights, and the employer has considerable discretion within the scope necessary for business purposes; such measures are valid unless there are special circumstances, such as a violation of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) or the like, or the measure constitutes an abuse of rights.

[2] Whether a transfer order or the like constitutes an abuse of rights should be determined by comparing and weighing the business necessity of the transfer order or the like against the disadvantages in the employee's living conditions resulting from the transfer, etc.; if the disadvantage in living conditions arising from the transfer, etc., made out of business necessity does not markedly exceed the degree that an employee should ordinarily endure, this falls within the scope of legitimate personnel authority and does not constitute an abuse of rights.

[3] It cannot be found that the employment contract limited the employee's job duties and place of work to that of an automobile maintenance worker at a free automobile service center located in Seoul; and even assuming that the job duties and place of work were so limited such that a change thereto would constitute a material change in working conditions, this is a case in which, as the company's automobile maintenance business division was merged into another company such that the workplace where the employee could provide labor as an automobile maintenance worker ceased to exist, it was held that in reassigning the said employee, it was not necessarily required to obtain his consent on the ground that his place of work and job duties had been limited.

[4] According to Article 22 of the collective bargaining agreement (단체협약), matters concerning disciplinary action are to be governed by separate disciplinary regulations, while Article 23, in contrast, enumerates six grounds for dismissal, including "where a final judgment of imprisonment or a heavier sentence has been rendered," one of which, under item 6, is "where dismissal has been finalized through a disciplinary action of the disciplinary committee"; therefore, in dismissing an employee of the company on grounds set forth in Article 23 of the collective bargaining agreement, it is not necessary to go through disciplinary procedures except in the case of item 6.

Full text (English, AI translation) 9,210 chars

[Plaintiff, Appellant]

[Defendant, Appellee] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission (중앙노동위원회 위원장)

[Defendant's Assistant Intervenor] Daewoo Shipbuilding & Heavy Machinery Co., Ltd. (대우조선공업 주식회사) (Attorney Kim Dae-seop, counsel for the intervenor)

[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 94Gu18685, decided May 4, 1995

[Order]

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal (including those arising from the intervention) shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

[Reasoning]

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to Grounds 1 and 2

A transfer or reassignment of an employee is, in principle, a matter within the authority of the employer as the holder of personnel authority, and therefore the employer has considerable discretion within the scope necessary for business operations; such a measure is valid unless there are special circumstances such as a violation of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) or other laws, or unless it constitutes an abuse of rights (see Supreme Court Decision 86Daka2567, decided February 28, 1989; Supreme Court Decision 90Da12366, decided September 24, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 90Da20428, decided October 25, 1991, etc.). Whether a transfer disposition, etc., constitutes an abuse of rights should be determined by comparing and weighing the business necessity of the transfer against the disadvantages to the employee's livelihood resulting from the transfer; if the disadvantage to the employee's livelihood arising from a transfer made out of business necessity does not markedly exceed the degree that the employee should ordinarily be expected to bear, this falls within the scope of legitimate personnel authority and does not constitute an abuse of rights (see the above Decision 90Da20428 and Supreme Court Decision 94Da52928, decided October 13, 1995).

