Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 92다28556

Severance Pay (퇴직금) Dispute퇴직금

Decided1994. 06. 24. Court대법원Case reversed and remanded — partial win for the worker (original rules restored for service up to 15 years)
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

A company amended its internal employment rules to lower the severance pay (퇴직금) rate without obtaining employee consent. The Supreme Court ruled that for years of service up to 15 years, the original (more favorable) rules must still apply, while only the portion of service exceeding 15 years—for which no prior rule existed—could be governed by the newly amended rules.

Key takeaways
  • CaseIncident: A company amended its employment rules to reduce the severance pay (퇴직금) rate without obtaining employee consent.
  • OutcomeResult: The court ruled that the original rules must apply to service years up to 15 years, while the amended (lower) rate could only apply to service years beyond 15 years, which the old rules never covered.
  • LessonLesson: Employers must obtain consent from a majority of employees before making unfavorable changes to working conditions like severance pay; without such consent, the original, more favorable terms remain legally binding.
Issues
  • Whether employee consent is required to amend severance pay (퇴직금) regulations unfavorably
  • How to interpret service periods not covered by the original regulation
  • Whether approval by worker representatives on a labor-management council satisfies the consent requirement
  • Whether accepting severance pay without objection waives the right to later dispute the amount
  • Whether filing a lawsuit long after the fact violates the principle of good faith (신의칙)
Key reasoning

Under Korean labor law, an employer cannot unilaterally change working conditions (including severance pay rates) to the disadvantage of employees without the consent of a majority of the workforce. Because the original rules already covered service periods up to 15 years, that portion remained protected and could not be lowered without valid employee consent. However, since the original rules never addressed service beyond 15 years, the newly amended provision effectively created a new rule for that portion, which was valid. The court also considered whether approval by worker representatives in a labor-management council could substitute for direct employee consent, and whether accepting severance pay without objection, or filing suit long after the fact, barred the claim—finding neither barred the worker's claim under the principle of good faith (신의칙).

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[a] A claim for retirement allowance exceeding the minimum standard set by the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) is recognized only where the contents of the retirement allowance system are provided for in an employment contract, collective agreement, rules of employment, etc. Accordingly, if the company's pre-amendment retirement allowance regulations initially set payment rates only up to 15 years of continuous service, the provisions concerning periods of continuous service exceeding 15 years should not be construed as intending to apply the progressive rate for 15 years of service as it stands, but should instead be regarded as a matter reserved for future consideration and, as such, not yet established.

[b] Where a company, without obtaining the consent of the group of employees concerned, amended the former retirement allowance regulations—which had provided payment rates only up to 15 years of continuous service—so as to newly provide payment rates up to 30 years of service, while at the same time lowering the progressive rate for the period up to 15 years of continuous service compared to the former rate and newly providing that, for periods of continuous service exceeding 15 years, amounts would be paid at a rate lower than the former rate applicable up to 15 years, the portion of the amended retirement allowance regulations concerning the period up to 15 years of continuous service, having substantially lowered the progressive rate compared to the pre-amendment regulations, constitutes, even if the scope of the base wage was broadened, a change unfavorable to the employees when considered as a whole; therefore, such a change requires the consent of the group of employees who were subject to the application of the pre-amendment regulations. Since the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations was made without obtaining such consent, it is, absent special circumstances, invalid. However, the portion of the amended retirement allowance regulations concerning periods of continuous service exceeding 15 years conforms to the standards of the Labor Standards Act, and since there existed no more favorable prior regulation, it cannot be said to constitute an unfavorable change to the previous working conditions; therefore, even without obtaining the consent of, or hearing the opinions of, the group of employees, that portion cannot be deemed invalid on that ground, and is valid as the establishment of new retirement allowance regulations. Consequently, for the period of continuous service up to 15 years, the pre-amendment retirement allowance regulations apply, while for the period of continuous service exceeding 15 years, the amended retirement allowance regulations apply.

