[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff (Attorneys of Law Firm Saram, Park Seong-min and 3 others, Counsel for the plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2016Nu59982 Decided April 7, 2017
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The Court determines the grounds of appeal.
1. Outline and progress of the case
A. The plaintiff's son, an unnamed person (date of birth omitted; hereinafter "the Deceased"), joined Samsung HRM Co., Ltd. on February 24, 2014, and was dispatched to work at a subcontractor (trade name omitted), where he performed duties such as sampling antennas built into mobile phones and conducting quality inspections.
On April 19, 2014, after arriving at work, at around 09:54, the Deceased worked together with a co-worker for approximately 10 minutes loading 80 boxes weighing about 5 kg each onto a freight truck, two or three boxes at a time. While walking to the office afterward, he suddenly collapsed and was taken to a hospital, but died of "cardiac tamponade due to rupture of a dissecting aortic aneurysm" (hereinafter "the injury or disease at issue").
On July 1, 2014, the plaintiff applied to the defendant for bereaved family benefits and funeral expenses under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법; hereinafter "the Industrial Accident Insurance Act"). However, on September 22, 2014, the defendant issued a decision denying payment of bereaved family benefits and funeral expenses (hereinafter "the disposition at issue"), on the ground that "it is difficult to recognize a proximate causal relationship between the injury or disease at issue, which caused the Deceased's death, and his work, and therefore it cannot be recognized as an occupational disease."
B. The plaintiff sought revocation of the disposition at issue, arguing that the Deceased's death constituted an occupational accident caused by overwork and stress. The court below, premising its decision on the well-established Supreme Court case law that, in order to be recognized as an occupational accident under Article 5, Subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, there must be a proximate causal relationship between the work and the accident, and that in such cases the burden of proving the causal relationship between the worker's work and the accident lies with the party asserting it, held that the circumstances relied upon by the plaintiff were insufficient to infer that the Deceased died as a result of the injury or disease at issue caused by excessive work, and therefore a proximate causal relationship between the Deceased's work and his death could not be recognized. Accordingly, the court below dismissed the plaintiff's claim.
2. The Supreme Court case law on the burden of proving proximate causal relationship, and the issue in this case
A. The Supreme Court has consistently held that "occupational accident" under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act refers to an accident occurring in the course of a worker's performance of duties and attributable to those duties, such that there must be a proximate causal relationship between the work and the accident, and that the burden of proving such proximate causal relationship lies with the party asserting it (see Supreme Court Decision 88Nu10947, decided July 25, 1989; Supreme Court Decision 99Du11424, decided May 12, 2000; Supreme Court Decision 2006Du4912, decided April 12, 2007, etc.).
Even after Article 37(1) was newly enacted when the Industrial Accident Insurance Act was wholly amended by Act No. 8694 on December 14, 2007 (hereinafter "the 2007 Amendment," and the provision of the Act prior to its amendment by Act No. 14933 on October 24, 2017 is hereinafter referred to as "the provision at issue"), the Supreme Court has maintained the position that "occupational accident" as referred to in Article 5, Subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and in the provision at issue means an injury, disease, physical disability, or death occurring in the course of a worker's performance of duties and attributable to those duties, such that there must be a proximate causal relationship between the work and the occurrence of the accident, and that such proximate causal relationship must be proved by the worker's side (see Supreme Court Decision 2014Du2546, decided October 30, 2014; Supreme Court Decision 2016Du43817, decided April 26, 2017; Supreme Court Decision 2015Du3867, decided August 29, 2017, etc.).
B. The issue in this case is whether, by virtue of the provision at issue, the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship between work and an accident should be regarded as having been shifted to the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service (hereinafter "the Service"), such that the Supreme Court's established case law should be overturned.
3. The system and legislative history of the relevant statutes
A. The concept and recognition criteria of "occupational accident" under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act
Article 5, Subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, in Chapter 1 (General Provisions), defines "occupational accident" as "a worker's injury, disease, disability, or death due to occupational causes." In order to receive insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, including the bereaved family benefits under Article 62(1) at issue in this case, one must be recognized as having suffered an "occupational accident" as defined in the above provision.
The provision at issue, titled "Criteria for Recognition of Occupational Accidents," provides: "Where a worker suffers an injury, disease, or disability, or dies due to any of the following causes, it shall be deemed an occupational accident: Provided, that this shall not apply where there is no proximate causal relationship (相當因果關係) between the work and the accident." It classifies the causes constituting occupational accidents into "occupational accidents [in the narrow sense]" (Subparagraph 1) and "occupational diseases" (Subparagraph 2). Subparagraph 1 provides for accidents occurring while a worker performs duties under an employment contract or acts incidental thereto [Items (a) through (f)]. Subparagraph 2 provides for diseases arising from handling or exposure to factors capable of causing health impairment to workers, such as physical agents, chemical substances, dust, pathogens, or physically burdensome duties, in the course of performing work [Item (a)]; diseases arising from an occupational injury [Item (b)]; and other diseases arising in connection with work [Item (c)].
B. Legislative history of the provision at issue
At the time of its enactment, the Industrial Accident Insurance Act contained only a definitional provision for "occupational accident" and made no provision regarding specific recognition criteria. The specific criteria for recognizing occupational accidents existed in the form of Ministry of Labor internal directives (예규), until they came to be provided for in the former Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (Ministry of Labor Ordinance No. 97) on April 29, 1995 (Articles 32 and 33).
However, as issues were raised that the above recognition criteria, having no basis in higher-level statutes, were merely internal administrative processing guidelines with no external binding effect on courts or the general public, the Industrial Accident Insurance Act was amended by Act No. 6100 on December 31, 1999, adding a second sentence to Article 4, Subparagraph 1, the definitional provision for "occupational accident," stating: "In this case, the criteria for recognizing occupational accidents shall be prescribed by Ministry of Labor Ordinance," thereby establishing a statutory basis for delegating the specific content of the recognition criteria for occupational accidents to subordinate regulations.
Subsequently, at the time of the 2007 Amendment, the provision at issue was newly enacted in the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, directly prescribing by type in the statute itself the recognition criteria for occupational accidents that had previously been delegated to the former Ministry of Labor Ordinance, while providing that the specific recognition criteria be prescribed by Presidential Decree (Article 37(3)).
4. The proper interpretation of the provision at issue and the validity of the Supreme Court case law
Considering the requirements for payment of insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the overall content and structure of the provision at issue, the legislative background and purpose, and the relationship with other accident compensation systems, the provision at issue, newly enacted by the 2007 Amendment, cannot be construed as a provision that distributes or shifts to the Service the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship between work and an accident, which is required for recognizing an "occupational accident" under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. It is appropriate to hold that, even after the 2007 Amendment, the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship between work and an accident lies with the worker asserting the occupational accident, and the existing case law should therefore be maintained. The specific reasons are as follows.
A. The proper interpretation of the provision at issue
1) Article 5, Subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act defines "occupational accident" as "a worker's injury, disease, disability, or death due to occupational causes." Article 36(1) enumerates the types of insurance benefits, including medical care benefits, and Article 36(2) provides that each insurance benefit shall be paid upon the claim of the entitled recipient. In addition, Articles 40, 52, 57, and 62 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act respectively provide for the grounds for payment, entitled recipients, calculation criteria, and payment timing of medical care benefits, temporary layoff benefits, disability benefits, and bereaved family benefits. Each of these provisions makes payment of the relevant insurance benefit conditional on a worker's injury, disease, or disability occurring, or death occurring, due to occupational causes, thereby making the existence of a causal relationship between work and the accident a requirement for payment of insurance benefits.
2) The provision at issue classifies occupational accidents into occupational accidents [in the narrow sense] and occupational diseases and provides detailed recognition criteria therefor. Each item under each subparagraph of the provision at issue likewise makes the relatedness and causal relationship between work and the accident or disease a requirement for recognizing an occupational accident, i.e., a requirement for payment of insurance benefits. For example, Item (b) of Subparagraph 2 of the provision at issue provides that a causal relationship must be recognized between an occupational injury and a disease. In particular, Item (c) of Subparagraph 2 of the provision at issue, as a general recognition criterion for occupational diseases not readily included in Items (a) or (b) of Subparagraph 2, makes clear that in order for a disease occurring to a worker to be regarded as an occupational accident, relatedness and a causal relationship must be recognized between the disease and the work. The same holds true for Item (f) of Subparagraph 1 of the provision at issue, concerning occupational accidents [in the narrow sense].
3) Meanwhile, the proviso of the provision at issue states: "Provided, that this shall not apply where there is no proximate causal relationship (相當因果關係) between the work and the accident." Where a statutory provision sets forth, in the form of a main clause and a proviso, the requirements necessary for the accrual of a right and the grounds for its impediment or extinguishment, there are cases where it is interpreted that the party asserting the accrual of the right bears the burden of proving the requisite facts prescribed in the main clause, while the party seeking to prevent it bears the burden of proving the requisite facts prescribed in the proviso. However, such a method of statutory interpretation, which primarily considers the formal structure of the main clause and proviso, can yield a valid conclusion where the statutory provision being interpreted clearly distinguishes between the matters to be proved under the main clause and under the proviso, respectively; but it should not be mechanically applied where, unlike that situation, the matters prescribed in the main clause and the proviso overlap in substance. Where, as in the provision at issue, the main clause already prescribes all the requirements necessary to be recognized as an occupational accident, including the causal relationship, such an interpretation cannot be adopted as is. Therefore, it is appropriate to construe the proviso of the provision at issue as being intended to confirm and explain that the causal relationship, which is the requirement for recognizing an occupational accident already prescribed in the main clause of the provision at issue, means the proximate causal relationship from a legal and normative perspective as referred to in Supreme Court precedents.
4) Comprehensively examining the concept of "occupational accident" under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the requirements for payment of insurance benefits, and the overall content and structure of the provision at issue as set forth above, it can be seen that in order to constitute an "occupational accident" as referred to in the provision at issue, a proximate causal relationship must be recognized between the work and the accident, and this, being a requirement for payment of insurance benefits, must be proved by the worker asserting it. The provision at issue, by prescribing in its main clause a causal relationship as a positive requirement for recognizing an occupational accident, and by prescribing in its proviso that such causal relationship means a proximate causal relationship, merely makes clear as a whole that a proximate causal relationship is required in order to recognize an occupational accident; it is not to be interpreted as a provision that shifts the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship, distributing to the Service the burden of proving its non-existence.
B. The legislative background and purpose of the provision at issue
1) Even in light of the legislative background and purpose of the provision at issue, it is difficult to regard the provision at issue as a provision that distributes or shifts to the Service the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship between work and an accident.
As noted above, before the 2007 Amendment, the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, without prescribing specific content regarding the recognition criteria for occupational accidents in the statute itself, delegated this to the subordinate Ministry of Labor Ordinance, and there was controversy that this constituted an impermissible blanket delegation. Subsequently, after prolonged discussion on overall improvement measures for the industrial accident compensation insurance system (hereinafter "the industrial accident insurance system"), the Government submitted to the National Assembly, in June 2007, an amendment bill for the Industrial Accident Insurance Act that mainly reflected the content agreed upon by the Economic and Social Development Commission. The National Assembly's Environment and Labor Committee, having examined the Government's amendment bill along with five other amendment bills for the Industrial Accident Insurance Act on June 21, 2007, resolved not to submit the Government's bill and other existing bills to the plenary session, but instead to propose to the plenary session a wholesale amendment bill for the Industrial Accident Insurance Act as an alternative bill of the Chair of the Environment and Labor Committee. Article 37 of the then-Chair's alternative bill, concerning the recognition criteria for occupational accidents, was identical in content to Article 35-2 of the Government's bill. However, while the agreement of the Tripartite Commission and the purposes of amendment stated in each bill included the resolution of the blanket delegation controversy, they contained no indication whatsoever of an intention to shift the burden of proving proximate causal relationship from the worker's side to the Service.
