[Plaintiff (Selected Party), Appellee and Incidental Appellant (the incidental appeal is limited to the Plaintiff and Selected Parties 36, 37, and 38 listed in the attached list)] Plaintiff (Selected Party) (Law Firm Hanbit, Attorneys Ahn Byung-yong and 1 other, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellant and Incidental Appellee] ○○○ Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Gwangjang, Attorneys Yoo Kyung-hee and 1 other, Counsel for the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2000Na51461 rendered on November 26, 2002
[Order]
1. The part of the judgment below concerning the Defendant's loss against the Plaintiff (Selected Party) and Selected Parties 36, 37, and 38 listed in the attached List of Selected Parties is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
2. A. Among the part of the judgment below concerning the Defendant's loss regarding the delay damages owed to the Selected Parties listed as Nos. 1 through 35 in the attached List of Selected Parties, with respect to each amount stated in the "Awarded Amount" column of the attached [Comprehensive Calculation Table], the portion exceeding the amount calculated at the rate of 6% per annum from April 1, 1998 for Selected Parties 1 through 10 and 12 through 35, and from May 25, 1998 for Selected Party 11, respectively, until May 31, 2003, and at the rate of 20% per annum from the following day until full payment, is reversed, and the appeal of the said Selected Parties with respect to that portion is dismissed.
B. The remainder of the Defendant's appeal with respect to the Selected Parties listed in item A above, and the incidental appeal of the Plaintiff (Selected Party), are all dismissed.
C. The total costs of litigation and the costs of the appeal with respect to the reversed portion between the Selected Parties listed in item A above and the Defendant shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
1. A. The court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the evidence it adopted, found the following facts as stated in its judgment: that Nonparty 1 Corporation maintained retirement allowance regulations (hereinafter "former Retirement Allowance Regulations") providing that, upon retirement of its employees, the retirement allowance would be calculated by multiplying the number of years of service by one month's average wage for up to 2 years after entry, by 2 months' average wage for 3 to 5 years, and by 3 months' average wage for 6 to 20 years; that the Defendant Company, upon the privatization of Nonparty 1 Corporation, comprehensively succeeded to Nonparty 1 Corporation's business, employees, and working conditions around 1969; that around September 1970, the Defendant Company held a second Labor-Management Council meeting with the labor union and agreed to change the former Retirement Allowance Regulations, which had adopted a progressive rate system for retirement allowance payment ratios, to a flat-rate system paying one month's retirement allowance for each year of continuous service, to change the form of the labor union from the previous so-called "open shop" to a "union shop," and for the Defendant Company to collectively deduct union dues from employees' salaries and pay them to the labor union; that accordingly, the Defendant Company amended the retirement allowance regulations to the flat-rate system (hereinafter the amended regulations are referred to as the "new Retirement Allowance Regulations"), and from the October 1970 salary onward, collectively deducted union dues from the salaries of employees subject to union membership and paid them to the labor union, with the result that, whereas at the time of the aforementioned Labor-Management Council meeting around September 1970 the number of union members was only 510, less than a majority of the total 1,637 employees, by around October the total number of employees bearing union dues increased to 1,062; and that the 1971 collective agreement concluded between the Defendant Company and the labor union around January 1971 provided that the payment of retirement allowances would be governed by the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) and the Retirement Allowance Payment Regulations. Based on these findings, the court below determined that the union shop agreement concluded between the Defendant Company and the labor union, which at the time of the said Labor-Management Council represented less than half of the employees, constituted an unfair labor practice under Article 39, Subparagraph 2 of the former Trade Union Act (구 노동조합법) (before amendment by Act No. 3350 of December 31, 1980; hereinafter the same) then in effect, and was therefore void; and that even though a collective agreement including provisions changing the retirement allowance payment ratio in the retirement allowance regulations from a progressive rate system to a flat-rate system was concluded between the Defendant Company and the labor union after it had achieved a majority of employees based on that unfair labor practice, this could not be deemed to constitute consent to the amendment of the rules of employment by the collective decision-making method of a majority of employees; therefore, the new Retirement Allowance Regulations could not be applied to the Plaintiff (Selected Party) and Selected Parties 36, 37, and 38 (hereinafter "the said four persons including the Plaintiff"), who were employees hired before the amendment of the former Retirement Allowance Regulations, and ordered the Defendant Company to pay the difference between the retirement allowance calculated under the former Retirement Allowance Regulations and the retirement allowance already paid.
B. However, the fact-finding and determination of the court below as set forth above cannot be upheld, for the following reasons.
(1) At the time of the said Labor-Management Council meeting around September 1970, the number of union members was only 510, less than a majority of the total 1,637 employees, and thus did not represent two-thirds or more of the employees; therefore, there is no error in the court below's determination that the union shop agreement agreed upon at the said Labor-Management Council meeting constituted an unfair labor practice and was void pursuant to the provisions of Article 39, Subparagraph 2 of the former Trade Union Act then in effect.
