Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 2019다208472

Claim for Damages (Industrial Accident) (손해배상(산))손해배상(산)

Decided2021. 03. 11. Court대법원Case reversed and remanded (파기환송) - the worker's claim was not finally rejected, but sent back to the lower court for recalculation of damages under corrected legal standards.
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

A worker who developed Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) while performing mold repair work due to an industrial accident sued his company for damages. The Supreme Court of Korea (대법원) reversed and remanded the lower court's decision, applying a new legal standard that recognizes age 65 as the standard retirement age for physical laborers when calculating lost future income. While the 80% comparative negligence (과실상계) ratio assigned to the worker was upheld, the Court found that further review was needed regarding the worker's retirement age for damage calculations and the amount awarded for future medical expenses.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA mold repair worker suffered an industrial accident that caused Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) and sued his employer for damages.
  • OutcomeThe Supreme Court kept the worker's 80% fault ratio but ordered the lower court to recalculate lost income using a new standard retirement age of 65, and to review the future medical expense award more carefully.
  • LessonEmployers and workers alike should note that Korean courts now generally presume physical laborers can work until age 65, which increases potential damages in industrial accident cases.
Issues
  • Whether the 80% comparative negligence (과실상계) ratio assigned to the worker was appropriate
  • What standard should be used to determine the retirement/working age (가동연한) for a mold repair worker
  • Whether the amount awarded for future medical treatment costs for Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) was properly determined
Key reasoning

The Supreme Court applied a new empirical rule (경험칙) establishing that the standard working age (가동연한) for physical laborers should be presumed to be 65 years old, rather than the previously accepted lower age. Since the worker was engaged in mold repair, a form of physical labor, the lower court needed to reassess his lost income calculations under this updated standard. Additionally, the Court held that under the principle of free evaluation of evidence (자유심증주의), judges have discretion in determining future medical costs, but this discretion must still be exercised in accordance with logic and empirical rules, meaning the lower court's determination of future treatment costs required stronger reasoning and evidentiary support.

Full text (English, AI translation) 12,449 chars

[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff 1 (Attorneys of Jungwon Law Firm Bae Ju-han and one other, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Seoyeon E&G Co., Ltd. (formerly: Seoyeon Co., Ltd.) (Kim Hee-chan, Attorney for the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Daegu District Court Decision 2018Na305213 dated January 16, 2019

[Order]

The part of the judgment below that ruled against the Plaintiff with respect to damages for lost income and future medical expenses is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Daegu District Court. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed.

[Reasoning]

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Regarding comparative negligence and limitation of liability

In tort cases, comparative negligence is a doctrine whereby the amount of damages is determined by taking into account the victim's negligence from the standpoint of fairness or good faith principles, and the matters to be considered in this regard include the degree of intent or negligence of the tortfeasor and the victim, and the extent to which each contributed to the occurrence of the unlawful act and the expansion of the damage. Factual findings regarding grounds for comparative negligence and the determination of the ratio thereof fall within the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, unless found to be significantly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Da227551 dated July 26, 2018).

The court below limited the Defendant's liability to 80%, taking into account that the Plaintiff's negligence—performing mold repair work, which carries a high risk of accidents, without taking sufficient safety measures—was one of the causes of the occurrence of this accident and the expansion of the resulting damage.

Upon examination in light of the relevant legal principles and the record, the above determination by the court below does not contain any error that misapprehended the legal principles on comparative negligence or limitation of liability, or that exceeded the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, such that it would have affected the judgment.

2. Regarding the working-life expectancy age

A. It accords with the empirical rule that a person who performs general manual labor, or a person who mainly earns a livelihood through manual labor, can be deemed capable of working until the age of 65, absent special circumstances (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Da248909 dated February 21, 2019).

Furthermore, when a fact-finding court determines the working-life expectancy age for a person engaged in a specific occupation, rather than general manual labor as described above, the court may derive the working-life expectancy age presumed under the empirical rule by investigating various circumstances such as the average national life expectancy, economic conditions, employment conditions, and other social and economic factors, as well as the working-age population by age group, employment rate or labor participation rate, and occupation-specific working conditions and mandatory retirement age limits, or the court may determine the working-life expectancy age by considering the victim's specific circumstances, such as age, occupation, career, and health condition (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da100920 dated May 13, 2011, among others).

B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the working-life expectancy age of the Plaintiff, who had been engaged in mold repair work, should be deemed to be 65, and instead recognized it as until the age of 60.

