[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant] Daedong Gear Co., Ltd., Attorneys Lee In-su and 2 others, Counsel for the Defendant
[Judgment Below] Busan High Court Decision 89Na1278, decided September 12, 1990
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal submitted by the Defendant's litigation representatives are examined together.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found, as a fact not disputed between the parties, that on December 5, 1987, the Defendant convened a disciplinary committee and resolved to dismiss the Plaintiff, who was working as a technical employee in the Tooling Section, Tool Team of the Defendant company, effective December 17 of the same month, on the grounds of refusal to work and negligence of duty, applying Article 28(8) of the collective agreement and Articles 10(8), 11(4), 11(6), 11(21), 11(25), and 11(35) of the Defendant company's disciplinary rules, and notified the Plaintiff of this on December 15 of the same month.
Based on the evidence presented, the court below found the following facts: Article 28 of the collective agreement concluded on August 9, 1985 between the labor union side of the Defendant company and the Defendant as the employer, and Article 10 of the Defendant company's disciplinary rules, provide for eight types of disciplinary action, namely warning, reprimand, probation, salary reduction, suspension, removal from position, demotion, and dismissal; and Article 11 of the disciplinary rules lists as grounds for discipline: a person who unjustly rebels against a superior or is negligent in duty (item 4); a person who violates the company's legitimate orders, instructions, rules and regulations (item 6); a person who, despite having submitted a written statement of reasons three or more times, shows no sign of repentance and habitually engages in defiant attitudes and speech (item 21); a person who, without justifiable reason, fails to comply with the company's call-up, mobilization, overtime work, or attendance requests (item 25); and a person who disobeys or protests against a superior's orders (item 35); and that Article 65(3) of the Defendant company's employment rules provides that continuous unauthorized absence for five or more days without justifiable reason constitutes grounds for dismissal.
The court below further found that the Plaintiff joined the Defendant company on April 22, 1977 as a technical employee in the Tooling Section, and thereafter worked there; that on December 1, 1982, he was transferred to a position assisting with union affairs in the General Affairs Section of the Administrative Department; that on October 20, 1983, he was transferred back to a technical position in the Tooling Section; that on February 1, 1985, he was transferred to a clerical position in the Quality Control Section; that on August 22 of the same year, he was again transferred to a technical position in the Tooling Section, and thereafter continued to work as a hob grinder belonging to the Tooling Section; that the Defendant, in order to obstruct the Plaintiff's union activities—the Plaintiff having previously served as head of the labor union—frequently took such personnel actions against the Plaintiff and also refused to assign the Plaintiff overtime work, unlike other employees; that the Plaintiff, protesting this and demanding correction, refused to work continuously for five days from November 20 to November 25, 1987 (excluding November 22, which was a Sunday); that the Defendant, in response, sent the Plaintiff warning letters on three occasions—November 20, 23, and 25—in the name of the deputy manager of the Tooling Section, urging the Plaintiff to return to normal work; that when the Plaintiff came to work on November 26 but did not begin work until 10:30, well past the starting time of 08:00, the deputy manager and department head of the Tooling Section requested disciplinary action; that accordingly, on December 5 of the same year, the Defendant convened a disciplinary committee and, based on the Plaintiff's aforementioned unauthorized absence of five or more days, resolved to dismiss the Plaintiff effective December 17 of the same month, applying Article 28(8) of the collective agreement and Articles 10(8), 11(4), 11(6), 11(21), 11(25), and 11(35) of the Defendant company's disciplinary rules, and notified the Plaintiff of this on December 15; and that Article 25 of the Defendant company's employment rules provides that when an employee is absent due to illness or other unavoidable reasons, the employee must submit an absence report within 24 hours, and failure to submit a reason for absence shall be treated as unauthorized absence.
At the same time, based on the evidence presented, the court below found the following facts: as noted above, the Defendant, without reasonable grounds, repeatedly transferred the Plaintiff back and forth between technical and clerical positions; in terms of wage payment, until the Plaintiff was assigned to a clerical position in the General Affairs Section on December 1, 1982, he was paid a daily wage of 4,980 won as a technical employee, but after being transferred to a clerical position on that date, he was paid a monthly salary of 224,300 won under the monthly wage system; that he was again assigned to a technical position on October 20, 1983 and switched back to the daily wage system, being paid a daily wage of 6,120 won; that on February 11, 1985, he was transferred to a clerical position and reverted to the monthly wage system, being paid a monthly salary of 238,800 won; and that on August 22 of the same year, he was again transferred to a technical position in the Tooling Section and switched to the daily wage system, being paid a daily wage of 6,600 won; that the Plaintiff, objecting to this, protested to the Defendant company and also filed a complaint with the local office of the Ministry of Labor, as a result of which the Defendant company decided, around November of that year, that while the Plaintiff would continue to work as a technical employee in the Tool Team, his wages would be paid under the monthly wage system rather than the daily wage system, at the monthly base salary of 238,800 won that he had received while working as a clerical employee in the Quality Control Section before his transfer to the Tool Team; and that as a result, although the Plaintiff was actually working as a technical employee, he received wages in the form of a monthly salary following the clerical employee wage system.
The court below further found that, under the Defendant company's wage regulations, technical employees are, in principle, paid under the daily wage system, while clerical employees are paid under the monthly salary system; that technical employees receive various allowances for overtime work, night work, and holiday work, whereas clerical employees receive no such special work allowances; that although the Plaintiff was actually working as a technical employee, the Defendant company, on the ground that the Plaintiff received wages under the monthly salary system applicable to clerical employees, did not assign the Plaintiff, alone among the technical employees, any overtime work of the kind described above; and that as a result, although the Plaintiff received a clerical employee's monthly salary, the amount he actually received was considerably less than that of other technical employees of comparable experience.