(2) However, the act of joining a labor union is, in principle, a contract formed by the meeting of minds consisting of an offer by the employee and acceptance by the union; therefore, if non-union employees, without any voluntary intent to join, were merely unilaterally deemed to be union members as a result of the collective deduction of union dues from their salaries pursuant to a void union shop agreement, then the very declaration of intent to offer to join the union would be lacking, and such fact alone cannot be deemed to constitute acquisition of union membership status. However, if it is recognized under special circumstances that non-union employees, taking the occasion of the conclusion of the union shop agreement, or independently of the union shop agreement, made a declaration of intent to offer to join by consenting to the deduction of union dues from their salaries with the intention of voluntarily joining the union themselves, and the union accepted this by receiving the union dues, then even though the union shop agreement that provided the occasion for joining the union constitutes an unfair labor practice and is void, it must be held that a union membership contract was formed between the employee and the labor union, and that union membership status was thereby lawfully acquired. If, even in cases where such special circumstances exist, the validity of employees' subsequent union membership were uniformly denied solely on the ground that the union shop agreement is void, there would be a risk that even employees who consented to the deduction of union dues from their salaries with a voluntary intent to join would fail to be recognized as having union membership status, and if such employees were excluded, the number of union members would fail to reach a majority of the employees, resulting in the denial of the private-law effect of all legal acts performed by the labor union as a union representing a majority of the employees; this cannot but be deemed unreasonable from the standpoint of the substance of the employment relationship and legal stability.
(3) However, in light of the following circumstances ascertainable from the record: that, in accordance with the matters agreed upon at the second Labor-Management Council meeting in September 1970, the Defendant Company collectively deducted union dues from the October 1970 salary onward and paid them to the labor union, with respect to 552 employees subject to union membership who had not yet joined the union up to that time, and that thereafter the practice of collectively deducting union dues from salaries appears to have continued for a long period, yet no material can be found showing that the said 552 employees raised any objection thereto or disputed that they were not union members; that, upon the enforcement of the new Retirement Allowance Regulations converting the retirement allowance payment method to the flat-rate system, in order to protect the vested rights of employees who had entered service earlier, employees who had entered service before February 28, 1969 were treated as having retired on February 28, 1969, and their retirement allowances for the period of service prior to that date were calculated and settled under the progressive rate system, and the employees concerned appear to have received their retirement allowances without raising any particular objection; that, after the enforcement of the new Retirement Allowance Regulations and the said collective agreement, when many employees who had entered service before the conclusion of the said collective agreement retired and the Defendant Company paid them retirement allowances calculated under the flat-rate system pursuant to the new Retirement Allowance Regulations, no material can be found showing that the retirees or the labor union raised any objection prior to Nonparty 2's filing of a lawsuit for retirement allowance in 1997; that the matters agreed upon at the said Labor-Management Council meeting also included provisions favorable to employees, such as the abolition of the daily employment system and conversion to regular employee status, in exchange for lowering the retirement allowance payment ratio; and that the membership procedure of the Defendant Company's labor union has been conducted in such a way that, rather than submitting a separate membership application, an employee wishing to join consents to having union dues deducted from his or her own salary and paid to the union; when these circumstances are considered comprehensively, it is reasonable to view that the majority of employees who acquired union membership status after the conclusion of the union shop agreement at that time joined the union of their own voluntary intent, taking the occasion of the conclusion of the union shop agreement, by consenting to the deduction of union dues from their salaries. If so, the labor union which concluded the said collective agreement with the Defendant Company, providing for the payment of retirement allowances in accordance with the new Retirement Allowance Regulations changing the retirement allowance payment ratio from the progressive rate system to the flat-rate system, must be deemed to have been organized by a majority of the employees at that time; therefore, the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations, having undergone the consent of that labor union, is valid, and the new Retirement Allowance Regulations must be deemed applicable even to the said four persons including the Plaintiff, who entered service before the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations.
(4) Nevertheless, the court below concluded, solely on the ground that the said union shop agreement constituted an unfair labor practice and was void, that it was difficult to deem all employees who were thereafter deemed to have joined the union as having lawfully joined the union in a uniform manner, and further determined that, since the labor union that concluded the said collective agreement at that time did not represent a majority of the employees, the consent by the collective decision-making method of a majority of employees had not been obtained, and thus the new Retirement Allowance Regulations could not be applied to the said four persons including the Plaintiff, who entered service before the amendment of the former Retirement Allowance Regulations, and thereby upheld the claims of the said four persons including the Plaintiff for retirement allowance seeking payment of the difference between the retirement allowance calculated under the former Retirement Allowance Regulations and the retirement allowance already paid under the new Retirement Allowance Regulations. This involves a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning union membership or a failure to exhaust the necessary examination, which affected the judgment and constitutes an unlawful error; and the argument in Ground of Appeal No. 1 pointing this out has merit.