However, in light of the fact that the working-life expectancy age of manual laborers now recognized under the empirical rule is 65, the court below should have investigated the various circumstances noted above and considered the Plaintiff's specific circumstances in determining the Plaintiff's working-life expectancy age as a person engaged in mold repair work. It appears that the court below, having concluded the oral argument and rendered judgment prior to the aforementioned en banc Decision 2018Da248909, failed to examine or consider such circumstances, and instead simply concluded, based on the previous empirical rule, that the Plaintiff's working-life expectancy age was until the age of 60. This determination by the court below contains an error that misapprehended the legal principles on the working-life expectancy age and failed to conduct the necessary examination, which affected the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.

However, it should be noted that the court below recognized the average wage for the three months prior to this accident as the Plaintiff's monthly income serving as the basis for calculating lost income, and according to the record, the Defendant company's employment rules provide that employees' "mandatory retirement age is the last day of the month in which the employee reaches the age of 60" (at the time of this accident it was 55, but it appears to have been changed to 60 on March 14, 2017, prior to the conclusion of oral arguments in the court below). Accordingly, the court below, upon remand, will need to additionally determine whether the Plaintiff would have been able to earn income at a level similar to that at the time of this accident from the mandatory retirement age until the working-life expectancy age.

3. Regarding future medical expenses for complex regional pain syndrome

A. The principle of free evaluation of evidence declared in Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act (민사소송법) merely means that courts need not be bound by formal or statutory rules of evidence, but does not permit arbitrary judgment by judges. Accordingly, factual findings must be made based on admissible evidence obtained through lawful evidentiary procedures, in accordance with the principles of logic and experience and based on the ideals of justice and equity, and even though factual findings fall within the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, such findings must not exceed these bounds (see Supreme Court Decision 82Daka317 dated August 24, 1982; Supreme Court Decision 2006Da42610 dated October 11, 2007, among others).

B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts can be ascertained.

(1) Non-party, a physician in the Department of Anesthesiology and Pain Medicine at Dongsan Medical Center, Keimyung University, who conducted a physical examination of the Plaintiff, stated in the physical examination report dated August 9, 2017, submitted while the case was pending before the first instance court, that for patients with complex regional pain syndrome such as the Plaintiff, generally ① nerve treatment, ② medication therapy, ③ physical therapy, and ④ spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery are performed. In the Plaintiff's case, the physician opined that nerve treatment (such as nerve block procedures on the cervical and thoracic spine) could first be attempted, and if the resulting pain reduction proved ineffective, medication therapy could be administered, and if there was still no improvement thereafter, spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery could be attempted. In particular, regarding spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery, a trial implantation is first performed, and only if pain improves by 50% or more is permanent implantation performed, and since patient responses vary, a trial implantation must first be attempted.

(2) The Plaintiff received nerve treatment (nerve block procedures on the cervical and thoracic spine, etc.) three times at the aforementioned hospital, and the court below subsequently made an inquiry regarding the Plaintiff's treatment progress, etc. In a reply to the fact inquiry dated October 29, 2018, submitted while the case was pending before the court below, the physician Non-party stated the following opinion: "Treatment of the Plaintiff has not been concluded. Since nerve block procedures have short-lasting effects and have been determined to be ineffective, pain is currently being controlled through oral medication administration. Narcotic analgesics are being used, and the current dosage has been increased more than twofold compared to the initial dosage. If pain is to be controlled solely through oral medication going forward, there is a possibility that the dosage will need to be increased further. It is now time for the Plaintiff to undergo spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery, which is the last resort. Spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery is divided into two stages: the first is trial implantation, and when pain reduction is 50% or more at that stage, the second stage, permanent implantation, is performed. The Plaintiff first requires trial implantation, and permanent implantation is required when there is meaningful pain reduction. Until trial implantation is performed, it is difficult to predict the effect of pain reduction."

C. In calculating the amount of damages for the Plaintiff's future medical expenses arising from this accident, the court below determined that it was difficult to conclude that spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery was essential for treating the Plaintiff's complex regional pain syndrome, and therefore the cost thereof could not be regarded as future medical expenses.

However, examining the above factual relationship in light of the legal principles set forth above, the following determination can be made.