Meanwhile, during the review of the system and wording by the Legislation and Judiciary Committee regarding the Chair's alternative bill, the term "proximate causal relationship" was deleted from the phrase "any other accident (disease) having a proximate causal relationship with the work" in Item (f) of Subparagraph 1 and Item (c) of Subparagraph 2 of Article 37(1) of the alternative bill, and instead the following was added to the proviso of paragraph (1): "Provided, that this shall not apply where there is no proximate causal relationship between the work and the accident." Article 37(1) of the alternative bill, as thus revised in wording, was enacted as the provision at issue. According to legislative materials, it appears that the reason for this revision by the Legislation and Judiciary Committee was to prevent the risk that, if a proximate causal relationship were prescribed only in some of the sub-items of the recognition criteria, other items might be mistakenly understood as not requiring a proximate causal relationship, and to clarify the common principle that a proximate causal relationship between work and an accident is required as a requirement for recognizing an occupational accident.
2) In light of the legislative background and purpose of the provision at issue as set forth above, and in particular the fact that the proviso of the provision at issue was added only in the course of the wording revision, it can be seen that the purpose of the enactment of the provision at issue at the time of the 2007 Amendment was to resolve the blanket delegation controversy by directly prescribing by type in the statute itself the recognition criteria for occupational accidents that had previously been delegated to the Ministry of Labor Ordinance, while providing that the specific recognition criteria be prescribed by Presidential Decree, and to clarify the principle that a proximate causal relationship between work and an accident is required as a requirement for recognizing an occupational accident. It is difficult to find circumstances suggesting that, going further than this, the proviso of the provision at issue was intended to bring about a change in a matter that could fundamentally alter the operation of the industrial accident insurance system, such as shifting the burden of proving proximate causal relationship.
C. Relationship with other compensation systems
1) Relationship with the employer's accident compensation liability under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법)
Chapter 8 of the Labor Standards Act provides for the employer's liability to compensate for occupational injuries and diseases suffered by workers. In order for the employer's accident compensation liability under the Labor Standards Act to be established, there must be a proximate causal relationship between the work and the accident, and in such cases, the burden of proving the causal relationship between the work and the accident lies with the party asserting it (see Supreme Court Decision 88Nu5037, decided October 23, 1990, etc.). Meanwhile, Article 80(1) of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act provides that where the entitled recipient has received or is entitled to receive insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the employer who is the insured is exempted from accident compensation liability under the Labor Standards Act for the same cause.
Regarding the relationship between insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and the employer's accident compensation liability under the Labor Standards Act, the Supreme Court has held that insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act have the nature of the State, in the position of an insurer, directly compensating the worker for damages arising from an occupational accident that the employer would otherwise have to compensate under the Labor Standards Act, and that the industrial accident insurance system, in addition to its character of guaranteeing the livelihood of workers, also has the nature of liability insurance for the employer's accident compensation liability under the Labor Standards Act, and performs that liability-insurance function as well (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da38826, decided May 24, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 2013Da25118, decided August 22, 2013, etc.).
Considering the nature and function of insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act as described above, requiring a proximate causal relationship between work and an accident in order to recognize an "occupational accident," which is a requirement for payment of insurance benefits, serves to rationally attribute the accident to the employer's sphere of responsibility. In principle, it is consistent with the overall compensation system to interpret the matter such that the party asserting entitlement to the insurance benefit bears the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship between work and the accident.
2) Relationship with provisions on pneumoconiosis, etc. under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and with other accident compensation systems
The Industrial Accident Insurance Act separately provides recognition criteria for occupational accidents with respect to pneumoconiosis among industrial accidents, in Article 91-2, etc. The Supreme Court has held that in order to be recognized as death due to pneumoconiosis, a proximate causal relationship must be recognized between pneumoconiosis, its complications, etc., and death, and that the burden of proving this lies with the party asserting it (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Du55292, decided March 30, 2017, etc.). Meanwhile, Article 51 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and Article 48(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (이하 '산재보험법 시행령'; hereinafter "the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act") make "the existence of a proximate causal relationship between the cured occupational injury or disease and the injury or disease subject to renewed medical care" a requirement for recognizing renewed medical care, and Article 49, Subparagraph 2 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act makes it a requirement for recognizing additional medical care that a worker receiving medical care for an occupational accident has "developed a new disease caused by the injury or disease resulting from the occupational accident, requiring medical care." Thus, recognition of renewed medical care and additional medical care under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act takes the existence of a proximate causal relationship as its positive requirement.
Furthermore, in appeal litigation contesting a disposition denying payment for on-duty injuries under the former Public Officials Pension Act (공무원연금법) (before its wholesale amendment by Act No. 15523 on March 20, 2018), or various benefits claimed on grounds of performance of duties, etc. under the Act on the Honorable Treatment of and Support for Persons of Distinguished Service to the State (국가유공자 등 예우 및 지원에 관한 법률) or the Act on Support for Persons Eligible for Veterans' Compensation (보훈보상대상자 지원에 관한 법률), the Supreme Court has held that, in principle, the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship lies with the party asserting it (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du723, decided May 13, 2011; Supreme Court Decision 2016Du63996, decided December 13, 2017; Supreme Court Decision 2017Du53941, decided June 28, 2018, etc.).
In particular, the recognition criteria for on-duty accidents under Article 4(1) of the Public Officials Accident Compensation Act (공무원 재해보상법), enacted as Act No. 15522 on March 20, 2018, and under Article 4(1) of the Military Personnel Accident Compensation Act (군인 재해보상법), enacted as Act No. 16761 on December 10, 2019, as well as the recognition criteria for on-duty accidents under Article 33 of the Private School Teachers and Staff Pension Act (사립학교교직원 연금법) and Article 29(2) of its Enforcement Decree, contain provisos almost identical to that of the provision at issue, to the effect that "if there is no proximate causal relationship between the official duty (duty) and the accident, it shall not be regarded as an on-duty (in-duty) accident." Article 2(2) of the Fishing Vessel Crew Members and Fishing Vessel Accident Compensation Insurance Act (어선원 및 어선 재해보상보험법), as amended by Act No. 9727 on May 27, 2009, provides that matters concerning the recognition criteria for accidents to fishing vessel crew members, etc. shall apply mutatis mutandis to the provision at issue of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. However, it is difficult to find circumstances indicating that, at the time of the enactment or amendment of the above provisions, there was legislative intent to shift the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship away from the entitled recipient. On the contrary, with respect to the Public Officials Accident Compensation Act, an amendment bill has been submitted premised on the understanding that the burden of proving the causal relationship still lies with the entitled recipient, seeking in certain cases to place that burden on the Minister of Personnel Management.
Therefore, interpreting the matter such that, only with respect to the requirement for recognizing an occupational accident under the provision at issue, the Service must prove the non-existence of the proximate causal relationship between work and the accident, is inconsistent with the overall system of accident compensation under the provisions on pneumoconiosis, etc. under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and under the relevant statutes, and brings about a situation entirely unanticipated by the legislature; this cannot be accepted.
5. Determination on the grounds of appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, comprehensively considering the evidence it adopted, found the facts as stated in its judgment, and held as follows: ① the Deceased was a worker dispatched to (trade name omitted) and had worked there for a short period of about 1 month and 25 days, and the content of the duties he was assigned cannot be said to have been of high intensity or great responsibility; ② there was no particular unexpected situation or abrupt change in work environment prior to the onset of the injury or disease at issue, and the box-loading work that the Deceased performed immediately before collapsing due to the ruptured aortic aneurysm was not his own duty but was voluntarily done to help a co-worker who was performing the loading work, and it was difficult to regard the work of carrying 80 boxes weighing about 5 kg each, two or three at a time, to a vehicle located about 2 to 3 meters away, as significantly physically burdensome; ③ the Deceased continued smoking and drinking, which are risk factors for cerebrovascular and cardiovascular diseases, up until the onset of the injury or disease at issue, and two days before the onset, after leaving work, he drank alcohol with co-workers, unrelated to work, at a game room, karaoke room, etc. until the early morning hours; and ④ medically, the Deceased's pre-existing condition, dissecting aortic aneurysm, was caused by weakening of the blood vessels due to arteriosclerosis and has low relatedness to work, and the physician who examined the medical records at the court of first instance and the defendant's advisory physicians assessed the likelihood that the Deceased's aortic dissection was caused by overwork or stress as very low, or expressed the view that there was no proximate causal relationship between the work and the death. Comprehensively considering the above, the court below determined that it was difficult to find that the Deceased died as a result of the injury or disease at issue caused by excessive work, and therefore that this did not constitute an occupational accident.
Examining the record in light of the legal principles set forth above, the court below's determination as described above does not, as argued in the grounds of appeal, involve a failure to conduct the necessary examination regarding whether there was any unexpected situation or abrupt change in the Deceased's work environment, in violation of the rules of logic and experience beyond the limits of free evaluation of evidence, nor does it violate the rules of evidence regarding the acceptance of expert opinion, nor does it misapprehend the legal principles regarding the proximate causal relationship between work and an accident.
It should be additionally noted that, while the court below followed the existing Supreme Court case law that the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship between work and an accident lies with the worker, it did not simply hold that, because the plaintiff failed to satisfy the burden of proof of proximate causal relationship, the matter should be resolved against the party bearing the burden of proof in a situation where the truth of the facts remains unclear; rather, it affirmatively found facts to the contrary, namely that it was difficult to infer that the Deceased died as a result of excessive work, and therefore difficult to find a proximate causal relationship between the Deceased's work and his death. Given such fact-finding, even if the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship were held to lie with the defendant, the defendant would be deemed to have proved the non-existence of the proximate causal relationship, and the court below's conclusion dismissing the plaintiff's claim can therefore be upheld.
6. Conclusion
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. It is so decided as set forth in the Order. The opinions of the Justices participating in this case were unanimous, except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Park Jung-hwa, Justice Kim Seon-su, and Justice Lee Heung-gu; there is also a supplementary opinion of Justice Lee Ki-taek and a supplementary opinion of Justice Noh Jeong-hee and Justice Noh Tae-ak concerning the majority opinion, and a supplementary opinion of Justice Kim Seon-su and Justice Lee Heung-gu concerning the dissenting opinion.
7. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Park Jung-hwa, Justice Kim Seon-su, and Justice Lee Heung-gu
A. Summary of the dissenting opinion
The majority opinion holds that the existing case law, according to which the party asserting an "occupational accident" as defined in Article 5, Subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act bears the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship between work and the accident, is valid.
However, such a position merely follows the case law formed before the 2007 Amendment of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act as is, and is an interpretation that disregards the significance of the provision at issue, newly enacted by the 2007 Amendment of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. According to the provision at issue, among the requirements for recognizing an "occupational accident," the party asserting it must prove the work-relatedness or causal relationship prescribed in the items under each subparagraph of the main clause, while the opposing party must prove the "non-existence of the proximate causal relationship" prescribed in the proviso. This is consistent with the general principles of statutory interpretation. Therefore, case law that contravenes this principle regarding the burden of proof for "occupational accident" should be overturned.
We wish to examine the reasons for this from the perspectives of literal interpretation, historical interpretation, systematic interpretation, and teleological interpretation, which are the general methods of statutory interpretation, and also to express our opinion regarding the majority opinion's specific determination in this case that the worker's death cannot be regarded as an "occupational accident."
B. Literal interpretation
Examining the wording of the provision at issue, it is clear that the opposing party seeking to deny the occupational accident must prove the "non-existence of the proximate causal relationship."
1) The starting point of statutory interpretation is the wording and sentence structure of the statutory provision. Where the sentence structure of a provision consists of a main clause and a proviso, and in particular where the proviso is drafted in the manner of "however, in certain cases, this shall not apply," thereby negating the legal effect prescribed by the main clause, case law and academic theory generally interpret, in accordance with the so-called normative theory or the theory of classification of legal requirements, that in principle the party asserting the legal effect bears the burden of proving the requisite facts prescribed in the main clause, while the opposing party contesting it bears the burden of proving the requisite facts prescribed in the proviso. This is a consistent trend in countries belonging to the continental legal system, including Korea, Germany, and Japan.
