[Plaintiffs, Appellants]
[Defendants, Appellees]
[Judgment Below] Daegu High Court Decision 93Na2408 delivered on July 7, 1994
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning the amount of KRW 3,100,704 and the delay damages thereon, among the portion in which Plaintiff 1 lost, is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.
The remainder of Plaintiff 1's appeal and the appeals of Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, and Plaintiff 4 are all dismissed, and the costs of the appeal with respect to the dismissed portion shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning]
(1) We examine the first and second grounds of appeal raised by the Plaintiffs.
Upon examination of the record, the ratio of comparative negligence found by the court below is acceptable, and it cannot be said to be so remarkably high as to run counter to justice and equity, and the amount of consolation money calculated by the court below also appears to be appropriate. Therefore, the argument to the effect that the court below made factual findings in violation of the rules of experience or erred in its understanding of the law in calculating comparative negligence and consolation money is without merit.
(2) We examine the third ground of appeal raised by Plaintiff 1.
In calculating the amount of Plaintiff 1's pecuniary damages arising from this accident, the court below deducted, from the KRW 5,167,840 that the Defendants had paid to Plaintiff 1 as medical treatment expenses after the occurrence of this accident, the amount of KRW 3,100,704 corresponding to the above Plaintiff's ratio of negligence.
However, with respect to medical care compensation (요양보상) under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), the employer is, absent special circumstances, obligated to pay the full amount thereof, and even if the worker was negligent, the employer cannot be exempted from paying the amount corresponding to that ratio of negligence, and therefore such amount may not be deducted from the amount of damages (see this Court's Decisions 88Daka25571 delivered on July 11, 1989 and 81Daka351 delivered on October 13, 1981 (en banc)). Accordingly, if the above medical treatment expenses paid by the Defendants to the above Plaintiff correspond to medical care compensation under the Labor Standards Act, then the portion of said medical treatment expenses corresponding to the above Plaintiff's ratio of negligence may not be deducted from the Defendants' amount of damages on the ground of unjust enrichment.
As found by the court below, if the automobile repair shop operated by the Defendants where this accident occurred was a workplace for which an industrial accident compensation insurance relationship had already been established prior to the occurrence of this accident, then there is ample room to find that the above medical treatment expenses paid by the Defendants to the Plaintiff correspond to medical care compensation under the Labor Standards Act. Therefore, in calculating the above Plaintiff's amount of pecuniary damages, the court below should have ascertained whether the above medical treatment expenses correspond to medical care compensation under the Labor Standards Act, and if they do correspond to such medical care compensation, then, absent special circumstances, not even a portion thereof may be deducted. Nevertheless, the court below, without due consideration, deducted the amount corresponding to the above Plaintiff's ratio of negligence from the above medical treatment expenses, thereby committing an error in its understanding of the law concerning the nature of medical care compensation under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) and the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법) and concerning the doctrine of set-off of profit and loss. The argument encompassing this point is meritorious.
(3) Therefore, the part of the judgment below concerning the amount of KRW 3,100,704 and the delay damages thereon, among the portion in which Plaintiff 1 lost, is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below; the remainder of Plaintiff 1's appeal and the appeals of Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, and Plaintiff 4 are all dismissed; and the costs of the appeal with respect to the dismissed portion shall be borne by the Plaintiffs. It is so decided by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as set forth in the Order.
Justice Lee Don-hui (Presiding Justice), Kim Seok-su (Justice in charge), Jeong Gwi-ho, Lee Im-su