[c] Even where the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations was made pursuant to a government directive aimed at improving the company's retirement allowance system—which, at the time, provided for a markedly higher payment rate than those of other government-invested institutions—so as to unify the progressive retirement allowance systems that were being implemented differently among government-invested institutions, and to achieve rationalization of the management of the company, which occupied a significant portion of the national economy, by adjusting the progressive retirement allowance rate downward only prospectively while leaving the payment rate for the period of service prior to the change to be governed by the former regulations, and even where wages were simultaneously increased by 10%, and bonuses and monthly/annual leave allowances—which had not previously been included in the average wage serving as the basis for calculating retirement allowances—were newly included, and even where, in the amendment procedure, the consent of the labor representative members of the labor-management council was obtained, since the wage increase appears to have been an annual occurrence and the mere inclusion of bonuses or monthly/annual leave allowances in the calculation of the average wage for retirement allowance purposes cannot be considered sufficient to compensate for the infringement of employees' vested rights, it was held that these circumstances alone are insufficient to establish that there existed such social reasonableness as would obviate the need to obtain the consent of the group of employees.

[d] A labor-management council is a system whose purpose is to promote industrial peace by enhancing the common interests of labor and management through mutual understanding and cooperation between employees and the employer, and its purpose differs from that of a labor union. Therefore, even if the company has designated matters concerning working conditions as matters for consultation by the council, it cannot be said that, in electing the labor representative members constituting the labor-management council, the employees comprehensively delegated to those members the authority to give consent on their behalf to an unfavorable change in working conditions. Furthermore, absent any material showing that the labor representative members, in giving their consent to the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations, collected and consolidated in advance the opinions of the employees in each department they represented and exercised the right of consent as agents representing the employees' expressions of intent, the consent of the labor representative members cannot be equated with the consent of a majority of the employees.

[e] Even if the employees belonging to the company received retirement allowances in accordance with the amended retirement allowance regulations without raising any clear objection, this fact alone is insufficient to find that the employees consented to the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations or subsequently ratified it.

[f] The mere fact that the employees filed suit and asserted the invalidity of the amendment only about ten years after the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations does not render their filing of the suit contrary to the principle of good faith.

Full text (English, AI translation) 14,643 chars

[Plaintiffs, Appellees] Jeong Jeong-woong and 8 others, Plaintiffs' Litigation Representatives Attorney Yoon Jong-hyun and 3 others
[Defendant, Appellant] POSCO Co., Ltd. (포항종합제철주식회사), Litigation Representative Attorney Lee Jae-hoo and 4 others
[Lower Court Judgment] Daegu High Court, Judgment of June 4, 1992, Case No. 91Na4684

[Order]

The lower court judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.

[Reasoning]

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to Grounds of Appeal Nos. 1 and 7

According to the lower court judgment, the lower court found the following facts: the Defendant company amended its former retirement allowance regulations, which had provided payment rates only up to 15 years of continuous service, to provide payment rates up to 30 years of service; in doing so, it lowered the progressive rate for years of service up to 15 years from an average of about 3 months' average wage per year of service under the former regulations to an average of about 1.6 months' average wage, and newly provided that, for years of service exceeding 15 years, an average of about 1.9 months' average wage per year of service would be paid. The lower court then determined as follows: even though the amendment of the Defendant company's retirement allowance regulations provided that the former regulations would apply to the period of service before the amendment, the amendment nonetheless lowered the expected benefits of employees who had anticipated that they would receive retirement allowances calculated under the former regulations for their future periods of service as well. Furthermore, even though the former retirement allowance regulations of the Defendant company had provided payment rates only up to 15 years of continuous service, in light of the fact that a progressive system was adopted for service periods up to 15 years (the amended retirement allowance regulations also adopt a progressive system up to 30 years) and that there was no separate provision establishing an upper limit on years of service, it is reasonable to interpret the former regulations as intending that, even for periods exceeding 15 years of service, the highest progressive rate under the former retirement allowance regulations—namely, the rate applicable to the period from 9 to 15 years of service—would continue to apply as is. Accordingly, the newly established payment rate for service periods exceeding 15 years also constitutes an unfavorable change to the former retirement allowance regulations. Ultimately, the lower court determined that the Defendant company's amendment of the retirement allowance regulations effective January 1, 1981 constituted an unfavorable change to the rules of employment (취업규칙), and that since the amendment was made without obtaining the consent of the group of employees subject to the former retirement allowance regulations through a collective decision-making method, the entire amended retirement allowance regulations were invalid; therefore, the former retirement allowance regulations apply to the Plaintiffs, who were employees subject to the former regulations, and in such case, for periods of service exceeding 15 years—for which the payment rate was not expressly provided under the former retirement allowance regulations—the progressive rate applicable to the immediately preceding period of service, namely the period from 9 to 15 years of service, should apply.