A typical example is Article 390 of the Civil Act (민법). This provision states: "Where the obligor fails to perform in accordance with the content of the obligation, the obligee may claim damages: Provided, that this shall not apply where performance has become impossible without the obligor's intention or negligence." Case law has held that, in a claim for damages due to nonperformance of an obligation, the burden of proving the grounds attributable to the nonperformance, i.e., intention or negligence, lies with the obligor (see Supreme Court Decision 84Daka1864, decided March 26, 1985; Supreme Court Decision 96Da47302, decided October 10, 1997, etc.). This contrasts with the case of a claim for damages due to a tort under Article 750 of the Civil Act, where the burden of proving intention or negligence, prescribed in the main clause of the provision, has been held to lie with the victim asserting it (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Da73879, decided February 26, 2002, etc.).
When enacting various special statutes as well, the burden of proof is often distributed based on this principle, using the structure and form of "main clause/proviso." Article 3-2 of the Product Liability Act (제조물 책임법), regarding "defect," which is a requirement for the establishment of liability for damages due to a defect in a product, provides: "Where the victim proves the facts under each of the following subparagraphs, it shall be presumed that the product had a defect at the time it was supplied and that the damage arose from the defect in the product: Provided, that this shall not apply where the manufacturer proves that the damage arose from a cause other than the defect in the product," and enumerates in the subparagraphs the facts the victim must prove. Article 5 of the Special Act on Remedy for Damage Caused by Humidifier Disinfectants (가습기살균제 피해구제를 위한 특별법) provides: "Where all the facts under each of the following subparagraphs are proved, it shall be presumed that damage to life or health has arisen from a humidifier disinfectant containing a toxic chemical substance: Provided, that this shall not apply where the business operator proves that the damage arose from another cause," distinguishing, with respect to the presumption of causal relationship, the subject and object of proof in the main clause and the proviso, respectively. Article 6(1) of the Act on Liability for Environmental Damage and Relief Thereof (환경오염피해 배상책임 및 구제에 관한 법률), regarding the business operator's strict liability for environmental pollution damage, provides: "Where environmental pollution damage occurs in connection with the installation or operation of a facility, the business operator of the relevant facility shall compensate for such damage: Provided, that this shall not apply where the damage arises from war, civil war, riot, natural disaster, or other force majeure," clearly setting forth the burden of proof regarding environmental pollution damage.
2) This principle of literal interpretation likewise applies to the interpretation of the provision at issue. Under the provision at issue, if a worker or bereaved family member asserting entitlement to insurance benefits proves specific facts sufficient to recognize the relatedness between work and the accident, such as the fact that an injury, disease, or disability occurred, or death occurred, due to a cause prescribed in the items under each subparagraph of the main clause, then the legal effect of being regarded as an "occupational accident" arises. There is no need for the worker's side to go so far as to prove that there is a proximate causal relationship between the work and the accident. Only where the Service, the opposing party contesting that it constitutes an "occupational accident," asserts and proves the circumstance prescribed in the proviso, namely that "there is no proximate causal relationship (相當因果關係)" between the work and the accident, does the legal effect of being regarded as an "occupational accident" under the main clause fail to arise.
In an administrative litigation such as the present case, where an entitled recipient, such as a worker or bereaved family member, applies to the Service for payment of insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act but receives a disposition denying payment and seeks revocation of that disposition, it is consistent to distribute the burden of proof according to the wording of the statute, also with respect to "occupational accident," which is a requirement for recognizing the right to claim insurance benefits.
3) The majority opinion states that the proviso of the provision at issue merely serves to clearly confirm that a proximate causal relationship between work and the accident is required as a common general requirement for the various types of occupational accidents classified in the items under each subparagraph of the main clause, and is not a provision intended to shift, from the worker's side to the Service, the burden of proving the non-existence of the proximate causal relationship as a separate requirement not prescribed in the main clause. As grounds for this, it points out that the items under each subparagraph of the main clause already prescribe the causal relationship between work and the accident as a positive requirement necessary for recognizing an occupational accident, and that the matters prescribed in the main clause and the proviso overlap in substance.
However, the provision at issue should be understood as prescribing in its main clause that "work-relatedness" is required as a conceptual element or recognition criterion for an occupational accident, specifying its content in the items under each subparagraph, and then, in its proviso, extracting from among the requirements for establishing an occupational accident the element of "proximate causal relationship between work and the accident," which is difficult for the worker's side to prove, and shifting the burden of proving that to the Service.
It is clear from the wording that work-relatedness, as a requirement for recognizing an occupational accident or occupational disease prescribed in the main clause, does not refer to proximate causal relationship. Nor is it a concept that necessarily includes proximate causal relationship. If the causes prescribed in the items under each subparagraph of the main clause of the provision at issue are satisfied, work-relatedness is recognized, but proximate causal relationship may or may not be affirmed. Therefore, proximate causal relationship has independent significance distinct from work-relatedness and is a separate subject of proof from work-relatedness. This view is consistent with the purpose of distinguishing between the main clause and the proviso in the provision at issue.
Furthermore, the fact that there is some partial overlap between the matters prescribed in the main clause and the content prescribed in the proviso does not impede the above interpretation. Nor does the conclusion change merely because the title of the provision at issue is not "Shift of Burden of Proof," or because the proviso does not use the expression "the Service bears the burden of proof."
The main clause of the provision at issue provides that it shall be "regarded as an occupational accident," taking the form of a deeming provision that gives rise to the legal effect of recognition as an occupational accident. This does not contradict the general principle that, unlike a presumption provision, a deeming provision does not permit rebuttal (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da52751, decided February 17, 1995), since if the Service succeeds in proving that there is no proximate causal relationship between work and the accident, the deeming effect simply does not arise.
Conditional causal relationship and proximate causal relationship are clearly distinguishable concepts. Supreme Court decisions holding that the causal relationship between work and an accident need not necessarily be clearly proved in a medical or natural-scientific sense, and that such proof exists where a proximate causal relationship is recognized from a legal and normative perspective (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu10022, decided May 12, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 2003Du5501, decided November 14, 2003; Supreme Court Decision 2003Du12530, decided April 9, 2004) also presuppose this distinction. Therefore, the provision at issue does not redundantly prescribe the same subject of proof, namely the causal relationship between work and the accident, in both the main clause and the proviso.
C. Historical interpretation
1) The legislative intent was to shift the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship in an occupational accident, so that the opposing party would bear the burden of proving the fact that "there is no proximate causal relationship."
2) In statutory interpretation, the legislature's intent must be inferred from the objective meaning or content expressed in the wording of the statute, and even where the statute is interpreted with reference to the legislature's intent or the legislative background, one should not be bound by the legislature's subjective intent that is not expressed in the wording of the statute.
Examining the provision at issue, it can be seen that the legislature newly enacted the provision at issue in order to effectively guarantee the rights of workers seeking to receive insurance benefits under industrial accident insurance in litigation related to industrial accident insurance benefits, and to alleviate the difficulty of proof on the worker's side, thereby distributing in advance, between the worker's side and the Service, the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship between work and the accident. It should be understood that not only the objective intent of the legislature as reflected in the wording of the statute and the legislative background, but also the intent of those who prepared or participated in the legislation, was likewise directed to this end.
3) We wish to examine the legislative background of the provision at issue. "Occupational accident" is, in itself, an indeterminate concept whose meaning is not clear, and it has undergone several changes in the course of amendments to the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. Article 3(1) of the former Industrial Accident Insurance Act (before its amendment by Act No. 3467 on December 17, 1981) provided: "means an accident occurring in the course of performing duties and attributable to those duties," but was revised by Act No. 3467 on December 17, 1981, to the somewhat more comprehensive language "a worker's injury, disease, physical disability, or death due to occupational causes." Upon the wholesale amendment by Act No. 4826 on December 22, 1994, a definitional provision was placed in Article 4, Subparagraph 1, and at the time of the amendment by Act No. 6100 on December 31, 1999, a second sentence was added, stating: "In this case, the criteria for recognizing occupational accidents shall be prescribed by Ministry of Labor Ordinance." Upon the wholesale amendment by Act No. 8373 on April 11, 2007, the location of the provision was changed to Article 5, Subparagraph 1, as it currently stands, and by the 2007 Amendment, the second sentence of the definitional provision regarding occupational accidents was deleted, and the provision at issue, concerning the recognition criteria for occupational accidents, was newly enacted.
The requirement of proximate causal relationship as a requirement for occupational accident can be seen to have originated from the requirement of occupational attributability set forth in Article 3(1) of the former Industrial Accident Insurance Act prior to the above amendment, which used the phrase "attributable to that work." Case law held that "occupational accident" under Article 3(1) of the former Industrial Accident Insurance Act prior to the above amendment meant an accident occurring in the course of a worker's performance of duties and attributable to those duties, requiring a causal relationship between the work and the accident, and that this also includes disease or death induced or aggravated by work-related overwork (see Supreme Court Decision 82Nu455, decided December 27, 1983).
The reason the definitional provision regarding occupational accident was thus revised to more comprehensive language was to interpret and apply the requirements of performance of duties and occupational attributability more flexibly and elastically in individual and specific cases, in consideration of the livelihood-guaranteeing character of the industrial accident insurance system.
However, even after the above amendment, case law, while presupposing a distinction between the requirements of performance of duties and occupational attributability, continued to hold that in order to be recognized as an occupational death under Article 3 of the former Industrial Accident Insurance Act (as amended by Act No. 3467 on December 17, 1981), the death must not only have occurred during the performance of duties but must also have arisen attributable to the work, such that there must be a proximate causal relationship between the work and the accident. In such cases, the burden of proving the causal relationship between the worker's work and the accident lies with the party asserting it, and it was held that, even where a worker's death occurred during the performance of duties, if the cause of death was unclear, death attributable to work was not to be presumed (see Supreme Court Decision 88Nu5037, decided October 23, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 96Nu17226, decided February 25, 1997, etc.).
The reason for newly enacting the provision at issue at the time of the 2007 Amendment was to directly prescribe in the statute itself the recognition criteria for occupational accidents that had previously been prescribed by Ministry of Labor Ordinance and had been subject to controversy over blanket delegation.
Prior to the 2007 Amendment, the second sentence of Article 5, Subparagraph 1 of the former Industrial Accident Insurance Act provided that the recognition criteria for occupational accidents be prescribed by Ministry of Labor Ordinance, and Articles 32 (occupational accidents [in the narrow sense]) and 33 (occupational diseases) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (before its wholesale amendment by Ministry of Labor Ordinance No. 304 on July 1, 2008; hereinafter "the former Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act") set forth the recognition criteria for occupational accidents. Article 33(1) of the former Enforcement Rule provided: "Where a worker's contraction of a disease meets the requirements under each of the following subparagraphs, and the disease falls within the scope of occupational diseases under Article 44(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act, it shall be regarded as an occupational disease unless there is clear counter-evidence that the disease was not contracted due to occupational factors," and listed as such causes: having a history of handling or being exposed to harmful factors in the course of performing duties (Subparagraph 1); performing duties involving the handling of, or the risk of exposure to, harmful factors, such that the degree of exposure to harmful factors, taking into account working hours, duration of service, level of exposure, and working environment, etc., is recognized as capable of causing the worker's disease or health impairment (Subparagraph 2); it being medically recognized that unusual clinical symptoms attributable to the harmful factor have appeared in a body part that may be affected depending on exposure to, or the manner of handling, the harmful factor (Subparagraph 3); and it being recognized that there is a need for medical care or grounds for payment of insurance benefits due to the contraction of the disease (Subparagraph 4).
