[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning lost income against Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The remaining appeals of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 and the appeal of Plaintiff 3 are all dismissed. Of the costs of appeal, the portion arising between Plaintiff 3 and the Defendants shall be borne by Plaintiff 3.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Regarding the Working-Age Limit
A. In its en banc decision rendered on December 26, 1989 in Case No. 88Da16867 (hereinafter “the prior en banc decision”), the Supreme Court abolished the existing view that the working-age limit (age until which a person may earn income through labor) of a person engaged in general manual labor or a person whose livelihood is mainly earned through manual labor (hereinafter “manual labor”) should, as a matter of common experience (empirical rule), be set at 55 years of age. From that time until now, the Court has maintained the view that the working-age limit for manual labor should, as a matter of common experience, be set at 60 years of age.
However, as Korea's social and economic structure and living conditions have rapidly improved and developed, and its legal system has been reorganized and improved, the various circumstances that formed the basis of the above empirical rule at the time of the prior en banc decision have changed significantly, as set out below, such that the above view can no longer be maintained. It is now more consistent with the empirical rule to hold that, absent special circumstances, a person may work beyond the age of 60 and up to the age of 65.
(1) The average life expectancy of the population (based on age 0) was 67.0 years for men and 75.3 years for women at the time of the prior en banc decision (1989), but increased to 79.0 years for men and 85.2 years for women in 2015, and to 79.7 years for men and 85.7 years for women in 2017.
(2) Korea's per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product) was USD 6,516 at the time of the prior en banc decision (1989), but exceeded USD 27,000 in 2015 and reached USD 30,000 by 2018.
(3) At the time of the prior en banc decision, the statutory retirement age for technical civil servants engaged mainly in physical work, such as railway workers, civil engineering workers, construction workers, and machinery workers, was 58 years; however, since 2013, the retirement age for most civil servants, including technical civil servants, has been extended to 60 years (Article 74(1) of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법), as amended by Act No. 9113 and effective from January 1, 2009, and Paragraphs 1 and 2 of its Addenda; Article 66(1) of the Local Public Officials Act (지방공무원법), as amended by Act No. 9301 and effective from January 1, 2009, and Article 7 of its Addenda). In the private sector as well, effective January 1, 2017, all employers have been required to set the retirement age at 60 or older for all workers [Article 19 of the Act on Prohibition of Age Discrimination in Employment and Elderly Employment Promotion (고용상 연령차별금지 및 고령자고용촉진에 관한 법률, hereinafter “the Elderly Employment Act”), as amended by Act No. 11791 and effective from January 1, 2016 or January 1, 2017, and Items 1 and 2 of its Addenda].
Furthermore, according to press releases of the Ministry of Employment and Labor, as of 2016, the average retirement age at workplaces operating a retirement age system was actually 60.4 years.
(4) According to data published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in Korea the actual retirement age is higher than the official retirement age; from 2011 to 2016, the average actual retirement age was 72.0 years for men and 72.2 years for women, which is not only higher than the OECD averages of 65.1 years for men and 63.6 years for women, but also the highest among member countries.
According to the National Statistical Office's Economic Activity Population Survey by Age (Total), the economic participation of the elderly has been gradually increasing; the economic participation rate for those aged 60 to 64 was 52.0% at the time of the prior en banc decision, but rose to 61.7% in August 2015 and to 61.5% in December 2017.
(5) The Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법), at the time of its enactment on December 27, 1993, applied to persons under the age of 60 who were newly employed (Article 8(1) of the Employment Insurance Act, enacted as Act No. 4644 and effective from July 1, 1995); however, following the amendment effective June 4, 2013, it applies to persons under the age of 65 who are employed or commence self-employment, excluding only those who are newly employed or commence self-employment after age 65 (Article 10(1) of the Employment Insurance Act, as amended by Act No. 11864 and effective from June 4, 2013).
(6) The age at which National Pension benefits commence has been gradually extended: 61 years for 2013–2017, 62 years for 2018–2022, 63 years for 2023–2027, 64 years for 2028–2032, and 65 years from 2033 onward (Article 62(1) of the National Pension Act (국민연금법), as amended by Act No. 11143 and effective from July 1, 2012, and Article 6 of its Addenda). The age at which Government Employees Pension and Private School Faculty Pension benefits commence has similarly been gradually extended: it remains 60 years until 2021, but becomes 61 years in 2022, 62 years in 2024, 63 years in 2027, 64 years in 2030, and 65 years from 2033 onward (Article 46(1)(1) of the Government Employees Pension Act (공무원연금법), as amended by Act No. 13387 and effective from January 1, 2016, and Article 7 of its Addenda; Article 42 of the Private School Faculty Pension Act (사립학교교직원 연금법), as amended by Act No. 13561 and effective from January 1, 2016, and Article 7 of its Addenda).
(7) Under various social security statutes, the elderly persons or senior citizens whose livelihoods the State must actively guarantee are defined as persons aged 65 or older.
The Basic Pension Act (기초연금법), enacted on May 20, 2014 upon the abolition of the Basic Old-Age Pension Act, sets the age of eligibility for basic pension benefits at 65 (Article 3(1)). In addition, under the Act on Long-Term Care Insurance for the Elderly (노인장기요양보험법), enacted on April 27, 2007, elderly persons eligible to receive long-term care benefits are likewise defined as persons aged 65 or older (Article 2).
(8) In order to respond to changes arising from the low birth rate and the aging of the population, the Framework Act on Low Birth Rate in an Aging Society (저출산·고령사회기본법) was enacted on May 18, 2005. This Act defines “population aging” as the phenomenon in which the proportion of elderly persons in the total population increases (Article 3(1)). In this connection, the National Statistical Office assesses the distribution of the elderly population using the aging index and the elderly dependency ratio; the aging index is calculated as the ratio of the population aged 65 or older per 100 persons in the population aged 0 to 14 (the youth population), and the elderly dependency ratio is calculated as the ratio of the population aged 65 or older per 100 persons in the population aged 15 to 64 (the working-age population). Other statistics relating to the elderly are likewise compiled based on the population aged 65 or older.
B. When a court of fact-finding instance determines the working-age limit that serves as the basis for calculating lost income, it may derive the working-age limit presumed as a matter of common experience by investigating, in addition to social and economic conditions such as the average life expectancy of the population, the economic level, and employment conditions, all relevant circumstances such as the number of workers by age group, the employment rate or labor participation rate, and working conditions and retirement age limits by occupation, or it may determine the working-age limit by taking into account the specific circumstances of the victim, such as age, occupation, career, and health condition (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da100920, decided May 13, 2011, among others).
C. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the lower court, in calculating the lost income of the deceased child (the deceased was approximately 4 years and 5 months old at the time of the accident) who died in this accident, found that the deceased child could have engaged in urban daily manual labor from December 7, 2031, when he would have completed 21 months of mandatory military service after becoming an adult, until March 6, 2071, when he would turn 60 years of age.
However, according to the record, it is clear that the Plaintiffs argued in their appellate brief that the deceased child's working-age limit should be at least 65 years of age, and as discussed above, the prior empirical rule, which regarded the working-age limit for manual labor as 60 years, can no longer be maintained in light of the changes in the empirical facts that formed its basis. Accordingly, the lower court should have investigated the various circumstances forming the basis of the empirical rule to derive the working-age limit for manual labor presumed as a matter of the newly derived empirical rule, or should have examined whether there existed special specific circumstances warranting a determination of the deceased child's working-age limit different from the newly derived empirical working-age limit, and should have determined the working-age limit accordingly. Instead, without reaching such a determination, the lower court simply concluded, based on the prior empirical rule, that the deceased child's working-age limit was until he turned 60. This determination by the lower court is unlawful, in that it misapprehended the legal doctrine concerning the working-age limit and failed to conduct the necessary examination, or violated the rules of logic and experience, thereby exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, and such error affected the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
2. Regarding Consolation Money
The amount of consolation money for mental suffering caused by a tort may be determined at the discretion of the court of fact-finding instance, within its exclusive authority, upon consideration of all relevant circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da77198, 77204, decided April 13, 2012, among others).
Examining the record in light of the above legal principle, there is no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, in the lower court's misapprehension of the legal doctrine regarding the calculation of consolation money, in its determination of the amounts of consolation money for the deceased child and the Plaintiffs as set forth in its judgment, having taken into account the circumstances of the occurrence and consequences of this accident, the deceased child's age, family relationships, and other circumstances revealed in the pleadings in this case.
3. Regarding Limitation of Liability
Where liability for damages is recognized but the amount of damages is limited in light of the ideal of the damages system, namely the equitable distribution of loss, upon consideration of all relevant circumstances, the fact-finding and the determination of the ratio concerning the grounds for reduction of liability fall within the exclusive authority of the court of fact-finding instance, unless found to be significantly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da92466, decided June 11, 2009, among others).
The lower court determined that, considering the circumstances of the occurrence of this accident, the degree of the Defendants' breach of the duty of care, the fact that the deceased child, being only 4 years old, required careful protection from a guardian in an environment such as the swimming pool at issue, and the fact that when a child enters a swimming pool without a guardian, measures such as requiring the wearing of a life jacket or the use of a tube are necessary but such measures were not taken, among other circumstances, together with the ideal of the damages system, whose guiding principle is the fair and equitable distribution of loss, it was reasonable to limit the Defendants' liability ratio to 60%.
Examining the record in light of the above legal principle, there is no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, in the lower court's misapprehension of the facts concerning the grounds for limitation of liability or in its misapprehension of the legal doctrine concerning the ratio of limitation of liability.
4. Conclusion
The part of the judgment below concerning lost income against Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further deliberation and judgment; the remaining appeal of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2, and the appeal of Plaintiff 3, are all dismissed as being without merit; and the costs of appeal arising between Plaintiff 3 and the Defendants shall be borne by Plaintiff 3. The judgment is rendered as stated in the Order. With respect to the grounds of appeal concerning the working-age limit, apart from the separate opinions of Justice Cho Hee-dae and Justice Lee Dong-won, and the separate opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung, the opinions of the participating Justices were unanimous.
5. Separate Opinion of Justice Cho Hee-dae and Justice Lee Dong-won Concerning the Working-Age Limit
A. We agree with the Majority Opinion that, although the Supreme Court has, since the prior en banc decision, regarded the empirical working-age limit for manual labor as 60 years, this view can no longer be maintained due to changes in the various circumstances that formed the basis of that empirical rule, and that, absent special circumstances, it is consistent with the empirical rule to hold that a person may work beyond the age of 60.
However, we cannot agree with the view, as set forth in the reasoning of the Majority Opinion, that it is consistent with the empirical rule to regard the working-age limit for manual labor as 65 years.
B. Specifically, for the following reasons, we cannot agree with the Majority Opinion, and we state that it is appropriate to regard the empirical working-age limit for manual labor as 63 years.
(1) An empirical rule refers to a rule of factual judgment concerning the nature of things or causal relationships, derived inductively from individual experiences; as it is a form of judgment based on common perceptions derived from specific empirical facts, its content of judgment inevitably changes according to changes in the empirical facts forming its basis (see the prior en banc decision). Meanwhile, proof of facts in civil litigation need not be scientific proof admitting of no doubt whatsoever, but, absent special circumstances, requires proving, through comprehensive examination of all evidence in light of the empirical rule, a high degree of probability sufficient to acknowledge that a certain fact existed, and such determination must be one in which an ordinary person could have confidence in its truthfulness without harboring doubt (see Supreme Court Decision 99Da65097, decided February 25, 2000; Supreme Court Decision 2008Da6755, decided October 28, 2010, among others). Therefore, the empirical rule that functions as the standard for factual judgment likewise need not be recognized to the extent of being a necessary and absolutely certain law, but must have a high degree of probability sufficient to allow an ordinary person to have confidence in its truthfulness without harboring doubt.
Accordingly, the empirical rule concerning the working-age limit can properly be called an empirical rule only when, after verifying the facts as to the actual age up to which ordinary persons in our society work, and after evaluating this in light of various statutes and norms, such as the statutory retirement age, pensions, and other social welfare systems in our society, so as to achieve consistency therewith, a working-age limit is presented to which the members of our society would not harbor doubt.
(2) Korea's per capita GDP, statutory retirement age, actual retirement age, economic participation rate, the age at which National Pension and other benefits commence, and eligibility for employment insurance are as set forth above in the Majority Opinion.
(3) However, in light of the foregoing standard for the empirical rule concerning the working-age limit, we cannot but raise doubts as to the Majority Opinion's conclusion that, on the premise of the above empirical facts, “it is now consistent with the empirical rule to generally regard the working-age limit for manual labor as extending beyond 60 years to 65 years.”
This is because, in light of the facts set forth below, it is difficult to say that generally regarding the working-age limit for manual labor as 65 years is something an ordinary person could believe without doubt, as it exceeds the objective factual relationships. We believe that, in declaring the empirical rule, the Majority Opinion has, under the guise of an empirical rule, declared a result reflecting consideration of what direction it would be desirable for our society to move in, rather than a result obtained from the realm of fact and norm.