However,

the right to claim a retirement allowance at a level exceeding the minimum standard under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) is recognized only where the content of the retirement allowance system is provided for in an employment contract, collective agreement, rules of employment, or the like. In the case of the Defendant company, if the former retirement allowance regulations, at their inception, provided payment rates only up to 15 years of continuous service, then the provision regarding periods of service exceeding 15 years should not be construed as intending that the progressive rate for 15 years of service would continue to apply as is; rather, it should be viewed as a matter that was reserved for future consideration and had not yet been established.

Therefore, the portion of the amended retirement allowance regulations relating to periods of service up to 15 years significantly lowered the progressive rate compared to the former retirement allowance regulations, as noted above, and thus, even though the scope of the base wage was expanded, the change was, on the whole, unfavorable to the employees; accordingly, such a change requires the consent of the group of employees subject to the former regulations. Since the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations in this case was made without obtaining such consent, it must, absent special circumstances, be held invalid (see this Court's Judgment of May 14, 1993, Case No. 93Da1893).

However, the portion of the amended retirement allowance regulations relating to periods of service exceeding 15 years conforms to the standards of the Labor Standards Act, and since there was no more favorable former regulation in existence, it cannot be said that this portion unfavorably changed the former working conditions. Therefore, even if the consent of the group of employees was not obtained, or their opinions were not sought, this portion cannot be held invalid on that ground, and it must be held valid as a newly established retirement allowance regulation. Ultimately, as to the Plaintiffs in this case, the former retirement allowance regulations apply to the period of service up to 15 years, and the amended retirement allowance regulations apply to the period of service exceeding 15 years; and the amount of the retirement allowance should be calculated by adding together the retirement allowance for 15 years of service calculated using the base wage and payment rate under the former retirement allowance regulations, and the retirement allowance for the period of service exceeding 15 years calculated under the amended retirement allowance regulations (the amount obtained by multiplying the number of payment days for the period of service exceeding 15 years under the amended retirement allowance regulations by the base wage).

The lower court judgment, having calculated the retirement allowance to be paid to the Plaintiffs in a manner different from the above, contains an error of law that misapprehends the legal principles concerning the retirement allowance system and thereby affected the judgment.

The argument pointing out this error has merit.

2. As to Ground of Appeal No. 2

As the argument points out,

even though the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations in this case was made, in accordance with the government's directive, to improve the Defendant company's retirement allowance system—whose payment rate was significantly higher than that of other government-invested institutions at the time—so as to unify the progressive retirement allowance systems being implemented differently among government-invested institutions and to rationalize the management of the Defendant company, which occupies a significant position in the national economy; and even though, in doing so, the retirement allowance payment rate for periods of service prior to the amendment was left to be governed by the former regulations while the progressive rate was adjusted downward only prospectively, and wages were simultaneously increased by 10%, and bonuses and annual/monthly leave allowances, which were previously not included in the average wage serving as the basis for calculating retirement allowances, were newly included, and even though the consent of the employee representatives on the Labor-Management Council was obtained in the amendment procedure—the wage increase appears to have been an annual occurrence, and the mere inclusion of bonuses or annual/monthly leave allowances in the calculation of the average wage for retirement allowance purposes cannot be considered sufficient to compensate for the infringement of the employees' vested rights. Therefore, these circumstances alone are insufficient to recognize that there was social reasonableness (사회통념상의 합리성) of a degree that would obviate the need to obtain the consent of the group of employees. The lower court judgment, having ruled to the same effect, cannot be said to contain an error of misapprehension of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence, misapprehension of legal principles, or failure to state reasons, as argued. This argument is without merit.

