[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff
[Defendant, Appellee] Icheon Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Attorney-in-fact Yoon Seung-yeong
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 92Na22932 rendered on September 3, 1993
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
1. As to the First Ground of Appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that although the Plaintiff was reassigned to the Rotating Machinery Business Division of the Defendant Company located in Seoul effective January 1, 1990, the Plaintiff's act of refusing to report to work for a long period of time while protesting the transfer order, on the ground that commuting was inconvenient due to a leg amputation injury sustained while employed at the Defendant Company, until the Defendant Company revoked the transfer order on February 28 of the same year, constituted an act lacking reasonableness and thus fell under grounds for dismissal, thereby determining that the above act constituted grounds for disciplinary action regardless of whether the above transfer order was valid or not.
However, if the above transfer order is invalid, the Plaintiff's act of not complying with it cannot be made a ground for disciplinary action (see this Court's Decision 90Da12366 rendered on September 24, 1991). Accordingly, whether the above act constitutes grounds for disciplinary action ultimately depends on whether the above transfer order is valid.
Meanwhile, a job transfer or reassignment of an employee may constitute a disadvantageous disposition to the employee in that it brings about changes in the type, content, or location of work that the employee must provide; however, this in principle falls within the authority of the employer, who holds personnel authority, and considerable discretion must be recognized within the scope necessary for business operations. Nevertheless, where there exist special circumstances such as violation of Article 27(1) or Article 105 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) or where it constitutes an abuse of rights, such transfer shall not be permitted (see the above Decision 90Da12366; this Court's Decisions 93Da10279 rendered on April 26, 1994; 93Da47677 rendered on May 10, 1994, etc.). Whether a transfer disposition falls within the scope of legitimate personnel authority must be determined by weighing the business necessity of the transfer order against the disadvantages in the employee's living conditions resulting from the transfer, and by whether procedures required under the principle of good faith, such as consultation with the employee concerned, were followed in the course of issuing the transfer order (see the above Decision 93Da47677; this Court's Decision 92Nu11121 rendered on February 23, 1993, etc.).
The court below made no deliberation or determination on this point. However, according to the record, the Plaintiff is a disabled person whose left thigh has been amputated (Exhibit A No. 23, Disability Registration Certificate), and it appears that changing his place of work from Incheon to Seoul would not only increase his commuting time but would also be extremely difficult for him to endure physically, unlike a person without disability. In contrast, the Defendant Company has failed to make any specific assertion or proof regarding the business necessity of transferring the Plaintiff. In light of these circumstances, it cannot be said that the necessity of this transfer outweighs the degree of disadvantage suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the transfer; moreover, no procedures required under the principle of good faith, such as consultation with the Plaintiff, were followed at all in the course of issuing the transfer order. Therefore, the transfer order in this case must be deemed invalid. (After issuing the above transfer order, upon receiving a notice from the Incheon Regional Labor Office directing the Plaintiff's reinstatement to his original position in response to the Plaintiff's petition, the Defendant Company reinstated the Plaintiff effective March 6 of the same year.)
Therefore, the court below's determination—without further examining the validity of the transfer order in this case—that the Plaintiff's act of refusing to report to work for a long period of time while protesting the Defendant Company's transfer order constituted an act lacking reasonableness and thus fell under grounds for dismissal, is unlawful in that it failed to exhaust deliberation and misapprehended the legal principles concerning grounds for disciplinary action. Accordingly, the argument pointing this out has merit.
2. As to the Second Ground of Appeal
The court below, based on the evidence cited therein, found as one of the grounds for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff, from November 28 to December 1, 1990, left the workplace without authorization for 4 to 5 hours each day, wandering around other factories or idly chatting in the maintenance team, and thereafter, from December 7 to December 18 of the same year, left the workplace without authorization either daily or every few days, wandering around other factories, chatting with other employees, or sleeping in the office, thereby neglecting his duties.
