[Plaintiff, Appellant]
[Defendant, Appellee] Korea Coal Corporation (대한석탄공사), Attorney Lim Chae-hong, Litigation Representative
[Court Below]
Seoul High Court Decision 81Na495 rendered on April 13, 1981
[Order]
1. The part of the judgment below dismissing the claim for payment of 160,503 won and interest thereon at the rate of 5% per annum from August 21, 1980 until full payment, among the parts of the judgment against the Plaintiff, is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
2. The Plaintiff's appeal with respect to the remaining part of the losing portion, aside from the part reversed above, is dismissed.
3. The costs of appeal with respect to the dismissed part of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The Court examines the grounds of appeal submitted by the Plaintiff's attorney.
1.
The purpose of the disaster compensation system under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) is to require an employer, who places workers providing labor under his control and operates an enterprise inherently involving the risk of disaster, to compensate for damage suffered by workers due to the occurrence of a disaster, regardless of whether the employer was at fault. Therefore, it is not required that a worker's occupational injury or illness be attributable to the employer's negligence; furthermore, as a general principle, even where the worker was negligent, such negligence may not be taken into account so as to exempt the employer from liability for compensation or to limit the scope of such compensation. In this respect, it must be held that the principle of fault-based liability and the theory of comparative negligence do not apply to the above-mentioned disaster compensation liability, except in cases specifically provided for by statute.
As an exception to the above principle of disaster compensation liability, Article 81 of the Labor Standards Act provides that where a worker suffers an occupational injury or illness due to his own gross negligence, and the employer has obtained recognition of such negligence from the Labor Relations Commission, the employer need not provide temporary disability compensation or disability compensation. According to this provision, with respect to temporary disability compensation and disability compensation, there is a way for the employer to be exempted from liability for compensation on the ground of the worker's gross negligence; however, with respect to other types of compensation, such as medical care compensation or survivors' compensation, the worker's gross negligence has no effect whatsoever on the employer's liability for compensation.
(However, in the case of medical care compensation, pursuant to Article 14, Paragraph 2 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법), the Chief of the Labor Office may withhold all or part of the insurance benefits with respect to a worker who violates instructions concerning medical care or impedes his own recovery.)
2.
In this case, the court below, based on the evidence cited therein, found the facts that the Plaintiff's loss of expected income due to this mining disaster accident amounted to 21,406,515 won, the loss of retirement allowance amounted to 5,688,867 won, and future medical expenses amounted to 1,582,900 won, for a total of 28,678,282 won. Taking into account the Plaintiff's negligence, which contributed to this accident, the court below fixed the Defendant's amount of compensation at 21,500,000 won, and then deducted from this amount of compensation the sum of 160,503 won, corresponding to the Plaintiff's ratio of negligence, out of the temporary disability benefits of 444,445 won and the medical care benefits of 642,015 won, which the Plaintiff admitted to having received.
However, it is clear that the deduction of the medical care benefits among the above deducted amounts was made by partially accepting the Defendant's defense to the effect that, of the medical care benefits of 642,015 won, the amount corresponding to the Plaintiff's ratio of negligence was an amount that the Plaintiff himself should have borne but which the Defendant paid instead, so that the Defendant has a right to claim restitution of unjust enrichment, and that this right should be set off against an equal amount. If the above medical care benefits refer to the medical care compensation provided for in Article 78 of the Labor Standards Act, then, as explained above, the Defendant, as employer, is obligated to pay the full amount thereof absent special circumstances, and cannot be exempted from paying the amount corresponding to the ratio of the Plaintiff's negligence merely because the Plaintiff was negligent. Therefore, there is no room for a right to claim restitution of unjust enrichment to arise with respect to this amount.
The court below should have clarified whether the medical care benefits asserted by the Defendant constitute medical care compensation as provided for in Article 79 of the Labor Standards Act, and if it does constitute such medical care compensation, then, absent special circumstances, not even a portion thereof may be deducted. Nevertheless, the court below failed to reach this conclusion, and this constitutes an error of law. Such error is a material violation of law that is significantly contrary to justice and equity; therefore, this part of the judgment below cannot escape reversal, and the argument on this point is well-founded.
3.
Accordingly, the Court's prior views inconsistent with this judgment (Supreme Court Decision 80Da2316 rendered on June 23, 1981, and Supreme Court Decision 80Da3252 rendered on July 28, 1981) are hereby overruled.
In conclusion, the part of the judgment below dismissing the claim for payment of 160,503 won and interest thereon at the rate of 5% per annum from August 21, 1980 until full payment, among the parts of the judgment against the Plaintiff, is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court for retrial; the appeal with respect to the remaining part of the losing portion, aside from the part reversed above, is without merit and is therefore dismissed; and the costs of appeal with respect to the dismissed part of the appeal shall be borne by the Appellant. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of all participating Justices.
Justice Yoo Tae-heung (Presiding Justice), Lee Il-gyu, Kim Jung-seo, Jeong Tae-gyun, Kang Woo-young, Lee Seong-ryeol, Jeon Sang-seok, Lee Jeong-woo, Yoon Il-young, Kim Deok-ju, Shin Jeong-cheol, Lee Hoi-chang