3. As to Ground of Appeal No. 3

According to the reasoning of the lower court judgment, the lower court found, based on the evidence cited, that the Defendant company amended its retirement allowance regulations effective January 1, 1981, and, after the Labor-Management Council was established following the enforcement of the Act on the Promotion of Workers' Participation and Cooperation (formerly the Labor-Management Council Act, 노사협의회법), further amended the amended retirement allowance regulations on February 28 of the same year; that on June 29 of the same year, at the 6th Labor-Management Council meeting, the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations was placed on the agenda and the consent of the employee representatives was obtained, and the content thereof was made known to the employees; that thereafter, in order to clarify the fact of the employee representatives' consent, a written consent of five employee representatives was obtained on January 18, 1982; and that the Defendant company's Labor-Management Council regulations provided that the Council could consult on and decide matters concerning working conditions such as wages and working hours, which are not matters for consultation under the Labor-Management Council Act. The lower court then determined as follows:

the Labor-Management Council is a system whose purpose is to promote industrial peace by enhancing the common interests of labor and management through mutual understanding and cooperation between employees and employers, and its purpose differs from that of a labor union; therefore, even if the Defendant company provided that matters concerning working conditions were subject to consultation by the Council, it cannot be said that, in electing the employee representatives constituting the Labor-Management Council, the employees comprehensively delegated to them the authority to give consent on their behalf to an unfavorable change in working conditions. Furthermore, in this case, there is no material to show that, in giving consent to the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations, the employee representatives collected and gathered the opinions of the employees in each department they represented in advance, and exercised the right of consent by proxy for the employees' expression of intent. Accordingly, the consent obtained from the employee representatives cannot be equated with the consent of a majority of the employees.

Upon examination of the record, the lower court's fact-finding and determination as above are correct, and it cannot be said that there is an error of misapprehension of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence, or an error of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning unfavorable changes to rules of employment under the former Labor Standards Act (former Labor Standards Act, Act No. 3492 of December 31, 1980), as argued. This argument is also without merit.

4. As to Ground of Appeal No. 4

According to the reasoning of the lower court judgment, the lower court determined that, even though employees of the Defendant company received retirement allowances in accordance with the amended retirement allowance regulations without raising any express objection, this fact alone is insufficient to find that the employees consented to the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations or subsequently ratified it. This determination by the lower court is deemed to be justified, and it cannot be said that there is an error of law affecting the judgment due to misapprehension of the legal principles concerning implied consent of employees in the context of an unfavorable change to rules of employment, as argued. This argument is likewise without merit.

5. As to Ground of Appeal No. 5

According to the reasoning of the lower court judgment, the lower court held that although Article 47 of the collective agreement concluded by the Defendant company's labor union on March 30, 1989 provides that "the Company shall pay a retirement allowance in accordance with the Company's relevant regulations when a union member retires after having served continuously for one year or more," the minutes of major meetings related to the collective bargaining recorded an agreement stating: "with regard to Article 47 of the collective agreement, taking into account the Supreme Court's precedents and the practices of other government-run enterprises, the parties agree to renegotiate at the next bargaining session, provided that if there is a special policy change by the government within that period, a supplementary agreement shall be concluded." In light of this, it is difficult to view the Defendant company's labor union as having retroactively ratified the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations by means of Article 47 of the collective agreement. Upon comparison with the record, the above fact-finding and determination are deemed justified, and there is no error of law affecting the judgment due to misapprehension of facts caused by a violation of the rules of evidence, as argued. This argument is without merit.

6. As to Ground of Appeal No. 6

The lower court determined that the mere fact that the Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit and asserted the invalidity of the amendment more than ten years after the amendment of the retirement allowance regulations does not mean that the Plaintiffs' filing of this lawsuit violates the principle of good faith (신의칙). This determination by the lower court is deemed to be correct, and it cannot be said that there is an error of law due to misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the principle of good faith, as argued. This argument is also without merit.

Therefore, the lower court judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.

Justice Yoon Young-cheol (Presiding Justice), Kim Sang-won, Park Man-ho, Park Jun-seo (Justice in Charge)

【판결요지】

가. 근로기준법의 최저기준을 초과하는 수준의 퇴직금 청구권은 퇴직금제도의 내용이 근로계약, 단체협약, 취업규칙 등에 규정되어 있는 경우에만 인정된다 할 것이므로, 회사의 개정 전 퇴직금규정이 초창기에 우선 근속기간 15년까지에 대하여만 지급율을 정하고 있었다면 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대한 퇴직금규정은 근속기간 15년의 누진율을 그대로 적용하겠다는 취지로 볼 것이 아니라 그 부분을 추후 검토하기로 유보하여 아직 제정되지 않은 것으로 보아야 할 것이다.