However, among the evidence adopted by the court below, that which is directly related to the above misconduct such as neglect of duty consists of the statements in Exhibit B No. 7-1 (Submission of Written Reply), No. 7-5 (Personnel Action Report), No. 7-8 (Report on Disciplinary Results), and the testimony of non-party 1, a witness at the first instance and the court below. Among these, Exhibit B No. 7-1 merely records the Defendant Company's one-sided assertions, and the above witness's testimony merely states that non-party 2 kept notes regarding the Plaintiff's departure from the workplace. Ultimately, it appears that the court below relied on Exhibit B No. 7-5 and Exhibit B No. 7-8, which was prepared based thereon, in finding the facts.
However, Exhibit B No. 7-5, although prepared on December 10, 1990, contains detailed descriptions of the situation on December 11 of the same year, which was in the future as of the time of preparation. Moreover, Exhibit B No. 7-8 additionally records the situation on December 17 and 18 of the same year without any basis, raising doubts as to its credibility. Furthermore, according to the testimony of the above witness Non-party 1, the Large Motor Section where the Plaintiff worked was a department that assembled parts according to design drawings, and the Plaintiff's review of drawings involved regularly checking the status of assembly work, confirming whether assembly according to the design drawings was proceeding smoothly, and whether machinery assembled according to the design drawings matched the actual site conditions, correcting or supplementing as necessary, which required the Plaintiff to be constantly well informed of on-site work conditions. Since the Large Motor Section worked overtime almost every day, there were occasions when it was necessary to inspect the site the following morning to check on the previous day's work progress. The witness testified that he had never seen the Defendant give the Plaintiff any warning or caution for leaving the workplace, and that the Plaintiff, being a disabled person whose left thigh was amputated, could only use a Western-style toilet, which was located on the second floor of the main building, approximately 200 meters away from the Plaintiff's work department. Considering the above content of the Plaintiff's duties, the nature of his work, and the particular circumstances arising from his disability, it is insufficient to find, merely on the basis that Exhibit B Nos. 7-5 and 7-8 record entries such as "wandering the site" or "not working," that the Plaintiff, from November 28 to December 1, 1990, left the workplace without authorization for 4 to 5 hours each day, wandering around other factories or idly chatting in the maintenance team, and thereafter, from December 7 to December 18 of the same year, left the workplace without authorization either daily or every few days, wandering around other factories, chatting with other employees, or sleeping in the office, thereby neglecting his duties.
Therefore, the court below's determination of the Plaintiff's grounds for disciplinary action based on the above unreliable evidence regarding the Plaintiff's alleged neglect of duty constitutes an error in violation of the rules of evidence and a misapprehension of the facts. Accordingly, the argument pointing this out has merit.
3. As to the Third Ground of Appeal
Since it cannot be said that the Defendant Company's collective bargaining agreement or rules of employment contain any provision authorizing the Defendant to intervene in or impose restrictions on the operation of the labor union, it cannot be said that the Defendant Company's collective bargaining agreement or rules of employment violate Article 33(1) of the Constitution or Articles 1, 3, and 39(4) of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법). Furthermore, although the Defendant Company held a disciplinary committee meeting on February 7, 1990 and resolved to dismiss the Plaintiff by way of disciplinary action, which resolution was subsequently withdrawn, the Defendant Company has never disciplined the Plaintiff on the same grounds as the grounds for dismissal in this case; therefore, it cannot be said that the disciplinary action in this case violates the principle against double jeopardy (일사부재리의 원칙). This argument has no merit.
4. As to the Fourth Ground of Appeal
Although it is recognized that the Plaintiff engaged relatively actively in union activities, including advocating for a progressive severance pay system, while serving as chairman of the labor union from December 1987 to around February 1989, such circumstances alone do not warrant the conclusion that the Plaintiff was, in substance, disciplinarily dismissed on account of his prior legitimate union activities. Accordingly, it is difficult to view the dismissal in this case as an unfair labor practice, and there is no error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning unfair labor practices as argued. This argument also has no merit.
