[Order]
The guilty portion of the judgment below is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Daejeon District Court Panel Division.
The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
1. We examine the prosecutor's grounds of appeal.
As to Point 1,
Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act (노동쟁의조정법) (Prohibition of Third-Party Intervention) provides that, except for workers or the relevant labor union who have direct employment relationships, or an employer, or other persons having legitimate authority under laws and regulations, and except in the case of a national federation of labor unions or an industry-wide federation of labor unions to which the relevant labor union belongs, no one shall intervene in a labor dispute, thereby prohibiting third-party intervention. Article 45-2 of the same Act provides for the punishment of persons who violate this provision. The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that labor disputes between workers or labor unions and employers are resolved autonomously and independently through negotiation and mediation between the parties standing on an equal footing, and to prohibit outside forces who are not parties in interest from intervening in such labor disputes to manipulate, incite, or obstruct the parties concerned, or to exert influence on their decision-making, since such intervention would rather impede the amicable resolution of labor disputes and harm sound industrial peace and labor relations.
In light of the purpose and intent of the above provision, the definitions of "labor dispute" and "dispute act" prescribed in Articles 2 and 3 of the same Act, the essential nature of a labor union as an autonomous organization, the characteristic that with respect to a labor dispute, labor and management stand in an adversarial relationship to each other while nevertheless being required to resolve it autonomously on an equal footing, and, in connection with the definition of a labor union, the purport of the proviso to Article 3, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법), which provides that "a person who is disputing the validity of a dismissal shall not be construed as not being a worker," it should be held that the third parties whose intervention is prohibited under the above provision do not include a worker who, even if dismissed by the employer while maintaining a direct employment relationship, disputes within a reasonable period that the dismissal constitutes an unfair labor practice or is invalid, files an application for relief from unfair labor practice with the Labor Relations Commission or files a lawsuit for confirmation of invalidity of dismissal with a court, thereby contesting the validity of the dismissal, and asserts that he continues to hold the status of a worker or a member or officer of the relevant labor union, and who engages in a dispute act within the labor-management relationship in question. This conclusion should not be interpreted differently merely because the dispute act in question occurred before the proviso to Article 3, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act (concerning the definition of a labor union) was newly inserted (November 28, 1987).
Furthermore, it should not be interpreted differently on the ground that the proviso to Article 3, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act is intended solely to prevent infringement of workers' right to organize by employers, or that a person disputing the validity of a dismissal does not fall under a "third party" under Article 12-2 (Prohibition of Third-Party Intervention) of the Trade Union Act but does fall under a "third party" under Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act.
According to the facts charged in this case and the facts established by the court below, the defendant, who had been employed as a driver at Chungnam Taxi Co., Ltd., was dismissed on June 2, 1987 on the grounds of unauthorized absence attributed to traffic law violations and preparation for organizing a labor union, and while he did lead a sit-in or engage in acts of resolving to conduct a sit-in and struggle during the labor dispute set forth in the judgment, which took place on August 14 and 16 of the same year demanding wage increases and abolition of the federation union, the defendant filed an application for relief from unfair labor practice with the Chungcheongnam-do Regional Labor Relations Commission on June 8 of the same year, asserting that the above dismissal constituted an unfair labor practice, and upon dismissal of that application, filed a request for reexamination with the National Labor Relations Commission on July 20 of the same year, which was still pending at the time of the acts in question. Upon examination of the record, it can be recognized that 20 workers employed at Chungnam Taxi Co., Ltd. held a labor union founding general meeting on April 21, 1986 to organize a labor union, and the defendant, acting as its representative, submitted a labor union establishment report to the Mayor of Daejeon, which was returned on May 8 of the same year; after filing an administrative lawsuit, they obtained a favorable judgment in Seoul High Court Case No. 86Gu1074 on March 4, 1987 (this Court notes that this case was ultimately finalized in favor of the plaintiff Chungnam Taxi Labor Union by Supreme Court Decision 88Nu7774 rendered on April 11, 1989), and that in order to organize the labor union, the defendant submitted a leave notice and was absent on May 1, 1987, which absence was treated as unauthorized and led to the above dismissal. If these are the facts, then the defendant's act of filing an application for relief from unfair labor practice within a reasonable period after his dismissal, contesting the validity of the dismissal, and participating in the labor dispute in this case, should be viewed as participation in his capacity as a worker maintaining a direct employment relationship with respect to the dispute act in question, rather than as intervention as a third party. This conclusion remains the same even if the defendant's application for relief had been dismissed prior to the acts in question, so long as his request for reexamination was still pending.