What deserves particular attention in the legislative process is the circumstances and reasons for the revision, whereby the proximate causal relationship regarding occupational accidents, initially prescribed in the main clause—Item (f) of Subparagraph 1 and Item (c) of Subparagraph 2—of the provision at issue, was revised to the current main-clause/proviso format of the provision at issue. Among the publicly disclosed legislative materials concerning the 2007 amendment of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the reasons for revision in the National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee's report on the review of the system and wording include the following two points. One is that the reason for adding the proviso to the provision at issue was to clarify that a proximate causal relationship is required in all types classified as occupational accidents [in the narrow sense] and occupational diseases. The other is that, by making it a requirement in the recognition criteria for occupational accidents that the absence of a proximate causal relationship between work and the accident be "proved by the Service," in order for it not to be recognized as an occupational accident, this was intended to make it more clearly apparent to the general public that a proximate causal relationship is required in determining occupational accidents.
[Continuing text — no section heading given in the source excerpt]
Thereafter, the alternative bill proposed by the Chairman of the Environment and Labor Committee, revised in the manner described above, was passed as is following deliberation at the plenary session on November 23, 2007, and was then promulgated and put into effect. In this process, despite the revised wording described above, no opinion was ever expressed to the effect that the burden of proof regarding the proximate causal relationship between work and injury lay with the worker.
Looking at the background and context in which this provision was amended as described above, it can be seen that, in order to directly prescribe in the statute itself the criteria for recognizing occupational accidents that had originally been governed by Ministry of Labor ordinance, and at the same time to shift the burden of proof concerning the "proximate causal relationship between work and injury," the legislature subdivided, in each item and sub-item, the requirements under which "occupational accident" as defined in Article 5, Subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법, hereinafter "Industrial Accident Insurance Act") could be recognized, allocating the subject and object of proof between the worker and the Corporation, and extracted "proximate causal relationship," one of those requirements, to provide for it in the proviso.
4) If, as the majority opinion holds, it is concluded that the legislature had no intention of shifting the burden of proof even though the provision at issue was amended into the form of a main clause and a proviso, then there is no way to explain the discussions that took place at the time of the 2007 amendment and the process by which the provision was revised. Are we to say that although the legislature revised the provision as described above with the intention of shifting the burden of proof concerning proximate causation, that intention is not reflected in the text of the provision at issue? Such a view cannot be accepted. The text of a statute is the most important indicator for discovering legislative intent. Where the content expressed in a statute differs from the subjective intention or original purpose of the legislature, priority in interpretation must be given to the objective intention manifested in the statutory text. Even if someone involved in the amendment of the provision at issue failed to clearly express the legislature's intention regarding the shifting of the burden of proof concerning the proximate causal relationship between work and injury, the statute must be interpreted as having shifted the burden of proof concerning proximate causation in accordance with what is revealed in the statutory text. In this sense, the statement that "the law is wiser than the legislator" (see the concurring opinion of Justices Kwon Soon-il, Kim Jae-hyung, and Cho Jae-yeon in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Do10912, decided November 1, 2018) applies equally to this case.
5) Inferring from the text of the provision at issue, the background of the statutory amendment, the content revealed in the legislative materials, and the specific content of reports made by persons who actually participated in the legislation, it is natural to conclude that the provision at issue, composed in the form of a main clause and a proviso, includes within its legislative intent, or necessarily presupposes, the purpose of placing the burden of proof concerning the proximate causal relationship between work and injury on the Corporation. The majority opinion has misinterpreted the legislature's intent regarding the provision at issue.
라. Systematic Interpretation
1) Even when interpreted systematically together with other provisions of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act and related statutes, the burden of proof concerning proximate causation in occupational accidents should be held to lie with the party denying it.
2) In order to be recognized as death due to pneumoconiosis as prescribed in the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the party asserting it must prove the proximate causal relationship between the pneumoconiosis, its complications, etc., and the death (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Du55292, decided March 30, 2017). However, Article 91-2 or Article 91-10 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, which are the basis provisions concerning the criteria for recognizing occupational accidents involving pneumoconiosis, are not, unlike the provision at issue, structured in the form of a main clause and a proviso; thus there is no logical need to interpret the burden of proof concerning the proximate causal relationship between pneumoconiosis and injury in the same manner as the provision at issue.
In order to be eligible for re-treatment (재요양) under Article 51, Paragraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, in addition to satisfying the requirements for medical care, there must be a medically recognized proximate causal relationship between the original injury or illness and the injury or illness for which re-treatment is sought, and there must be a medical opinion that the symptoms have worsened compared to their state at the time treatment for the original injury was concluded or at the time disability benefits were paid, such that therapeutic effect is expected from re-treatment (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Du1762, decided April 26, 2002; Supreme Court Decision 2014Du14532, decided March 12, 2015). However, Article 48, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, which prescribes the requirements for recognizing re-treatment, provides as a requirement for re-treatment that "there be a proximate causal relationship between the cured occupational injury or illness and the injury or illness that is the subject of re-treatment," but this is not structured in the form of a main clause and a proviso, and Article 49 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, concerning the requirements for applications for medical care benefits for additional injuries or illnesses, is likewise not structured in the form of a main clause and a proviso; therefore, the allocation of the burden of proof concerning proximate causation cannot be interpreted in the same manner as under the provision at issue.
3) The forms of the individual statutory provisions that serve as the basis for social security benefit entitlements are not uniform. Where a beneficiary applies for the payment of benefits under an individual statute, receives a denial disposition, and files a suit for revocation, the burden of proof regarding the factual elements corresponding to the requirements for entitlement must be determined individually through interpretation of the relevant basis provision.
For example, in appeal litigation contesting a non-payment disposition regarding various benefits claimed on the ground of performance of duty, etc., under the Act on the Honorable Treatment of and Support for Persons, etc. of Distinguished Service to the State or the Act on Support for Persons Eligible for Veteran's Compensation, the burden of proof concerning proximate causation lies with the party asserting it (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Du723, decided May 13, 2011; Supreme Court Decision 2016Du63996, decided December 13, 2017, respectively). However, since the structure or form of the statutory provisions that serve as the basis for entitlement under each of the above Acts is not, like the provision at issue, composed of a main clause and a proviso, there is no reason to interpret the burden of proof concerning proximate causation in the same manner as under the provision at issue. In accordance with the principle of the theory of classification of legal requirements, it is logically appropriate to require the party asserting the claim to bear the burden of proof.
However, Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Public Officials' Accident Compensation Act (공무원 재해보상법), Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Military Personnel Accident Compensation Act (군인 재해보상법), and Article 33 of the Private School Faculty and Staff Pension Act (사립학교교직원 연금법) together with Article 29, Paragraph 2 of its Enforcement Decree, are prescribed in a main clause/proviso form nearly identical to that of the provision at issue. Even in such cases, it is appropriate to interpret them in the same manner as the provision at issue, namely that the burden of proof concerning "proximate causal relationship" prescribed in the proviso lies not with the beneficiary but with the opposing party who disputes it; accordingly, it is more consistent with the overall system to interpret these provisions in line with the new legal doctrine concerning the provision at issue.
마. Teleological Interpretation
1) In light of the legislative purpose of the provision at issue as well, it should be held that the burden of proof concerning proximate causation has been shifted.
2) Where the text of a statute is unclear or ambiguous, the meaning of the statute must be determined, within the range of possible textual meaning, by considering the purpose and system of the statute; accordingly, I wish to examine the constitutional basis of the industrial accident insurance system and the legislative purpose and objectives of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act.
Article 34, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution declares the State's duty to strive to promote social security and social welfare, and Paragraph 6 declares the State's duty to strive to prevent disasters and protect citizens from their dangers. The fundamental philosophy of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is to guarantee the right to survival of workers who have suffered industrial accidents and their families, and the right to receive industrial accident insurance benefits is a concretization, under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, of the constitutional fundamental right to survival (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2004Hun-Ba2, decided July 21, 2005). The industrial accident insurance system goes beyond having the character and function of liability insurance for individual employers' compensation obligations under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법); it is a public insurance or social insurance system whereby all employers jointly bear, through insurance techniques based on the law of large numbers, what would otherwise be the individual liability of each employer, with the State directly overseeing the collection of premiums and payment of insurance benefits, etc.
The Industrial Accident Insurance Act was enacted for the purpose of promptly and fairly compensating workers for occupational accidents, establishing and operating the insurance facilities necessary to promote the rehabilitation and social reintegration of injured workers, and implementing projects for the prevention of accidents and otherwise promoting workers' welfare, thereby contributing to the protection of workers (Article 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act). The State established the Corporation (공단) to efficiently carry out projects for the achievement of these purposes, under delegation from the Minister of Employment and Labor (Article 10 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act).
In order for the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, a statute enacted to protect persons engaged in labor at industrial worksites, to achieve its purpose, it is desirable to shift the burden of proof concerning the proximate causal relationship between work and injury in suits for revocation of dispositions denying payment of insurance benefits. To impose the burden of proof concerning proximate causation—the core requirement for recognizing an occupational accident—unilaterally and entirely on the worker does not accord with the legislative purpose of the industrial accident insurance system as a social security system designed to protect workers, the purpose for which the Corporation was established to achieve that purpose, or the purpose for which the Corporation was specially granted authority to investigate accidents.
3) Since the provision at issue was newly enacted through the 2007 amendment, the character and function of the right to industrial accident insurance benefits as a social security benefit right has gradually strengthened; however, there is a shared understanding that the Industrial Accident Insurance Act remains insufficient to protect injured workers or their bereaved families, and that procedural difficulties persist in enabling injured workers or their bereaved families to receive fair and adequate compensation.
In litigation relating to industrial accident insurance benefits, most methods of proof and information exist within the workplace, making it difficult for a worker to prove his or her case without the employer's full cooperation. Working conditions or the working environment in which a worker was employed are frequently not disclosed on the ground that they constitute trade secrets. In the case of occupational accidents, due to the specialization and modernization of work, the causes of accidents are often complex and technical, requiring a high degree of specialized knowledge to determine, and it may be difficult for a worker personally to scientifically prove the cause of an accident. In the case of occupational diseases, it is frequently practically impossible to establish medical causation due to a lack of medical expertise or the limitations of epidemiological investigation. In particular, with respect to diseases whose medical cause has not been identified, epidemiological investigation, etc. requires considerable time and expense, and it runs contrary to principles of fairness and the concept of justice to require a worker who cannot bear such costs to carry the burden of proof. Out of this awareness of the problem, the Supreme Court has, in specific cases, developed doctrines to individually mitigate or reduce the burden of proof.
4) The allocation of the burden of proof must be made, in accordance with the ideal of fairness, so as to produce the most reasonable result for both parties. Notwithstanding the sentence structure of a provision composed in the form of a main clause and a proviso, cases in which a statutory provision is interpreted, with respect to the allocation of the burden of proof, in a manner different from the general principles of interpretation are mostly cases where, out of policy considerations aimed at resolving difficulties of proof arising from a structural imbalance in access to evidence, the requirement facts are presumed or the burden shifted in a manner favorable to victims, consumers, persons with disabilities, or other socially vulnerable parties who face difficulty in gathering evidence. Nevertheless, the majority opinion, in interpreting the provision at issue—composed in the form of a main clause and a proviso—not in favor of the worker seeking payment of insurance benefits but in precisely the opposite manner, is not only inconsistent with the general principles of interpretation but also represents an inverted interpretation that disregards the protection of workers, and is inconsistent with traditional theory and with the overall trend and tendency of case law aimed at easing the worker's burden of proof.
5) In order for a beneficiary to receive insurance benefits, the beneficiary must apply to the Corporation for payment of insurance benefits and obtain a benefit payment decision from the Corporation. Given that evidentiary means capable of proving an occupational accident are concentrated in the hands of the employer, the Industrial Accident Insurance Act grants the Corporation authority to investigate the causes of occupational accidents in order to alleviate the worker's difficulty of proof. The Corporation may have its employees investigate workplaces, etc. for purposes of deciding on insurance benefits or adjudicating requests for examination (Article 117 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act), and may require industrial accident insurance medical institutions to report on a worker's medical treatment or to submit documents or objects related to such treatment, or may have its employees question relevant persons or investigate relevant documents or objects (Article 118 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act). In reality, however, investigations into the causes of occupational accidents are not being properly conducted, due to shortages of investigative personnel, lack of expertise, and shortages in the number of labor inspectors, among other reasons.