Reviewing the instant case, according to the record, the order transferring the Plaintiff's position was not, as the Plaintiff's argument contends, issued on the ground that the Plaintiff protested against the Defendant's Assistant Intervenor (hereinafter "the Intervenor") forcing an inter-company transfer in violation of Article 16 of the collective bargaining agreement, as alleged by the Plaintiff. Rather, it arose from the following circumstances: as part of management rationalization, the Intervenor company, from March 1, 1993, integrated the Daewoo Gungmin-cha (Tico) maintenance business division into the maintenance business of non-party Daewoo Motor Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "the non-party company"), which had an established and systematic automobile maintenance business, and transferred only the physical facilities of that division to the non-party company. As a result, it became necessary either to reduce personnel or to reassign the employees who had worked in that division; the Intervenor accordingly transferred to the non-party company (via inter-company transfer of employment, 전적) those employees who consented to the inter-company transfer alleged by the Plaintiff, while as for the Plaintiff, who refused the transfer of employment to the non-party company, since the Daewoo Gungmin-cha free maintenance center located in Seongsu-dong, Seoul, where he had been working, was being relocated to the non-party company and he could no longer work there, the Intervenor had no choice but to reassign the Plaintiff to the Okpo Shipyard, where he had originally worked. Therefore, there is no error in misapprehending the legal principles concerning Article 16 of the collective bargaining agreement or in mistaking the facts.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff originally joined the Intervenor company, which is engaged in shipbuilding and repair, construction of offshore steel structures, etc., at its Okpo Shipyard on May 7, 1980, and, as set out below, worked in matters related to shipbuilding in the pump division of the hull construction department for more than ten years until he applied to become an automobile maintenance worker. In 1990, after the Intervenor company received a designation for industrial rationalization from the government as a measure to overcome its chronic operating deficits caused by the shipbuilding industry's downturn, and as part of its business diversification began manufacturing and selling the Daewoo Gungmin-cha (Tico passenger car), a light automobile, the Plaintiff applied on June 11, 1990 to become a maintenance worker needed for the automobile maintenance business that the Intervenor company was to operate through approximately 70 Daewoo Gungmin-cha free maintenance centers nationwide. After receiving the prescribed training, he worked as an automobile maintenance worker at the Daewoo Gungmin-cha free maintenance center in Seongsu-dong, Seoul, from November 1, 1991. Accordingly, it cannot be said that, under the Plaintiff's employment contract, his job duties and workplace were limited to being an automobile maintenance worker at the Daewoo Gungmin-cha free maintenance center in Seongsu-dong, Seoul. Moreover, even if his job duties and workplace had been so limited such that a change thereto would constitute a material change in working conditions, as noted above, since the Intervenor company's automobile maintenance business division was integrated into the non-party company and the workplace where the Plaintiff could provide labor as an automobile maintenance worker ceased to exist, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff's consent was necessarily required for his reassignment merely because his workplace and job duties had been limited.

In addition, while it is true, as argued by the Plaintiff, that Article 14, Paragraph 6 of the Intervenor's collective bargaining agreement provides that "the company shall consult with the individual concerned or the union when providing job-conversion training to union members or reassigning them with a change of job type," it appears that around August 1993, the Intervenor company explained to the maintenance workers that, because the Intervenor company's automobile maintenance business was being integrated into the non-party company and the physical maintenance facilities, etc. were being transferred to the non-party company, they would either be transferred in employment to the non-party company or, failing that, would have to return to their original positions held before becoming maintenance workers (see the testimony of witness An Jeong-ju in the court below, record p. 175). Furthermore, even if this consultation provision had been violated, that fact alone would not render the order transferring the Plaintiff's position invalid.

Accordingly, in this case, the Intervenor's order transferring the Plaintiff's position was issued out of business necessity, and there is no material showing that it otherwise violated the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) or other laws or constituted an abuse of rights; thus, it must be deemed lawful.

This ground of appeal is without merit in its entirety.

2. As to Ground 3

According to Article 22 of the Intervenor's collective bargaining agreement, matters concerning disciplinary action are to be governed by separate disciplinary regulations. Meanwhile, Article 23, in a separate provision, enumerates six grounds for dismissal, including "where a final judgment of imprisonment or a heavier sentence has been rendered," one of which, under item 6, is "where dismissal has been finalized by a disciplinary measure of the disciplinary committee." Therefore, in dismissing an employee of the Intervenor company for a reason under Article 23 of the collective bargaining agreement, it is not necessary to go through disciplinary procedures except in the case of item 6, and there is no defect of procedural violation, as argued by the Plaintiff, in the Plaintiff's dismissal in this case.