Moreover, even assuming that the defendant's dispute act constituted a crime before the proviso to Article 3, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act was newly inserted (at the time of the act), and only ceased to constitute a crime after the insertion of the proviso, the same result would be reached under Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Act (형법), which requires application of the new law.
Therefore, the argument criticizing the judgment below from the opposite standpoint is without merit.
As to Point 2,
The factual findings of the court below regarding the defendant's violation of the (pre-amendment) Assembly and Demonstration Act (집회및시위에관한법률) at Daejeon Station Plaza on August 17, 1987 can be upheld. Given the facts as found by the court below—that the defendant, having consulted with the Chief of Daejeon Police Station and agreed not to hold a street demonstration, conducted only a peaceful sit-in demonstration at Daejeon Station Plaza; that after the demonstration at Daejeon Station Plaza ended, when some attempted to move out onto the street, the defendant restrained them, resulting in a peaceful dispersal; and that the demonstration plan itself was designed to be conducted as peacefully as possible in order to inform citizens of the intentions of the striking workers—this cannot be regarded as an assembly of the degree likely to cause considerable social unrest under Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the pre-amendment Assembly and Demonstration Act. Therefore, the judgment of the court below to this effect is also justified. This argument is likewise without merit.
As to Point 3,
Upon examination of the record, the finding of the first instance court—that it is not recognized that the defendant conspired with or participated in the act of certain unidentified demonstrators who damaged taxis at the time set forth in the judgment, in connection with the charge against the defendant for violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Crimes of Violence (property damage)—as well as the measure of the court below upholding this finding, can be affirmed, and there is no illegality in violation of the rules of evidence as argued. Even assuming that the defendant could have foreseen that some of the demonstrators would damage other taxi drivers' taxis, this alone cannot establish that the defendant conspired in the act of damage, and since it is not recognized that the defendant conspired in or participated in the act of damage, the defendant cannot be held responsible for that act of damage. Therefore, there is no error in the judgment below in misapprehending the legal principles concerning joint principal offenders.
Accordingly, this argument is also without merit.
2. As to the guilty portion:
Before examining the defendant's grounds of appeal, we note ex officio that the Assembly and Demonstration Act, which the court below applied with respect to the guilty portion concerning the defendant, was comprehensively amended by Act No. 4095 on March 29, 1989 (effective 30 days after promulgation), and the elements of the offense and the punishment were changed in a manner favorable to the defendant. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Act, the new law must be applied, and consequently, the judgment below cannot be maintained as it stands and must be reversed.
3. Therefore, the guilty portion of the judgment below is reversed and this part of the case is remanded to the court below, and the prosecutor's appeal is dismissed. The opinions of the participating Justices were unanimous, except for the dissenting opinion of Justices Kim Deok-ju, Ahn Woo-man, Kim Ju-han, Kim Yong-jun, and Yoon Kwan regarding Point 1 of Section 1 above, and the separate opinion regarding the dissenting opinion, and the supplementary opinion of Justice Bae Man-woon to the majority opinion, which is added in connection therewith. It is adjudged as stated in the Order.
4. Dissenting Opinion of Justices Kim Deok-ju, Ahn Woo-man, Kim Ju-han, and Kim Yong-jun
We cannot agree that the mere fact that a dismissed worker has filed a lawsuit or the like to contest the validity of the dismissal means that such worker does not fall under a "third party" as defined in Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, and we hereby set forth our dissenting opinion as follows.