In administrative litigation proceedings, which serve as the means of contesting dispositions such as the denial of industrial accident insurance benefits filed by workers or bereaved families as plaintiffs, the structure of the litigation is such that the Corporation becomes the defendant. In order to ensure the legality of a non-payment disposition regarding insurance benefits—an administrative disposition—the Corporation must, at the stage of making that disposition, have already confirmed that no proximate causal relationship is recognized between the work and the injury; accordingly, even interpreting the proviso of the provision at issue as shifting to the Corporation the burden of proving the absence of a proximate causal relationship between work and injury cannot readily be said to demand something impossible to prove or to bring about a major change in practice.
There is concern that if the provision at issue is interpreted as a provision shifting the burden of proof concerning the proximate causal relationship between work and injury in suits for revocation of non-payment dispositions on insurance benefits, this would impose a heavy financial burden, worsening the fiscal soundness of the industrial accident insurance program. However, each item and sub-item of the provision at issue already prescribes, centered on typical patterns of causation, specific types that may be recognized as "occupational accidents" as formal requirements, and the Corporation makes the initial determination as to whether these requirements are satisfied upon a beneficiary's application; therefore, this will not result in occupational accidents being indiscriminately recognized.
Even if fiscal burden is a concern, it should be addressed by other means, such as securing the relevant budget or amending the statute, and it is not appropriate for the courts to interpret the law in a manner that retreats from what the legislature has decided. Courts should not interpret statutes differently from their text out of concern for budgetary matters and the fiscal burden of insurance benefits, which are matters for the executive branch or the National Assembly to decide.
6) There may be differing views on the question of whether courts should show consideration for workers, as a socially vulnerable group, by shifting the burden of proof concerning proximate causation. However, what we can agree upon is that socially vulnerable parties should not be treated less favorably than the text of the statute itself. Even while asserting that socially vulnerable parties should be protected, at the actual stage of statutory interpretation, we must not interpret the law less favorably to socially vulnerable parties than its text provides. The dissenting opinion is fundamentally about faithfully carrying out the duty entrusted to the judiciary by interpreting the provision at issue in accordance with its text. It is not the intent of this dissent that the issue in this case can only be resolved by taking the position that the judiciary must play an active role in solving social problems or that socially vulnerable parties must be protected.
7) The new interpretive doctrine concerning the provision at issue does not exceed the ordinary bounds of textual interpretation, and moreover is reasonable and appropriate even taking into account changed circumstances and the times. The National Human Rights Commission's 2012 recommendation for amendment and the various proposed amendments to the Industrial Accident Insurance Act regarding the shifting of the burden of proof concerning causation reflect the practical and policy need for shifting the burden of proof that the legislature intended at the time of the 2007 amendment. Even viewed from the present-day perspective, it can be said that the legislature, wisely, distributed the burden of proof concerning the proximate causal relationship between work and injury through the provision at issue so that the purpose and function of the industrial accident insurance system as a social security system could be faithfully realized.
바. Changes in the Court's Attitude
Let us examine the Supreme Court decisions concerning the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. According to precedent, causation required for the recognition of an occupational accident need not be clearly proven in a medical or natural-scientific sense; it suffices if a proximate causal relationship is recognized from a legal and normative perspective (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Du3867, decided August 29, 2017). In order for a proximate causal relationship between work and injury to be recognized, it is required that there exist, beyond a mere conditional causal relationship between work and injury, a relationship in which the work is, according to ordinary experience, a relatively predominant cause.
Whether there is a proximate causal relationship between work and injury is not purely a matter of fact-finding but rather a question of evaluating the indirect facts underlying that determination, occupying a position somewhere between typical fact-finding and legal judgment. In most cases, precedent has treated this as a matter of fact-finding and accepted the lower court's determination, dismissing the appeal through a summary decision without full review; however, in some cases, the Court has reversed on the ground that the lower court's determination on proximate causation contained an error of misapprehending legal principles. While there may be a critical view of this in that the Supreme Court, as a court of law, is thereby intervening in the fact-finding court's determinations, the Supreme Court has continuously examined whether there was an error in misapprehending legal principles concerning the proximate causal relationship between work and injury and has rendered reversing decisions on that basis, and the general trend has developed in the direction of recognizing such relationships broadly.
In order to interpret a statutory provision in a manner different from its text, sentence structure, or context, there must be grounds, in light of the statutory scheme and legislative intent or purpose, sufficient to justify such a modification. Accordingly, methods of statutory interpretation have developed beyond textual interpretation to include logical and systematic interpretation, historical interpretation, teleological interpretation, and interpretation in conformity with the Constitution, among other methods, and methods such as analogy or teleological extension are used to fill gaps in statutes. Interpreting and applying a statute contrary to what it prescribes, without such grounds, may not only infringe upon the National Assembly's legislative power but also risk violating the constitutional principle of separation of powers. When courts adhere to the above methods and principles concerning the interpretation and application of statutes, the legislature, too, will strive to refine statutes that might otherwise, due to inappropriate legislative techniques or forms, undermine legal stability and predictability and cause confusion among those subject to the law. Through this process, substantive rule of law is established, and, ultimately, a nation's legal culture develops.
Since the Civil Procedure Act applies mutatis mutandis to administrative litigation (Article 8, Paragraph 2 of the Administrative Litigation Act), it is appropriate, in principle, to interpret the allocation of the burden of proof in accordance with the theory of classification of legal requirements, just as in civil litigation, and the majority opinion does not deny this either. However, the majority opinion interprets the provision at issue, composed in the form of a main clause and a proviso, contrary to its text, sentence structure, and context. If, as noted by the majority opinion, it is considered excessive to interpret the provision at issue as a provision shifting the burden of proof under the theory of classification of legal requirements, then rather than relying on statutory interpretation to resolve that problem without presenting reasons sufficient to overturn the textual interpretation, the proper course would be to amend the statute with clearer wording to correct it.
Furthermore, even with respect to administrative regulations such as the provision at issue, courts should refrain from interpreting statutes contrary to their text out of concern for the budgetary requirements or fiscal burden accompanying the enforcement of the statute. Administrative regulations, too, ultimately function as norms of adjudication in administrative litigation procedures, which are the procedures for relief of rights. In particular, norms concerning the burden of proof serve a very important function in guaranteeing the objectivity and fairness of adjudication, and it is essential that clear and unambiguous standards, taking into account the allocation of the burden of proof, be presented from the legislative stage onward.
Even after the provision at issue was newly enacted through the 2007 amendment, thereby changing the law concerning occupational accidents, neither academia nor legal practice properly recognized or paid attention to its existence and meaning. Although the reason for this is not entirely clear, it can only be explained as a matter of established judicial practice and its uncritical acceptance. If precedent had been changed, or a new precedent had been established, immediately after the statute was amended as described above, the problem of workers or bereaved families being unable to receive insurance benefits due to their failure to prove the proximate causal relationship between work and injury would already have been resolved, or else a new legislative solution would have been presented through statutory amendment. It is the correct approach for the Supreme Court, which holds ultimate authority over statutory interpretation, to now correct its position of having interpreted and applied the provision at issue contrary to its text without clear grounds. It may be argued that it is problematic to shift the burden of proof concerning proximate causation more than a decade later, but looking back from a point far in the future, it may also be thought that making this change now was not too late.
사. Resolution of This Case
1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the following circumstances may be ascertained.
According to the National Health Insurance treatment records, the deceased son of the Plaintiff (hereinafter "the Deceased") had never received treatment for conditions such as hypertension or diabetes. From February 24, 2014, until the date of his death, April 19, 2014, the Deceased worked six days a week, generally starting work around 8:30 a.m. and working until around 8:30 p.m. (on Sundays, he began work around 8:30 a.m. and worked until around 5:30 p.m.). In the eight weeks before onset, he worked an average of 69 hours per week, and in the four weeks before onset, an average of 62 hours per week. From March 7, 2014 to March 25, 2014, he worked without a single day off, and in the eight weeks before onset, he had only six days off.
The medical examiner who reviewed the medical records at the first instance opined that no risk factors capable of causing aortic aneurysm rupture were observed in the Deceased, and that while occupational overwork or stress was not the sole cause of the dissecting aortic aneurysm rupture, it was possible that it acted, to some degree, as a risk factor.
2) Examining these circumstances in light of the legal principles set forth above, the following conclusion is reached.
The Plaintiff proved that the Deceased was in a state of objectively excessive workload prior to his death and died while performing his duties at the workplace, and it may be inferred that he died of "another disease arising in connection with work" as referred to in Subparagraph 2, Item (c) of the provision at issue. By contrast, it cannot be said that the Defendant succeeded in proving facts to the contrary sufficient to support the proposition that the dissecting aortic aneurysm that caused the Deceased's death was a spontaneously arising personal illness with low relevance to his work, such that no proximate causal relationship existed between it and occupational overwork or stress.
With respect to the cause of the Deceased's death, Item (a) of Subparagraph 1 ("Cerebrovascular Disease or Cardiac Disease") of "Specific Criteria for Recognizing Occupational Diseases" in [Attached Table 3] to Article 34, Paragraph 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act provides that where the onset of "dissecting aortic aneurysm"—a disease substantially identical to the "dissecting aortic aneurysm" that caused the Deceased's death—results from any of the following causes: 1) a sudden and unexpected event, 2) an increase in work-related burden during a short period before onset, or 3) chronic excessive workload, it shall be regarded as an occupational disease, but provides that it shall not be regarded as an occupational disease where the onset resulted from spontaneous deterioration. The content of this Enforcement Decree provision also shows that it reflects, as is, the structure of the allocation of the burden of proof prescribed in the provision at issue.
Accordingly, the Deceased's death may be regarded as an occupational accident under the main clause of the provision at issue, and the judgment below, which held to the contrary, erred by misapprehending the legal principles concerning proximate causation.
3) Furthermore, even under existing precedent, an occupational accident may be recognized in this case.
가) Even where the primary cause of the disease that caused death is not directly related to the performance of work, if occupational overwork or stress at least combined with the primary cause to induce or aggravate the disease, a causal relationship must be recognized between them. This includes cases where an underlying or pre-existing illness, which would normally have permitted normal work performance, rapidly worsened beyond its natural rate of progression due to excessive workload or the like, when such proof is established, and in determining whether a worker's death constitutes an occupational accident, the focus should be on whether the worker was in a state of objectively excessive workload (see Supreme Court Decision 2019Du62604, decided May 28, 2020; Supreme Court Decision 2018Du46155, decided August 20, 2020, among others). This has been the Supreme Court's consistent position regarding occupational overwork.
Moreover, the "Matters Necessary for Determining Whether Cerebrovascular Disease or Cardiac Disease and Musculoskeletal Disease Constitute Occupational Diseases" (Ministry of Employment and Labor Notice No. 2013-32, June 28, 2013; hereinafter "the Pre-amendment Notice") is an administrative rule that has no binding effect on citizens or courts externally; therefore, even where the Corporation issued a disposition denying approval of medical care benefits by applying the notice in effect at the time of the disposition, a court may take into account the content and purport of a notice amended after that disposition (Ministry of Employment and Labor Notice No. 2017-117, December 29, 2017; hereinafter "the Amended Notice") in determining the existence of a proximate causal relationship (see Supreme Court Decision 2020Du39297, decided December 24, 2020).
The Pre-amendment Notice provided that "chronic excessive workload" means a state in which work-related factors are objectively confirmed to have continuously caused an excessive physical or mental burden for three months or more before onset [I.1.(c), first sentence], but provided that whether this applies is to be determined comprehensively by taking into account the volume, duration, intensity, and responsibility of the work, hours of rest such as holidays and vacations, work patterns such as shift work and night work, the degree of mental strain, sleep hours, working environment, and other factors such as the worker's age, sex, and health condition; and, as a general rule, provided that where working hours exceed an average of 60 hours per week over the twelve weeks preceding onset (or an average of 64 hours per week over the four weeks preceding onset), the relevance between the work and the disease is evaluated as strong [I.1.(c)1)]. The Amended Notice, out of reflective consideration that the content of the Pre-amendment Notice had been excessively strict, not only deleted "health condition," which had previously been listed as a factor, so that a victim's underlying illness would not be considered in assessing work-relatedness [I.1.(c), second sentence], but also provides that where working hours exceed an average of 52 hours per week over the twelve weeks preceding onset, the relevance between the work and the disease increases as the working hours lengthen, and that, in particular, in cases such as work with insufficient rest days [I.1.(c)2)③], the relevance between the work and the disease is evaluated as strong.
