[Plaintiffs, Appellees and Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 3 others (Litigation representatives: Attorney Jang Seok-dae and 2 others)
[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff 5
[Plaintiffs, Appellees and Appellants] Plaintiff 6 and 9 others (Litigation representatives: Attorney Jang Seok-dae and 2 others)
[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff 15
[Plaintiffs, Appellees and Appellants] Plaintiff 17 and 2 others (Litigation representatives: Attorney Jang Seok-dae and 2 others)
[Defendant, Appellant and Appellee] ○○○ Co., Ltd. (Litigation representative: Attorney Bae Hyeon-tak)
[Judgment Below] Daegu High Court Judgment 2009Na6692, decided October 7, 2010
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined as follows.
1. As to the Defendant's grounds of appeal
A. As to grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2
(1) In concluding an employment contract, it is in principle for the employer to determine a basic wage for the worker and then add and pay various allowances on that basis (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da24699, decided March 24, 1998). However, even where a wage payment contract or collective agreement is concluded under a so-called comprehensive (lump-sum) wage system—whereby, without calculating the basic wage in advance, the sum of various allowances is set as the monthly wage or daily wage, or a basic wage is set and a fixed amount is paid each month as various allowances—such an arrangement is valid so long as it does not disadvantage the worker, such as by including working conditions that fall short of the standards prescribed by the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법, "Labor Standards Act").
However, whether an agreement on a comprehensive wage system has been formed must be determined specifically by comprehensively considering various circumstances, including working hours, the form of work and the nature of the duties, the unit for calculating wages, the contents of the collective agreement and the rules of employment, and the actual practice at similar workplaces. Even where, in a particular case, overtime, night, or holiday work is naturally to be expected in light of the form of work or the nature of the duties, if the collective agreement, rules of employment, or wage regulations clearly provide for the payment of overtime, night, and holiday work allowances as separate itemized amounts distinct from the basic wage, this does not constitute a comprehensive wage system; and it should not be hastily concluded that an agreement on a comprehensive wage system as described above exists merely because the collective agreement, etc., contains an agreement on overtime hours exceeding a certain number of working hours, or because the wage increase rate was set based on an amount that includes allowances in the basic wage (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Da57852, decided December 10, 2009).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, having comprehensively considered the evidence it adopted, found the facts as stated in its reasoning, and then determined that the collective agreement and wage agreement in this case, concluded between the Gyeongsangbuk-do Regional Motor Vehicle Workers' Union (hereinafter "the Union") and the Gyeongsangbuk-do Bus Transport Business Association (hereinafter "the Business Association"), of which the Defendant is a member, could not be regarded as an agreement on a comprehensive wage system.
In light of the legal principles set forth above and the record, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the Defendant's grounds of appeal, of misapprehending the legal principles regarding the comprehensive wage system that affected the judgment.
(2) Where labor and management have agreed to deem a certain number of hours as overtime hours regardless of the actual overtime hours worked, the employer is not permitted to dispute the working hours on the ground that the worker's actual overtime hours fell short of the agreed hours (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81523, decided November 29, 2007).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, it can be seen that, because it is difficult to accurately calculate working hours given the nature of intercity bus driving duties, the Defendant, pursuant to the wage agreement in this case, agreed—regardless of actual working hours—to deem the daily working hours to be 12 hours, consisting of 8 basic working hours plus 4 overtime hours (of which 1 hour is night work, and Saturday overtime work of 8 hours occurs 4 times per month), and has paid overtime and night work allowances corresponding thereto. In light of the legal principles set forth above, applied to these facts, the Defendant may not assert that allowances should be calculated according to the Plaintiffs' actual overtime and night working hours on the ground that the Plaintiffs' actual working hours fell short of the agreed hours. The Defendant's argument on this point cannot be accepted.
