[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant] Sinchon Transportation Co., Ltd. (신촌교통주식회사)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 90Na27568, decided November 14, 1990
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the first ground of appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that it was undisputed between the parties that the Plaintiff joined the Defendant company on June 11, 1987 and worked there until he was subjected to a disciplinary dismissal on August 11, 1989. Based on the evidence presented, the court below further found the following facts: the Defendant company was established for the purposes of passenger automobile transportation business, automobile manufacturing and repair business, etc., and hires employees through open examinations or selection procedures, adopts a lifetime employment system by providing for a mandatory retirement age, and its employees consist of office staff, drivers, conductors, and mechanics; drivers automatically become members of the labor union upon joining the company pursuant to the collective agreement between the Seoul Metropolitan Bus Transportation Business Cooperative and the Seoul Bus Branch of the National Federation of Automobile Labor Unions, but the approximately 40 mechanics had not been union members until the end of 1989; the Defendant company required the Plaintiff and other vehicle mechanics, in the case of normal daytime work, to report to work at around 8:00 a.m. and work until around 5:00 p.m., including a one-hour rest period, and additionally required them, on a rotating basis, to perform vehicle maintenance at night and on the weekly holiday as well; taking into account this work pattern of the mechanics, the Defendant company first determined the total wage amount according to each employee's skill and career, and then allocated 60% thereof as basic pay, 17.9% as overtime allowance, 11.3% as night-work allowance, 8.8% as weekly holiday allowance, and 2% as monthly leave allowance, paying these as a fixed monthly amount; around April 1989, the Plaintiff and about ten other mechanics agreed that the above working conditions and wage payment terms were disadvantageous compared to those of the drivers in the same workplace, and judged that this was because, in the case of drivers, a labor union had been organized and they could receive the various statutory allowances in proportion to actual working hours as prescribed by statute or the collective agreement, whereas in their own case there was no workers' organization to conduct such collective bargaining; accordingly, they decided to demand correction of this situation, and each contributed 30,000 won as activity expenses, which the Plaintiff kept in his custody; the said mechanics requested the Defendant company to pay statutory allowances in proportion to actual working hours and to observe, in principle, the working hours prescribed by the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), but when the Defendant company did not accept this, on July 3 of the same year, they interpreted the 8-hour statutory daily working hours only formally and asserted that the working day ended at 4:30 p.m., leaving the worksite 30 minutes earlier than the scheduled 5:00 p.m.; the Plaintiff, despite that day being his day off, voluntarily came to work and joined in this action; and the Plaintiff took the 1988 work log kept in a cabinet in the Defendant company's office out at night without the knowledge of the person in charge, copied it, and returned it about 20 days later. The court below also found that the Defendant company's Rules of Employment (제58조, Article 58) and its Rules on Reward and Punishment provide for four types of disciplinary measures—reprimand, wage reduction, suspension, and dismissal—depending on the degree of the disciplinary offense and the circumstances, and that Article 57 of the Rules of Employment enumerates 17 grounds for discipline, including intentionally impeding work capacity or obstructing performance of duties (item 3), taking out or attempting to take out company property without permission (item 6), damaging the honor or credit of the company (item 7), and violating work-related directives (item 9), while Article 2 of the Rules on Reward and Punishment enumerates 16 grounds, including spreading false rumors or inciting others so as to impede the reasonable operation of the company (item 11) and disturbing company discipline or morale (item 12); and that, upon belatedly learning that the Plaintiff had taken out the above work log, the Defendant company, suspecting that the Plaintiff had incited the aforementioned slowdown together with a non-party and that the Plaintiff had also been responsible for a prior incident in which someone had removed the oil unit causing engine failure, held a disciplinary committee on the ground that the Plaintiff's conduct fell under the grounds for discipline set out in Article 57, items 3, 6, 7, and 9 of the Rules of Employment and Article 2, items 11 and 12 of the Rules on Reward and Punishment, summoned the Plaintiff to appear before the committee and heard his views, and then disciplinarily dismissed the Plaintiff and notified him thereof. The court below rejected the Defendant's assertion that the Plaintiff had incited the mechanics and led the above slowdown and had caused the engine failure by removing the oil unit.
In light of the record, the above fact-finding by the court below is acceptable, and it cannot be said that there was any illegality due to a mistake of fact resulting from a violation of the rules of evidence in the process thereof.
