[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff, Litigation Representative Attorney Oh Seung-geun
[Defendant, Appellee] Gangwon Sanup Co., Ltd.
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Judgment 91Na13757, decided November 8, 1991
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts are found.
The Rules of Employment of the Defendant company, after their original enactment, were amended three times—on March 1, 1964, January 1, 1973, and August 1, 1974—but on each occasion the retirement allowance provisions in the Rules of Employment were revised in a direction unfavorable to the employees without their consent.
In this action, the Plaintiff joined the Defendant company on September 1, 1978, worked as an employee at the Defendant company's Muksan Mining Office, and retired on January 31, 1988. In calculating the Plaintiff's retirement allowance, the Plaintiff argues that, on the premise that all three amendments to the Rules of Employment made before the Plaintiff's employment were invalid, the retirement allowance provisions of the original Rules of Employment prior to each such amendment (Exhibit A No. 7-3) should apply, whereas the Defendant argues that the retirement allowance provisions of the Rules of Employment as amended on August 1, 1974 (Exhibit A No. 5)—which, through the above amendments, remained in effect from the time the Plaintiff joined the company until the Plaintiff's retirement—should apply. (It appears that the statement in the Defendant's brief of February 21, 1990, and the account in the judgment below, describing the amendment date as January 1, 1973, is a clerical error.)
However, the court below found as follows: The Defendant company had maintained separate retirement allowance provisions distinguishing between employees assigned as regular staff (사원) and employees not so assigned. However, with the addition of Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) by Act No. 3349 on December 31, 1980, it became prohibited to establish differential retirement allowance systems within a single business in setting up a retirement allowance system. Under the proviso to Paragraph 1 of the Addenda to that Act, the above provision took effect from April 1, 1981, and under Paragraph 2 of the same Addenda, where a collective agreement or Rules of Employment in effect at the time of enforcement of this Act violate the provisions of Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the Act, the employer must amend them to conform to this Act and report such amendment to the Chief of the Labor Office by March 31 of that year; where no such report is made, the retirement allowance system applicable to the largest number of employees within the relevant business shall be deemed applicable. Accordingly, in order to calculate the retirement allowance based on either the Rules of Employment asserted by the Plaintiff or that asserted by the Defendant, it would be necessary to allege and prove that such Rules of Employment applied to the largest number of employees within the Defendant company's business. However, neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant made any such allegation or proof. Rather, according to part of the testimony of the witness (name omitted), it can be found that the majority of the Defendant company's employees worked as employees subject to the collective agreement (Exhibit A No. 3) concluded between the Gangwon Coal Mine Labor Union of the National Federation of Mine Workers' Unions and the Defendant company. Accordingly, the court below held that the said collective agreement, which took effect on October 1, 1986 and applies to the majority of the Defendant company's employees, also applies to the Plaintiff, and calculated the Plaintiff's retirement allowance in accordance with the retirement allowance provisions of that collective agreement.
Further, it is clear from the record that the content of the retirement allowance payment provisions in the Rules of Employment asserted by the Plaintiff is more favorable to employees than the content of the corresponding provisions in the above collective agreement, and that the content of the retirement allowance payment provisions in the above collective agreement is, in turn, more favorable to employees than the content of the corresponding provisions in the Rules of Employment as amended on August 1, 1974, which was in effect when the Plaintiff joined the company.
2. The gist of the grounds of appeal asserted by the Plaintiff's litigation representative is as follows: since all three unfavorable amendments to the Defendant company's retirement allowance provisions were made without the consent, by way of a collective decision-making method, of the employees subject to them, none of the amendments has effect as an amendment of the Rules of Employment; therefore, the payment rate to be applied in calculating the Plaintiff's retirement allowance should be the payment rate under the original Rules of Employment in effect prior to February 29, 1964; and the court below erred in the law by applying the payment rate under the above collective agreement instead. We shall therefore examine whether the Rules of Employment asserted by the Plaintiff could apply to the Plaintiff from the time the Plaintiff joined the Defendant company until retirement.
The authority to draft and amend Rules of Employment resides, in principle, with the employer, so that the employer may draft and amend the Rules of Employment according to its own intention; however, pursuant to Article 95 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), the employer is subject to the restriction that it must hear the opinion of the labor union or a majority of the employees, and, in particular, where the amendment is unfavorable to employees, must obtain their consent. It is the consistent view of this Court that, where existing working conditions are to be changed unfavorably to employees, the consent required of the employees must be consent obtained through a collective decision-making method of the employees, and that an amendment to the Rules of Employment made without such consent has no effect (see Supreme Court Judgment 77Da355, decided July 26, 1977; Supreme Court Judgment 87Daka2578, decided May 10, 1988; Supreme Court Judgment 88Daka4277, decided May 9, 1989; Supreme Court Judgment 90Da15952, 15969, 15976, decided February 12, 1991, among others).