According to Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, except for workers or the relevant labor union who have a direct employment relationship, or an employer, or other persons having legitimate authority under laws and regulations, no one shall intervene in a dispute act for the purpose of manipulating, inciting, obstructing, or otherwise influencing the parties concerned; provided, however, that this shall not apply to a national federation of labor unions or an industry-wide federation of labor unions to which the relevant labor union belongs, which shall not be regarded as third-party intervention. The content of this provision of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act should be understood as providing that a dispute act must, in principle, be resolved autonomously by the free will of the parties to the labor relationship from its commencement to its settlement, and that intervention by third parties exercising influence is not permitted, with the sole exception that a national federation of labor unions and an industry-wide labor union to which the relevant labor union belongs are excluded from the category of third parties.
The reason for prohibiting third-party intervention in a dispute act is that a dispute act is a collective action aimed at having the parties to the labor relationship achieve their demands through actual force in an adversarial relationship between labor and management, and since this causes losses to both labor and management and has significant consequential effects on the entire national economy, the purpose is to prevent a third party who is not a direct party from intervening to exert pressure on the other side, thereby expanding the labor dispute to society at large and causing confusion. Accordingly, dispute acts that impede the normal operation of business should, so far as possible, be avoided through the good sense of labor and management, and even when a dispute act arises, it should be resolved peacefully and swiftly through the autonomous efforts of the parties to the labor relationship.
In light of the legislative purpose of prohibiting third-party intervention in labor disputes as described above, the scope of persons who are not "third parties" as provided in Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act must be strictly construed as expressly stated in the text of the law, and expanding its meaning or drawing an analogy from other statutory provisions to broadly recognize exceptions to "third party" status would run contrary to the legislative purpose of the Act.
Therefore, when an employer dismisses a worker, the worker's status as such is lost; and except where the dismissal is void as a matter of course, unless the effect of the dismissal is suspended by a court's provisional injunction or the like, the mere fact that the worker has filed an application for relief with the Labor Relations Commission or filed a lawsuit for invalidity of dismissal with a court, thereby contesting the validity of the dismissal, cannot mean that the worker's status vis-à-vis the employer continues to exist as before. Moreover, under our positive law, which places no time limit on contesting the validity of a dismissal in civil proceedings, the validity of a dismissal may be contested even after a considerable period of time has passed. If, in such a case, the mere act of contesting the validity of dismissal were sufficient to recognize the worker's status and preclude treatment as a "third party," this would broadly expand the exception to third-party status, contrary to the spirit of the law which seeks the swift resolution of dispute acts, and would make the resolution of problems even more difficult.
The majority opinion interprets Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, in light of the purport of the proviso to Article 3, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act, as excluding from the category of "third party" a worker who, having been dismissed, contests the validity of the dismissal within a reasonable period by filing an application for relief from unfair labor practice with the Labor Relations Commission or a lawsuit for confirmation of invalidity of dismissal with a court, and who asserts that he continues to hold the status of a worker while engaging in a dispute act. However, such a statutory interpretation excessively expands the scope of persons who are not "third parties" as provided in Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, or forcibly invokes the Trade Union Act, and is thus improper.
Article 3 of the Trade Union Act, in defining "labor union" for purposes of that Act, provides: "'Labor union' means an organization or federation thereof organized by workers on their own initiative, acting as the principal body, for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and promoting workers' welfare and other economic and social status. However, this shall not apply to any of the following cases," and Item 4 thereof addresses cases permitting the membership of persons who are not workers, provided that a person contesting the validity of a dismissal shall not be construed as not being a worker.
The purport of the proviso to Article 3, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act is to prevent an employer, without justifiable reason, from dismissing a worker who has joined a labor union in order to obstruct the establishment or continued existence of the labor union, thereby rendering the labor union unlawful on the basis that it has permitted the membership of a non-worker; accordingly, where a worker so dismissed contests the validity of the dismissal, that worker is, insofar as it concerns the continued existence of the labor union, to be treated as a worker so that the labor union may continue to exist as a legitimate labor union comprised only of workers.