(A) Although the economic participation rate of elderly persons aged 60 to 64 is on an increasing trend, it has increased only from 52.0% at the time of the prior en banc decision to 61.7% in August 2015 and 61.5% in December 2017, i.e., by only 9.7 percentage points and 9.5 percentage points respectively, and moreover, this rate is markedly lower than the economic participation rate of approximately 80% for those aged 25 to 59 (the same holds true in terms of employed persons and employment rate). Meanwhile, although the economic participation rate for those aged 65 or older has risen from 25.8% at the time of the prior en banc decision to 32.9% in August 2015, 28.2% in December 2015, and 29.5% in December 2017, it can be seen that this rate is markedly lower than the economic participation rate for those aged 60 to 64.
Moreover, a figure in the low 60% range for the economic participation rate is a rate appropriate for persons of a middle age within the 60 to 64 age bracket, and it is readily apparent that, by age 64, the economic participation rate would fall below this figure.
Furthermore, the economic participation rate refers to the ratio of the economically active population (the sum of the employed and unemployed) among the population aged 15 or older, and an “employed person” refers to a person who worked for one hour or more during one week for the purpose of earning income; accordingly, it must be noted how great a discrepancy exists between the concept of the economic participation rate itself and the present case, which concerns the working-age limit of a manual laborer engaged in urban daily labor for 22 days per month.
In conclusion, it is difficult to find that there has been such a marked increase in the economic participation rate, compared to the time of the prior en banc decision, as would warrant raising the working-age limit from 60 to 65 years, and moreover, the figure itself is difficult to regard as sufficient to allow the working-age limit for manual labor to be generally accepted, without doubt, as 65 years.
(B) It is also difficult to regard raising the working-age limit by five years, from 55 to 60, as qualitatively the same as raising it by five years, from 60 to 65.
Generally, it is difficult to regard physical condition, health condition, and continuity of labor provision as being the same between the ages of 55 to 60 and 60 to 65. The probability of contracting disease sharply increases, and physical strength declines, as one grows older; and compared to the effect of the extension of average life expectancy over time, the effect of the extension of healthy life expectancy is small, and this is supported by the steep rate of increase in the mortality rate after age 60.
That is, as noted in the Majority Opinion, while average life expectancy has been on an extending trend, from 67.0 years for men and 75.3 years for women at the time of the prior en banc decision, to 79.0 years for men and 85.2 years for women in 2015, and to 79.7 years for men and 85.7 years for women in 2017, healthy life expectancy according to the National Statistical Office (meaning the period of maintaining a healthy life, excluding the period suffering from disease or injury, out of the expected lifespan) has, by contrast, tended to decrease, from 65.7 years in 2012 to 65.2 years in 2014 and 64.9 years in 2016.
Moreover, according to the 2015 Life Tables published by the National Statistical Office, the probability of death is 0.00254 at age 50, 0.00360 at age 55, 0.00520 at age 60, and 0.00791 at age 65, with the increments growing larger at 0.00106, 0.00160, and 0.00271 respectively, and this pattern is the same for 2016 and 2017.
(C) Meanwhile, with respect to infants such as the deceased child (approximately 4 years and 5 months old at the time of death) who died in this accident, there are many variables, such as the occurrence of accidents, before reaching adulthood; accordingly, no one would dispute that the probability that an infant would survive in good health, without any accident, until age 60 or beyond, and be able to work, is lower than the probability that an adult who has remained healthy and able to work up to the time of the accident would survive in good health, without any accident, until age 60 or beyond, and be able to work.
Looking only at the 2015 Life Tables published by the National Statistical Office, the cumulative probability of death from age 51 to 60 is 0.03817, and the cumulative probability of death from age 41 to 60 is 0.05572; thus, the younger and the earlier the age group, the higher the cumulative probability of death, and in particular, the cumulative probability of death from age 4, the age group of the deceased victim in this case, to age 60 is 0.06974, which is far higher than the probability of death at age 60, namely 0.00520.
(D) According to the 2017 Annual Report on the Economically Active Population published by the National Statistical Office, in 2015 the proportion of persons aged 60 or older within the farm household economically active population (47.24%) was markedly higher than the proportion of persons aged 60 or older within the non-farm household economically active population (11.32%), and similarly in 2017, the proportion of persons aged 60 or older within the farm household economically active population (51.47%) was markedly higher than the proportion of persons aged 60 or older within the non-farm household economically active population (12.96%); in light of this reality, urban daily labor and rural daily labor cannot be evaluated in the same manner.
Reflecting such realities, the Special Act on Improving the Quality of Life of Farmers and Fishermen and Promoting Development of Agricultural and Fishing Villages (농어업인 삶의 질 향상 및 농어촌지역 개발촉진에 관한 특별법) was amended, and, pursuant to that Act, the “Standard Terms and Conditions for Automobile Insurance” (자동차보험에 관한 표준약관), as amended and effective from May 29, 2018, set the employable age limit for farmers and fishermen at 65 years; thus, while there is now normative and institutional support for raising the working-age limit for farmers and fishermen to 65 years, there remains no normative or institutional support for raising the employable age limit to 65 years for persons other than farmers and fishermen.
(E) Furthermore, the general statutory retirement age remains 60 years, and it was only as recently as January 1, 2017, that the statutory retirement age of 60 years or older became mandatory even for all workers in the private sector.
Moreover, the social security system for old age and the necessity of labor by the elderly population are mutually related. However, although the age at which National Pension benefits commence has been gradually raised, it is only 61 years in 2015 and 62 years in 2018, and remains only 63 years even in 2023, four years later, reaching 65 years only from 2033 onward, fourteen years later. The ages at which Government Employees Pension and Private School Faculty Pension benefits commence are similarly only 60 years until 2021, and remain only 63 years in 2027, eight years later, reaching 65 years only from 2033 onward, fourteen years later.
(4) Considering the circumstances discernible from the foregoing facts—namely, that the economic participation rate for those aged 60 to 64 is approximately 60%, that the probability of death sharply increases after that age group, that, in particular, the younger the victim, the higher the probability of dying before reaching that age group, and that the general statutory retirement age and pension benefit commencement age have not, as of 2018, exceeded 63 years and are not expected to change significantly in the near future—it is reasonable to consider that, ordinarily, a person engages in economic activity up to age 63, and, in the end, 63 years, which appropriately reflects average life expectancy, economic participation rate, and the relationship with the social security system, may be regarded as the appropriate working-age limit for manual labor.
C. In conclusion, we agree with the Majority Opinion's conclusion that this case should be reversed and remanded, but we set forth this Separate Opinion, opposing the view that the appropriate working-age limit for manual labor is 65 years.
