[Plaintiffs, Appellants and Appellees] Plaintiff 1 and 4 others (Plaintiffs' Attorneys Lee Won-mok and 1 other)
[Defendant, Appellee and Appellant] Korea Expressway Corporation (한국도로공사) (Attorney for the Defendant: Donghо Joint Law Office, Attorney in Charge Lee Jin-woo and 1 other)
[Court Below] Seoul High Court Decision 95Na7835 rendered on June 21, 1995
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, and Plaintiff 4, and the part of the judgment below in which the Defendant lost concerning Plaintiff 5, are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The appeals of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 5, and the Defendant's appeal concerning Plaintiff 1, are all dismissed. The costs of the appeal with respect to the dismissed portions shall be borne by each respective party.
[Reasoning]
1. Judgment on the Defendant's counsel's grounds of appeal.
A. As to the Second Ground of Appeal
Even if an employer, in changing the rules of employment (취업규칙) to the disadvantage of employees, did not obtain the consent of the employees through their collective decision-making method, since the authority to draft and amend the rules of employment lies with the employer, the currently effective rules of employment having normative effect are the amended rules of employment; provided, however, that with respect to existing employees whose vested interests are infringed, the former rules of employment shall apply (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da45165 rendered on December 22, 1992). Accordingly, where, pursuant to Article 28(2) and the Addendum, Paragraph 2, of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) (Act No. 3349 of December 31, 1980), which prohibited differential retirement pay systems, the retirement pay system applicable to the largest group of employees within the relevant enterprise must be applied from April 1, 1981, if the retirement pay provisions applicable to that largest group of employees had been changed to the disadvantage of employees without obtaining consent through the employees' collective decision-making method, then, even though the pre-amendment retirement pay provisions would apply to those employees belonging to the largest group who joined before the retirement pay provisions were amended, for the protection of their vested interests, the amended retirement pay provisions—having normative effect with respect to the largest group of employees—must be deemed applicable to employees not belonging to the largest group.
Furthermore, since a concrete right to claim retirement pay arises upon satisfaction of the factual requirement of "retirement," meaning the termination of continuous employment (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da17754 rendered on September 14, 1992), if the retirement pay provisions were changed by the employer in the middle of a continuous period of service, then, in principle, the amended retirement pay provisions must apply not only to the period of service after the amendment but also, so long as the employee's vested interests are not infringed, to the period of service before the amendment (see Supreme Court Decision 89Daka15939 rendered on November 27, 1990). This same legal principle applies equally where the retirement pay provisions were not changed by the employer, but rather where, pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Standards Act (Act No. 3349 of December 31, 1980) as noted above, the differential retirement pay system was prohibited from April 1, 1981, and the retirement pay system applicable to the largest group of employees within the enterprise came to apply to all employees (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da28123 rendered on September 26, 1995).
According to the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited by the court below, the court below found the following facts: Plaintiff 1 joined the Defendant Corporation as a special-service employee (별정직 직원) on June 1, 1971, and from around May 23, 1974, worked as a general-service employee (일반직 직원) in a driving position, retiring on December 20, 1991; Plaintiff 2 and Plaintiff 3 each joined as special-service employees on December 10, 1969; Plaintiff 4 joined as a general-service employee on March 25, 1971; and Plaintiff 5 joined as a general-service employee on February 1, 1977, and worked until retiring—Plaintiff 2 on March 31, 1992, Plaintiff 3 on June 30, 1992, Plaintiff 4 on December 31, 1993, and Plaintiff 5 on March 30, 1993. The court below further found that, even before the Plaintiffs joined, the Defendant Corporation had in place, for special-service employees, the Management Regulations on Contracted and Temporary Employees (촉탁및임시고용원관리예규), under which one month's average monthly wage was paid as retirement pay for each year of service, while for general-service employees, unlike special-service employees, the Defendant Corporation had in place separate Retirement Benefit Regulations (퇴직급여규정) providing for retirement pay calculated by multiplying the monthly salary at the time of retirement by a retirement pay rate under a high progressive rate system, with "monthly salary" meaning the average monthly wage (hereinafter, these retirement pay provisions are referred to as the "pre-amendment retirement pay provisions"). The court below also found that the Defendant Corporation, on January 1, 1981, amended the above pre-amendment retirement pay provisions without obtaining consent through the employees' collective decision-making method; while maintaining the basic method of calculating retirement pay by multiplying monthly salary by the retirement pay rate, the amendment lowered the progressive rate and limited the concept of "monthly salary" to the average of the basic pay paid during the last three months prior to the day before retirement plus various commonly paid monthly allowances (construction allowance, overtime allowance, holiday work allowance, monthly leave allowance), together with the annual leave allowance and bonus allowance paid during the one year prior to retirement, calculated on a one-month average basis—thereby disadvantageously changing the pre-amendment retirement pay provisions that had applied to existing general-service employees (hereinafter, this amended retirement pay provision is referred to as the "Retirement Pay Provisions as Amended on January 1, 1981"). The court below also found that, as of April 1, 1981, the Defendant Corporation had 2,753 general-service employees and 1,244 special-service employees. Based on these findings, and for the reasons stated in its judgment, the court below calculated retirement pay by applying the pre-amendment retirement pay provisions to the Plaintiffs' entire period of service.
