[Plaintiffs, Appellees]
[Defendant, Appellant] Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (문화방송) Co., Ltd., Litigation Representative Attorneys Lee Jae-hoo and 2 others
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Judgment 90Na32706, dated October 9, 1991
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
As to Ground 1
1. According to the record, the court below found, as undisputed facts, that on March 30, 1981, the Defendant Company comprehensively transferred its newspaper publishing business, one of the Defendant Company's business divisions at the time, to the non-party Kyunghyang Shinmun Foundation (사단법인 경향신문사), and that the Plaintiffs had been engaged in the newspaper business division of the Defendant Company. The court below then held that, in the case of a business transfer, where an employee objects to the transfer of the employment relationship, the employment relationship is not transferred to the transferee but continues to exist between the employee and the transferor, and since there was no material showing that the Plaintiffs had consented to the transfer of the employment relationship pursuant to the said business transfer, the employment relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Company must be deemed to continue without having been transferred to the said Kyunghyang Shinmun. On this basis, the court below rejected the Defendant's preliminary objection on the merits that the Plaintiffs' claim for confirmation in this case lacked standing to sue, which was premised on the comprehensive succession of the employment relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Company by the said Kyunghyang Shinmun.
2.
Where a contract is concluded to acquire part of another company's business division, and it is agreed that the rights and obligations concerning the employees working in that business division shall also be comprehensively succeeded to along with the physical facilities, the employment relationship with the relevant employees is, in principle, succeeded to by the business transferee (see this Court's Decision 91Da40276, dated July 14, 1992). However, the employment relationships thus succeeded to mean only the employment relationships with employees who were actually working in that business division as of the date of conclusion of the contract, and do not extend to succeeding the employment relationship with an employee who had worked in the relevant business division prior to the date of conclusion of the contract but had been dismissed or discharged, and who is disputing the validity of such dismissal or discharge.
Accordingly, according to the description in Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, it is recognized that on March 30, 1981, when the said Kyunghyang Shinmun concluded the business transfer contract concerning the newspaper publishing business with the Defendant Company, it was agreed (Article 1) that the said Kyunghyang Shinmun would comprehensively succeed to the personnel among the Defendant Company's employees who were engaged in the newspaper division, and would comprehensively succeed to all rights and obligations as employer concerning the status and treatment of the succeeded employees. However, the employment relationships comprehensively succeeded to by the said Kyunghyang Shinmun pursuant to the said agreement are limited to the employment relationships with employees who were actually working in the Defendant Company's newspaper publishing division at the time of the conclusion of the said contract, and the employment relationships with the Plaintiffs, who had already been dismissed by the Defendant Company and were not working at that time, are not succeeded to.
Accordingly, although it cannot be said that the court below's view—that the reason the employment relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Company was not transferred to the said Kyunghyang Shinmun was the absence of the Plaintiffs' consent—was appropriate, the court below's rejection of the Defendant's above objection, which was premised on the transfer of the employment relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant Company to the said Kyunghyang Shinmun, is ultimately justified, and it cannot be said that there is an illegality in the judgment, as argued in the grounds of appeal, of misapprehending the rules of evidence and erroneously finding facts, or of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the transfer of employment relationships upon comprehensive business transfer, such as to have affected the judgment. This ground of appeal is without merit.
As to Grounds 3 and 4
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, based on the evidence cited, found the following facts through the process indicated in its judgment: that on June 27, 1980, the Defendant issued a dismissal disposition against Plaintiffs 1, 2, 3, and 4; and that as for the remaining Plaintiffs excluding the above Plaintiffs, the Defendant sequentially accepted their resignation letters and processed them as voluntary resignations, even while knowing that the resignation letters submitted by these Plaintiffs were not submitted based on their true intent.
Regarding the disciplinary dismissal of Plaintiffs 1, 2, 3, and 4, the court below held that the conduct of the said Plaintiffs, which the Defendant relied upon as grounds for discipline, was difficult to regard as falling under "when one has damaged the dignity or honor of the company" as provided in Article 47, Paragraph 3 of the Defendant Company's Personnel Regulations, and further held that even if legitimate grounds for discipline arose against the disciplined person after the fact, an unjust disciplinary disposition rendered before the occurrence of such grounds for discipline is not thereby ratified as a legitimate disciplinary disposition. On these grounds, the court below determined that each of the above disciplinary dismissals of the said Plaintiffs was invalid as an unfair dismissal without just cause.