6. Separate Opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung Concerning the Working-Age Limit
A. There is no disagreement between the Majority Opinion and this Separate Opinion that the Supreme Court's view regarding the working-age limit for manual labor as 60 years can no longer be maintained, and that, absent special circumstances, it should be held that a person can work beyond the age of 60. However, we cannot agree with the Supreme Court declaring the working-age limit for manual labor uniformly at a specific age, such as 65 or 63 years.
This conclusion can be derived in light of the meaning and nature of the empirical rule, the method of determining the empirical rule concerning the working-age limit, and the distribution of authority between the fact-finding instance and the legal instance. The detailed reasons are as follows.
B. (1) First, it is necessary to consider the meaning of determining the working-age limit for manual labor by an empirical rule.
The rule of experience, that is, the empirical rule, is a rule of factual judgment obtained inductively from human experience. Moreover, since proof of facts in civil litigation must establish a high degree of probability sufficient for an ordinary person to have confidence in its truthfulness without harboring doubt, the empirical rule, as a rule of factual judgment, must likewise have a high degree of probability (see Supreme Court Decision 89Dakka7730, decided June 26, 1990, among others).
In this manner, in order for a rule derived from human experience, observation of social phenomena, or statistical analysis to have effect as an empirical rule, it must be recognized as a legal norm in accordance with the common perception and confidence of the members of society regarding such rule, and it must conform to the overall legal order as formed at the time of its application. Therefore, in deriving an empirical rule, social and economic reality and legal norms must be considered together. This applies equally to the empirical rule concerning the working-age limit for manual labor.
(2) There are broadly three methods of determining the working-age limit.
First, the method of determining it in the same manner as the statutory retirement age. The statutory retirement age is uniformly determined without considering an individual's physical strength, ability, and the like. In the case of a person subject to a statutory retirement age, even if it is statistically likely that the person would not have worked until the statutory retirement age, the statutory retirement age is recognized as the working-age limit at the time the person suffers injury or dies.
In Germany, except for occupations subject to special provisions regarding retirement age, the statutory general retirement age for ordinary employed workers was originally 65 years, but was raised to 67 years for all persons born after 1963, pursuant to the amendment of Article 35 of Book VI of the German Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch; SGB), effective January 1, 2008. This was intended to curb the increase in pension contributions and to raise the pension level, in consideration of the increasing life expectancy and the decreasing birth rate. In practice, there are not many cases in which a person engages in income-earning activity up to the statutory retirement age, and the age at which income-earning activity is engaged in also differs according to occupation and gender. Nevertheless, German case law generally recognizes the statutory retirement age as the working-age limit, without considering personal factors, such as the employed worker's age, occupation, and health condition, and statistical facts concerning the actual age of income-earning activity. In particular, where the victim suffered the accident at a young age, the working-age limit is determined by predicting, in light of the victim's intellectual capacity, physical condition, surrounding environment, and the like, what occupation the victim would have obtained had the accident not occurred, and then applying the statutory retirement age set for that occupation as the working-age limit (see German Federal Supreme Court Judgment of May 30, 1989, BGH NZV 1989, 345; German Federal Supreme Court Judgment of October 5, 2010, BGH NJW 2011, 1148, among others).
Second, the method of determining the working-age limit as an empirical rule based on specific empirical facts, particularly statistics. Since the empirical rule is a rule of factual judgment obtained inductively from human experience, the empirical working-age limit is likewise premised on reflecting, to the maximum extent possible, the reality of actual working ability or possibility. If this method is to be thoroughly implemented, then, just as with the question of how long a person can work, the question of from what age a person can begin to work should likewise be determined on the basis of specific empirical facts.
Japan's Act on Stabilization of Employment of Older Persons (고연령자 등의 고용의 안정 등에 관한 법률) sets the statutory retirement age at 60 years and provides that there is an obligation to make efforts to secure employment up to age 65. However, the working-age limit is not determined in accordance with this retirement age, but is determined by considering personal factors such as the victim's career, age, occupation, and health condition, together with statistical data such as the average working-age period and average life expectancy. In practice, considering the above factors, the working-age limit is generally recognized as 67 years, and the age at which a person can begin working is also determined by considering the actual age from which a person can begin to work. Meanwhile, for infants, the working-age limit is generally recognized only from age 18 to age 49, on the ground that the probability of surviving in good health and being able to work is statistically lower than that of an adult.
Third, the method of recognizing the working-age limit up to the statutory retirement age, but reflecting empirical facts or statistical data at the stage of recognizing it up to a specific age beyond that. This combines the first and second methods. The statutory retirement age is uniformly determined without considering an individual's physical strength, ability, and the like. This is premised on the normative judgment that, regardless of actual reality, anyone can work up to the statutory retirement age. In determining the working-age limit for manual labor as well, it should generally be held that a person can work up to the statutory retirement age. However, in order to recognize a working-age limit exceeding the statutory retirement age, personal factors such as the victim's age, occupation, and health condition, as well as social and economic reality, must be considered.
(3) Under the first method, where the statutory retirement age norm fails to correspond to social and economic reality, the working-age limit inevitably comes to be recognized at an age lower than the age at which a person can actually work. Moreover, since there are cases in which a person actually finishes income-earning activity at an age earlier than the statutory retirement age, as well as many cases in which a person engages in income-earning activity even beyond the statutory retirement age, there is a great likelihood of a gap arising between the legal norm and social and economic reality. Determining the working-age limit based on the statutory retirement age makes it difficult to appropriately respond to our reality, in which aging is intensifying and social conditions are rapidly changing. In particular, this method cannot be followed where the statute does not set a retirement age for the relevant occupation and the statutory retirement age provisions cannot be applied by analogy.
The second method allows social and economic reality to be thoroughly reflected, but has the problem that, each time the empirical working-age limit is to be determined, the victim's personal factors and the relevant statistics must be investigated. Furthermore, unlike the statutory retirement age, which normatively presumes that anyone can work up to the retirement age, when the empirical working-age limit is determined to be an age earlier than the retirement age, the problem of unreasonable discriminatory treatment arises. Even where the empirical rule is invoked to determine the working-age limit at an age later than the statutory retirement age, it is not easy to present the empirical facts or statistical data forming the basis for that determination. Although past practice has purported to determine the working-age limit by an empirical rule, in reality it can be said that the age deemed appropriate by the judge, with reference to retirement age provisions and the like, was recognized as the working-age limit.
Considering Korea's statutory retirement age and social reality, the third method is the most appropriate method for determining the working-age limit.