The court below found that the Plaintiff protested to the company regarding the frequent transfers, and asserted that if the company intended to pay him a monthly salary and not assign him overtime work, it should give him a clerical position commensurate with that arrangement; and that if, instead, the company intended to have him work in a technical position, it should pay him under the daily wage system and allow him to work overtime, etc., so as to bring his wages into balance with those of other technical employees; and that he made repeated demands for correction on this basis, but the company ignored these demands and took no corrective measures. The court below found that, in response, on November 20, 1987, the Plaintiff informed the team leader of the Tooling Section and others of the Defendant company of his intention to refuse work in order to press for improvement of these unreasonable working conditions, and began his work refusal; and that on November 23, upon receiving a warning letter from the Defendant company, the Plaintiff submitted a written statement of reasons for his work refusal, in which he set out the above grounds.
The court below also found that the Plaintiff had worked for the Defendant company for more than ten years from April 22, 1977 without any particular misconduct, and had twice—on May 29, 1981 and May 20, 1987—received commendations from the representative director of the Defendant company as a model employee and long-service employee; and that, while serving as the Saemaul work-group leader of the Tool Team in the Tooling Section, he had improved work methods, thereby reducing production costs, for which he received an encouragement award at the Defendant company's factory Saemaul contest.
Based on these findings, the court below determined as follows: even if the Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the Defendant company's personnel actions and working conditions regarding him, his refusal to work for five or more days on that basis would, in light of Article 25 of the Defendant company's employment rules as noted above, prima facie fall under the ground for dismissal set out in Article 65(3) of the same employment rules, namely unauthorized absence of five or more days without justifiable reason. However, as found above, the Defendant company had in fact, without reasonable grounds, repeatedly transferred the Plaintiff, and had also treated him unfairly by comparison with other technical employees in not assigning him overtime work, etc., thereby resulting in a reduction of his income; and if the Plaintiff's work refusal was carried out as a means of protest against this unfair treatment by the Defendant company, then, considering the circumstances and motive that led the Plaintiff to refuse work, together with his contributions to the Defendant company as noted above, and weighing these various factors against the degree of the Plaintiff's misconduct in refusing to work for the five days in question, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff's work refusal constitutes misconduct so serious as to warrant a finding that it would be manifestly unreasonable to continue the employment relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Accordingly, the court below concluded that the Defendant's selection of dismissal—the heaviest form of discipline among those set out in the collective agreement and disciplinary rules—in disciplining the Plaintiff amounted to either an abuse of the right to discipline or an unfair decision contrary to equity, and therefore held that the Defendant's dismissal of the Plaintiff was void.
Upon examination of the record, the fact-finding of the court below is acceptable, and it cannot be said that there was any illegality therein, such as insufficient deliberation or violation of the rules of evidence, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
A transfer or reassignment of an employee that brings about a change in the type, content, or place of the labor that the employee is to provide belongs, in principle, to the authority of the employer (the holder of personnel authority), and accordingly a reasonable degree of discretion must be recognized within the scope necessary for business operations; however, where there exist special circumstances such that the transfer violates Article 27(1) or Article 105 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), or constitutes an abuse of rights, it loses its legitimacy (see Supreme Court Decision 86Daka2567, decided February 28, 1989).
As found by the court below, the Defendant, without reasonable grounds, repeatedly and at frequent intervals transferred the Plaintiff back and forth between technical and clerical positions; and, unlike the Defendant company's wage system whereby technical employees are paid on a daily wage basis and are able to earn a substantial income by working overtime, night work, and holiday work with separate allowances therefor, the Defendant, on the ground that the Plaintiff—who was engaged in technical work—was paid a monthly salary, did not assign him such overtime work, etc., with the result that the Plaintiff suffered considerable loss of income compared to other technical employees of the same grade, effectively producing a result equivalent to a de facto salary reduction. If this is so, then the Defendant's series of actions against the Plaintiff may be viewed as violating Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act or as an unfair action exceeding the scope of discretion permitted to the employer. Furthermore, if the Plaintiff, having repeatedly demanded correction of this situation without success, then made known his intention in these terms and refused to work as a means of protest or a demand for correction, this cannot be regarded, unlike ordinary work refusal or unauthorized absence, as misconduct of such gravity as to warrant a finding that it would be manifestly unreasonable to continue the employment relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Accordingly, the measure taken by the court below—considering the circumstances of the Plaintiff's work refusal as set out in its judgment, together with the Plaintiff's contributions to the Defendant company and other relevant circumstances, and determining that the Defendant's dismissal of the Plaintiff in this case was void as constituting an abuse of the right to discipline or as being contrary to the principle of equity—is correct, and there is no error therein based on a misunderstanding of the legal principles governing disciplinary dismissal, as argued in the grounds of appeal.
Furthermore, the argument that the Plaintiff, by receiving dismissal allowance without expressing any reservation, thereby approved the effect of this disciplinary dismissal, is a new argument raised for the first time at the appellate stage, not having been raised in the court below, and therefore cannot constitute a lawful ground of appeal (see Supreme Court Decision 86Nu325, decided February 24, 1987). Accordingly, there is no need to examine this argument further, and it is without merit. All of the grounds of appeal are without merit.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as set out in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Presiding Justice Yoon Kwan, Justice Choi Jae-ho, Justice Kim Yong-jun