2. The total amount of wages forming the basis for calculating average wages includes all money and valuables paid by an employer to an employee as remuneration for labor, which are continuously and regularly paid and for which the employer is obligated to pay under a collective agreement, rules of employment, wage regulations, employment contract, or labor practice, regardless of the name given thereto (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da2758, decided June 24, 2003, among others).
The court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the evidence it adopted, found that in 1973 the Defendant Company agreed with the labor union to pay a lunch subsidy to all employees working domestically, and thereafter provided lunch in the form of goods in kind or purchase vouchers, the value of which was equivalent to KRW 75,000 per month; and, having so found, determined that the value assessed for lunch provided in the form of purchase vouchers or goods in kind, having the character of remuneration for labor, must be included in the average wage.
Examining the record in light of the foregoing legal principles, the fact-finding and determination of the court below as set forth above are justified, and there is no error therein of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning average wages as alleged in Ground of Appeal No. 2.
3. The court below rejected the argument of the said four persons including the Plaintiff that the Defendant was obligated to pay retirement allowance calculated by multiplying the number of years of service exceeding 20 years by 3 months' average wage, on the ground that there was no evidence to establish that labor and management had agreed to apply the same progressive rate as under the former Retirement Allowance Regulations even to years of service exceeding 20 years. Examining the record, this measure of the court below can be upheld as justified in its conclusion, and there is no error therein such as a failure to exhaust the necessary examination, mistake of fact in violation of the rules of evidence, or violation of the principle of party presentation, as alleged in the grounds of the incidental appeal by the said four persons including the Plaintiff.
4. However, upon examination ex officio, with respect to the portion of "the interest rate prescribed by Presidential Decree" in the main text of Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the former Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings (소송촉진등에관한특례법) (before amendment by Act No. 6868 of May 10, 2003), the Constitutional Court rendered a decision of unconstitutionality on April 24, 2003; and thereafter, the amended provision of the said Act and the Regulation on Statutory Interest Rate under the Main Text of Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings (소송촉진등에관한특례법제3조제1항본문의법정이율에관한규정) (as amended by Presidential Decree No. 17981 of May 29, 2003), amended accordingly, provide that the statutory interest rate to be applied from June 1, 2003 onward, with respect to cases pending before the courts at the time the said amended Act came into force, shall be 20% per annum; meanwhile, since the Defendant's obligation to pay the retirement allowances in this case to the Selected Parties listed as Nos. 1 through 35 in the attached List of Selected Parties (hereinafter "the 35 Selected Parties") is a commercial obligation, and there is no material showing that any agreement was made as to a different interest rate or default interest rate, the delay damages on each retirement allowance amount awarded by the court below should have been ordered to be paid at the commercial statutory interest rate of 6% per annum up to May 31, 2003, before the said amended Act came into force, and at the rate of 20% per annum under the said amended Act from the following day until full payment. However, contrary to this, the court below applied the provisions of the law before the amendment even to the period up to May 31, 2003, and ordered the payment of delay damages at the rate of 25% per annum; as a result, the portion of the judgment below concerning the 35 Selected Parties, which erroneously applied the statutory interest rate for delay damages, contains an unlawful error that affected the judgment.
5. Accordingly, (1) the part of the judgment below concerning the Defendant's loss against the said four persons including the Plaintiff is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below; (2) the part of the judgment below concerning the Defendant's loss against the 35 Selected Parties with respect to the claim for delay damages, exceeding the amounts set forth below, is reversed, and since this Court finds it sufficient to render judgment directly on this portion, this Court renders judgment itself as follows: the Defendant is obligated to pay to the 35 Selected Parties, with respect to each amount stated in the "Awarded Amount" column of the attached "Comprehensive Calculation Table," delay damages calculated at the rate of 6% per annum prescribed under the Commercial Act (상법), from April 1, 1998, being the day following the date of retirement or thereafter, for Selected Parties Nos. 1 through 10 and 12 through 35, and from May 25, 1998, being the day following the date of retirement of Selected Party No. 11, respectively, until May 31, 2003, and at the rate of 20% per annum prescribed under the amended Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings, from the following day until full payment; and the appeal of the said 35 Selected Parties with respect to the portion exceeding the foregoing is dismissed; and (3) the remainder of the Defendant's appeal with respect to the 35 Selected Parties and the incidental appeal of the said four persons including the Plaintiff are all dismissed. It is so ordered as stated in the Order.
Justices Byun Jae-seung (Presiding Justice), Kang Sin-uk, Park Jae-yun (Justice in Charge), Ko Hyun-cheol