As seen above, in order for an empirical rule to have legal effect, it must be in harmony with the overall legal order, including relevant statutes. Therefore, in determining the empirical working-age limit, where there is a relevant statute, it should in principle be determined in accordance with that statute. The Elderly Employment Act contains a mandatory provision requiring, in the private sector, effective January 1, 2017, that the retirement age for all workers be set at “60 years or older” (Article 19). It has become the normative foundation of our society that anyone, without regard to differences in individual physical strength or ability, can work up to “60 years or older.” Therefore, the empirical working-age limit should likewise, absent special circumstances, be set at least at “60 years or older.” There is no reason to view this differently merely because it concerns the working-age limit for manual labor.
However, up to what specific age a person can work beyond 60 years is not provided by statute. In order to recognize the empirical working-age limit as extending beyond 60 years to “a certain specific age,” various empirical facts, including social and economic reality—namely, social and economic conditions such as the average life expectancy of the population, economic level, and employment conditions, as well as the number of workers by age group, employment rate or labor participation rate, and working conditions by occupation—must be comprehensively considered. Since such empirical facts have the characteristic of reflecting the social conditions prevailing at any given time and of changing frequently with the passage of time, the empirical working-age limit for manual labor cannot be predetermined as extending beyond 60 years to “a certain specific age.”
Since predicting up to what age a person can work exceeds the limits of cognition and experience, the Supreme Court should confine itself to presenting a range for the working-age limit. The Majority Opinion presents 65 years as the working-age limit, but cannot provide any affirmative reason why it would be wrong to set the working-age limit at 64 or 66 years. While one might have the impression that 67 or 70 years is too old for the working-age limit, it cannot be demonstrated that this is wrong and that 65 years is correct.
Furthermore, in determining the empirical working-age limit, it is necessary to consider the age group to which the victim belongs. Where the victim, at the time of the accident, was an infant or otherwise had not yet reached adulthood, caution should be exercised in applying the empirical working-age limit beyond 60 years. By contrast, where the victim had already reached 60 years of age, it is easier to recognize the empirical working-age limit as extending beyond 60 years. If the victim, at the time of the accident, was between 65 and 70 years of age and continuing to engage in economic activity, then the empirical working-age limit should be recognized as extending even further. The third method can naturally reflect such circumstances as well.
(4) In light of this basic understanding, the Supreme Court should confine itself to presenting a comprehensive legal doctrine concerning the empirical working-age limit, and should not declare it definitively as a specific age.
Nevertheless, the reason for seeking to declare the empirical working-age limit definitively as 65 years (Majority Opinion) or 63 years (Separate Opinion of Justice Cho Hee-dae and Justice Lee Dong-won) is to change the Supreme Court's prior view that the empirical working-age limit is 60 years.
However, this approach differs from the manner of judgment in prior Supreme Court decisions. First, the prior en banc decision stated: “It is consistent with the empirical rule to generally hold that a person can work even beyond the age of 55; therefore, this Court's prior view regarding the empirical working-age limit for manual labor as 55 years is hereby abolished.” That is, it merely abolished the existing view regarding the empirical working-age limit as 55 years and held that it is consistent with the empirical rule to hold that a person can work even beyond the age of 55, without definitively declaring the specific age up to which a person can work beyond 55. Although there are many Supreme Court decisions concerning the working-age limit, none has ever definitively declared the empirical working-age limit uniformly as a specific age. Nor, in other countries, except where the statutory retirement age is treated as the working-age limit, is it easy to find an example of a specific age being designated as the working-age limit on the basis of an empirical rule.
It is difficult to say that there has been such a definite change in empirical facts as would warrant definitively declaring the empirical working-age limit as 65 or 63 years at this time. Nor can it be said to be an empirical rule to uniformly determine the working-age limit without considering personal factors such as the victim's health condition. Moreover, it is questionable whether it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to investigate empirical facts and declare a specific empirical working-age limit through an en banc decision each time there is a change in empirical facts warranting a different recognition of the empirical working-age limit.
Since the decisions of the lower courts have been inconsistent, there is a need for the Supreme Court to present a unified standard. However, the method by which the Supreme Court should present a unified standard is not, as in the Majority Opinion, to uniformly declare the working-age limit definitively as 65 years, but rather it would suffice to “present only that the general working-age limit for manual labor is 60 years or older, and, in a separate case where the fact-finding instance's judgment recognized 65 years, to determine that the judgment of the fact-finding instance was correct.”
In this judgment, both the Majority Opinion and the Separate Opinion of Justice Cho Hee-dae and Justice Lee Dong-won have decided not to abolish the prior en banc decision. This is because the prior en banc decision, which held that “a person can work even beyond the age of 55,” is not in conflict with this judgment, which declares that the empirical working-age limit for manual labor is “65 years.” However, since this judgment uniformly and definitively declares the empirical working-age limit for manual labor as 65 years, it may itself be abolished later, in accordance with changes in empirical facts, where it becomes necessary to recognize the limit as exceeding 65 years. The prior en banc decision itself abolished the existing view that regarded the working-age limit for manual labor, as a matter of empirical rule, as “55 years.”
(5) Even from the standpoint of the distribution of authority between the fact-finding instance and the legal instance, it is not appropriate for the Supreme Court to go beyond presenting a comprehensive legal doctrine concerning the empirical working-age limit and to declare it definitively as a specific age.
Judgment concerning the empirical rule is not purely a normative judgment. Such judgment involves a mixture of fact-finding and legal judgment. The working-age limit is determined based on fact-finding grounded in the victim's personal factors together with empirical understanding of human life and labor or various statistical data. Here, the purely factual determination belongs to the fact-finding instance. Even though the judgment concerning the empirical working-age limit is a normative judgment, the Supreme Court, as the legal instance, cannot itself make the fact-finding that forms the basis of such judgment. Nor is the Supreme Court better positioned than the fact-finding instance to make factual determinations. Even where a judge uses statistical data to make a factual determination, it must be presented in the pleadings so as to give the parties an opportunity to state their opinions, thereby ensuring that a party does not receive an unfavorable judgment that it did not anticipate. It is desirable for the Supreme Court's intervention in judgments concerning the empirical rule to take the form of providing direction or opening the way, where it determines that there has been a significant error in the process by which the fact-finding instance made factual determinations and derived the empirical rule.
Prior precedent likewise held that the specific age up to which a person could work beyond 55 years should be determined either by the fact-finding instance, which has the authority to conduct factual investigation, investigating empirical facts and other relevant circumstances to derive the working-age limit presumed as a matter of the empirical rule, or by considering the specific circumstances of the victim concerned, such as age, occupation, career, and health condition (see the prior en banc decision; Supreme Court Decision 2009Da100920, decided May 13, 2011, among others).
(6) Definitively declaring the empirical working-age limit as a specific age may become an obstacle to flexible judgment concerning the empirical working-age limit and may impede judgments with concrete reasonableness. Under the Majority Opinion, even in cases where it is judged appropriate in judicial practice to regard the working-age limit as less than 65 years, the working-age limit would inevitably have to be recognized as 65 years. And in situations where the working-age limit must be recognized as exceeding 65 years, consistency may be lost.