However, unlike the Trade Union Act, the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act contains no such express provision. Therefore, to apply by analogy, to the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act—whose legislative purpose is the fair adjustment of labor relations and the prevention or resolution of labor disputes—this proviso, which was enacted as a device to prevent an employer from obstructing the establishment or continued existence of a labor union, is an unreasonable interpretation of the law.
To be sure, if one interprets the matter solely on the logic that "workers' right to collective action must be protected," the majority opinion might be tenable. However, in our view, such an interpretation cannot be said to be faithful to the legislative purpose of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, which is to maintain industrial peace and contribute to the development of the national economy. This is because, in the actual field of labor disputes, we cannot dispel the concern that a dismissed worker, in order to achieve his own demands, is highly likely to take the lead in driving a lawful labor union's dispute act toward extreme methods of struggle, such as violence or destructive acts, standing in the position of an even "more militant third party" than an ordinary worker, let alone an actual third party.
Therefore, we cannot agree with the majority opinion, which excludes from third-party status—thereby allowing to remain as a worker capable of engaging in a dispute act, i.e., as a member of the labor union—a dismissed worker merely because he has filed a lawsuit or the like to contest the validity of the dismissal.
We believe that if there is a worker who has been dismissed without justifiable reason, that worker should take measures, such as a provisional injunction, to preserve his status as a worker, and only then participate in a dispute act as a member of the labor union.
Accordingly, the court below erred in its interpretation of the prohibition of third-party intervention under the above statutory provision, in holding that the defendant, who was contesting the validity of his dismissal, fell under the category of a worker maintaining a direct employment relationship as provided in Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, and in thereby acquitting the defendant on the charge of violation of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act in this case. This error affected the judgment, and accordingly the judgment below should be reversed.
5. The separate opinion of Justice Yoon Kwan, regarding the dissenting opinion, is as follows.
I concur with the dissenting opinion insofar as it holds that, in interpreting "workers who have a direct employment relationship" as provided in Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, the provision of the proviso to Article 3, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act—"a person who is disputing the validity of a dismissal shall not be construed as not being a worker"—cannot be invoked.
However, I would add that, examining the provisions of Article 4 of the Trade Union Act, Article 14 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), and Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, each of these statutes defines the concept of "worker" differently, and it is clear, even in light of their respective legislative purposes, that these statutes stand not in a hierarchical relationship but in a parallel relationship to one another. Accordingly, absent a deeming provision or provision for mutatis mutandis application analogous to the proviso to Article 3, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act, the deeming provision of the Trade Union Act cannot be followed in interpreting the status of a worker under the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act.
However, this does not mean that I can agree with the premise of the dissenting opinion that a worker immediately loses the status of "worker who has a direct employment relationship" as provided in Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act upon dismissal by the employer.
Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act provides that no one, except workers and others who have a direct employment relationship, may intervene in a dispute act, thereby making a person who is not "one who has a direct employment relationship" the subject of that offense. Since this negative status element, referring generally to persons who do not hold a certain status, is undoubtedly one of the elements of the offense, it is entirely self-evident that a court, in determining whether the offense has been established, must first examine and establish, on the basis of strict evidence, whether the defendant is or is not "one who has a direct employment relationship."
If this is not done, then upon the mere formal dismissal by the employer, the court would be compelled to accept, without any opportunity to examine whether that dismissal is void as a matter of course under the Labor Standards Act, collective agreements, employment rules, or the employment contract, that the worker's intervention in a dispute act is unlawful solely on the basis of that dismissal; conversely, even where a dismissal is valid, the mere fact of contesting it would compel the court to condone the intervention as lawful—effectively leaving the interpretation of "third party" status in a dispute act to be determined by the will of the employer and the worker themselves.
The majority opinion holds that, with respect to an act committed by the defendant before the proviso to Article 3, Item 4 of the current Trade Union Act—"a person who is disputing the validity of a dismissal shall not be construed as not being a worker"—was newly inserted, the defendant should be regarded as having held the status of worker even at the time of the act, merely because he was later found to be contesting the dismissal.