Prior to the conclusion of oral arguments in the court below, the Plaintiff had already received nerve treatment and medication therapy to treat the complex regional pain syndrome, but nerve treatment (nerve block procedures on the cervical and thoracic spine, etc.) had little effect on the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff still complains of pain even after being administered oral medication at a dosage more than twice the initial amount. For patients with complex regional pain syndrome who obtain little therapeutic effect from nerve treatment and medication therapy alone, as is the case here, spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery may be attempted, and the examining physician for the Plaintiff also mentioned the necessity of this procedure, opining that the Plaintiff first needs to undergo trial implantation. Nor does it appear from the record that there is any contradiction in the examining physician's opinion or any other circumstance conflicting therewith. Accordingly, the court below should have examined whether spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery could improve the pain and symptoms caused by the Plaintiff's complex regional pain syndrome (to determine this, the Plaintiff would need to undergo at least trial implantation), and what treatment, for what period, and at what cost would be required for the Plaintiff going forward if the Plaintiff were to undergo spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery (permanent implantation), and should have calculated the amount of damages for the Plaintiff's future medical expenses based thereon.

Nevertheless, even though medical opinion regarding the necessity of spinal cord stimulator implantation surgery was submitted as evidence, the court below hastily rejected this and concluded that such treatment was unnecessary for the Plaintiff, and calculated the Plaintiff's future medical expenses on this basis. This determination by the court below contains an error that misapprehended the legal principles on the calculation of future medical expenses and failed to conduct the necessary examination, or that exceeded the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, which affected the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.

4. Conclusion

The part of the judgment below that ruled against the Plaintiff with respect to damages for lost income and future medical expenses is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and determination. The remainder of the appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.

Justice Roh Tae-ak (Presiding Justice), Kim Jae-hyung, Min Yu-sook (Justice in charge), Lee Dong-won

【참조조문】

[1] 민법 제396조, 제763조, 민사소송법 제202조, 제432조

[2] 민법 제393조, 제750조, 제763조

[3] 민사소송법 제202조

【참조판례】

[1] 대법원 2018. 7. 26. 선고 2018다227551 판결(공2018하, 1843) / [2] 대법원 2019. 2. 21. 선고 2018다248909 전원합의체 판결(공2019상, 781), 대법원 2011. 5. 13. 선고 2009다100920 판결(공2011상, 1142) / [3] 대법원 1982. 8. 24. 선고 82다카317 판결(공1982, 877), 대법원 2007. 10. 11. 선고 2006다42610 판결(공2007하, 1742)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 4,409자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고, 상고인】 원고 1 (소송대리인 법무법인 중원 담당변호사 배주한 외 1인)

【피고, 피상고인】 서연이엔지 주식회사(변경 전 상호: 주식회사 서연) (소송대리인 변호사 김희찬)

【원심판결】 대구지법 2019. 1. 16. 선고 2018나305213 판결

【주 문】

원심판결 중 일실수입 및 향후치료비 손해에 관한 원고 패소 부분을 파기하고, 이 부분 사건을 대구지방법원에 환송한다. 나머지 상고를 기각한다.

【이 유】상고이유를 판단한다.

1. 과실상계와 책임제한에 관하여

불법행위에서 과실상계는 공평이나 신의칙의 견지에서 피해자의 과실을 고려하여 손해배상액을 정하는 것으로, 이때 고려할 사항에는 가해자와 피해자의 고의·과실의 정도, 위법행위의 발생과 손해의 확대에 관하여 어느 정도의 원인이 되어 있는지 등을 포함한다. 과실상계 사유에 관한 사실인정이나 그 비율을 정하는 것은 형평의 원칙에 비추어 현저히 불합리하다고 인정되지 않는 한 사실심의 전권사항에 속한다(대법원 2018. 7. 26. 선고 2018다227551 판결 참조).

원심은, 사고 위험이 높은 금형수리 업무를 하면서 충분한 안전조치를 취하지 않은 채 작업에 임한 원고의 과실이 이 사건 사고의 발생 및 그 손해 확대의 한 원인이 되었다는 점을 감안하여 피고의 책임을 80%로 제한하였다.

관련 법리와 기록에 비추어 살펴보면, 원심의 위와 같은 판단에 상고이유 주장과 같이 과실상계 내지 책임제한에 관한 법리를 오해하거나 논리와 경험의 법칙에 반하여 자유심증주의의 한계를 벗어나는 등으로 인해 판결에 영향을 미친 잘못이 없다.

2. 가동연한에 관하여

가. 일반육체노동을 하는 사람 또는 육체노동을 주로 생계활동으로 하는 사람은 특별한 사정이 없는 한 만 65세까지 가동할 수 있다고 보는 것이 경험칙에 합당하다(대법원 2019. 2. 21. 선고 2018다248909 전원합의체 판결 참조).