(3) When converting ordinary wages set as a monthly amount into an hourly amount, the amount must be divided by the standard number of hours for calculating monthly ordinary wages (the number of hours obtained by multiplying the standard number of hours for calculating weekly ordinary wages by the average number of weeks in a year, then dividing by 12) (Article 6, Paragraph 2, Item 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법 시행령, "Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act")). Accordingly, in order to calculate the hourly ordinary wage, the monthly ordinary wage amount must first be determined. However, if a worker is paid a monthly wage as compensation for agreed working hours exceeding the standard working hours under Article 50 of the Labor Standards Act, or is paid a fixed monthly allowance together with a basic hourly wage, such monthly wage or monthly fixed allowance includes payment for paid holidays under Article 55 of the Labor Standards Act and payment for overtime and night work under Article 56 of the same Act, which cannot be regarded as ordinary wages, making it difficult to determine the ordinary wage. In such a case, it is permissible to calculate the hourly ordinary wage by deeming the worker to have worked on the paid holiday, adding this to the agreed working hours to calculate the total working hours, and then dividing the monthly wage or fixed allowance—which includes the portion corresponding to paid holiday pay and overtime/night work allowances—by that total number of working hours (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da28421, decided April 24, 1998).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the collective agreement in this case provided that "working hours shall be 8 basic hours per day, with overtime work possible by separate agreement between labor and management," and that "the number of working days per month shall be 22 days until June 30, 2006, and 21 days thereafter." The wage agreement based thereon likewise provided for the same number of monthly working days as the collective agreement, and further provided that "daily working hours shall be deemed to be 12 hours, consisting of 8 basic working hours and 4 overtime hours, of which 1 hour of overtime shall be deemed night work, and Saturday overtime shall be deemed to be 16 hours per month, i.e., 4 hours per day, 4 times per month," thereby setting the working hours subject to wage calculation in excess of the standard working hours prescribed by the Labor Standards Act. If so, among the various allowances set forth in the wage agreement in this case, the length-of-service allowance, which is a fixed allowance paid in the form of a monthly wage, must be regarded as wages paid in consideration of the agreed working hours including overtime and night work. Therefore, if the length-of-service allowance is included in the ordinary wage, in order to calculate it as an hourly ordinary wage, it must be divided by the total working hours obtained by adding together the standard number of hours for calculating monthly ordinary wages, the average monthly deemed working hours for weekly paid holidays, and the average monthly overtime and night working hours (taking into account each applicable premium rate).
Contrary to this, the judgment below calculated the hourly ordinary wage by dividing the length-of-service allowance only by the number of hours obtained by adding the deemed weekly paid holiday working hours to the monthly standard working hours under the Labor Standards Act, without considering the overtime and night working hours included in the working hours subject to wage calculation as set forth in the wage agreement in this case. This constitutes an error of misapprehending the legal principles regarding the interpretation of collective agreements and the calculation of ordinary wages. The Defendant's ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
B. As to ground of appeal No. 3
Money or valuables paid to a worker as compensation for prescribed work or total work constitute, in principle, ordinary wages if paid regularly and uniformly. However, in light of the legislative purpose of the Labor Standards Act and the function and necessity of ordinary wages, for any wage to constitute an ordinary wage, it must be a fixed wage paid regularly and uniformly; accordingly, wages that are not paid regularly and uniformly, or whose payment or amount varies according to actual work performance, and which are thus not fixed wages, do not constitute ordinary wages. Here, "uniformly" paid includes not only payment to "all workers" but also payment to "all workers who satisfy a certain condition or standard," and the "certain condition" referred to here, in light of the concept of ordinary wages as intended to derive a "fixed and average wage," must be a "fixed condition" (see Supreme Court Decisions 2006Da13070, decided June 15, 2007, and 2009Da74144, decided January 28, 2010, among others).
The court below, having comprehensively considered the evidence it adopted, found the facts as stated in its reasoning, and then determined that the length-of-service bonus, which the Defendant paid to workers who had continuously worked for more than one year by adding a fixed amount per year of service as their years of service increased, was paid regularly each month regardless of work performance and thus constituted a fixed wage paid regularly and uniformly, and accordingly was included in the ordinary wage.