나. 회사가 근로자집단의 동의를 받지 않고 근속기간 15년까지의 지급율만을 규정하고 있던 종전의 퇴직금규정을 30년까지의 지급율을 정하는 것으로 수정하면서 그 누진율도 15년까지의 근속기간에 대한 종전 지급율을 인하하고 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대하여도 종전의 15년까지의 지급율보다 적은 비율에 의한 금액을 지급하는 것으로 새로이 규정을 둔 경우, 개정 퇴직금규정 중 근속기간 15년까지에 대한 부분은 개정 전 퇴직금규정에 비하여 누진율을 크게 낮춘 것이어서 비록 기초임금의 범위를 넓혔다 하더라도 전체로서 근로자에게 불리하게 변경된 것이라면 그 변경에는 개정 전 규정의 적용을 받고 있던 근로자집단의 동의를 요한다 할 것인데 퇴직금규정의 개정이 그러한 동의를 받지 않고 이루어졌으므로 특별한 사정이 없는 한 무효라 할 것이나, 개정 퇴직금규정 중 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대한 부분은 근로기준법의 기준에 적합하고 그보다 유리한 종전 규정이 존재하지 않아 종전의 근로조건을 불이익하게 변경한 것이라고 할 수 없으므로 근로자집단의 동의를 얻거나 의견청취를 하지 않았다 하여도 이를 이유로 그 부분을 무효라 할 수 없고 새로운 퇴직금규정의 제정으로서 유효하다 할 것이어서, 결국 15년까지의 근속기간에 대하여는 개정 전 퇴직금규정이, 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대하여는 개정 퇴직금규정이 각 적용된다.

다.퇴직금규정을 개정한 것이 당시 다른 정부 투자기관에 비하여도 지급율이 현저히 높은 회사의 퇴직금제도를 개선하여 정부투자기관마다 상이하게 시행되고 있는 퇴직금 누진제도를 통일하고, 국민경제에서 큰 비중을 차지하고 있는 회사의 경영합리화를 이루려는 정부의 지시에 따라 변경 전의 재직기간에 대한 퇴직금 지급율은 종전의 규정에 의하도록 둔 채 장래에 향하여만 퇴직금 누진율을 하향조정한 것이고 동시에 임금을 10% 인상하였으며 종전에는 퇴직금 산정의 기초가 되는 평균임금에 산입되지 않던 상여금과 연월차수당을 새로이 산입키로 하였고 그 개정 절차에 있어서도 노사협의회 근로자위원들의 동의를 얻은 바 있다 하더라도, 임금인상은 연례적인 것으로 보여지고 상여금이나 연월차수당을 퇴직금 산정을 위한 평균임금 계산에 산입하였다는 것만으로는 근로자들의 기득권 침해를 보상하기에 충분하다고 할 수 없으므로, 위와 같은 사정만으로는 거기에 근로자집단의 동의를 얻지 않아도 될 만큼 사회통념상의 합리성이 있는 것으로 인정하기 어렵다고 한 사례.

라. 노사협의회는 근로자와 사용자 쌍방이 이해와 협조를 통하여 노사공동의 이익을 증진함으로써 산업평화를 도모할 것을 목적으로 하는 제도로서 노동조합과 그 제도의 취지가 다르므로 비록 회사가 근로조건에 관한 사항을 그 협의사항으로 규정하고 있다 하더라도 근로자들이 노사협의회를 구성하는 근로자위원들을 선출함에 있어 그들에게 근로조건을 불이익하게 변경함에 있어서 근로자들을 대신하여 동의를 할 권한까지 포괄적으로 위임한 것이라고 볼 수 없으며, 그 근로자위원들이 퇴직금규정의 개정에 동의를 함에 있어서 사전에 그들이 대표하는 각 부서별로 근로자들의 의견을 집약 및 취합하여 그들의 의사표시를 대리하여 동의권을 행사하였다고 볼 만한 자료도 없다면, 근로자위원들의 동의를 얻은 것을 근로자들 과반수의 동의를 얻은 것과 동일시할 수 없다.

마. 소속 근로자들이 개정된 퇴직금규정에 따라 퇴직금을 지급받으면서 명백한 이의를 제기한 바 없다 하더라도, 이것만으로 근로자들이 퇴직금규정의 개정에 동의하였다거나 사후적으로 추인하였다고 보기 어렵다.

바. 근로자들이 퇴직금규정의 개정 이후 10여 년이 지난 후에야 소를 제기하면서 그 개정의 무효를 주장한 사실만으로 그들의 제소가 신의칙에 위반된다고 할 수 없다.