그리고 위와 같은 일반육체노동이 아니라 특정한 직종에 종사하는 사람에 대하여 사실심법원이 가동연한을 인정할 때에는, 국민의 평균여명, 경제수준, 고용조건 등의 사회적·경제적 여건 외에 연령별 근로자 인구수, 취업률 또는 근로참가율 및 직종별 근로조건과 정년 제한 등 제반 사정을 조사하여 이로부터 경험칙상 추정되는 가동연한을 도출하거나 피해자의 연령, 직업, 경력, 건강상태 등 구체적인 사정을 고려하여 그 가동연한을 인정할 수 있다(대법원 2011. 5. 13. 선고 2009다100920 판결 등 참조).

나. 원심판결 이유에 의하면, 원심은 금형수리 업무에 종사해온 원고의 가동연한을 만 65세로 보아야 한다는 원고의 주장을 배척하고, 만 60세가 될 때까지로 인정하였다.

그러나 원심은 이제 경험칙상 인정되는 육체노동 종사자의 가동연한이 만 65세라는 점에 비추어, 앞서 본 제반 사정을 조사하고 원고의 구체적인 사정들을 고려하여 금형수리 업무에 종사하는 자로서 원고의 가동연한을 인정하여야 한다. 원심은 위 2018다248909 전원합의체 판결 이전에 변론을 종결하여 선고한 탓에, 위와 같은 사정을 심리하거나 고려하지 않은 채 막연히 종전의 경험칙에 따라 원고의 가동연한을 만 60세가 될 때까지로 단정한 것으로 보인다. 이러한 원심의 판단에는 가동연한에 관한 법리를 오해하여 필요한 심리를 다하지 않는 등으로 인해 판결에 영향을 미친 잘못이 있다. 이를 지적하는 취지의 상고이유 주장은 이유 있다.

다만, 원심은 이 사건 사고 이전 3개월간 평균임금을 일실수입 산정의 기초가 되는 원고의 월 소득으로 인정하였는바, 기록상 피고 회사의 취업규칙은 소속 근로자의 ‘정년을 만 60세(이 사건 사고 당시에는 55세였으나 원심 변론종결 전인 2017. 3. 14. 60세로 변경된 것으로 보인다)가 되는 월의 말일’로 정하고 있으므로 환송 후 원심으로서는 원고가 정년 이후 가동연한까지 이 사건 사고 당시와 같은 정도의 수입을 얻을 수 있는지 여부를 추가로 판단할 필요가 있음을 밝혀둔다.

3. 복합부위통증증후군에 대한 향후치료비에 관하여

가. 민사소송법 제202조가 선언하고 있는 자유심증주의는 형식적·법률적 증거규칙에 얽매일 필요가 없다는 것을 뜻할 뿐 법관의 자의적 판단을 허용하는 것은 아니므로, 사실의 인정은 적법한 증거조사절차를 거친 증거능력 있는 증거에 의하여 정의와 형평의 이념에 입각하여 논리와 경험의 법칙에 따라 하여야 하고, 사실인정이 사실심의 전권에 속한다고 하더라도 그 한도를 벗어나서는 안 된다(대법원 1982. 8. 24. 선고 82다카317 판결, 대법원 2007. 10. 11. 선고 2006다42610 판결 등 참조).

나. 원심판결 이유와 기록에 따르면, 다음 사실을 알 수 있다.

(1) 원고에 대한 신체감정을 실시한 계명대학교 동산의료원 마취통증의학과 의사 소외인은 제1심 계속 중인 2017. 8. 9.자 신체감정서에서 원고와 같은 복합부위통증증후군 환자에 대해서는 일반적으로 ① 신경치료, ② 약물치료, ③ 물리치료, ④ 척수신경 자극기 삽입술 등을 시행하는데, 원고의 경우 먼저 신경치료(경추 및 흉추에 대한 신경 차단술 등)를 시행해볼 수 있고, 이로 인한 통증 감소가 효과적이지 않으면 약물치료를 할 수 있으며, 그 후에도 호전되지 않으면 척수신경 자극기 삽입술을 시행해볼 수 있다는 의견을 밝혔다. 특히 척수신경 자극기 삽입술은 시험적 삽입술을 하여 통증이 50% 이상 호전되어야 영구적 삽입술을 실시하는데, 환자마다 반응이 달라 시험적 삽입술을 먼저 시행해 보아야 한다고 하였다.