나) In light of this precedent, even though the Deceased worked for less than three months, from February 24, 2014 to April 19, 2014, whether he was overworked may be determined by taking into account the average weekly working hours prescribed in each of the above notices. Even if the Deceased's aortic aneurysm rupture originated from a personal underlying illness, it may be inferred that, amid fatigue and stress accumulated from ordinarily excessive workload, his blood pressure rose sharply while he was performing the loading work at issue in this case, causing the condition to deteriorate rapidly beyond its natural course and resulting in his death; accordingly, this is a case in which occupational overwork or stress combined with the primary cause of the disease to aggravate it, and a proximate causal relationship may be recognized between the Deceased's work and his death.
Nevertheless, the court below, without conducting the necessary examination as to whether the Deceased's work was objectively excessive, denied the proximate causal relationship between his work and death, holding that, given that his workload decreased as the onset drew nearer and in light of the intensity of the work and degree of responsibility, the above working hours alone were insufficient to establish that the Deceased performed excessive work, and citing the fact that the Deceased had drinks late into the night two days before onset and had engaged in smoking and drinking.
Therefore, whether the new legal doctrine proposed in the dissenting opinion is applied, or existing precedent is applied, it may be concluded that a proximate causal relationship between the Deceased's death and the accident has been proven; accordingly, the judgment below contains an error affecting the outcome of the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles concerning proximate causation and by failing to conduct the necessary examination, and must be reversed.
This is the reason for dissenting from the majority opinion.
8. Concurring Opinion of Justice Lee Ki-taek on the Majority Opinion
가. The majority opinion holds that the provision at issue, newly enacted upon the 2007 amendment, cannot be regarded as a provision that allocates or shifts to the Corporation the burden of proof concerning the proximate causal relationship between work and injury for purposes of recognizing "occupational accident," a requirement for payment of insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, and that the established position of Supreme Court precedent—that the burden of proof concerning the proximate causal relationship between work and injury prescribed in the proviso of the provision at issue lies, in principle, with the worker asserting entitlement to payment of insurance benefits—is correct.
This lawsuit is an appeal litigation (Article 3, Subparagraph 1, and Article 4, Subparagraph 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act) seeking revocation of the Defendant's disposition denying insurance benefits, and the Plaintiff, as the party who claimed payment of survivors' benefits, etc., under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, bears the burden of proving the existence of a "proximate causal relationship between work and injury," which is necessary to recognize "occupational accident"—a requirement for payment of insurance benefits favorable to the Plaintiff. The following primarily rebuts the dissenting opinion through textual interpretation and supplements the reasoning of the majority opinion.
나. 1) The dissenting opinion contends that, under the so-called theory of classification of legal requirements, the provision at issue must be regarded as a provision that allocates the burden of proof separately as between the worker and the Corporation with respect to the matters prescribed in the main clause and the proviso, respectively.
However, even under the theory of classification of legal requirements, a statutory provision composed in the form of a main clause and a proviso is regarded as a provision concerning the allocation of the burden of proof only where the main clause prescribes the requirements for the arising of a right, and the proviso separately prescribes, as a compatible but distinct fact for blocking that right, facts that impede the arising of the right, facts that extinguish the right, or facts that block the exercise of the right. In such cases, the so-called theory of classification of legal requirements interprets the burden of proof as being objectively and abstractly allocated, based on the structure and form of the statute, such that the party asserting the effect of the arising of the right bears the burden of proving the requirement facts prescribed in the main clause, which is the principal provision, while the party disputing that legal effect bears the burden of proving the negative requirement facts prescribed in the proviso.
2) This may be explained schematically as follows. Suppose a statutory provision is structured such that its main clause prescribes the legal effect of the arising of a right where some of the requirement facts (A, B) are established, and its proviso prescribes a separate but compatible fact (C) as a negative requirement capable of producing the opposite effect. In such a structure and form, under the theory of classification of legal requirements, the burden of proof is allocated such that the party asserting the arising of the right bears the burden of proving the affirmative requirement facts (A, B) prescribed in the main clause, which is the principal provision, while the party disputing that effect bears the burden of proving the negative requirement fact (C) prescribed in the proviso, which is the exceptional provision.
다. 1) However, examining closely the structure and form of the provision at issue, although it is composed in the form of a main clause and a proviso, it is appropriate to interpret it as one in which the main clause and the proviso do not separately prescribe the elements for establishing an "occupational accident," but rather as a whole, unitarily, presenting the criteria for recognizing occupational accidents. Accordingly, in determining where the burden of proof lies concerning the "proximate causal relationship between work and injury" for purposes of recognizing an accident as resulting from occupational causes, the provision at issue must be understood as a single, unified whole.
The "occupational accident" referred to in the main clause of the provision at issue means an occupational accident as defined in Article 5, Subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. "Occupational accident" under Article 5, Subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act means "an injury, illness, disability, or death of a worker due to occupational causes," and in order to constitute an occupational accident, a causal relationship must be recognized between the work and the injury. Furthermore, since each item and sub-item under the main clause of the provision at issue also prescribes that there must be a causal relationship between work and injury, the concept of "occupational accident" in the main clause of the provision at issue must be understood to include the content that "there is a causal relationship between work and injury."
The proximate causal relationship between work and injury prescribed in the proviso of the provision at issue is not a negative requirement, separate and compatible with the matters prescribed in the main clause, capable of producing the opposite of the legal effect prescribed in the main clause; rather, it was prescribed for the purpose of clearly explaining or emphasizing that the causal relationship required for the "occupational accident" already provided for in the main clause to be recognized is not a mere medical or natural-scientific conditional relationship, but the "proximate causal relationship" from a legal and normative perspective, as set forth in precedent.
This point is made all the more clear by the fact that the proviso of the provision at issue does not separately specify "the Corporation" as the subject that must prove the absence of a proximate causal relationship between work and injury.
2) Logically simplifying the structure and form of the provision at issue and contrasting it with the general case described above, the explanation is as follows. For example, suppose that requirements A, B, and C (C referring to causation) are required for an occupational accident to be recognized. The provision at issue does not, in its main clause, prescribe requirements A and B, which are to be proven by the party asserting entitlement to insurance benefits, while prescribing in its proviso the non-existence of a separate, compatible requirement C capable of producing the opposite effect. Rather, the main clause of the provision at issue, together with all of its items and sub-items, prescribes requirements A, B, and C (causation) among the requirements for an occupational accident, and the proviso prescribes C₁ (proximate causation) in order to elaborate on or supplement the meaning of C (causation) prescribed in the main clause. Accordingly, the burden of proving the facts underlying requirements A, B, and C (C₁, proximate causation)—all of which are necessary for the recognition of an "occupational accident"—is borne entirely by the party asserting entitlement.
3) The dissenting opinion takes the position that while work-relatedness or causation, as prescribed in each item and sub-item of the main clause of the provision at issue, must be proven by the party asserting entitlement to recognition of an "occupational accident" under the main clause, the non-existence of the proximate causal relationship prescribed in the proviso of the provision at issue must be proven by the Corporation.
The dissenting opinion, taken in this sense, appears to understand that there exists a separate subject of proof called "proximate causation," distinct from "causation." However, the burden of proof at issue in this case refers to the risk or disadvantage borne by one party to a lawsuit who, when the trial has concluded and reached its final stage, is nevertheless left with an undetermined factual matter in the litigation and therefore receives an unfavorable legal judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 4293Minsang818, decided November 23, 1961). In a suit for revocation of a disposition denying insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, after the conclusion of the trial, the judge, having comprehensively evaluated the degree of proof of causation between work and injury based on all the evidence submitted by the parties, determines whether only a mere conditional causal relationship is recognized between work and injury, or whether a proximate causal relationship is recognized from a legal and normative perspective. It is not the case, as the dissenting opinion suggests, that there exist two independent subjects of proof premised on a division of the causal relationship between work and injury into "conditional causation" and "proximate causation."
Supreme Court precedent, in this context, has held that a proximate causal relationship between work and the occurrence of an injury may be proven, in individual and specific cases, by inferring such relationship comprehensively from the various indirect facts involved (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu10022, decided May 12, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 2003Du12530, decided April 9, 2004, among others).
4) The dissenting opinion regards the main clause of the provision at issue as a so-called deeming provision that produces the legal effect of recognizing an "occupational accident," while at the same time holding that if the Corporation proves, in rebuttal, the absence of the "proximate causal relationship between work and injury" prescribed in the proviso, the deemed effect does not arise. However, in general, unlike presumption provisions, deeming provisions must be understood as not admitting of rebuttal by counter-proof (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da52751, decided February 17, 1995, among others).
If, as the dissenting opinion holds, the proviso of the provision at issue is interpreted as a provision allocating or shifting to the Corporation the burden of proving the proximate causal relationship between work and injury, then, for example, where the worker succeeds in proving the work-relatedness and causation of the illness, thereby giving rise to the legal effect of being deemed an "occupational accident" under the main clause of the provision at issue, but the Corporation then proves, under the proviso of the provision at issue, the absence of a proximate causal relationship between work and injury, the illness would not be deemed an "occupational accident"—which is inconsistent with treating the main clause of the provision at issue as a deeming provision in the first place. The dissenting opinion's position, that the deemed effect fails to arise if the Corporation succeeds in proving the absence of a proximate causal relationship between work and injury, presupposes that "the existence of a proximate causal relationship between work and injury" is itself a requirement for the establishment of "occupational accident" under the main clause of the provision at issue, which is also logically inconsistent with the dissenting opinion's own view that the worker need not prove proximate causation in order for an occupational accident to be recognized.
5) Furthermore, the provision at issue concerns the administration of the industrial accident insurance system, a social security system, and is an administrative regulation. Examining the text of the provision at issue, which reads "where a worker … it shall be regarded as an occupational accident. Provided, however, that … this shall not apply," both the main clause and the proviso are structured around "the Corporation," the administrative body, prescribing the criteria by which the Corporation, upon receiving an application or claim for payment of insurance benefits from a person seeking to receive benefits prescribed under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, determines whether payment should be made and its content, based on whether the case constitutes an "occupational accident." For example, Article 37, Paragraph 2 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act provides: "… a worker's intentional or self-inflicted act … shall not be regarded as an occupational accident. Provided, however, that where … there exists a reason prescribed by Presidential Decree, it shall be regarded as an occupational accident." This provision, too, is likewise structured around the Corporation, the entity responsible for deciding on the payment of insurance benefits, prescribing the criteria for determining "occupational accident" under Article 5, Subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act in the form of "shall not be regarded as … provided, however, … shall be regarded as," and the main clause and the proviso do not separately allocate the subject and object of proof.
In light of the form, content, and legal character of the provision at issue as described above, it is difficult to derive the correct conclusion regarding where the burden of proof lies in this lawsuit by mechanically applying the general theory concerning the allocation of the burden of proof under the main clause/proviso structure of the theory of classification of legal requirements to the interpretation of the provision at issue.
The dissenting opinion appears to overlook the unique regulatory form, content, and legal nature of the language of this provision as discussed above. Accordingly, it is reasonable to interpret this provision such that its main text and proviso together, as an organic whole with a single purpose and function, prescribe the criteria for recognizing "occupational accidents." Even under the legal requirement classification theory, the mere fact that this provision is structured in the form of a main text and a proviso, as the dissenting opinion contends, cannot be interpreted as separately allocating the burden of proof between the parties with respect to the same subject of proof, namely "the causal relationship between work and the accident."