The court below then examined the Defendant's argument that, even if the dismissal dispositions against the said Plaintiffs were invalid, since the said Plaintiffs received final and conclusive guilty judgments after the said dismissal dispositions, the dismissals were valid as ex officio dismissal dispositions pursuant to Article 37, Item 1 of the said Personnel Regulations, or at least were valid as leave-of-absence dispositions under Article 39, Item 7 of the said Personnel Regulations. The court below rejected this argument of the Defendant on the ground that the ex officio dismissal, ex officio leave of absence, and disciplinary dismissal are all provisions concerning status-related measures unfavorable to employees, each with different grounds and procedures, such that where one disposition is invalid due to lack of just cause or due process, it cannot take effect as another disposition even if the requirements of just cause and due process for that other disposition are satisfied.
Furthermore, regarding the voluntary resignation dispositions concerning the remaining Plaintiffs excluding the above four Plaintiffs, the court below determined that each of the said Plaintiffs' declarations of intent to resign constituted declarations of intent not made in earnest (non-genuine declarations of intent), and that the Defendant Company, as the counterparty, accepted these while knowing this fact; therefore, the act of terminating the employment contract relationship in the form of voluntary resignation based on an invalid declaration of intent to resign is, in substance, the termination of the employment contract relationship by the unilateral intent of the Defendant Company as the employer, and accordingly each of the said voluntary resignation dispositions, notwithstanding their form, constitutes in substance unfair dismissal and is invalid.
Upon examining the relevant evidence against the record, the above findings and determinations of the court below are justified, and it cannot be said that the judgment below contains an illegality, as argued in the grounds of appeal, of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning Article 47, Paragraph 3 of the Defendant Company's Personnel Regulations, the legal principles concerning conversion of void acts, or the legal principles concerning non-genuine declarations of intent, or of erring in the interpretation of the Defendant Company's dismissal dispositions, or of misunderstanding the meaning of the collective resignation letters, or of violating the rules of evidence and thereby erroneously finding facts. These grounds of appeal are all without merit.
As to Ground 2
The court below examined the Defendant's argument that, since the Plaintiffs raised no objection whatsoever from the time of their dismissal or voluntary resignation until the filing of this lawsuit, received their retirement allowances without any reservation, and are currently active in other fields such that it appears they neither expect nor intend to actually work at the Defendant Company even if reinstated, the filing of this lawsuit disputing the validity of the dismissal and voluntary resignation nearly nine years after such dismissal and voluntary resignation violates the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel. The court below rejected this argument of the Defendant on the ground that, even assuming the Defendant's argument were to be accepted, in light of the circumstances under which the Plaintiffs came to retire as indicated in the judgment and the political and social circumstances at the time, it was practically difficult for the Plaintiffs to expect reinstatement through judicial procedures or other means in the near future, and that under such circumstances, the fact that the Plaintiffs received retirement allowances and, while engaging in other fields for their livelihood, filed this lawsuit after a considerable period of time had elapsed, cannot be deemed to violate the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel.
However, where an employee dismissed by the employer receives retirement allowances, etc. without raising any objection or reservation, it must be deemed, absent special circumstances, that the employee has acknowledged the dismissal disposition as valid; accordingly, filing a lawsuit disputing the validity of the dismissal after a long period of time has elapsed therefrom is deemed to violate the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel (see this Court's Decisions 91Da29811, dated August 14, 1992; 92Da3809, dated July 10, 1992; and 92Da3670, dated May 26, 1992). Accordingly, if the circumstances alleged by the Defendant exist, the Plaintiffs' lawsuit in this case would be deemed to violate the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel. Nevertheless, without conducting an examination into this matter, the court below, on the premise that it was practically difficult for the Plaintiffs to expect reinstatement through judicial procedures or other means in the near future in light of the circumstances under which the Plaintiffs came to retire as indicated in the judgment and the political and social circumstances at the time, lightly rejected the Defendant's above argument on the ground that this lawsuit, filed nearly nine years after the Plaintiffs' dismissal and voluntary resignation, did not violate the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel. This ultimately constitutes an illegality in the judgment below of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the principle of good faith or the principle of estoppel, such as to have affected the judgment, and accordingly, the ground of appeal pointing this out is meritorious.
Therefore, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below, the opinions of the Justices involved being unanimous, and it is so decided as stated in the Order.
Justice Bae Man-woon (Presiding Justice), Choi Jae-ho, Kim Seok-su, Choi Jong-young (Justice in Charge)