Turning first to the retirement pay provisions applicable to Plaintiff 1: even if the Retirement Pay Provisions as Amended on January 1, 1981, currently have normative effect, if the facts are as lawfully established by the court below, it is clear that these retirement pay provisions infringe upon the vested rights of general-service employees who joined before the amendment. Therefore, for the period of service after Plaintiff 1's reclassification to the general-service job category—which occurred before the retirement pay provisions were amended—the pre-amendment retirement pay provisions must naturally apply.
Furthermore, regarding the method of calculating retirement pay where there has been a change in job category in the middle of a continuous period of service and the retirement pay rate differs depending on the job category, in the absence of any special provision in the rules of employment or collective bargaining agreement, the applicable rate must be the rate for the job category at the time of retirement, and the average wage that forms the basis for calculating retirement pay must likewise be based on the average wage at the time of retirement, after the change in job category (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 93Da26168 rendered on July 11, 1995). Accordingly, the pre-amendment retirement pay provisions must also apply to Plaintiff 1's period of service prior to the change in job category.
Therefore, the court below's calculation of retirement pay by applying the pre-amendment retirement pay provisions to Plaintiff 1's entire period of service is proper, and it cannot be said that the judgment below contains the illegality alleged in the argument. This ground of appeal is without merit.
Next, regarding the retirement pay provisions applicable to Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, Plaintiff 4, and Plaintiff 5: according to the record, it can be seen that Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, Plaintiff 4, and Plaintiff 5 joined as special-service employees on the dates found by the court below and retired on the dates found by the court below. Given these facts, as of April 1, 1981, when Article 28(2) of the Labor Standards Act (as amended by Act No. 3349 of December 31, 1980) took effect, the retirement pay provisions having normative effect with respect to the Defendant Corporation's general-service employees were not the pre-amendment retirement pay provisions but the Retirement Pay Provisions as Amended on January 1, 1981. Therefore, in calculating the retirement pay of the above Plaintiffs, who joined as special-service employees between December 10, 1969, and February 1, 1977, and retired after the differential retirement pay system was prohibited, in principle, the Retirement Pay Provisions as Amended on January 1, 1981, must be applied to the entire period of service (according to the record, since the Defendant Corporation's retirement pay provisions were amended after January 1, 1981, to include night work allowance in the monthly salary, night work allowance must also be included in the monthly salary that forms the basis for calculating the above Plaintiffs' retirement pay). However, for the period of service up to March 31, 1981, whichever provision is more favorable to the above Plaintiffs—between applying the Management Regulations on Contracted and Temporary Employees applicable to special-service employees, and applying the Retirement Pay Provisions as Amended on January 1, 1981—must be applied, after comparison.
Nevertheless, the court below, for the reasons stated in its judgment, calculated retirement pay by applying the pre-amendment retirement pay provisions to the above Plaintiffs' entire period of service. Accordingly, the judgment below is erroneous in that it misapprehended the facts in violation of the rules of evidence, and, moreover, failed to fully examine or misapprehended the legal principles regarding which retirement pay provisions should apply in calculating retirement pay. Such illegality clearly affected the judgment, and thus this ground of appeal pointing out this error is well-founded.
B. As to the First Ground of Appeal
The argument is that, at the time Plaintiff 1 joined, he entered into an alternate-day employment contract with the Defendant Corporation for the purpose of excluding the application of statutory working hours and working days, and moreover, that the Defendant Corporation obtained approval from the Minister of Labor for exclusion of the application of the Labor Standards Act provisions concerning working hours, etc., with respect to the above Plaintiff, and therefore the basic wage received by the above Plaintiff included overtime allowance, holiday work allowance, and night work allowance. However, this is a new factual assertion not raised in the court below, and therefore cannot constitute a proper ground of appeal; moreover, upon examination of the record, there is no evidence to support this assertion. Therefore, this ground of appeal is without merit.
2. Judgment on the Plaintiffs' counsel's grounds of appeal (including the supplementary grounds of appeal stated in the supplementary brief on grounds of appeal filed after the deadline for submitting the grounds of appeal brief, to the extent they supplement the grounds of appeal).
A. As to Plaintiff 1
The average wage that serves as the basis for calculating retirement pay refers to the amount obtained by dividing the total amount of wages paid as consideration for labor during the three months prior to the date of retirement by the total number of days in that period. Therefore, even if, by perfect attendance or attendance of 90% or more during the year prior to the year of retirement, the employee became entitled to annual paid leave under Article 48 of the Labor Standards Act but did not use it, thereby giving rise to a right to claim annual leave allowance for that period, such annual leave allowance is consideration for labor performed during the one year prior to the year of retirement, not for labor performed during the year of retirement itself. Accordingly, where part of the one-year period of perfect attendance or attendance of 90% or more, which forms the basis of the right to annual leave, falls within the three months prior to the date of retirement, only the portion of the annual leave allowance corresponding to that included part is to be included in the total amount of wages that serves as the basis for calculating the average wage (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da4649 rendered on May 24, 1994). According to the record, it is found that Plaintiff 1 received the sum of KRW 1,141,440 from the Defendant Corporation in the name of annual leave allowance around July 1991; however, since this annual leave allowance is consideration for labor performed during the one-year period from June 1, 1989, to May 31, 1990, it cannot be included in the average wage that serves as the basis for calculating the retirement pay of the above Plaintiff, who retired on December 20, 1991.