Furthermore, as noted above, since the order transferring the Plaintiff's position was lawful, the Plaintiff's continuous absence from work over a long period from October 5, 1993 to March 17, 1994, as found by the court below, due to his refusal to comply with the transfer order, clearly falls under the ground for dismissal set forth in Article 23, Item 4 of the above collective bargaining agreement, namely, "a person who is absent without leave for seven or more consecutive days, or for a total of ten or more days of unauthorized absence within one month." Considering all the circumstances appearing in the record, including the circumstances leading to the Plaintiff's absence, the length of the absence, and the Plaintiff's ordinary work attitude, such conduct by the Plaintiff constitutes a case where it is socially unacceptable to continue the employment relationship. Therefore, the Intervenor's dismissal of the Plaintiff on this ground was justified, and there is no illegality of abuse of discretion therein.

This ground of appeal is also without merit in its entirety.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, with the unanimous concurrence of the participating Justices.

Justice Ahn Yong-deuk (Presiding Justice), Cheon Gyeong-song, Ji Chang-gwon, Shin Seong-taek (Justice in Charge)

【판결요지】

[1] 근로자에 대한 전보나 전직은 원칙적으로 인사권자인 사용자의 권한에 속하므로 업무상 필요한 범위 내에서는 사용자는 상당한 재량을 가지며 그것이 근로기준법 등에 위반되거나 권리남용에 해당되는 등의 특별한 사정이 없는 한 유효하다.

[2] 전보처분 등이 권리남용에 해당하는지 여부는 전보처분 등의 업무상의 필요성과 전보 등에 따른 근로자의 생활상의 불이익을 비교·교량하여 결정되어야 할 것이고, 업무상의 필요에 의한 전보 등에 따른 생활상의 불이익이 근로자가 통상 감수하여야 할 정도를 현저하게 벗어난 것이 아니라면 이는 정당한 인사권의 범위 내에 속하는 것으로서 권리남용에 해당하지 아니한다.

[3] 근로계약에 의하여 근로자의 근무내용과 근무장소가 서울 소재 자동차 무상정비소의 자동차 정비요원으로 한정되었다고 볼 수는 없고, 설사 그와 같이 근무내용과 근무장소가 한정되어 있어 그에 대한 변경이 중대한 근로조건의 변경이 된다고 하더라도 회사의 자동차 정비업무부문이 다른 회사로 통합됨에 따라 근로자가 자동차 정비요원으로 근로를 제공할 사업장이 없어지게 되어 위 근로자를 배치전환함에 있어서까지 근무장소와 근무내용이 한정되어 있었음을 이유로 반드시 그의 동의를 얻을 필요가 없다고 본 사례.

[4] 단체협약 제22조에 의하면 징계에 관한 사항은 별도 징계규정에 의하도록 되어 있고, 한편 제23조에는 이와 달리 해고사유로 "금고 이상의 형확정 판결을 받은 경우" 등 6개항의 해고사유를 열거하면서 그 하나로 제6호에 "징계위원회의 징계처분에 의하여 해고가 확정된 경우"를 들고 있으므로 단체협약 제23조 소정의 사유를 이유로 회사의 근로자를 해고함에 있어서는 제6호의 경우를 제외하고는 징계절차를 거칠 필요가 없다.

【참조조문】

[1] 근로기준법 제27조

[2] 근로기준법 제27조

[3] 근로기준법 제27조

[4] 근로기준법 제27조

【참조판례】

[1][2] 대법원 1995. 5. 9. 선고 93다51263 판결(공1995상, 2072), 대법원 1995. 8. 11. 선고 95다10778 판결(공1995하, 3127), 대법원 1995. 10. 13. 선고 94다52928 판결(공1995하, 3764) /[1] 대법원 1989. 2. 28. 선고 86다카2567 판결(공1989, 510), 대법원 1991. 7. 12. 선고 91다12572 판결(공1991, 2155), 대법원 1991. 9. 24. 선고 90다12366 판결(공1991, 2592), 대법원 1991. 10. 25. 선고 90다20428 판결(공1991, 2816) /[3] 대법원 1992. 1. 21. 선고 91누5204 판결(공1992, 927) /[4] 대법원 1992. 11. 13. 선고 92누6082 판결(공1993상, 135), 대법원 1993. 5. 25. 선고 92누12452 판결(공1993하, 1893)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 3,371자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고,상고인】

【피고,피상고인】 중앙노동위원회 위원장

【피고보조참가인】 대우조선공업 주식회사 (소송대리인 변호사 김대섭)

【원심판결】 서울고법 1995. 5. 4. 선고 94구18685 판결

【주문】

상고를 기각한다. 상고비용(보조참가로 인한 부분 포함)은 원고의 부담으로 한다.