Therefore, where an employer amends working conditions set forth in the Rules of Employment unfavorably to employees without obtaining employee consent, the amendment does not take effect as against existing employees whose vested interests are infringed by the amendment, and as to them the effect of the previous Rules of Employment continues to be maintained; however, as against employees who entered into an employment relationship after the amendment, having accepted the working conditions under the amended Rules of Employment, the amended Rules of Employment must naturally apply. There is no basis for holding that, even as to employees hired after the amendment—who are not subject to the ground for denying effect, namely infringement of vested interests—the effect of the amendment should likewise be denied and the previous Rules of Employment should apply.
In such a case, it may appear that the Rules of Employment applicable to employees hired after the amendment and the Rules of Employment applicable to existing employees coexist; however, the Rules of Employment currently having the force of a legal norm are the amended Rules of Employment, and the previous Rules of Employment apply only to the extent that, as against existing employees, the amendment does not take effect due to infringement of vested interests. Accordingly, this cannot be regarded as the same as maintaining two or more sets of Rules of Employment within a single business.
Furthermore, although Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) prohibits the establishment of a differential retirement allowance system within a single business, even if the retirement allowance system under the amended Rules of Employment does not take effect as to existing employees because it infringes their vested interests—such that they are inevitably subject to the previous system—resulting in a different retirement allowance system being applied to employees hired after the amendment of the Rules of Employment who have no such vested interests, this cannot be deemed to constitute the establishment of a differential retirement allowance system prohibited under the above provision.
Contrary to this, the prior precedents of this Court, which took the view that where a provision of the Rules of Employment concerning retirement allowances is amended unfavorably without the consent, by way of a collective decision-making method, of the employees subject to it, the pre-amendment Rules of Employment must also apply to employees hired after the amendment (Supreme Court Judgment 89Daka7754, decided April 27, 1990; Supreme Court Judgment 89Daka31443, decided July 10, 1990; Supreme Court Judgment 91Da8777, 8784, decided December 10, 1991, among others), are hereby overruled.
3. In conclusion, the argument that the court below erred in not calculating the Plaintiff's retirement allowance based on the original, pre-amendment retirement allowance provisions on the premise that all three amendments to the Defendant company's retirement allowance provisions are invalid, cannot be accepted in light of the legal principles set forth above. Moreover, since the retirement allowance payment provisions of the above collective agreement are, as noted above, more favorable to employees than the corresponding provisions of the Rules of Employment as amended on August 1, 1974, which was in effect at the time the Plaintiff joined the company, there is no need, in this case where only the Plaintiff has appealed, to determine whether the court below's calculation of the Plaintiff's retirement allowance based on the retirement allowance provisions of the collective agreement was proper. The grounds of appeal are therefore without merit.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiff, who has lost the appeal. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, with all participating Justices concurring except for the separate opinion of Justice Park Woo-dong and Justice Bae Man-woon.
The separate opinion of Justice Park Woo-dong and Justice Bae Man-woon is as follows.
1. The majority opinion is understood to mean the following: since the authority to revise and amend the Rules of Employment resides with the employer, the employer may amend them according to its own intention; even where the Rules of Employment are amended unfavorably to employees and the employees do not consent thereto, the amendment is without effect only as against employees whose vested interests are infringed by the amendment, while the amended Rules of Employment apply to employees hired after the amendment; and even if this results in employees within a single business being subject to different retirement allowance systems, this cannot be regarded as maintaining multiple Rules of Employment within a single business, nor does it violate Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법).
However, we believe that this view runs counter to the legal principle and spirit maintained by the majority opinion itself, namely: that in order to unfavorably amend existing working conditions through an amendment of the Rules of Employment, the consent of the group of employees subject to the previous Rules of Employment, obtained through a collective decision-making method, is required, and that without such consent the amendment has no effect as an amendment of the Rules of Employment; and that, having recognized the Rules of Employment as having the character of a legal norm, unless such consent is obtained through the collective decision-making method of the employee group, the amendment has no effect even as against an employee who has individually consented to the amendment (see Supreme Court Judgment 91Da3031, decided March 27, 1991; Supreme Court Judgment 91Da17542, decided September 24, 1991). Furthermore, this view fails to correctly perceive the general reality that amendments to Rules of Employment are undertaken with existing employees as the intended object of application, in order to apply the amendment to them. We therefore cannot agree with the majority opinion.
2. Once the Rules of Employment are amended, only the amended Rules of Employment exist; and it is only natural, as a matter of logic, that if an unfavorable amendment to employees fails to take effect for lack of employee consent, the previous Rules of Employment continue to be valid. To hold otherwise—that in such a case the amendment has no effect as against existing employees, such that the previous Rules of Employment remain in effect as to them, while the amended Rules of Employment must apply as against newly hired employees—is difficult to distinguish from either (i) deeming an ordinary amendment of the Rules of Employment to be, in substance, an amendment providing that the previous provisions apply to existing employees while the amended content applies to employees hired after the amendment, or (ii) treating the case as though the amended Rules of Employment contained a transitional provision providing that the previous Rules of Employment shall apply to existing employees.
