[Plaintiff, Appellant] Duseong Labor Union (Counsel Hong Ki-bae)
[Defendant, Appellee] Daewoo Electronics Co., Ltd. (Counsel Sim Hun-jong and 5 others)
[Defendant's Assistant Intervenor]
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 94Na14331 rendered on November 25, 1994
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal submitted by Plaintiff's counsel are examined.
1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, comprehensively considering the evidence presented, found that non-party Duseong Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "the non-party company") had agreed to pay the wages at issue, which were owed to its employees, to the Plaintiff labor union, of which said employees were members. The court below then held that the above agreement was invalid as being in violation of the principle of direct payment of wages under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), and that consequently the seizure and collection order on the claim at issue based on the said agreement was likewise invalid, and thus the claim for collection in this case could not be accepted. Furthermore, with respect to the Plaintiff's argument that it was seeking the collection payment in this case as the assignee, having received an assignment of the wage claims from the said employees, the court below held that there was no evidence to establish the fact of assignment of the wage claims, and that even assuming such assignment had occurred, it constituted a trust whose primary purpose was to enable the pursuit of litigation, and was therefore invalid pursuant to Article 7 of the Trust Act (신탁법). On these grounds, the court below dismissed the Plaintiff's claim.
2. Article 36, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act provides for the principle of direct payment of wages, while Article 109 of the same Act imposes penal sanctions on those who violate this principle, thereby compelling compliance. In light of the purpose of these provisions—namely, to ensure that wages reliably reach the hands of the employee personally, so that they may be freely disposed of by the employee, and further to protect the employee's livelihood—it follows that even where an employee has assigned his or her wage claim, the same principle applies to the payment of such wages, and the employer must pay the wages directly to the employee. As a result, even a lawful and valid assignee cannot personally demand payment of wages from the employer (see this Court's en banc Decision 87Daka2803 rendered on December 13, 1988). This legal principle applies equally where a person who has received an assignment of a wage claim from an employee, or who has been entrusted with the collection thereof, seeks to participate in a distribution of the employer's property subject to execution (see this Court's Decision 94Da6918 rendered on May 10, 1994). Therefore, even if, as argued in the grounds of appeal, the Plaintiff labor union received an assignment from its member employees of the wages they were to receive from the non-party company, the Plaintiff could not bring a claim for collection payment of the kind at issue here against the Defendant, who is the third-party obligor with respect to the claim for payment for goods that constitutes the non-party company's property subject to execution. Accordingly, the judgment below, which reached the same conclusion, is ultimately justified, and therefore the propriety of the court below's determination as to whether the Plaintiff received an assignment of the wage claims from the said employees and whether such assignment constituted an invalid litigation trust has no bearing on the outcome of the judgment.
Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the Plaintiff argued before the court below to the effect that the non-party company had agreed to pay the employees' wage claims to the Plaintiff, or had entrusted the collection thereof to the Plaintiff. Therefore, it cannot be said that the court below, in rendering its judgment on this premise, ruled on facts not argued by the parties, or committed an error by failing to exercise its right of clarification or by insufficient deliberation, as argued in the grounds of appeal. Moreover, upon examination of the record, there is no trace that the Plaintiff argued, up until the close of oral argument before the court below, that it was seeking payment on the basis that the Defendant had promised to pay the price to the Plaintiff if the remaining inventory products were delivered; accordingly, the argument that there was an unlawful omission of judgment on this point is without merit. The appeal's argument—that, given that such an agreement was made, the Defendant must be deemed to have waived, at the time of that agreement, its argument that the assignment of the wage claim was invalid and its argument regarding litigation trust, and that the court below's contrary determination constituted errors such as contradictory reasoning, omission of judgment, and insufficient deliberation—is likewise unacceptable.
The grounds of appeal are all without merit.
3. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision.
Justice Ji Chang-gwon (Presiding Justice), Cheon Gyeong-song (Justice in Charge), Ahn Yong-deuk, Shin Seong-taek