(2) 원고는 위 병원에서 3회에 걸쳐 신경치료(경추 및 흉추에 대한 신경차단술 등)를 받았고, 그 후 원심은 원고의 치료경과 등에 대해 사실조회를 하였는데, 의사 소외인은 원심 계속 중인 2018. 10. 29.자 사실조회 회신에서 ‘원고에 대한 치료는 종결되지 않았다. 신경 차단술은 지속효과가 짧아 효과가 없는 것으로 판단하여 경구 약물 투여로 통증을 조절 중이다. 마약성 진통제를 사용하고 있고 현재 초기보다 2배 이상 증량된 상태이다. 향후 경구 약물로만 통증을 조절할 시 용량이 더 올라갈 가능성이 있다. 원고에게 최후 수단인 척수신경 자극기 삽입술이 필요한 시점이다. 척수신경 자극기 삽입술은 2단계로 나뉘는데, 첫 번째는 시험적 삽입술이고 이때 통증의 감소가 50% 이상일 때 두 번째 단계인 영구적 삽입술을 시행한다. 원고에게는 우선 시험적 삽입술이 필요하고 유의미한 통증감소가 있을 때 영구적 삽입술이 필요하다. 시험적 삽입술을 시행하기 전까지는 통증감소 효과에 대해 예측하기 어렵다.’는 의견을 밝혔다.

다. 원심은, 이 사건 사고로 인한 원고의 향후치료비 손해액을 산정하면서, 원고의 복합부위통증증후군 치료를 위해 척수신경 자극기 삽입술이 필수적이라고 단정하기 어려우므로, 그 비용을 향후치료비로 볼 수 없다고 판단하였다.

그러나 앞서 본 법리에 비추어 위와 같은 사실관계를 살펴보면 다음과 같이 판단할 수 있다.

원고는 원심 변론종결 전에 이미 복합부위통증증후군을 치료하기 위해 신경치료와 약물치료를 받았으나, 신경치료(경추 및 흉추에 대한 신경차단술 등)는 원고에게 별다른 효과가 없었고 초기보다 2배 이상 증량한 경구 약물을 투여하여도 여전히 통증을 호소하고 있다. 이처럼 신경치료 및 약물치료만으로 별다른 치료효과를 얻지 못하는 복합부위통증증후군 환자에 대해서는 척수신경 자극기 삽입술을 시행해볼 수 있는데, 원고에 대한 감정의도 그 시술의 필요성을 언급하면서 원고에게 먼저 시험적 삽입술을 시행해볼 필요가 있다는 의견을 밝히고 있다. 기록상 이러한 감정의의 의견에 모순이 있거나 이와 배치되는 다른 사정이 있다고 보이지도 않는다. 따라서 원심으로서는 척수신경 자극기 삽입술이 원고의 복합부위통증증후군에 의한 통증 및 증상을 개선할 수 있는지(이를 판단하기 위해 적어도 원고는 시험적 삽입술을 받아 볼 필요가 있을 것이다), 척수신경 자극기 삽입술(영구적 삽입술)을 받게 되면 원고에게 향후 어떤 치료가 어느 정도의 기간 동안 필요하며 그 소요비용은 어느 정도인지 등에 대해 심리한 다음 그에 근거하여 원고의 향후치료비 손해액을 산정하였어야 한다.

그런데도 원심은 척수신경 자극기 삽입술의 필요성에 관한 의학적 견해가 증거로 제출되었는데도 이를 섣불리 배척하고 원고에게 이러한 치료행위가 필요하지 않다고 단정한 후 이를 기초로 원고의 향후치료비를 산정하였다. 이러한 원심의 판단에는 향후치료비 산정에 관한 법리를 오해하여 필요한 심리를 다하지 않거나 논리와 경험의 법칙에 반하여 자유심증주의 한계를 벗어나는 등으로 인해 판결에 영향을 미친 잘못이 있다. 이를 지적하는 취지의 상고이유 주장은 이유 있다.

4. 결론

원심판결 중 일실수입 및 향후치료비 손해에 관한 원고 패소 부분을 파기하고, 이 부분 사건을 다시 심리·판단하게 하기 위하여 원심법원에 환송하며, 나머지 상고는 이유 없어 이를 기각하기로 하여, 관여 대법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 노태악(재판장) 김재형 민유숙(주심) 이동원

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