In light of the legal principles set forth above and the record, the above determination by the court below is justified, and there is no error therein, as alleged in the Defendant's grounds of appeal, of misapprehending the legal principles regarding ordinary wages.
2. As to the Plaintiffs' grounds of appeal
A. As to ground of appeal No. 1
Ordinary wages refer to fixed wages agreed to be paid regularly and uniformly to a worker as compensation for prescribed work or total work. Accordingly, wages in items whose payment or amount varies according to a worker's actual work performance cannot be regarded as fixed wages and thus do not constitute ordinary wages. However, even wages paid to a worker at intervals exceeding one month may be included in ordinary wages if they are paid regularly and uniformly (see Supreme Court Decisions 94Da19501, decided February 9, 1996, and 2002Da74282, decided June 13, 2003, among others).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, having comprehensively considered the evidence it adopted, found that Article 27 of the collective agreement in this case provided that "bonuses shall be paid at 350% of the full-attendance basic wage for those with 6 months or more of service, 550% for 3 years or more, 650% for 8 years or more, and 750% for 12 years or more," and that "bonuses shall be paid quarterly to those who remain employed as of the end of each quarter, and for those who retire, shall be calculated and paid on a monthly basis," and that the Defendant paid bonuses to the Plaintiffs quarterly in accordance with the collective agreement in this case. On this basis, the court below determined that the payment or amount of the bonus depended on the worker's actual work performance, and thus it was not included in the ordinary wage.
However, the above determination by the court below is difficult to accept for the following reasons.
Examining the facts found by the court below in light of the legal principles concerning ordinary wages set forth above, first, the bonus in this case is an amount calculated by applying predetermined rates according to increasing years of service to workers who have continuously worked for more than 6 months, and paid quarterly. Although it differs from the length-of-service allowance, which is paid monthly in the form of a monthly wage, in that it is paid quarterly, this fact alone cannot lead to the conclusion that it is not an ordinary wage. Furthermore, Article 27 of the collective agreement in this case, while providing that "bonuses shall be paid to those who remain employed as of the end of each quarter," immediately thereafter additionally provides that "for those who retire, [bonuses] shall be calculated and paid on a monthly basis," and this cannot be interpreted as excluding mid-term retirees from bonus payment. Moreover, if the meaning of the above provision regarding bonus payment eligibility is, as with the basic wage, that although a bonus cannot be paid for the period after a worker's retirement even if the worker retires during the bonus payment period, a bonus will nonetheless be paid in proportion to the period of service, then the payment or amount of the bonus in this case cannot be said to depend on the worker's actual work performance; rather, there is room to view the amount as fixed, and thus the bonus may constitute a fixed wage paid regularly and uniformly, i.e., an ordinary wage. If so, the court below should have examined the actual practice of the Defendant's bonus payments and other matters to review the specific meaning of Article 27 of the collective agreement in this case, in order to determine whether the bonus at issue, as found by the court below, constitutes money or valuables paid to workers as compensation for prescribed work or total work, paid regularly and uniformly, and thus an ordinary wage. The court below, having failed to do so, erred in misapprehending the legal principles on ordinary wages and thereby failing to exhaust the necessary examination, and the Plaintiffs' ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
B. As to ground of appeal No. 2
(1) Among the Plaintiffs' arguments under this ground of appeal, the argument that it was unlawful for the court below to reject the Plaintiffs' primary argument regarding the standard for calculating monthly leave allowance and weekly holiday allowance, on the ground that there was no evidence to find that the Business Association and the Union had agreed to pay the agreed paid-leave allowance amount under the wage agreement in this case with respect to monthly leave allowance and weekly holiday allowance, ultimately amounts to a challenge to the court below's selection and weighing of evidence and fact-finding, which fall within the exclusive authority of the court below as the fact-finding court, and thus cannot be regarded as a legitimate ground of appeal.
