[Plaintiff, Appellant] Park Gwi-sun, Attorney Jang Ho, Litigation Representative
[Defendant, Appellee] Choyang Textile Co., Ltd., Attorney Oh Seong-hwan, Litigation Representative
[Judgment Below] Daegu High Court Decision 86Na1064 rendered on January 15, 1987
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal submitted by the Plaintiff's litigation representative are examined as follows.
According to Article 22, Articles 46 through 48, etc. of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), an employer must specify wages, working hours, and other working conditions to the employee at the time of concluding an employment contract, and wages must include, in addition to the basic wage, various allowances for overtime work, night work, holiday work, etc. Accordingly, in principle, the wages of an employee should be calculated by first determining the basic wage under the employment contract and then calculating and adding the various allowances accordingly. However, even where an employment contract does not separately determine the basic wage but instead provides that a fixed amount, in which various allowances have already been aggregated in advance, is to be paid as the monthly wage with the employee's consent, such a contract shall be permissible if, in light of the collective bargaining agreement or the rules of employment, it does not disadvantage the employee, and if it is recognized as justifiable in view of all the circumstances (see this Court's Decision 80Da2384 rendered on March 9, 1982, among others).
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, upon comprehensive consideration of the evidence indicated therein, found that the Plaintiff, at the time of joining the company, entered into an employment contract with the Defendant company under which, taking into account the special nature of the work, working hours, and form of work, a fixed amount in which the various allowances set forth in the judgment had already been aggregated in advance was to be paid as the monthly wage; that the Plaintiff renewed such employment contracts of the same content each year with an increase in the monthly wage amount and continued to work under such terms; and that the Plaintiff received the monthly wage amount, which included the various allowances, without any objection until the time of retirement. On the ground that such a method of wage payment could not be deemed particularly disadvantageous to the Plaintiff as an employee, the court below rejected the Plaintiff's claim for payment of the various allowances at issue in this case (and the retirement allowance calculated on the basis thereof), which claim was premised on the assertion that the monthly wage amount paid to the Plaintiff until retirement did not include the aforementioned allowances. Here, the court below's statement that such a method of wage payment could not be deemed particularly disadvantageous to the Plaintiff as an employee is to be interpreted as meaning that the employment contract in this case, which set the monthly wage amount by aggregating in advance not only the basic wage but also the various allowances set forth in the judgment in determining the Plaintiff's pay, was not prohibited by the collective bargaining agreement or rules of employment argued by the Plaintiff, and that, in its content as well, it could not be deemed particularly disadvantageous to the Plaintiff as an employee.
Upon examination of the record, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are deemed justifiable and are acceptable, and there is no illegality therein such as insufficient deliberation or misapprehension of the law as pointed out in the grounds of appeal. Moreover, the precedent of this Court cited in the grounds of appeal concerns a case with different facts from the present case and is therefore inapplicable to the present case. The argument is, in the end, without merit.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Bae Seok (Presiding Justice), Yun Il-yeong, Choi Jae-ho