However, since the above newly inserted provision is clearly a deeming provision, as a matter of interpretation, that mandates treating a worker as a worker without any room for discretion so long as the worker merely contests the validity of dismissal, if no such provision existed at the time of the defendant's act, then even though the defendant contested the validity of the dismissal, the question of whether that dismissal was valid or void should be determined according to the Labor Standards Act, collective agreements, employment rules, and the employment contract; it cannot be deemed that the worker's status continued to exist merely because the validity of the dismissal was contested.
The dissenting opinion, while stating that a worker's status is lost upon dismissal by the employer, also states that, except where the dismissal is void as a matter of course, the worker's status cannot continue to exist unless the effect of the dismissal is suspended by a court's provisional injunction or the like. Since dismissal signifies the termination of the employment contract by the employer, it is beyond doubt that, absent special circumstances, the employment contract is terminated by the employer's termination.
However, where a worker is contesting the validity of the dismissal and the dismissal is void as a matter of course, the employer's termination of the employment contract is absolutely without effect from the outset, so that the worker naturally retains that status; whereas, where the dismissal is valid, it must be held that the worker's status is terminated by that dismissal as a matter of course, no matter how much the worker contests its validity.
Nor can this conclusion be altered by the fact that the effect of the dismissal was suspended by a court's provisional injunction. A court's provisional injunction has only the effect of provisionally preserving the status of the dismissed worker; it does not conclusively determine the validity or invalidity of the dismissal, and, moreover, a court, in a criminal case, in determining the validity of the dismissal for the purpose of establishing the subject of the offense, is not necessarily bound to follow such a provisional injunction.
In the end, both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion, setting aside the court's fundamental duty to examine and establish the subject of the offense, determine the establishment of the offense in this case on the somewhat deterministic premise that the validity or invalidity of the dismissal is to be resolved according to the will of the employer and the worker, and for this reason cannot be accepted.
Accordingly, I am of the view that the court below erred in acquitting the defendant, on the sole basis of the reasoning set forth in its judgment, without examining and determining whether the defendant fell under the category of the subject of the offense of violation of Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, and that this failure to exhaust the examination affected the outcome of the judgment; therefore, the judgment below should be reversed on this ground.
6. The supplementary opinion of Justice Bae Man-woon to the majority opinion is added as follows.
Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution (헌법) provides that workers shall have the autonomous right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to collective action for the improvement of working conditions.
This is intended to enable workers to acquire an autonomous and equal status in relation to the employer. The securing of workers' working conditions is achieved mainly through an employment contract based on collective bargaining with the employer, and the right to organize is guaranteed to support the workers' autonomous and equal status in this collective bargaining, while the right to collective action is recognized as a means of conducting this collective bargaining advantageously. As such, the three labor rights (the right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to collective action) are closely interrelated, and, absent special circumstances, must be understood as an integrated whole rather than considered separately.
Accordingly, the fact that the provision stating "a person who is disputing the validity of a dismissal shall not be construed as not being a worker" is set forth in the Trade Union Act in connection with the definition of a labor union does not mean that it is entirely unrelated to the right to collective action, and it cannot be said that, in interpreting Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, the purport of this proviso cannot be invoked.
I do not think it reasonable to regard a person as a worker with respect to the establishment or continued existence of a labor union, while regarding that same person as nothing but a third party with respect to collective bargaining or collective action.
Moreover, in this case, the reason a worker who is disputing the validity of dismissal and engaging in a dispute act within the labor-management relationship in question is treated in the same manner as a worker who has a direct employment relationship, rather than as a third party, is grounded in the standpoint of Article 13-2 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act; it is not because the worker's status or standing vis-à-vis the employer is recognized as continuing to be maintained or to exist as before. These are not necessarily the same issue, and I believe there should be no confusion on this point.