【참조조문】

가.나.마.바. 근로기준법 제28조 / 나.다.라.마.바. 구 근로기준법 (1989.3.29. 법률 제4099호로 개정되기 전의 것) 제95조 / 라. 노사협의회법 제1조 , 제20조 / 바. 민법 제2조

【참조판례】

다. 대법원 1992.11.27. 선고 92다32357 판결(공1993상,259), 1993.1.26. 선고 92다49324 판결(공1993상,863), 1994.4.12. 선고 92다20309 판결(공1994상,1409)

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【원고, 피상고인】 정정웅 외 8인 원고들 소송대리인 변호사 윤종현 외 3인

【피고, 상고인】 포항종합제철주식회사 소송대리인 변호사 이재후 외 4인

【원심판결】 대구고등법원 1992.6.4. 선고 91나4684 판결

【주 문】

원심판결을 파기하고 사건을 대구고등법원에 환송한다.

【이 유】 상고이유를 본다.

1. 상고이유 제1점과 제7점에 관하여

원심판결에 의하면, 원심은 피고 회사가 근속기간 15년까지의 지급률만을 규정하고 있던 종전의 퇴직금규정을 30년까지의 지급률을 정하는 것으로 수정하면서 그 누진율도 15년까지의 근속기간에 대한 지급률이 종전에 근속기간 1년에 대하여 평균 약 3개월분의 평균임금이던 것을 평균 약 1.6개월분으로 인하하고, 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대하여는 근속기간 1년에 대하여 평균 약 1.9개월분의 평균임금을 지급하는 것으로 새로이 규정을 둔 사실을 인정한 다음 피고 회사의 위 퇴직금규정의 개정이 비록 개정 이전의 근속기간에 대하여는 종전의 규정을 적용하는 것으로 하였더라도 장래의 근무기간에 대하여도 종전의 규정에 의한 퇴직금을 지급받을 수 있을 것으로 예상하고 있던 근로자들의 기대이익을 저하시키는 것이라 아니할 수 없고, 나아가 피고 회사의 개정전 퇴직금규정이 비록 근속연수 15년까지의 퇴직금 지급률만을 정하고 있었다 하더라도 근속연수 15년까지는 누진제를 채택하고 있었고(개정 퇴직금규정도 30년까지 누진제를 채택하고 있다) 그 근속연수의 상한에 관하여 따로 규정을 두고 있지 않는 점에 비추어 보면 근속연수 15년을 초과하는 기간에 대하여도 종전 퇴직금규정상의 누진율 중 가장 높았던 근속연수 9년부터 15년까지의 누진율을 그대로 적용한다는 취지로 해석함이 상당하여 새로이 규정한 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대한 지급률도 종전의 퇴직금규정을 불이익하게 변경하는 것에 해당하므로 결국 피고 회사의 1981.1.1.자 퇴직금규정의 개정은 취업규칙의 불이익한 변경임에도 그 개정에 있어 종전 퇴직금규정의 적용을 받고 있던 근로자집단의 집단적 의사 결정방법에 의한 동의를 받지 못하여 개정 퇴직금규정 전부가 효력이 없어 종전 퇴직금규정의 적용을 받고 있던 근로자인 원고들에게는 종전 퇴직금규정이 적용되고, 이 경우 종전의 퇴직금규정상 지급률이 명문으로 규정되어 있지 않은 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대하여는 그 직전의 근속기간인 9년부터 15년까지의 근속기간에 대하여 적용되는 누진율이 적용되어야 한다고 판단하고 있다.

그러나 근로기준법의 최저기준을 초과하는 수준의 퇴직금 청구권은 퇴직금 제도의 내용이 근로계약, 단체협약, 취업규칙 등에 규정되어 있는 경우에만 인정된다 할 것인바, 이 사건 피고 회사의 경우에 있어서 개정 전 퇴직금규정이 초창기에 우선 근속기간 15년까지에 대하여만 지급률을 정하고 있었다면 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대한 퇴직금규정은 근속기간 15년의 누진율을 그대로 적용하겠다는 취지로 볼 것이 아니라 그 부분을 추후 검토하기로 유보하여 아직 제정되지 않은 것으로 보아야 할 것이다.

