[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff 1 (Attorneys of Jungwon Law Firm Bae Ju-han and one other, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Seoyeon E&G Co., Ltd. (formerly: Seoyeon Co., Ltd.) (Kim Hee-chan, Attorney for the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Daegu District Court Decision 2018Na305213 dated January 16, 2019
[Order]
The part of the judgment below that ruled against the Plaintiff with respect to damages for lost income and future medical expenses is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Daegu District Court. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Regarding comparative negligence and limitation of liability
In tort cases, comparative negligence is a doctrine whereby the amount of damages is determined by taking into account the victim's negligence from the standpoint of fairness or good faith principles, and the matters to be considered in this regard include the degree of intent or negligence of the tortfeasor and the victim, and the extent to which each contributed to the occurrence of the unlawful act and the expansion of the damage. Factual findings regarding grounds for comparative negligence and the determination of the ratio thereof fall within the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, unless found to be significantly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Da227551 dated July 26, 2018).
The court below limited the Defendant's liability to 80%, taking into account that the Plaintiff's negligence—performing mold repair work, which carries a high risk of accidents, without taking sufficient safety measures—was one of the causes of the occurrence of this accident and the expansion of the resulting damage.
Upon examination in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the above determination by the court below does not contain any error that misapprehended the legal principles on comparative negligence or limitation of liability, or that exceeded the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, such that it would have affected the judgment.
2. Regarding the working-life expectancy age
A. It accords with the empirical rule that a person who performs general manual labor, or a person who mainly earns a livelihood through manual labor, can be deemed capable of working until the age of 65, absent special circumstances (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Da248909 dated February 21, 2019).
Furthermore, when a fact-finding court determines the working-life expectancy age for a person engaged in a specific occupation, rather than general manual labor as described above, the court may derive the working-life expectancy age presumed under the empirical rule by investigating various circumstances such as the average national life expectancy, economic conditions, employment conditions, and other social and economic factors, as well as the working-age population by age group, employment rate or labor participation rate, and occupation-specific working conditions and mandatory retirement age limits, or the court may determine the working-life expectancy age by considering the victim's specific circumstances, such as age, occupation, career, and health condition (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da100920 dated May 13, 2011, among others).
B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the working-life expectancy age of the Plaintiff, who had been engaged in mold repair work, should be deemed to be 65, and instead recognized it as until the age of 60.
However, in light of the fact that the working-life expectancy age of manual laborers now recognized under the empirical rule is 65, the court below should have investigated the various circumstances noted above and considered the Plaintiff's specific circumstances in determining the Plaintiff's working-life expectancy age as a person engaged in mold repair work. It appears that the court below, having concluded the oral argument and rendered judgment prior to the aforementioned en banc Decision 2018Da248909, failed to examine or consider such circumstances, and instead simply concluded, based on the previous empirical rule, that the Plaintiff's working-life expectancy age was until the age of 60. This determination by the court below contains an error that misapprehended the legal principles on the working-life expectancy age and failed to conduct the necessary examination, which affected the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
However, it should be noted that the court below recognized the average wage for the three months prior to this accident as the Plaintiff's monthly income serving as the basis for calculating lost income, and according to the record, the Defendant company's employment rules provide that employees' "mandatory retirement age is the last day of the month in which the employee reaches the age of 60" (at the time of this accident it was 55, but it appears to have been changed to 60 on March 14, 2017, prior to the conclusion of oral arguments in the court below). Accordingly, the court below, upon remand, will need to additionally determine whether the Plaintiff would have been able to earn income at a level similar to that at the time of this accident from the mandatory retirement age until the working-life expectancy age.
3. Regarding future medical expenses for complex regional pain syndrome
A. The principle of free evaluation of evidence declared in Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act (민사소송법) merely means that courts need not be bound by formal or statutory rules of evidence, but does not permit arbitrary judgment by judges. Accordingly, factual findings must be made based on admissible evidence obtained through lawful evidentiary procedures, in accordance with the principles of logic and experience and based on the ideals of justice and equity, and even though factual findings fall within the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, such findings must not exceed these bounds (see Supreme Court Decision 82Daka317 dated August 24, 1982; Supreme Court Decision 2006Da42610 dated October 11, 2007, among others).