C. In addition, we note that, separately from the question of whether to raise the working-age limit, it is necessary, insofar as possible, to avoid determining the working-age limit differently according to occupation and the like.
Since the manner in which a person works does not change entirely according to occupation or type of work, discriminatory treatment based on who the person is, or based on occupation, should, insofar as possible, be restrained. Even under the current method of calculating damages, it is necessary to devise a method that can restrain excessive disparities in the amount of damages arising from differences in occupation, income, and the like.
For this reason as well, unless a case requiring reasonable discriminatory treatment exists, it is desirable to align, or make similar, the empirical working-age limit and the statutory retirement age. There is a problem in that the method of determining the working-age limit solely by reference to statistical figures concerning when a particular occupational group generally finishes income-earning activity and enters pension life confuses fact and norm. A method should be sought of amending statutes to reorganize retirement age provisions that generally apply, including to manual labor.
D. In conclusion, we agree with the Majority Opinion's conclusion that this case should be reversed and remanded, but we present this Separate Opinion on the ground that it is inappropriate to declare the empirical working-age limit for manual labor as a specific age.
7. Concurring Opinion of Justice Park Sang-ok and Justice Kim Seon-su, Supplementing the Majority Opinion
A. Korea's average actual retirement age is at a very high level compared to OECD member countries.
Based on 2011–2016 figures, the OECD member countries' average actual retirement age is 65.1 years for men and 63.6 years for women. In Germany, the actual retirement age is 63.3 years for men and 63.2 years for women, but the working-age limit is recognized as the statutory labor limit of 67 years. In Japan, the actual retirement age is 70.2 years for men and 68.8 years for women, and, as early as the 1960s, the working-age limit has generally been recognized as 67 years.
Based on 2011–2016 figures, Korea's average actual retirement age is 72 years for men and 72.2 years for women, which is not only the highest among OECD member countries, but also higher than the figures for Germany and Japan, which generally regard the working-age limit as 67 years.
The OECD assesses the economic participation rate of the elderly on the basis of the “55 to 64” age population, which appears to take into account the average actual retirement age. Korea (the Ministry of Employment and Labor) also uses the economic participation rate as an indicator in assessing employment trends and the like; the economic participation rate refers to the ratio of the economically active population to the working-age population, with the working-age population being based on the “15 to 64” age population, and, among this, the elderly economic participation rate being assessed based on the “55 to 64” age population, in accordance with the OECD standard.
B. It appears that the following circumstances are among the factors contributing to Korea's high actual retirement age as described above.
(1) First, as in other countries, the life expectancy has significantly increased due to changes in health conditions and other factors. As of 2017, life expectancy has increased by 12.7 years for men compared to 1989, when the previous en banc decision was rendered, reaching 79.7 years, and by 10.4 years for women, reaching 85.7 years.
According to a paper published in the medical journal "The Lancet" in 2017 by Imperial College London and the World Health Organization, Korea's life expectancy is expected to improve rapidly going forward, increasing to 91 years for women and 84.07 years for men by 2030. This is said to mean that Korea will have the highest level of life expectancy in the world.
(2) Healthy life expectancy is also at a high level, not far behind life expectancy.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), Korea's healthy life expectancy as of 2015 averaged 73.2 years, with 70.7 years for men and 75.1 years for women. On the other hand, the average healthy life expectancy announced by Statistics Korea was 65.7 years in 2012, 65.2 years in 2014, and 64.9 years in 2016. The reason for this discrepancy in healthy life expectancy figures is that Statistics Korea calculates healthy life expectancy based on the proportion of time not afflicted by disease or injury, whereas the WHO calculates it based on the proportion of time without restrictions on daily activities due to health problems.
There is an aspect in which it is difficult to conclude that the WHO's healthy life expectancy coincides with the age at which one can work, given that it is based on restrictions on "daily life" rather than "work" (the WHO-based healthy life expectancy appears to be higher than the age at which one can work). On the other hand, the Statistics Korea standard is too strict, in that even a person who is normally employed, if prescribed and taking medication such as antihypertensive drugs, would have that period counted as a period of illness, thereby shortening healthy life expectancy; thus, this standard, too, is difficult to regard as coinciding with the age at which one can work (the Statistics Korea-based healthy life expectancy appears to be lower than the age at which one can work).
Even under the Statistics Korea standard, which is stricter than the WHO's, the fact that healthy life expectancy is "equivalent to 65 years of age" may reasonably be interpreted as meaning that the physical conditions necessary to work are satisfied at least up to the age of 65.
(3) Amid these supporting physical conditions for continued work, it is a reality that, due to changes in perceptions regarding the family system and support in old age, changes in population structure, and the resulting changes in social systems and policies, there is a need to continue economic activity even after age 60, that is, even after the statutory retirement age.
(A) As the trend toward nuclear families has rapidly progressed, the era in which the head of household supported the entire family and was in turn supported by his children after retirement has already passed. Once children grow up, they become independent and maintain a separate livelihood, and it is now common for parents not to live with their children even after retirement. According to Statistics Korea's social survey results, as of 2017, among the population aged 60 or older, 69.4% do not live with their children, while only 30.6% live with their children, and this trend is expected to continue. Meanwhile, the view that the family should be responsible for parents' livelihood in old age has continuously declined: 40.7% in 2008, 36% in 2010, 33.2% in 2012, 31.7% in 2014, 30.8% in 2016, and 26.7% in 2018, while the view that one should resolve this on one's own has been on the rise: 11.9% in 2008, 12.7% in 2010, 13.9% in 2012, 16.6% in 2014, 18.6% in 2016, and 19.4% in 2018.
(B) Due to changes in population structure such as low birth rates, aging, and the increase in single-person households, it has become even more difficult to expect a retirement supported by one's children. As of 2018, the number of single-person households is approximately 5.7 million, accounting for 11.1% of the total population, and by 2045 it is projected to exceed 8 million, reaching 15.9%. In particular, the proportion of single-person households among the non-elderly population is expected to continue expanding, and it is predicted that support for the elderly by families will sharply decrease going forward. Ultimately, it appears that the situation in which all members of society must take responsibility for their own living and old age will increasingly expand, and the period of economic activity will naturally increase as well.
(C) The Constitution (헌법) and various other statutes require the State and others to take measures such as creating jobs for the elderly to secure income security in old age (Article 34 of the Constitution, Article 11 of the Framework Act on Low Birth Rate in an Aging Society (저출산·고령사회기본법), etc.). The age at which various pensions, such as the National Pension and the Government Employees Pension, begin to be paid has been extended to age 65, and the age at which one becomes eligible for benefits under various social security systems has been set at 65 or older. This may be seen as a legislative policy judgment made in consideration of the social and economic reality that a person can, and indeed should, earn income through his or her own labor at least until age 65.