Furthermore, even if, as argued, the Defendant Corporation had previously, in calculating retirement pay for general-service employees, included annual leave allowance in the average wage that serves as the basis for calculating retirement pay regardless of whether it constituted consideration for labor performed during the three months immediately prior to retirement, this appears to have stemmed from the Defendant Corporation's misunderstanding of the legal nature of annual leave allowance. Therefore, such circumstances alone are insufficient to conclude that there was an implicit agreement between the Defendant Corporation and its employees to include annual leave allowance in the average wage that serves as the basis for calculating retirement pay.
Moreover, even assuming, as argued, that the above Plaintiff acquired the right to annual paid leave by perfect attendance or attendance of 90% or more between June 1, 1990, and May 31, 1991, the resulting annual leave allowance would be consideration for labor performed between June 1, 1990, and May 31, 1991, and thus cannot be included in the average wage that serves as the basis for calculating the retirement pay of the above Plaintiff, who retired on December 20, 1991.
Finally, where an employee retires without having completed one year of service prior to the reference date for the accrual of the right to annual paid leave, and the number of days worked during that period falls short of the number of attendance days required to be entitled to annual paid leave, no right to claim annual leave allowance corresponding to that period of service arises (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da14826 rendered on November 12, 1991). Since the above Plaintiff did not complete one year of service prior to June 1, 1992, and the number of days worked during that period fell short of the number of attendance days required to be entitled to annual paid leave, no right to claim annual leave allowance arises even for the period of service between June 1, 1991, and December 20, 1991.
Therefore, the court below's decision not to include annual leave allowance in the average wage that serves as the basis for calculating the above Plaintiff's retirement pay is proper, and it cannot be said that the judgment below failed to fully examine the matter or misapprehended the legal principles concerning annual leave allowance, as argued. This ground of appeal is entirely without merit.
B. As to Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, and Plaintiff 4
Article 28(1) of the Labor Standards Act sets forth the minimum amount of retirement pay that an employer must pay to a retiring employee. Therefore, where there exist retirement pay provisions in the rules of employment or a collective bargaining agreement that are more favorable to employees than the above provision, retirement pay must be calculated in accordance with those more favorable provisions (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da46841 rendered on May 24, 1994).
As discussed above, the retirement pay of the above Plaintiffs, who were special-service employees, must be calculated by applying the Retirement Pay Provisions as Amended on January 1, 1981. Under these retirement pay provisions, "monthly salary," which serves as the basis for calculating retirement pay, means one-third of the sum of: (i) the basic pay paid during the last three months prior to the day before retirement, plus various commonly paid monthly allowances (construction allowance, overtime allowance, holiday work allowance, monthly leave allowance); and (ii) an amount equal to 3/12 of the annual leave allowance and bonus allowance paid during the one year prior to retirement. If the amount of retirement pay for the above Plaintiffs, calculated under the Defendant Corporation's above retirement pay provisions, is greater than the amount calculated under Article 28(1) of the Labor Standards Act, then, regardless of whether part of the one-year period prior to the year of retirement giving rise to the right to annual paid leave falls within the three months prior to the date of retirement, one-third of the amount equal to 3/12 of the annual leave allowance paid to the above Plaintiffs during the one year prior to retirement must be included in the monthly salary for purposes of calculating retirement pay.
Nevertheless, the court below failed to include annual leave allowance in the monthly salary that serves as the basis for calculating the above Plaintiffs' retirement pay. Accordingly, the judgment below is erroneous in that it failed to fully examine the matter or misapprehended the legal principles concerning the retirement pay provisions, and such illegality clearly affected the judgment. Therefore, this ground of appeal pointing out this error is well-founded.
C. As to Plaintiff 5
According to the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited by the court below, it is clear that the court below, in calculating the retirement pay for the above Plaintiff, included annual leave allowance in the monthly salary that serves as the basis for calculating retirement pay. Therefore, this ground of appeal is without merit.
3. Accordingly, the part of the judgment below concerning Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, and Plaintiff 4, and the part of the judgment below in which the Defendant lost concerning Plaintiff 5, are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The appeals of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 5, and the Defendant's appeal concerning Plaintiff 1, are all dismissed, and the costs of the appeal with respect to the dismissed portions shall be borne by each respective losing party. The Justices participating in this case unanimously agree on the foregoing, and it is so ordered as stated in the Order.
Presiding Justice Shin Sung-taek; Justice Cheon Kyung-song; Justice Ahn Yong-deuk (Justice in Charge); Justice Ji Chang-kwon