The foregoing is intended to supplement the Majority Opinion.
9. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Noh Jeong-hui and Justice Noh Tae-ak to the Majority Opinion
The Dissenting Opinion argues, primarily on the basis of the sentence structure of this provision consisting of a main text and a proviso, that this provision should be interpreted as allocating the burden of proof regarding the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident to the Corporation, or as shifting that burden from the worker's side to the Corporation, and that such interpretation is also consistent with the legislative intent revealed in the legislative history of this provision, the constitutional basis of the industrial accident insurance system, and the legislative purpose and objectives of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법, hereinafter "Industrial Accident Insurance Act"). Since the Supplementary Opinion of Justice Lee Ki-taek to the Majority Opinion has already supplemented the grounds of the Majority Opinion through a meticulous demonstration regarding textual interpretation, we state our agreement with that Supplementary Opinion regarding textual interpretation, and below, we briefly respond to the points raised by the Dissenting Opinion and supplement the grounds of the Majority Opinion, focusing mainly on the perspectives of historical, systematic, and teleological interpretation of this provision.
A. Principles and Limits of Statutory Interpretation
1) Since law is, in principle, a universally valid social norm having identical binding force upon an unspecified number of persons, when interpreting it, the standard meaning of the law must be clarified so as to ensure objective validity, and consistency that is acceptable to all persons as far as possible must be maintained so that legal stability is not undermined. Statutory interpretation must be conducted in a direction that seeks concrete validity within the scope that does not undermine legal stability, and to this end, one must, in principle, faithfully interpret the ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute, and further employ historical and systematic interpretation methods that additionally consider the legislative purpose and objective of the relevant statute, its enactment and amendment history, harmony with the legal order as a whole, and relationships with other statutes, thereby arriving at a valid interpretation that meets the above requirements of statutory interpretation. Meanwhile, if the text of a statute is relatively clearly worded, in principle there is no need to resort to other interpretive methods, or their use must be limited; and even when one attempts to interpret a statute differently from the ordinary meaning of its text by placing emphasis on its legislative purpose and objective, one cannot ignore the systematic relationship with other provisions within the relevant statute and other statutes, or harmony with the legal system as a whole, and thus there are inevitably certain limits to such interpretation (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035, decided April 23, 2009; Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Du47264, decided March 18, 2021, etc.).
2) The Dissenting Opinion's point that statutory interpretation must begin with the text and sentence structure of the statutory provision is valid and self-evident. From the same standpoint, the Majority Opinion grasped the ordinary meaning of the language used in this provision, its overall structure, and its legal nature, and based thereon, concluded that this provision requires the worker's side to prove "the existence of a causal relationship between work and the accident" as an affirmative requirement for recognizing an "occupational accident," while confirming that such causal relationship is the substantial causal relationship from the legal and normative perspective referred to in case law. The grounds and reasons therefor have already been set forth in detail in the Majority Opinion and the preceding Supplementary Opinion.
It is difficult to regard it as a universal method of interpretation to mechanically apply the so-called legal requirement classification theory based solely on the form of the main text and proviso, disregarding the content, structure, and legal nature of the statutory provision, and the criticism to the effect that the Majority Opinion interpreted the provision differently from its text out of concern for budgetary and insurance financial burdens, or that it interpreted the provision in a manner that retreats from what the legislature decided, is difficult to accept as it is not based on the grounds and reasons of the Majority Opinion.
The Majority Opinion additionally employed historical and systematic interpretation methods to examine this provision in order to arrive at a valid interpretation that meets the requirements of statutory interpretation of seeking legal stability and concrete validity. As a result, even if it is difficult to grasp the legislative intent inferable from the objective meaning and content used in this provision in a unified and unequivocal manner, or if there may be differing views thereon, the Majority Opinion's position is that interpreting this provision as a provision allocating or shifting the burden of proof cannot be accepted even from the standpoint of historical and systematic interpretation. The criticism that the Majority Opinion unduly disregards the legislature's amendment intent is not appropriate.
Furthermore, in light of the limits of teleological interpretation examined above, even considering the constitutional basis of the industrial accident insurance system and the legislative purpose of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, interpreting this provision as a provision allocating or shifting the burden of proof regarding the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident to the Corporation must be seen as exceeding the limits of statutory interpretation.
This case concerns whether the burden of proof was shifted by this provision. This is a matter of grasping the meaning of this provision through valid statutory interpretation. In other words, the issue in this case is unrelated to the question of whether a shift in the burden of proof is necessary to realize the purpose of the industrial accident insurance system, and the conclusion cannot vary depending on one's position as to whether the courts need to strengthen the guarantee of social security benefit rights and take an active approach to the scope of recognition under the industrial accident insurance system in order to protect the livelihood of workers and their families. We wish to make clear that any criticism suggesting that the Majority Opinion is concerned about the financial burden of industrial accident insurance, or that it prioritizes the soundness of insurance finances over the purpose of the compensation system, is entirely without basis.
B. Regarding Historical and Systematic Interpretation
1) Examining the legislative history and legislative purpose of this provision as supplementary material for valid statutory interpretation, the following circumstances warrant additional consideration.
The industrial accident insurance system is a social insurance system that, in order to guarantee the livelihood of injured workers and their families, addresses the social risk of occupational accidents occurring to workers, regardless of the employer's fault, through an insurance method, using as its financial resources the insurance premiums paid by employers who are insured persons and the burden borne by the national treasury. Given the content and operational method of this industrial accident insurance system, whether the burden of proof regarding the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident, as a requirement for payment of insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, should be borne by the worker's side asserting it, or by the opposing party, the Corporation, can significantly affect the overall practice of operating the industrial accident insurance system, the insurance finances, and the interests of workers, employers, and others. Therefore, if the legislature had intended, through this provision at the time of the 2007 amendment, to allocate or shift the burden of proof regarding the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident to the Corporation, it would be reasonable to expect that this would ordinarily have been clearly stated through the reasons or purpose of the statutory amendment, and that the process would have involved discussion and debate in the course of the National Assembly's legislative process, as well as consideration or prediction of the interests of the parties concerned and the impact on insurance finances.
However, the stated reasons for the amendment promulgated pursuant to the 2007 amendment only indicate that the purpose was to resolve controversy over comprehensive delegation, among other things, by clearly prescribing the criteria for recognizing occupational accidents in the statute itself, and contain no mention whatsoever of allocating or shifting the burden of proof regarding the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident. It is also difficult to find any substantive discussion regarding the shifting of the burden of proof for substantial causal relationship in the legislative process of this provision. However, as the Dissenting Opinion points out, the review report on systematic and textual matters (체계·자구검토보고서) prepared during the systematic and textual review process by the National Assembly's Legislation and Judiciary Committee does contain some language suggesting a different purpose. However, this report contains no statement whatsoever regarding the reasons or grounds for such review, and according to other legislative materials, it appears that even in the process of the textual revision of this provision into the form of a main text and a proviso, the portion of the report stating the reasons for such revision was never publicly discussed. Therefore, the mere statement in this report cannot be regarded as having changed the substantive content of the bill.
2) Meanwhile, following the 2007 amendment, [Attached Table 3] "Specific Criteria for Recognizing Occupational Diseases" under Article 34(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, enacted pursuant to delegation under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, sets forth examples of cases that may be regarded as occupational diseases. Among these, Item 1(b) provides that "even in the case of a cerebrovascular disease or heart disease not prescribed under Item (a), if it is temporally and medically clear that the onset or aggravation of the disease has a substantial causal relationship with work, it shall be regarded as an occupational disease," and Item 13 provides that "even where the requirements for onset under Items 1 through 13 are not satisfied, or even in the case of a disease not prescribed under Items 1 through 12, if a substantial causal relationship (相當因果關係) between the worker's disease and the work is recognized, the relevant disease shall be regarded as an occupational disease." These provisions presuppose that the burden of proof regarding causal relationship has not been shifted to the Corporation's side under Article 37 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, the higher-level provision.
Furthermore, around 2012, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea recommended that the industrial accident insurance statutes and regulations be amended so that the burden of proving the causal relationship between work and disease be borne by the opposing party rather than the injured worker, and thereafter, bills to amend the Industrial Accident Insurance Act containing provisions shifting the burden of proof regarding causal relationship were submitted to the National Assembly in the form of member-sponsored legislation. If, as pointed out by the Dissenting Opinion, this provision had already shifted the burden of proof regarding substantial causal relationship, such recommendations for amendment or such bills would not have been submitted, or their content would have been different.
The Dissenting Opinion points out that even after the 2007 amendment, neither academia nor practice properly recognized or paid attention to the existence and meaning of this provision, and attributes this to the practice of the courts and its uncritical acceptance. However, we cannot at all agree with this vague speculation in the Dissenting Opinion; rather, it should be seen as historically demonstrating that academia and practice had no particular doubt that the provision did not constitute a shift in the burden of proof.
C. Regarding Teleological Interpretation
1) All citizens have the right to lead a life worthy of human beings (Article 34(1) of the Constitution), and to this end, the State bears the duty to endeavor to promote social security and social welfare, and must endeavor to prevent accidents and protect citizens from such risks (Article 34(2) and (6) of the Constitution).
In accordance with its legislative purpose and objective, the Industrial Accident Insurance Act requires the worker's side to bear the burden of proof regarding the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident in order to promptly and fairly compensate workers for occupational accidents, while also establishing systems requiring the Corporation to substantively investigate and collect materials to determine whether an occupational accident has occurred, thereby playing a role in practically alleviating the worker's side's burden of proof (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2014Hun-Ba269, decided June 25, 2015). Furthermore, [Attached Table 3] under Article 34(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, established pursuant to delegation under this provision and the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, sets forth specific criteria for recognizing occupational diseases by dividing them into categories and providing examples of what constitutes an occupational disease, so it may be considered that, at least with respect to diseases falling under such categories, the worker's side's burden of proof is alleviated to some extent.
2) The Supreme Court, too, considering the constitutional basis and legislative purpose of the industrial accident insurance system as described above, has grasped the meaning of the causal relationship between work and the accident as a normative and legal concept, and has actively developed case law principles to alleviate and reduce the worker's side's burden of proof by considering, in specific cases, the cause of the occupational accident, the characteristics of each type, the circumstances of the uneven distribution of evidence, and the difficulty of proof.
The Supreme Court has held that in order to recognize "death due to occupational cause" under Article 5, Item 1 of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, there must be a causal relationship between the work and the disease that caused the death, but even if the main cause of the disease is not directly related to the performance of duties, if at least work-related overwork or stress compounded the main cause of the disease and induced or aggravated the disease, a causal relationship should be found to exist between them. Furthermore, the Court has held that such causal relationship need not necessarily be clearly proven in a medical or scientific manner, and that proof shall be deemed established even where a substantial causal relationship between work and disease may be inferred by comprehensively considering all indirect facts; that this includes cases where an underlying disease or pre-existing disease, which would normally allow for ordinary work, is rapidly aggravated beyond its natural progression due to causes such as excessive workload; and that the existence of a causal relationship between work and disease or death must be determined based on the health and physical condition of the relevant worker, rather than an ordinary average person (see Supreme Court Decision 2018Du32125, decided May 15, 2018; Supreme Court Decision 2019Du62604, decided May 28, 2020, etc.).
Furthermore, case law has held that, considering the practical and normative reasons for protecting workers through industrial accident insurance against diseases caused by hazardous chemical substances in cutting-edge industrial fields, and the purpose and function of the industrial accident insurance system, comprehensively, at the stage of recognizing a substantial causal relationship between the work and disease of a worker who has developed a so-called "rare disease" or a newly emerging type of disease in cutting-edge industrial settings, various matters that may be considered as indirect facts favorable to the worker should be specifically presented, and that where multiple hazardous substances or factors exist in the working environment, the possibility that individual hazardous factors may act complexly and cumulatively in causing the onset or aggravation of a specific disease should not be overlooked (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Du3867, decided August 29, 2017).