【이유】 상고이유를 판단한다.

1. 제1점, 제2점에 대하여

근로자에 대한 전보나 전직은 원칙적으로 인사권자인 사용자의 권한에 속하므로 업무상 필요한 범위 내에서는 사용자는 상당한 재량을 가지며 그것이 근로기준법 등에 위반되거나 권리남용에 해당되는 등의 특별한 사정이 없는 한 유효하다 할 것이다( 대법원 1989. 2. 28. 선고 86다카2567 판결, 1991. 9. 24. 선고 90다12366 판결, 1991. 10. 25. 선고 90다20428 판결 등 참조). 그리고 전보처분 등이 권리남용에 해당하는지 여부는 전보처분 등의 업무상의 필요성과 전보 등에 따른 근로자의 생활상의 불이익을 비교·교량하여 결정되어야 할 것이고, 업무상의 필요에 의한 전보 등에 따른 생활상의 불이익이 근로자가 통상 감수하여야 할 정도를 현저하게 벗어난 것이 아니라면 이는 정당한 인사권의 범위 내에 속하는 것으로서 권리남용에 해당하지 아니한다( 위 90다20428 판결 및 대법원 1995. 10. 13. 선고 94다52928 판결 참조).

돌이켜 이 사건을 보건대 기록에 의하면 원고에 대한 전직명령은 소론이 내세우는 것처럼 피고 보조참가인(이하 참가인이라 한다)이 단체협약 제16조를 위반하여 소론 주장의 사간 전출을 강요하는 것에 대하여 원고가 항의한 것을 이유로 한 것이 아니라, 참가인 회사가 경영합리화를 위하여 1993. 3. 1.부터 대우국민차 정비업무 부문을 자동차 정비업무가 안정적이고 체계적으로 구축되어 있는 소외 대우자동차 주식회사(이하 소외 회사라고 한다)의 정비업무에 통합하게 되면서 소외 회사에게 그 물적시설만을 양도함에 따라 그 부문에 종사하던 근로자들에 대하여 인원감축을 하거나 다시 배치전환을 하여야 할 필요에 의하여 소론 주장의 사간 전출(社間轉出)에 동의하는 근로자에 대하여는 소외 회사로의 전적(轉籍) 처분을 하고, 소외 회사로의 전적을 거부하는 원고에 대하여는 그가 당시 근로를 제공하던 서울 성수동 소재 대우국민차 무상정비소가 소외 회사로 이전되어 그 곳에서 근무할 수 없게 됨에 따라 원고 자신이 원래 근로를 제공하였던 옥포조선소로 배치전환을 할 수밖에 없는 사정에 기인하여 이루어진 것에 불과하므로, 거기에 단체협약 제16조에 관한 법리를 오해하거나 사실오인의 위법이 있다 할 수 없다.

그리고 원고는 원래 1980. 5. 7. 선박건조 및 수리업, 해양 철구조물 등의 건조업 등을 영위하는 참가인 회사의 옥포조선소에서 입사하여 다음에서 보는 바와 같이 자동차 정비요원으로 지원할 때까지 10년 이상 선거부 펌프반에서 선박건조 관련 업무에 종사하여 왔고, 1990년에 참가인 회사가 조선경기의 불황으로 인한 만성적인 경영적자의 타개책으로 정부로부터 산업합리화 지정을 받은 다음 경영다각화의 일환으로 경자동차인 대우국민차(TICO 승용차)를 생산·판매하게 됨에 따라 원고는 1990. 6. 11. 참가인 회사가 전국 70여 군데에 대우국민차 무상정비소를 설치하여 수행하게 된 자동차 정비업무에 필요한 정비요원으로 지원하여 그 소정 교육을 받은 후 서울 성수동 소재 대우국민차 무상정비소에서 1991. 11. 1.부터 자동차 정비요원으로 근무하였던 것이므로 원고의 경우 근로계약에 의하여 근무내용과 근무장소가 서울 성수동 소재 대우국민차 무상정비소의 자동차 정비요원으로 한정되었다고 할 수는 없을 뿐 아니라, 설사 그와 같이 근무내용과 근무장소가 한정되어 있어 그에 대한 변경이 중대한 근로조건의 변경이 된다고 하더라도 위에서 본 바와 같이 참가인 회사의 자동차 정비업무 부문이 소외 회사로 통합됨에 따라 원고가 자동차 정비요원으로 근로를 제공할 사업장이 없어지게 되어 원고를 배치전환함에 있어서까지 근무장소와 근무내용이 한정되어 있었음을 이유로 반드시 그의 동의를 얻어야 한다고 할 수도 없다 할 것이다.