5. As to the Fifth Ground of Appeal
The court below held that, although the Defendant Company held a disciplinary committee meeting on February 7, 1990 and resolved to dismiss the Plaintiff by way of disciplinary action, which resolution was subsequently withdrawn, the grounds for dismissal in this case include misconduct that was discovered or newly committed after the withdrawal of the above disciplinary dismissal, and that, despite having been given an opportunity for self-reflection through the withdrawal of the disciplinary dismissal, the Plaintiff nonetheless failed to abandon his insincere work attitude; therefore, the grounds prior thereto could also be included among the grounds for disciplinary dismissal.
However, as described above, for the Defendant Company to hold a disciplinary committee meeting regarding the Plaintiff, resolve to dismiss the Plaintiff by way of disciplinary action, withdraw that resolution, and then, approximately ten months later, dismiss the Plaintiff again by way of disciplinary action despite the absence of any new misconduct, constitutes an abuse of the right to discipline. It is clear that, among the grounds for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff, all except for the misconduct such as neglect of duty during the periods from November 28 to December 1, 1990 and from December 7 to December 18 of the same year, were committed prior to the withdrawal of the above disciplinary dismissal, and no evidence can be found showing that misconduct newly discovered after the withdrawal of the above disciplinary dismissal is included.
However, according to Exhibit B No. 3 (Written Decision) and Exhibit B No. 7-18 (Statement Record), it is recorded that a draft leaflet containing content disparaging the management of the Defendant Company and the executives of the Defendant Company and the labor union was discovered on December 13, 1990 in the break room inside the Defendant Company's factory, and it appears that the court below found, on this basis, that the misconduct set forth in item (e) of Section 2 of the judgment below was newly discovered after the withdrawal of the disciplinary dismissal against the Plaintiff. However, absent special circumstances, it is difficult to readily accept that the draft leaflet, allegedly prepared between around July 1989 and around November of the same year, was discovered only after more than a year had passed. Moreover, according to the testimony of witness Non-party 1, employees of the Defendant Company discovered the above draft leaflet (Exhibit B Nos. 5-1 through 5-8) on several occasions, and Exhibit B No. 7-17 (Status of Collection of In-house Leaflets), which records the status of collection of in-house leaflets from August 4, 1989 to December 17, 1990 and to which all of the above draft leaflets are attached, contains no entry indicating that a draft leaflet was discovered on December 13, 1990. Accordingly, Exhibit B No. 3 and Exhibit B No. 7-18, which state that the above draft leaflet was discovered on December 13, 1990 in the break room inside the Defendant Company's factory, cannot be believed.
Therefore, as noted above, unless the misconduct such as neglect of duty set forth in Paragraph 2 above is established, and absent evidence that misconduct newly discovered after the withdrawal of the above disciplinary dismissal is included, the dismissal of the Plaintiff dated December 31, 1990 constitutes an abuse of the right to discipline and is therefore invalid. Accordingly, the court below committed an error affecting the judgment by violating the rules of evidence, misapprehending the facts, and misapprehending the legal principles concerning disciplinary dismissal. The argument pointing this out has merit.
Even assuming that the misconduct set forth in item (e) of Section 2 of the judgment below was newly discovered after the withdrawal of the disciplinary dismissal against the Plaintiff, the Defendant Company dismissed Non-party 2 by way of disciplinary action on March 9, 1990 (Exhibit B Nos. 13-2, 13-3)—Non-party 2 having directly prepared and distributed the above leaflet and having a prior record of receiving a warning disposition for unauthorized departure from the workplace—but reinstated him around October of the same year after Non-party 2 filed a lawsuit (testimony of witnesses Non-party 1 and Non-party 3). In light of this, the disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff in this case, whose degree of misconduct cannot be said to be graver than that of the above Non-party 2, also constitutes, in this respect, a deviation from the scope of disciplinary discretion.
6. Therefore, the judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order by the unanimous consent of the participating Justices.
Justice Lee Im-su (Presiding Justice), Kim Seok-su, Jeong Gwi-ho (Justice in Charge), Lee Don-hui