3) We deeply sympathize with the purport of the Dissenting Opinion that, in consideration of the livelihood-guaranteeing nature of the industrial accident insurance system, there is a need to interpret and apply the requirements for recognizing occupational accidents more flexibly and elastically. The Supreme Court, too, being aware that in the case of occupational diseases in particular, the worker's side often lacks medical expertise or relevant information, and that new diseases difficult to identify with current science or medicine sometimes emerge due to hazardous environments resulting from industrialization, such that proving the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident may impose a considerable burden on the worker's side, has made efforts to alleviate or reduce the burden of proof individually in specific cases, and the Dissenting Opinion does not deny that this stance represents the general trend or tendency of the Supreme Court. While the Dissenting Opinion's position may find the Majority Opinion's approach of not regarding this provision as a shift in the burden of proof to be regrettable, this cannot justify abandoning the principle of securing legal stability and predictability through fair and valid statutory interpretation based on textual, historical, and systematic interpretation.
The right to receive insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act is a concretization, by statute, of the constitutional right to receive social security benefits; its content is determined by statute, and the legislature is recognized as having broad legislative discretion in shaping it. Even if requiring the worker's side to bear, in principle, the burden of proof regarding the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident is insufficient to protect injured workers, or even if there is a practical and policy-based need to shift such burden of proof, interpreting this provision as a provision allocating or shifting the burden of proof exceeds the limits of the ordinary meaning of the language used in this provision and the limits of systematic and logical interpretation, and cannot be permitted.
Moreover, the causes leading to a state of non liquet (unresolved truth) regarding the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident, even at the final stage of deliberation in industrial accident litigation, vary greatly depending on the individual and specific case. Therefore, rather than a uniform shift of the burden of proof, it may be more desirable to alleviate or reduce the burden of proof through allocation of the subject of proof or presumptions, taking into account the characteristics of each type of case, the uneven distribution of evidence, and the difficulty of proof, and it would be the path that ensures legal stability and predictability to resolve the fundamental improvement of the industrial accident insurance system through legislation after sufficient social discussion.
The foregoing supplements the Majority Opinion.
10. Supplementary Opinion of Justice Kim Seon-su and Justice Lee Heung-gu to the Dissenting Opinion
A. The Majority Opinion, like the Dissenting Opinion, presents grounds regarding this provision through textual interpretation, historical interpretation, systematic interpretation, and teleological interpretation methods. The Majority Opinion and the Dissenting Opinion have arrived at different conclusions while using the same interpretive methods. The Dissenting Opinion has sufficiently demonstrated that the Dissenting Opinion's view is justified even under the basic principle of statutory interpretation that "a statute should not be interpreted more unfavorably to socially vulnerable persons than its text warrants," irrespective of the perspective that the judiciary should play an active role in protecting socially vulnerable persons. Nevertheless, upon probing the fundamental cause of the different conclusions reached by the Majority Opinion and the Dissenting Opinion, it cannot be denied that this ultimately comes down to a fundamental difference in perspective regarding the understanding of the industrial accident insurance system as a social security system and the role of the courts.
The Majority Opinion takes a passive stance regarding the scope of recognition under the industrial accident insurance system, and also places emphasis on legal stability with respect to the role of the courts. In contrast, the Dissenting Opinion may be said to stand on the perspective that, in order to faithfully achieve the purpose of protecting injured workers under the Constitution and the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, a more active approach should be taken regarding the scope of recognition under the industrial accident insurance system, and that the courts should play an active role, when interpreting and applying statutes, to ensure conformity with their normative purpose. In light of the fundamental direction that, in order to respect the dignity and value of all members of society as human beings, the guarantee of the constitutional fundamental right to social security benefits should be strengthened, and the livelihood of workers injured while working and their families should be faithfully protected, the Dissenting Opinion should be the direction our society aims for.
B. Where a statutory provision is structured in the form of a main text and a proviso, and the proviso negates the legal effect prescribed by the main text, it is a universal method of interpretation that the burden of proving the facts required under the proviso is borne by the party seeking to preclude that legal effect. The Majority Opinion states that, on the ground that this provision already prescribes causal relationship as a requirement for recognizing occupational accidents in the main text, the universal interpretive method regarding provisions in the form of a main text and a proviso cannot be adopted as is. However, as pointed out by the Dissenting Opinion, the main text of this provision merely prescribes work-relatedness as a requirement for recognizing an occupational accident, and this can be sufficiently distinguished from the substantial causal relationship prescribed in the proviso, i.e., a stricter causal relationship from a legal and normative perspective, and thus it is difficult to agree with the Majority Opinion. The Dissenting Opinion is the interpretive method more faithful to the general principles of allocation of the burden of proof.
If, as the Majority Opinion holds, this provision is not intended to shift the burden of proof regarding the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident, and the proviso is merely intended to confirm and explain that the work-relatedness in the main text refers to substantial causal relationship, then this provision would have had no need to take the current form of a main text and a proviso. That is, this provision could simply have been drafted in a single sentence such as: "Where a worker suffers an injury, disease, disability, or death due to any of the following causes, and there is a substantial causal relationship between the work and the injury, disease, disability, or death, this shall be regarded as an occupational accident." The Majority Opinion fails to sufficiently explain why this provision takes the form of a main text and a proviso, and why the proviso prescribes substantial causal relationship as a separate requirement.
C. The Majority Opinion grasps the legislature's intent in amending this provision as being to resolve the controversy over comprehensive delegation by directly prescribing in the statute the criteria for recognizing occupational accidents that had been delegated to Ministry of Employment and Labor ordinances, and to clearly establish the basic principle that a substantial causal relationship between work and the accident is required.
However, the legislature's intent in amending the provision is not limited to the scope grasped by the Majority Opinion as described above. While prescribing the criteria for recognizing occupational accidents in the statute, the legislature did not simply carry over the existing provisions that had been prescribed in the Ministry of Employment and Labor ordinance as is. The former Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act prescribed, from Article 32 onward, criteria for recognizing occupational accidents, such as occupational accidents (사고) and occupational diseases, and these provisions generally began to be regulated at the higher, statutory level through the 2007 amendment. However, Article 32 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, concerning criteria for recognizing occupational accidents (사고), and Article 33, concerning occupational diseases, were not structured in the form of a main text and proviso like this provision; rather, Article 32 explicitly designated "substantial causal relationship" as an affirmative requirement for recognition as an occupational accident. Given that, as described above, this provision did not simply carry over the existing criteria for recognizing occupational accidents under the former Enforcement Rule of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, but instead took the form of a main text and proviso, separately prescribing the requirement of substantial causal relationship in the proviso, the Majority Opinion's view that this provision is merely intended to elevate the existing criteria under the Ministry of Employment and Labor ordinance to the statutory level as is, unduly disregards the legislature's intent in consciously modifying the form of the provision in this manner.
D. The Supplementary Opinion of Justice Noh Jeong-hui and Justice Noh Tae-ak to the Majority Opinion, citing the circumstances after the 2007 amendment that the National Human Rights Commission of Korea recommended around 2012 that the industrial accident insurance statutes and regulations be amended so that the burden of proving the causal relationship between work and disease be borne by the opposing party rather than the injured worker, and that bills to amend the Industrial Accident Insurance Act to that effect were subsequently submitted to the National Assembly, concludes that this provision was not intended to shift the burden of proof regarding substantial causal relationship.
However, this is merely a judgment that puts the cart before the horse. The correct interpretation is that the National Human Rights Commission's recommendation and the submission of the amendment bills to the National Assembly constitute legislative efforts to correct the Supreme Court's interpretive error by once again clarifying the shift in the burden of proof, precisely because, even though the burden of proof regarding the substantial causal relationship between work and the accident had already been shifted by this provision, the Supreme Court continued to follow its prior case law regarding the allocation of the burden of proof for occupational accidents under the pre-amendment industrial accident insurance statutes and regulations even after the 2007 amendment. These legislative bills are, in fact, evidence rebutting the correctness of the Supreme Court's interpretation maintaining its prior case law, notwithstanding that a social consensus in favor of shifting the burden of proof regarding substantial causal relationship had formed at the time of the 2007 amendment and was legislated into this provision.
E. Furthermore, the above Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion also points out that, since the Supreme Court has already actively developed case law principles to alleviate or reduce the worker's side's burden in proving substantial causal relationship, there is no need to interpret this provision, beyond the possible limits of its text, as a provision shifting the burden of proof regarding substantial causal relationship.
However, as the above Supplementary Opinion itself acknowledges, notwithstanding the case law principles alleviating the burden of proof regarding substantial causal relationship, there remain many cases in which it is not easy for the worker's side to prove this, and therefore merely alleviating the burden of proof is insufficient to fully realize the purpose of the industrial accident insurance system, and there remains a need to change the case law in the direction of interpreting this provision as a provision shifting the burden of proof. Furthermore, as explained in the Dissenting Opinion, interpreting this provision as a provision shifting the burden of proof regarding the causal relationship between work and the accident also conforms to the text of this provision, and thus we cannot agree with the above Supplementary Opinion to the Majority Opinion, which premises its position on the assumption that such an interpretation is unreasonable.
F. The Majority Opinion cites the fact that other statutes and regulations concerning other accident compensation systems, such as the Public Officials' Accident Compensation Act (공무원 재해보상법), the Military Personnel Accident Compensation Act (군인 재해보상법), and the Enforcement Decree of the Private School Teachers and Staff Pension Act (사립학교교직원 연금법 시행령), prescribe provisions concerning criteria for recognizing accidents in the course of public duty (official duty), with a proviso to the effect that "where there is no substantial causal relationship between the public duty (official duty) and the accident, it shall not be regarded as an accident in the course of public duty (official duty)," which is nearly identical to this provision, and on this basis argues that this provision of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act likewise cannot be regarded as a provision shifting the burden of proof regarding substantial causal relationship to the Corporation, in the same manner as the aforementioned statutory provisions.
However, each of the provisions concerning other accident compensation systems cited by the Majority Opinion newly prescribed the criteria for recognizing accidents in the form of a main text and a proviso through the enactment or amendment of the relevant statutes after the 2007 amendment of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. It is reasonable to interpret these provisions as being intended to redesign the burden of proof regarding substantial causal relationship across various compensation systems, such that the opposing party of the beneficiary bears the burden of proof, modeled on this provision introduced through the 2007 amendment of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act. To regard all of these new provisions concerning criteria for recognizing accidents, including this provision, as unrelated to a shift in the burden of proof regarding substantial causal relationship, as the Majority Opinion does, cannot but be said to disregard the significance of the enactment or amendment of the relevant statutes.
G. As this case is concluded in accordance with the Majority Opinion, the legislative purpose of this provision, which sought to shift the burden of proof regarding substantial causal relationship to the opposing party of the injured worker in connection with the recognition of occupational accidents under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, has effectively been frustrated. As a result, workers who may have contracted a disease while working diligently in poor industrial working environments remain unable to escape their circumstance of receiving no protection whatsoever on the ground that they themselves failed to properly prove the substantial causal relationship between their work and their disease. Yet this substantial causal relationship is something that even the government, the Corporation, and employers, with their formidable human and material organizations, have not properly clarified or have been unable to clarify. It is difficult to justify, on any ground, allowing workers and their families to continue bearing that disadvantage entirely on their own. Social consensus and effort are needed to change this situation.
Accordingly, we also state that there is a need for social consensus and legislative effort to re-amend the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, so as to faithfully realize the constitutional ideal of social security and conform to the worker-protective purpose of the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, such that an injured worker need only prove the fact of the accident and specific facts sufficient to recognize the relatedness between the work and the accident in order to have the accident recognized as an occupational accident, while making clear that the opposing party of the worker must prove the absence of a substantial causal relationship between the work and the accident.
For the foregoing reasons, we state this Supplementary Opinion to the Dissenting Opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyung (Justice-Rapporteur), Justice Cho Jae-yeon, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Kim Seon-su, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hui, Justice Noh Tae-ak, Justice Lee Heung-gu, Justice Cheon Dae-yeop