(4) Changes have also occurred in the quality of labor and the labor environment.
In modern times, due to changes and developments in systems such as automation, mechanization, and safety improvements at industrial sites, it is no exaggeration to say that there is almost no labor site left that relies purely on physical strength as in the past. The rapid advancement of technology has brought about structural changes in the production methods of industries and organizations, which in turn has had an enormous impact on how humans work. While the phenomenon of existing jobs shrinking and being replaced by automated facilities is accelerating, on the other hand, it has become possible to create new jobs, improve working environments, and increase the efficiency of labor. As a result, it has become fully possible to engage in physical labor even at an advanced age, and this holds true across all areas of labor, whether at urban construction sites or at agricultural work sites in rural and fishing communities.
Since the demand of the times for automation is increasing every year due to labor shortages caused by low birth rates and aging, it is highly likely that the above phenomenon will continue or intensify further.
C. The fact that people are actually continuing economic activity even after age 60 is also clearly confirmed through other statistical figures.
(1) According to Statistics Korea's social survey results, as of 2015, the methods by which the population aged 60 or older secures living expenses were: the person or their spouse bearing the burden, 66.6%; support from children or relatives, 23%; and support from the government or social organizations, 10.4%. Among these, for the population aged 60 to 64, the proportion in which the person or their spouse bears the living expenses is 86.3%. As of 2017, the methods by which the population aged 60 or older secures living expenses were: the person or their spouse bearing the burden, 69.9%; support from children or relatives, 20.2%; and support from the government or social organizations, 9.9%. Among these, for the population aged 60 to 64, the proportion in which the person or their spouse bears the living expenses is 88.4%.
(2) According to Statistics Korea's Economically Active Population Survey, as of December 2018, the overall labor force participation rate was 62.2%, of which the rate for ages 20-29 was 63.2% (47.2% for ages 20-24, 76.6% for ages 25-29), 60.4% for ages 60-64, and 29.6% for ages 65 and older. The overall employment rate was 60.1%, with 57.7% for ages 20-29 (42.6% for ages 20-24, 70.6% for ages 25-29), 58.4% for ages 60-64, and 29.0% for ages 65 and older.
D. Although it has become possible to engage in economic activity even after age 60, it is difficult, as a matter of common experience (경험칙), to recognize the age limit for physical labor as being 65 or older.
This is because, as noted above, the Statistics Korea-based healthy life expectancy is approximately 64.9 years as of 2016, the labor force participation rate and employment rate sharply decrease starting at age 65, and most people begin to receive pension and social security benefits once they reach age 65 or older—all of which have been confirmed as empirical facts.
In this regard, the separate opinion of Justice Cho Hee-dae and Justice Lee Dong-won states that it is appropriate to regard age 63 as the age limit for physical labor as a matter of common experience; however, since it is difficult to distinguish the limit of physical labor capacity between ages 63 and 65, it is proper to regard age 65 as the limit.
(1) As mentioned in the separate opinion of Justice Cho Hee-dae and Justice Lee Dong-won, it may be true that the probability of contracting disease increases and physical strength declines as one grows older; however, this circumstance alone is insufficient to conclude that there is a clear distinction in the limit of physical labor capacity between ages 63 and 65.
Rather, insofar as the healthy life expectancy under the Statistics Korea standard has been confirmed to be "equivalent to 65 years of age," it is not unreasonable, and is in fact consistent with empirical facts, to hold that a person can work at least until age 65. While the WHO's healthy life expectancy can be said to be higher than the age at which one can work, given that it is based on restrictions on daily life rather than work, the Statistics Korea-based healthy life expectancy is nonetheless "equivalent to age 65" even though its standard is strict, in that healthy life expectancy is shortened even for a person normally employed if that person is prescribed and takes medication.
Furthermore, the age at which various pensions begin to be paid and the age at which one becomes eligible for social security benefits have already been set at 65, meaning that, normatively and institutionally, the age at which one can work is already regarded as being 65. This presupposes that there is no essential difference between age 63 and age 65. The reason the pension eligibility age was not raised to 65 all at once but was instead gradually adjusted upward through 2033 was to align with the global trend, seen in many countries such as the United States and Germany, of raising the pension eligibility age due to changes in the social environment such as increased life expectancy, while also protecting the rights of existing subscribers and minimizing the shock caused by the change in the system—not because it was thought that one would only be able to work until age 65 once the year 2033 arrived.
(2) As mentioned in the separate opinion of Justice Cho Hee-dae and Justice Lee Dong-won, it is true that the proportion of persons aged 60 or older among the economically active population in farming households is higher than that in non-farming households, and that, pursuant to the amended Special Act on Improving the Quality of Life of Farmers and Fishermen and Promoting Development of Agricultural and Fishing Villages (농어업인 삶의 질 향상 및 농어촌지역 개발촉진에 관한 특별법), the standard terms and conditions for automobile insurance have raised the retirable age for farmers and fishermen to 65. However, this circumstance alone cannot justify evaluating the customary age limit for urban daily labor differently from that for rural daily labor.
Aging due to low birth rates and increased life expectancy is a problem that arises not only in rural and fishing communities but also in cities. Nevertheless, the reason aging is more severe in rural and fishing communities than in cities is mainly the outflow of young people from rural and fishing communities, the resulting sharp decrease in the young population there, and the intensification of low birth rates. According to Statistics Korea's domestic population migration statistics, the "population aged 20-29" is increasing every year in the Seoul metropolitan area, including Seoul and Gyeonggi-do, while it is decreasing every year in other regions, including rural and fishing communities (even the metropolitan cities of Daejeon, Daegu, Busan, and Gwangju are experiencing annual decreases). Therefore, the fact that the proportion of elderly persons aged 60 or older among the economically active population is higher in farming households than in non-farming households is merely an arithmetic result naturally arising from social phenomena, and it is difficult to view it as being due to a difference in the working capacity of urban and rural populations. As noted above, due to changes in the quality of labor and the labor environment, it has become fully possible to engage in physical labor even at an advanced age, and this holds true across all areas of labor in both cities and rural and fishing communities. The fact that no other country sets different customary age limits for urban and rural areas also appears to be because there is no difference in the working capacity of urban and rural populations.