Accordingly, following the majority opinion, one cannot avoid concluding that both the amended Rules of Employment and the previous Rules of Employment exist as multiple sets of rules within a single business, and to regard such a case as involving only a single amended set of Rules of Employment fails to properly grasp the facts.
Unless otherwise specifically provided, an amendment of the Rules of Employment applies to all present and future employees, and is indeed made for that very purpose. If the intention is for the amendment to apply only to newly hired employees while the previous provisions continue to apply to existing employees, such intent must be expressed by including a transitional provision or a provision to that effect in the amendment itself. Only in that case can it be said that a single business has a single set of Rules of Employment.
Moreover, while establishing a retirement allowance system that differentiates, within a single business, based on the date of hire is, in principle, unreasonable and therefore violates Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), we do not believe that it necessarily violates this provision where, in unfavorably amending the retirement allowance system for employees, a transitional provision is included providing that the more favorable previous provisions shall continue to apply to existing employees.
3. Turning to the present case, according to the record, it is clear that the Defendant company's three amendments to the Rules of Employment were intended to apply to existing employees, and not solely to newly hired employees.
Therefore, if such amendments to the Rules of Employment were unfavorable to employees and did not receive the consent of the employee group, the amendments have no effect, and accordingly the previous Rules of Employment must be regarded as remaining valid; it cannot be said that the previous Rules of Employment remain effective only as against existing employees whose vested interests are infringed by the amendment, while the amended Rules of Employment must naturally apply as against employees who entered into an employment relationship after the amendment.
The majority opinion appears to rely, as the basis for holding that the amended Rules of Employment must naturally apply to newly hired employees, on the fact that such employees entered into an employment relationship after the amendment, having accepted the working conditions under the amended Rules of Employment. However, it is doubtful whether it can truly be said that a newly hired employee entered into the employment relationship with the intention of accepting the working conditions under Rules of Employment that, as to existing employees, are without effect as an amendment. Moreover, this disregards the normative character of the Rules of Employment, and we cannot agree with it.
4. However, according to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below did not determine that the above amendments to the Rules of Employment were valid and calculate the Plaintiff's retirement allowance based on the amended Rules of Employment; rather, without addressing at all the question of the effectiveness of the amendment to the Rules of Employment, the court below held—based on Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), newly added by Act No. 3349 on December 31, 1980, and its Addenda—that in order to apply the retirement allowance provisions asserted by either the Plaintiff or the Defendant, it must be alleged and proven that such Rules of Employment applied to the largest number of employees within the Defendant company's business; that no such allegation or proof was made; and that, rather, it was found that the majority of the Defendant company's employees worked as employees subject to the collective agreement referred to in the judgment. On this basis, the court below determined that the retirement allowance system set forth in the collective agreement should also apply to the Plaintiff, and calculated the Plaintiff's retirement allowance accordingly. Accordingly, the issue that must be resolved as a preliminary matter in this case is not whether the effect of the amendment to the Rules of Employment extends to the Plaintiff, but whether the retirement allowance system set forth in the collective agreement applies to the Plaintiff.
However, what the Plaintiff's litigation representative asserts as grounds of appeal is only that, on the premise that the Plaintiff is a person subject to the Rules of Employment, since the amendment to the Rules of Employment was made without the consent of the employee group and is therefore without effect, the original Rules of Employment should apply in calculating the Plaintiff's retirement allowance, and that the court below erred in applying the above collective agreement instead; there is no further argument that, even assuming the retirement allowance system set forth in the collective agreement applies, the court below's calculation of the retirement allowance based thereon was unlawful.
Upon examination, the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), through the addition of Article 28, Paragraph 2 by Act No. 3349 on December 31, 1980, provides that a differential system shall not be established within a single business in setting up a retirement allowance system, and Paragraph 2 of the Addenda thereto provides that where a collective agreement or Rules of Employment in effect at the time of enforcement of this Act violate Article 28, Paragraph 2, the employer must amend them to conform to this Act and report such amendment before the effective date of the amending Act, and that where this is not done, the retirement allowance system applicable to the largest number of employees within the relevant business shall be deemed applicable. Accordingly, the court below's determination that the retirement allowance system applicable to the largest number of employees should apply to the Plaintiff, who retired after the enforcement of the above amending Act, is correct. The Plaintiff does not otherwise assert that the court below's determination that the retirement allowance provisions under the above collective agreement constitute the retirement allowance system applicable to the largest number of employees of the Defendant company, or the method of calculating the retirement allowance based thereon, is unlawful, but merely raises an argument concerning a matter not determined by the court below. This argument is therefore without merit, and the appeal should be dismissed on this ground.
Chief Justice Kim Deok-ju (Presiding Justice), Justice Lee Hoe-chang, Justice Choi Jae-ho, Justice Park Woo-dong, Justice Yoon Kwan, Justice Kim Sang-won, Justice Bae Man-woon, Justice Kim Ju-han, Justice Yoon Young-cheol, Justice Kim Yong-jun, Justice Kim Seok-su, Justice Park Man-ho, Justice Choi Jong-young