B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts can be ascertained.
(1) Non-party, a physician in the Department of Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine at Dongsan Medical Center, Keimyung University, who conducted a physical examination of the Plaintiff, stated in the physical examination report dated August 9, 2017, submitted while the case was pending before the first instance court, that for patients with complex regional pain syndrome such as the Plaintiff, generally ① nerve treatment, ② medication therapy, ③ physical therapy, and ④ spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery are performed. In the Plaintiff's case, the physician opined that nerve treatment (such as nerve block procedures on the cervical and thoracic spine) could first be attempted, and if the resulting pain reduction proved ineffective, medication therapy could be administered, and if there was still no improvement thereafter, spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery could be attempted. In particular, regarding spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery, a trial implantation is first performed, and only if pain improves by 50% or more is permanent implantation performed, and since patient responses vary, a trial implantation must first be attempted.
(2) The Plaintiff received nerve treatment (nerve block procedures on the cervical and thoracic spine, etc.) three times at the aforementioned hospital, and the court below subsequently made an inquiry regarding the Plaintiff's treatment progress, etc. In a reply to the fact inquiry dated October 29, 2018, submitted while the case was pending before the court below, the physician Non-party stated the following opinion: "Treatment of the Plaintiff has not been concluded. Since nerve block procedures have short-lasting effects and have been determined to be ineffective, pain is currently being controlled through oral medication administration. Narcotic analgesics are being used, and the current dosage has been increased more than twofold compared to the initial dosage. If pain is to be controlled solely through oral medication going forward, there is a possibility that the dosage will need to be increased further. It is now time for the Plaintiff to undergo spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery, which is the last resort. Spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery is divided into two stages: the first is trial implantation, and when pain reduction is 50% or more at that stage, the second stage, permanent implantation, is performed. The Plaintiff first requires trial implantation, and permanent implantation is required when there is meaningful pain reduction. Until trial implantation is performed, it is difficult to predict the effect of pain reduction."
C. In calculating the amount of damages for the Plaintiff's future medical expenses arising from this accident, the court below determined that it was difficult to conclude that spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery was essential for treating the Plaintiff's complex regional pain syndrome, and therefore the cost thereof could not be regarded as future medical expenses.
However, examining the above factual relationship in light of the legal principles set forth above, the following determination can be made.
Prior to the conclusion of oral arguments in the court below, the Plaintiff had already received nerve treatment and medication therapy to treat the complex regional pain syndrome, but nerve treatment (nerve block procedures on the cervical and thoracic spine, etc.) had little effect on the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff still complains of pain even after being administered oral medication at a dosage more than twice the initial amount. For patients with complex regional pain syndrome who obtain little therapeutic effect from nerve treatment and medication therapy alone, as is the case here, spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery may be attempted, and the examining physician for the Plaintiff also mentioned the necessity of this procedure, opining that the Plaintiff first needs to undergo trial implantation. Nor does it appear from the record that there is any contradiction in the examining physician's opinion or any other circumstance conflicting therewith. Accordingly, the court below should have examined whether spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery could improve the pain and symptoms caused by the Plaintiff's complex regional pain syndrome (to determine this, the Plaintiff would need to undergo at least trial implantation), and what treatment, for what period, and at what cost would be required for the Plaintiff going forward if the Plaintiff were to undergo spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery (permanent implantation), and should have calculated the amount of damages for the Plaintiff's future medical expenses based thereon.
Nevertheless, even though medical opinion regarding the necessity of spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery was submitted as evidence, the court below hastily rejected this and concluded that such treatment was unnecessary for the Plaintiff, and calculated the Plaintiff's future medical expenses on this basis. This determination by the court below contains an error that misapprehended the legal principles on the calculation of future medical expenses and failed to conduct the necessary examination, or that exceeded the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, which affected the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
4. Conclusion
The part of the judgment below that ruled against the Plaintiff with respect to damages for lost income and future medical expenses is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and determination. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Roh Tae-ak (Presiding Justice), Kim Jae-hyung, Min Yu-sook (Justice in charge), Lee Dong-won