E. The separate opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung states that it is sufficient for the Supreme Court to declare that the customary age limit for labor capacity is "age 60 or older," and that going further to declare "a specific age of 60 or older" would be inappropriate, as it would exceed the scope of judgment appropriate to a court of law (법률심). However, in light of the legal nature of common experience (경험칙) and other factors, the Supreme Court, as a court of law, can, through its normative judgment, specifically declare that the customary age limit for labor capacity is "age 65."
(1) Common experience (경험칙) refers to a "rule" of fact-finding, that is, a rule that functions as a premise for fact-finding rather than as a specific fact itself. Although it is derived from empirical facts and may therefore change according to changes in empirical facts, it is a kind of rule that the court may determine on its own initiative, without being bound by the parties' assertions or evidence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 76Da983, delivered on July 13, 1976). A finding of fact that contravenes common experience departs from the limits of free evaluation of evidence and constitutes an unlawful ground for appeal (Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act (민사소송법)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court, as a court of law, may make normative determinations as to what changes have occurred in empirical facts and what common experience has changed as a result, and as to whether a fact-finding contravenes such common experience. Meanwhile, the empirical facts that serve as the basis for deriving common experience include not only the content of statutory provisions but also statistical data officially announced by international organizations and state agencies, as well as facts of common judicial notice.
The same applies to the customary age limit for labor capacity. The Supreme Court, as a court of law, may determine what the customary age limit for labor capacity is. In doing so, it may determine that the customary age limit for labor capacity is merely "a certain age or older," but it may also determine it as "up to a specific age beyond that." There is no need to hold otherwise merely because common experience has the characteristic of constantly changing due to ever-changing empirical facts, or because fact-finding is a matter for the court of fact (사실심).
Due to the variable nature of common experience, both "a certain age or older" and "up to a specific age beyond that" are inevitably variable, albeit to differing degrees. Therefore, just as it is possible to determine "a certain age or older," it must be held that it is likewise possible to determine "up to a specific age beyond that." Even so, there is no risk of undermining concrete appropriateness in specific cases. Even if the customary age limit for labor capacity is set at "a specific age," if there are special circumstances in a specific case warranting a different determination of the age limit than the customary age limit, it remains possible to set the age limit lower or higher accordingly. This is the view consistently maintained by precedent, including the previous en banc decision (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da100920, delivered on May 13, 2011).
Furthermore, the principle of free evaluation of evidence declared in Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act only means that the court need not be bound by formal, statutory rules of evidence; it does not permit arbitrary judgment by the judge. Therefore, fact-finding must be made in accordance with the principles of logic and experience, based on the ideals of justice and equity, through evidence with evidentiary capacity obtained through lawful procedures of evidence examination, and even though fact-finding falls within the exclusive authority of the court of fact, it must not exceed these limits (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da77198, 77204, delivered on April 13, 2012). Accordingly, where a fact found by the court of fact (the age limit for labor capacity) contravenes common experience (the customary age limit for labor capacity), the Supreme Court, as a court of law, may determine whether such contravention is unlawful, and, as a premise for doing so, it is only natural that it may determine the existence and content of the relevant common experience. Determining what the common experience is (what the customary age limit for labor capacity is)—that is, its existence and content (whether the customary age limit for labor capacity is "a certain age or older" or "up to a specific age beyond that")—does not fall within the exclusive fact-finding authority of the court of fact, even though elements of fact-finding may be involved in the process of making that determination. However, the court of fact may investigate whether there are special circumstances warranting recognition of an age limit for labor capacity different from the customary age limit for labor capacity, and may accordingly recognize an age limit higher or lower than the customary age limit for labor capacity; this falls within the exclusive fact-finding authority of the court of fact. To leave the determination of the content of common experience to the court of fact merely because elements of fact-finding are involved would be no different from leaving to the court of fact the determination of whether a finding of fact contravenes common experience and is thus unlawful, and such a view is difficult to accept.
(2) Declaring the customary age limit for labor capacity as "up to a specific age beyond that," rather than merely as "a certain age or older," is more appropriate in that it can promote legal stability and other such interests.
This is all the more true in the current situation, in which judgments on the customary age limit for labor capacity applied in recognizing a specific age limit for labor capacity differ among lower courts, causing confusion. If the Supreme Court determines only that the customary age limit for labor capacity is "a certain age or older" and leaves it to the lower courts to determine "up to a specific age beyond that," this would not only place a burden of deliberation on the lower courts but could also result in renewed confusion due to differing judgments among the lower courts.
Moreover, since the customary age limit for labor capacity has a significant impact on various economic actors, including the automobile insurance industry, there is also a need to specify the customary age limit for labor capacity so that each economic actor may take appropriate measures, such as reorganizing relevant systems, in response to changes in the customary age limit.
Furthermore, unlike at the time of the previous en banc decision, it is now possible, through statistical data officially announced by international organizations and state agencies, to sufficiently ascertain that not only life expectancy and the statutory retirement age but also other empirical facts have changed significantly, and on this basis, the Supreme Court can derive the specific age, beyond age 60, at which the customary age limit for labor capacity now stands.
(3) The customary age limit for labor capacity need not necessarily coincide with the statutory retirement age.
While the statutory retirement age serves as one empirical fact in deriving the customary age limit for labor capacity, it need not necessarily be equated with the customary age limit for labor capacity. The statutory retirement age is a matter to be resolved legislatively through coordination with other social systems, whereas the customary age limit for labor capacity is a matter of up to what age a person can, as a matter of common experience, engage in labor; if a person can work beyond the statutory retirement age, the customary age limit for labor capacity may be recognized as higher than the statutory retirement age.
In practice, following the previous en banc decision, courts have, in accordance with its purport, regarded the customary age limit for labor capacity as age 60. However, at the time of the previous en banc decision, the retirement age for technical civil servants (기능직공무원) engaged mainly in physical labor, such as railway workers, civil engineering workers, construction workers, and machinery workers, was only 58 years under the applicable statutes, and it was only after 2013 that the retirement age for most civil servants, including technical civil servants, was extended to 60. Furthermore, it was only from January 1, 2017 that the statutory retirement age of 60 or older became mandatory for all workers in the private sector.
Although the current statutory retirement age is 60 or 60 or older, it is predicted that, in line with changes in reality and empirical facts, once the customary age limit for labor capacity is first adjusted upward, official retirement ages such as pension enrollment age and the statutory retirement age will also be improved in the direction of being raised accordingly.
F. In conclusion, now that empirical facts such as life expectancy have changed significantly compared to the time of the previous en banc decision, it is generally possible, absent special circumstances, to work beyond age 60, and, in light of all the circumstances, it is appropriate to regard the customary age limit for physical labor as age 65. The foregoing is set forth as a supplementary opinion to the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justice Cho Hee-dae, Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Park Sang-ok (Reporting Justice), Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Cho Jae-yeon, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Kim Seon-su, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hee