(2) Article 55 of the Labor Standards Act provides that "the employer shall grant workers at least one paid holiday per week on average." Meanwhile, Article 57, Paragraph 1 of the former Labor Standards Act (before amendment by Act No. 6974, September 15, 2003; hereinafter "former Labor Standards Act") provided that "the employer shall grant one day of paid leave per month." (The Labor Standards Act as amended by Act No. 6974, September 15, 2003 deleted this provision, and Article 1, Item 3 of the Addenda provided that, for businesses or workplaces employing 100 or more but fewer than 300 workers on a regular basis, such as the Defendant's, the amended Act would take effect on July 1, 2006.) Such weekly holiday allowance, as well as monthly leave allowance based on the former Labor Standards Act, are likewise allowances under the Labor Standards Act, paid on the premise that a worker is deemed to have worked even if the worker did not actually work on the weekly holiday or monthly leave day, and by their nature, it is appropriate to regard them as allowances to be calculated on the basis of the ordinary wage (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da74144, decided January 28, 2010).
Nevertheless, the judgment below, having determined that there was no obligation to calculate the weekly holiday allowance under the Labor Standards Act or the monthly leave allowance under the former Labor Standards Act on the basis of the ordinary wage, erred in misapprehending the legal principles regarding the allowances to which ordinary wages apply. The Plaintiffs' ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
C. As to ground of appeal No. 3
A judicial confession is a statement, made at a pleading date or a preparatory pleading date, of a fact unfavorable to oneself that coincides with the assertion of the opposing party. Once a judicial confession has been established, the court is bound by it unless it is lawfully withdrawn, and the court may not, on the basis of evidence, find facts inconsistent with a confession established with respect to facts not in dispute between the parties. Furthermore, a party seeking to withdraw a confession must prove not only that the confession is contrary to the truth but also that it was made due to mistake; the fact that the confession is proven to be contrary to the truth does not give rise to a presumption that it was made due to mistake (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da84288, 84295, decided February 11, 2010, among others).
With respect to the Plaintiffs' claim for unpaid weekly holiday allowance corresponding to 4 days per year, on the ground that, although there are on average 52 weekly holidays per year, the Defendant paid weekly holiday allowance only for 4 times per month, i.e., 48 days per year, the court below rejected this claim on the ground that there was no evidence to find that the Plaintiffs had perfect attendance on their prescribed working days each week sufficient to earn paid holidays exceeding 48 days per year.
However, the above determination by the court below cannot be accepted as it stands, in light of the record and the legal principles set forth above.
According to the record, the Plaintiffs, at the second preparatory pleading date in the first instance, stated the application for modification of the purport of claim dated March 5, 2009, which set forth the number of weekly holiday days forming the basis for weekly holiday allowance and the weekly holiday allowance already paid, among other matters; and the Defendant, at the second pleading date in the first instance, stated that if the ordinary wage were recognized as asserted by the Plaintiffs, the Defendant would acknowledge the basis for calculating the difference, including the unpaid weekly holiday allowance, as asserted by the Plaintiffs in the above application for modification of the purport of claim. If so, the assertions of both parties coincide with respect to the fact that the number of weekly holiday days forming the basis for the weekly holiday allowance that the Defendant must pay to the Plaintiffs is as stated in the above application for modification of the purport of claim, and thus a confession must be deemed to have been established.
Nevertheless, the court below, contrary to the Defendant's above confession, rejected the Plaintiffs' argument on this point on the ground that there was no evidence to find weekly holiday days exceeding 48 days per year as the basis for the additional weekly holiday allowance that the Defendant must pay to the Plaintiffs. This judgment below erred in misapprehending the legal principles regarding judicial confession, which affected the judgment.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. This judgment is rendered by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision, as set forth in the Order.
Presiding Justice Kim Neung-hwan
Justice Ahn Dae-hee
Justice Lee In-bok (Presiding Reporting Justice)
Justice Park Byung-dae