The separate opinion appears to regard "workers who have a direct employment relationship," which the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act defines as persons who are not third parties, as having the same meaning as "workers who maintain an employment relationship that is valid under private law," and to hold that this should be determined in criminal proceedings. However, I do not think it reasonable to understand the above provision, which relates to workers' right to collective action, solely from such a civil-law standpoint.
Originally, the provision prohibiting third-party intervention in the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act should be understood as intended to prevent the harm arising from intervention by outside forces unrelated to the relevant labor union or workers, which would infringe upon the essential nature of the labor union as an autonomous organization. Such a provision prohibiting third-party intervention also exists in Article 12-2 of the Trade Union Act in connection with workers' right to organize and right to collective bargaining, and it is necessary to examine the two provisions in relation to each other. Both provisions define the scope of persons who are not third parties in an identical manner (although, in the case of the Trade Union Act, it is naturally the case that the employer is excluded, given the nature of that provision), and I do not think that a double standard should be applied here.
I do not deny that treating a worker who is contesting the validity of dismissal as not being a third party carries no small risk that lawsuits for invalidity of dismissal may be abused. The majority opinion's requirement that this occur "within a reasonable period" serves as one restriction to prevent the abuse of such lawsuits. However, treating such a worker as a third party would also open the way for infringement of workers' right to collective bargaining or right to collective action through the employer's abuse of the power of dismissal, and this harm cannot be regarded as insignificant either.
A labor dispute is permitted only within the bounds of lawfulness. Even a worker who is originally in a direct employment relationship is, of course, not permitted to engage in unlawful acts such as violence or destructive acts, and Article 13, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act makes this clear.
Therefore, the scope within which a worker who is contesting the validity of dismissal may participate in a dispute act within the labor-management relationship in question is, in any event, limited to lawful dispute acts, and where such a worker commits an unlawful act, such as violence or destructive acts, that worker may be punished under the applicable statutes. Accordingly, I do not believe that treating a worker who is contesting the validity of dismissal as not being a third party fails to address the concerns raised in the dissenting opinion.
Whether a dismissal is valid or void is ultimately to be determined through litigation, and while litigation is pending, this matter remains undetermined. It is unclear what the dissenting opinion means by "cases where the dismissal is void as a matter of course," which it sets aside as a separate matter, but so long as there is a dispute, whether a dismissal is void as a matter of course cannot be determined without going through litigation.
Therefore, I believe that not treating such a worker, who is contesting the validity of dismissal and participating in a dispute act, as having intervened as a third party in the dispute act—in the same manner as a worker who has a direct employment relationship, until the litigation is finally determined—represents the correct interpretation of the Trade Union Act, which guarantees the three labor rights pursuant to Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, and of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act, which seeks the fair adjustment of labor relations. I do not believe that this constitutes a forced invocation of the Trade Union Act or an excessive expansion of the scope of persons who are not third parties.
As the majority opinion states, whether the proviso to Article 3, Item 4 of the Trade Union Act is regarded as a confirmatory provision or as a deeming provision, the same result is reached in this case.
Finally, I would like to point out that it is not appropriate for a criminal court to examine whether such a dismissal is valid or void, and that this is not a matter of a nature to be ultimately examined and determined in criminal proceedings.
Moreover, if this were required, it would have to be examined even from the investigative stage, causing not only confusion but also making it impossible, from the outset, for either the employer or the worker to determine immediately whether a person contesting the validity of dismissal while participating in a dispute act is or is not a "third party," thereby merely adding another seed of dispute and further complicating labor relations. Furthermore, imposing on the worker the risk of bearing responsibility for violation of the prohibition of third-party intervention unless the dismissal is later confirmed as invalid in litigation would be no better than simply preventing the worker from participating in the dispute act from the outset.
Chief Justice Lee Il-gyu (Presiding Justice), Justices Kim Deok-ju, Lee Hoe-chang, Park Woo-dong, Yoon Kwan, Bae Seok, Lee Jae-seong, Kim Sang-won, Bae Man-woon, Ahn Woo-man, Kim Ju-han, Yoon Yeong-cheol, Kim Yong-jun