따라서 개정 퇴직금규정 중 근속기간 15년까지에 대한 부분은 위에서 본 바와 같이 개정 전 퇴직금규정에 비하여 누진율을 크게 낮춘 것이어서 비록 기초 임금의 범위를 넓혔다 하더라도 전체로서 근로자에게 불리하게 변경된 것이므로 그 변경에는 개정 전 규정의 적용을 받고 있던 근로자집단의 동의를 요한다 할 것인데 이 사건 퇴직금규정의 개정은 그러한 동의를 받지 않고 이루어졌으므로 특별한 사정이 없는 한 무효라 할 것이나(당원 1993.5.14. 선고 93다1893 판결 참조), 개정 퇴직금규정 중 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대한 부분은 근로기준법의 기준에 적합하고 그보다 유리한 종전 규정이 존재하지 않아 종전의 근로조건을 불이익하게 변경한 것이라고 할 수 없으므로 근로자집단의 동의를 얻거나 의견청취를 하지 않았다 하여도 이를 이유로 그 부분을 무효라 할 수 없고 새로운 퇴직금규정의 제정으로서 유효하다 할 것이다. 결국 이 사건 원고들에게는 15년까지의 근속기간에 대하여는 개정 전 퇴직금규정이, 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대하여는 개정 퇴직금규정이 각 적용되고, 그 퇴직금 액수는 개정 전 퇴직금 규정의 기초임금과 지급률에 의하여 근속기간 15년에 대한 퇴직금을 계산한 후 여기에 개정 퇴직금규정에 의하여 계산한, 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대한 퇴직금(개정 퇴직금규정에 따라서 15년을 초과하는 근속기간에 대한 지급일수에 기초임금을 곱한 금액)을 합산한 금액이 되어야 할 것이다.

원고들에게 지급되어야 할 퇴직금을 위와 다른 방식으로 계산한 원심판결에는 퇴직금제도에 대한 법리를 오해하여 판결에 영향을 미친 위법이 있다 할 것이다.

이 점을 지적하는 논지는 이유 있다.

2. 상고이유 제2점에 관하여

소론이 지적하는 바와 같이 이 사건 퇴직금규정을 개정한 것이 당시 다른 정부 투자기관에 비하여도 지급률이 현저히 높은 피고 회사의 퇴직금제도를 개선하여 정부투자기관마다 상이하게 시행되고 있는 퇴직금 누진제도를 통일하고, 국민경제에서 큰 비중을 차지하고 있는 피고 회사의 경영합리화를 이루려는 정부의 지시에 따라 변경 전의 재직기간에 대한 퇴직금 지급률은 종전의 규정에 의하도록 둔 채 장래에 향하여만 퇴직금 누진율을 하향조정한 것이고, 동시에 임금을 10% 인상하였으며, 종전에는 퇴직금 산정의 기초가 되는 평균임금에 산입되지 않던 상여금과 연월차수당을 새로이 산입키로 하였고, 그 개정절차에 있어서도 노사협의회 근로자위원들의 동의를 얻은 바 있다 하더라도 임금인상은 연례적인 것으로 보여지고, 상여금이나 연월차수당을 퇴직금 산정을 위한 평균임금 계산에 산입하였다는 것만으로 근로자들의 기득권 침해를 보상하기에 충분하다고 할 수 없으므로 위와 같은 사정만으로는 거기에 근로자집단의 동의를 얻지 않아도 될 만큼 사회통념상의 합리성이 있는 것으로 인정하기 어렵다. 같은 취지로 판단한 원심판결에 소론과 같이 채증법칙 위배로 인한 사실오인, 법리오해 또는 이유불비로 인한 위법이 있다 할 수 없다. 논지는 이유 없다.

