[Plaintiff, Appellant] Korea Ilbo Dongbu Advertising Co., Ltd. (Attorney Kim Byung-jun, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Defendant
[Judgment Below] Seoul District Court Judgment of December 4, 1998, 98Na16608
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
1. Determination as to whether the Defendant was an employee of the Plaintiff Company
Whether a person constitutes an "employee" under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) must be determined, irrespective of the form of the contract, according to whether the person, in substance, provided labor to the employer in a subordinate relationship for the purpose of receiving wages. In making this determination, the following matters must be comprehensively considered: whether the content of the work was determined by the employer and whether the person was subject to employment rules, service regulations, personnel regulations, etc., and whether the person was subject to specific and direct direction and supervision by the employer in the course of performing the work; whether working hours and the place of work were designated by the employer and whether the person was bound thereby; the ownership of equipment, raw materials, work tools, etc.; matters concerning remuneration, including whether the remuneration had the character of consideration for the labor itself, whether a basic or fixed wage was set, and whether income tax was withheld at source; the continuity of the labor-provision relationship and the existence and degree of exclusive affiliation with the employer; whether the person's status as an employee should be recognized under other statutes such as those concerning the social security system; and the economic and social conditions of both parties (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da56235, delivered February 9, 1999). In assessing such subordinate relationship, the need for protection under labor-related statutes must also be taken into account.
According to the reasoning of the first-instance judgment cited by the court below, the court below found as follows: according to the labor agreement prepared and submitted by the Defendant to the Plaintiff Company, the president not only oversaw all matters concerning field (outside) employees but also had authority over their hiring and dismissal, and had the authority to take personnel action when a field employee failed to faithfully perform his duties or a ground for dismissal arose, with the grounds for dismissal being defined as "unauthorized absence three or more times per month or two or more consecutive days, or markedly negligent work attitude"; that senior management employees of the Plaintiff Company supervised whether sales employees observed their attendance and departure times, received reports on work status through work logs, and gave individual and specific work instructions to sales employees; that the Defendant, along with other sales employees, was issued and carried an identification card from the Plaintiff Company, and was enrolled in the National Pension and the Medical Insurance Association with the Plaintiff Company designated as the place of business; that sales employees solicited advertisements from advertisers and concluded advertising contracts according to their own connections, experience, and ability, but such contracts were concluded in the name of the Plaintiff Company rather than in the individual name of the sales employee, and the employees were responsible for collecting advertising fees from advertisers and remitting them to the Plaintiff Company, with remuneration paid in the form of a performance-based payment consisting of a fixed percentage of the advertising fees according to the volume of advertisements solicited; and that the Defendant, at the request of the Plaintiff Company and in order to simplify the Plaintiff Company's tax matters, registered as a business operator in his own name on April 6, 1995, and issued some tax invoices accordingly. Based on these findings, and comprehensively considering the sales employees' attendance status, the content of their duties, the degree of direction and supervision by managers, and their enrollment in medical insurance and other matters constituting employee benefits, the court below determined that even though the Defendant received differential pay each month according to the volume of advertisements solicited and issued tax invoices in his own name, it was reasonable to view the Defendant as an employee in a subordinate employment relationship with the Plaintiff Company, and that it could not be viewed that the Defendant requested the Plaintiff Company to place advertisements as a party of equal standing to the Plaintiff Company.
Upon examining the relevant evidence against the record, the fact-finding and determination of the court below as set forth above are made in accordance with the legal principles set forth above and are justified, and there is no error therein in violation of the rules of evidence or in misunderstanding the legal principles concerning "employee" under the Labor Standards Act.
2. Determination as to whether the Defendant embezzled part of the advertising fees collected from advertisers
According to the reasoning of the first-instance judgment cited by the court below, the court below found as follows: sales employees of the Plaintiff Company received pay in proportion to the advertisements they solicited, and were required to remit the advertising fees for advertisements published in a given month by the last day of the following month, such that both the Plaintiff Company and its sales employees focused more on the total amount of advertising fees to be remitted for the month than on the specific details of fee collection; that accordingly, it was common practice, when a sales employee remitted advertising fees collected from advertisers to the Plaintiff Company, not to specify from which advertiser the fees had been received, and that so long as a sales employee remitted the amount scheduled for deposit that month, the Plaintiff Company did not verify the specific details, and even where the details did not match, the Plaintiff Company had accepted such remittances; that, in accordance with this remittance practice, the Defendant recorded in the books that he had remitted 4,950,000 won as the 1995 advertising fee for non-party ○○ Villa even though the actual fee was 770,000 won, while on the other hand, although he collected 3,863,000 won as advertising fees from non-parties △△ Housing, Korea Peninsula Trading Co., and others, he did not record these amounts in the books as fees from those respective advertisers but processed them as remittances forming part of the advertising fees of other advertisers; and that, with respect to the advertisements solicited by the Defendant, there remained outstanding advertising fee claims exceeding the amount of unpaid advertising fees alleged by the Plaintiff. Based on these findings, and considering the characteristics of the bookkeeping method for advertising fees, the remittance practice, and the total amount of outstanding unpaid advertising fees, the court below determined that even if part of the advertising fees collected by the Defendant were omitted from the books, it was reasonable to view that the Defendant had remitted all such fees to the Plaintiff Company, and that there was no other evidence to establish that the Defendant had embezzled the advertising fees he collected.