The court below further determined as follows: while the Plaintiff's above-found conduct of leaving work early and taking out the work log could be subject to the exercise of disciplinary authority under the Rules of Employment, on the other hand, the above early departure and taking-out of the work log arose in the course of the mechanics, including the Plaintiff, attempting to press their demands for improvement of wages and working hours out of dissatisfaction that, unlike the drivers, they were not unionized and thus were not receiving the treatment prescribed under labor-related statutes, and resulted from a mistaken interpretation of the regulations concerning working hours; the conduct itself amounted only to a single instance of leaving 30 minutes early; the maintenance division's work log taken out by the Plaintiff was a document in which the team leader or team members of each work team recorded the day's maintenance status, and for six months after its preparation it was always kept on the desk of the person in charge in the administrative section, where it could be inspected at any time if necessary; the Plaintiff's purpose in taking it out was merely to ascertain the mechanics' accurate working conditions, and not for any other improper purpose; and, of the roughly ten mechanics including the Plaintiff, no disciplinary action was taken against anyone other than the Plaintiff and non-party Na Deok-man, while the Plaintiff was subjected to dismissal, the most severe of the disciplinary measures. Considering these circumstances, the court below determined that the disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff ultimately exceeded the scope of the disciplinary authority and thus fell within the category of a dismissal lacking justifiable cause.
The above determination by the court below is proper, and there is no error of misapprehension of the law as argued in the grounds of appeal.
Where the Rules of Employment or the Rules on Reward and Punishment prescribe grounds for discipline and provide that several grades of disciplinary measures are possible for the same ground, the choice of which disciplinary measure to select among them belongs to the discretion of the person holding disciplinary authority; however, this discretion is not left to the arbitrary and expedient discretion of the person holding disciplinary authority, and a balance that is deemed reasonable under generally accepted social norms is required to exist between the ground for discipline and the disciplinary measure imposed; imposing a harsh sanction for a minor disciplinary ground must be held void as an abuse of the disciplinary authority.
If the Plaintiff, together with the mechanics, demanded that the Defendant improve working conditions such as wages and working hours that were disadvantageous compared to those of the drivers, and when the Defendant did not respond thereto, the Plaintiff left work early as a means in the course of demanding such improvement, and took the work log in order to ascertain the mechanics' accurate working conditions, then, unlike an ordinary refusal to work, unauthorized early departure, or removal of company property, the above early departure and taking-out of the work log cannot be regarded as misconduct of such a degree that it would be deemed markedly unjust to allow the employment relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to continue. Accordingly, the determination of the court below—having taken into account, as stated in its judgment, all the circumstances including the motive and background of the Plaintiff's early departure and taking-out of the work log, the Plaintiff's contribution to the company, and equity as compared with the other mechanics, and having determined that the Defendant's dismissal of the Plaintiff in this case was void as an abuse of disciplinary authority and lacked justifiable cause—is proper in light of the above legal principles. This ground of appeal is without merit.
2. As to the second ground of appeal
A worker who has been dismissed due to a cause attributable to the employer may claim wages for that period from the employer pursuant to the main sentence of Article 538(1) of the Civil Act (민법), even though the worker did not provide labor during that period; in such a case, where the worker has obtained a benefit by being relieved of his own obligation, he is obligated to reimburse this benefit to the employer pursuant to Article 538(2) of the same Act. Since income earned by a worker from working at another job during the period of dismissal constitutes a benefit obtained from being relieved of the obligation to provide labor, the employer may, in paying the worker's wages for the period of dismissal, deduct such benefit (the so-called intermediate income).
However, Article 38 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), for the purpose of guaranteeing workers' minimum livelihood, provides that where a worker is placed on leave (temporary closure of business, 휴업) due to a cause attributable to the employer, the employer shall pay the relevant worker an allowance of not less than 70% of the average wage during the period of such leave; "leave" here includes cases where an individual worker, despite being willing to provide labor pursuant to the labor contract, is refused employment or rendered unable to work against his will. Accordingly, the provisions of the Labor Standards Act concerning the leave allowance may apply even where a worker has been dismissed due to a cause attributable to the employer, and in such a case, of the amount of wages for the period of dismissal that the worker may claim, the portion up to the limit of the above leave allowance cannot be made subject to deduction of intermediate income, and deduction may be made only from the amount exceeding such leave allowance.
The court below held, in calculating the wages for the period of dismissal that the Defendant must pay to the Plaintiff, that although any income the Plaintiff earned from another job during that period must be reimbursed to the Defendant, the Defendant is nonetheless obligated, pursuant to Article 38 of the Labor Standards Act concerning the leave allowance, to pay the Plaintiff at least 70% of the average wage (the leave allowance), and since the amount of wages for the Plaintiff's period of dismissal falls short of the above leave allowance amount (the court below's statement that "[the leave allowance falls short of 70% of the average wage]" appears to be an error), there is no room to deduct intermediate income from the wages for the said period of dismissal. This determination by the court below is proper, and it cannot be said that there was an error of misapprehension of the law as argued in the grounds of appeal. This ground of appeal is also without merit.
Therefore, since the grounds of appeal are without merit, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Defendant, who is the losing party. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order, the opinions of the Justices involved being unanimous.
Justice Kim Sang-won (Presiding Justice), Park Woo-dong, Yoon Young-cheol, Park Man-ho