또한 참가인의 단체협약 제14조 제6항에 "회사는 조합원의 직종전환 교육 및 직종을 변경하여 전환배치할 시는 본인 또는 조합과 협의하여야 한다"고 규정되어 있음은 소론과 같으나, 참가인 회사는 1993. 8.경에 참가인 회사의 자동차 정비업무가 소외 회사로 통합되게 되어 정비시설 등의 물적시설이 소외 회사로 이전됨에 따라 정비요원들에 대하여 그들이 소외 회사로 전적을 하든가 그렇지 아니하면 정비요원으로 되기 이전의 원직에 복귀하여야 됨을 설명하였던 것으로 보여질 뿐 아니라(원심증인 안정주의 증언, 기록 175쪽 참조), 설사 이와 같은 협의규정을 위반하였다 하더라도 그 점만으로 원고에 대한 전직명령의 효력이 없어지는 것도 아니라 할 것이다.

그렇다면 원고에 대한 참가인의 전직명령은 업무의 필요에 의한 것으로서 달리 그것이 근로기준법 등에 위반되거나 권리남용에 해당한다고 볼 아무런 자료가 없는 이 사건에 있어서 정당한 것이라 할 것이다.

논지는 모두 이유 없다.

2. 제3점에 대하여

참가인의 단체협약 제22조에 의하면 징계에 관한 사항은 별도 징계규정에 의하도록 되어 있고, 한편 제23조에는 이와 달리 해고사유로 "금고 이상의 형확정 판결을 받은 경우" 등 6개항의 해고사유를 열거하면서 그 하나로 제6호에 "징계위원회의 징계처분에 의하여 해고가 확정된 경우"를 들고 있으므로 단체협약 제23조 소정의 사유를 이유로 참가인 회사의 근로자를 해고함에 있어서는 제6호의 경우를 제외하고는 징계절차를 거칠 필요가 없다 할 것이고, 달리 원고에 대한 이 사건 해고에 소론과 같은 절차 위배의 위법이 있다 할 수 없다.

그리고 위에서 본 바와 같이 원고에 대한 전직명령이 정당한 이상 원고가 이에 불응하여 원심판시와 같이 1993. 10. 5.부터 1994. 3. 17.까지 사이에 장기간에 걸쳐 계속 결근한 것은 위 단체협약 제23조 제4호 소정의 해고사유인 "무계결근 7일 이상 계속하거나 통산 1월에 무계결근 10일 이상 결근한 자"에 해당함이 명백하고, 원고가 결근에 이른 경위, 결근한 기간, 원고의 평소의 근무태도 등 기록에 나타난 제반 사정을 종합하여 보더라도 원고의 이와 같은 행위는 사회통념상 근로계약관계를 계속하기 어려운 사정이 있는 경우에 해당한다 할 것이므로 참가인이 이를 이유로 원고를 해고한 것은 정당하다 할 것이고, 거기에 재량권을 남용한 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다.

논지도 모두 이유 없다.

3. 그러므로 상고를 기각하고, 상고비용은 패소자의 부담으로 하기로 하여 관여 법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 안용득(재판장) 천경송 지창권 신성택(주심)

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