Upon examining the relevant evidence against the record, the fact-finding of the court below as set forth above is justified, and there is no error therein of misapprehending the facts in violation of the rules of evidence.
3. Determination as to whether the Defendant agreed to directly pay the outstanding advertising fees
According to the reasoning of the first-instance judgment cited by the court below, the court below found that, while it is true that the service pledge and labor agreement prepared and submitted by the Defendant to the Plaintiff Company contained provisions relating to the remittance and repayment of outstanding advertising fees, when the contents of these documents are considered comprehensively, the obligations of the sales employee set forth in these documents should be construed as (i) the duty in the course of employment to collect and remit the outstanding advertising fees for advertisements the employee had solicited, and (ii) the duty to compensate for damage caused to the Plaintiff Company through intentional or negligent conduct in handling matters such as the collection of advertising fees and the handling of advertisement placement business, and it is reasonable to view that these obligations did not extend to an obligation to pay advertising fees on behalf of the advertiser in lieu of the advertiser. Upon examination of the record, this determination of the court below is acceptable, and there is no error therein in misconstruing the service pledge and the labor agreement.
Meanwhile, according to the reasoning of the first-instance judgment cited by the court below, the court below found as follows: as the outstanding advertising fees for advertisements solicited and published by the Defendant increased, the Plaintiff Company accused the Defendant of having been negligent in the fee-collection work and strongly demanded that he prepare a promissory note with the face value equal to the outstanding amount as of that time; and that on November 3, 1995, the Defendant, in accordance with the Plaintiff Company's demand, prepared and submitted to the Plaintiff Company a promissory note (Exhibit Ga No. 1) stating the face amount as 51,773,540 won, consisting of the then-outstanding advertising fees and dishonored amounts, with the due date recorded as February 28, 1996. Based on this finding, and in light of the circumstances under which the Defendant, having been accused by the Plaintiff Company of negligence in the collection work, was left with no choice but to prepare the promissory note in question, the court below determined that it was reasonable to view that the Defendant had agreed to compensate the Plaintiff Company only for the portion of the outstanding advertising fees that became uncollectible due to the Defendant's own occupational negligence, such as negligence in the performance of his duties, and had prepared the promissory note in question as security therefor; and, since it was recognized that the Defendant had exerted his best efforts in collecting the advertising fees without any fault attributable to him, the court below determined that the Defendant bore no liability for damages to the Plaintiff.
According to the record, it can be recognized that the Plaintiff accused the Defendant and other advertising sales employees of having caused the increase in outstanding fees through negligence in the fee-collection work, and instructed them to state their respective outstanding amounts on a promissory note, and that, in accordance with this instruction, the Defendant prepared and delivered the promissory note in question in the sense of confirming the outstanding amount as of that time (based on the description in Exhibit Eul No. 12 and the respective testimony of non-parties 1 and 2, witnesses in the first instance). In light of the circumstances under which the promissory note was prepared and the fact that the Defendant was fundamentally in the position of an employee, the mere fact of preparing the promissory note is insufficient to establish that the Defendant agreed to directly repay the outstanding advertising fees or to assume that obligation. Furthermore, since the promissory note was issued on the premise that the Defendant owed a debt for the outstanding advertising fees, with that debt as the underlying obligation, in this case where such underlying obligation is not recognized, the Defendant may refuse payment of the note amount against the Plaintiff, who is the Defendant's direct counterparty in the act of issuing the note, on the basis of such grounds.
Although the reasoning set forth by the court below is not appropriate, its conclusion in rejecting the Plaintiff's argument is justified. Accordingly, the ground of appeal alleging that the judgment below is unlawful due to misapprehension of the facts in violation of the rules of evidence or misunderstanding of the legal principles is without merit.
4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order.
Supreme Court Justices Yu Ji-dam (Presiding Justice), Seo Seong, Bae Gi-won, Park Jae-yun (Justice in Charge)