3. 상고이유 제3점에 관하여

원심판결 이유에 의하면, 원심판결은 거시 증거에 의하여 피고 회사는 1981.1.1.자로 퇴직금규정을 개정하고, 노사협의회법의 시행에 따라 노사협의회가 구성된 후인 같은 해 2.28. 위 개정 퇴직금규정을 다시 개정한 후 같은 해 6.29. 제6회 노사협의회에서 퇴직금규정의 개정을 안건으로 상정하여 근로자위원들의 동의를 받아 그 내용을 근로자들에게 공지시켰으며, 그 후 근로자위원들의 동의 사실을 명확히 하기 위하여 1982.1.18. 근로자 위원 5인의 동의서를 받은 사실 및 피고 회사 노사협의회 규정은 노사협의회법상 노사협의회의 협의사항으로 되어 있지 않은 임금, 근로시간 등의 근로조건에 관한 사항까지 협의, 결정할 수 있는 것으로 규정하고 있는 사실을 인정한 다음, 노사협의회는 근로자와 사용자 쌍방이 이해와 협조를 통하여 노사공동의 이익을 증진함으로써 산업평화를 도모할 것을 목적으로 하는 제도로서 노동조합과는 그 제도의 취지가 다르므로 비록 피고 회사가 근로조건에 관한 사항을 그 협의사항으로 규정하고 있다 하더라도 근로자들이 노사협의회를 구성하는 근로자위원들을 선출함에 있어 그들에게 근로조건을 불이익하게 변경함에 있어서 근로자들을 대신하여 동의를 할 권한까지 포괄적으로 위임한 것이라고 볼 수 없으며, 이 사건에 있어서 위 근로자 위원들이 위 퇴직금규정의 개정에 동의를 함에 있어서 사전에 그들이 대표하는 각 부서별로 근로자들의 의견을 집약 및 취합하여 그들의 의사표시를 대리하여 동의권을 행사하였다고 볼 만한 자료도 없으므로 근로자위원들의 동의를 얻은 것을 근로자들 과반수의 동의를 얻은 것과 동일시할 수 없다고 판단하고 있는바, 기록에 비추어 보면 원심의 그러한 사실 인정과 판단은 옳고 거기에 소론과 같은 채증법칙 위배로 인한 사실오인이나 구 근로기준법(1980.12.31. 법률 제3492호) 아래에서의 취업규칙의 불이익변경에 대한 법리오해가 있다 할 수 없다. 논지도 이유 없다.

4. 상고이유 제4점에 관하여

원심판결 이유에 의하면, 원심은 피고 회사 소속 근로자들이 개정된 퇴직금규정에 따라 퇴직금을 지급 받으면서 명백한 이의를 제기한 바 없다 하더라도 이것만으로 근로자들이 위 퇴직금규정의 개정에 동의하였다거나 사후적으로 추인 하였다고 보기 어렵다고 판단하고 있는바, 이러한 원심의 판단은 정당한 것으로 수긍이 가고 거기에 소론과 같은 취업규칙의 불이익변경에 있어서 근로자의 묵시적 동의에 대한 법리를 오해하여 판결에 영향을 미친 위법이 있다 할 수 없다. 논지 역시 이유 없다.

5. 상고이유 제5점에 관하여

원심판결 이유에 의하면, 원심은 피고 회사 노동조합이 1989.3.30. 체결한 단체협약 제47조가 '회사는 조합원이 1년 이상 계속 근무하고 퇴직한 때에는 회사의 관련규정이 정하는 바에 따라 퇴직금을 지급한다'고 규정하고 있으나, 한편 단체교섭 관련 주요회의록에 '단체협약 제47조와 관련하여 대법원의 판례 및 타국영업체의 사례를 감안하여 차기 교섭시 재교섭키로 하되 그 기간 내에 정부의 특별한 정책변화가 있을 경우에는 보충협약을 체결함'이라는 합의사상을 남기고 있다면 피고 회사 노동조합이 단체협약 제47조로써 위 퇴직금규정의 개정을 소급적으로 추인한 것으로 보기는 어렵다고 판시하였는바, 기록에 대조하여 살펴볼 때 위 사실 인정과 판단은 정당한 것으로 수긍이 되고 거기에 소론이 주장하는 바와 같은 채증법칙 위배로 인한 사실오인으로 판결에 영향을 미친 위법은 없다. 논지는 이유 없다.

6. 상고이유 제6점에 관하여

원심은, 이 사건에서 원고들이 위 퇴직금규정의 개정 이후 10여 년이 지난 후에야 소를 제기하면서 그 개정의 무효를 주장한 사실만으로 원고들의 이 사건 제소가 신의칙에 위반된다고 할 수 없다고 판단하고 있는바, 원심의 위와 같은 판단은 옳은 것으로 수긍되고, 이에 소론이 지적하는 바와 같은 신의칙에 관한 법리오해의 위법이 있다 할 수 없다. 논지도 이유 없다.

그러므로 원심판결을 파기하고 사건을 원심법원에 환송하기로 하여 관여 법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 윤영철(재판장) 김상원 박만호 박준서(주심)

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