[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant] Korea Automobile Insurance Co., Ltd., Litigation Representative Attorney Jeong Man-jo
[Judgment Below] Daejeon High Court Decision 93Na2436 rendered on December 14, 1993
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal and the portion supplementing the grounds of appeal in the supplementary brief on the grounds of appeal submitted after the expiration of the period for submitting the grounds of appeal are examined together.
1. With respect to comprehensive automobile insurance, which is a liability insurance, the right to directly claim insurance proceeds that was recognized under the insurance policy terms before the enforcement of the amended Commercial Act (Act No. 4470 of December 31, 1991) is based on, and has the same content as, the insured's right to claim insurance proceeds against the insurer. However, even if, before the victim exercised the right to claim insurance proceeds against the insurer by satisfying the requirements set forth in the insurance policy terms, a judgment was rendered between the insurer and the insured declaring that the insured's right to claim insurance proceeds against the insurer does not exist, and that judgment became final and conclusive, the effect of that judgment does not extend to the victim, who was not a party to that judgment, and therefore this fact alone does not naturally preclude the victim from claiming insurance proceeds. Res judicata originally refers to the effect that prevents a court or the parties from making assertions or judgments in the same case that are inconsistent with the determination made in a prior judgment; it does not, by itself, cause a substantive right of claim that existed to be extinguished, nor does it cause a substantive right of claim that did not exist to newly arise. Therefore, even if in the prior judgment between the insurer and the insured it was determined that the insured has no right to claim insurance proceeds due to the existence of a cause for exemption from liability as provided in the insurance policy terms, in a case where the victim, having satisfied the requirements set forth in the insurance policy terms, directly claims insurance proceeds against the insurer, it is necessary to re-examine, independently of the prior judgment, whether the insured has a right to claim insurance proceeds against the insurer.
The court below, in the same vein, held that the effect of the final judgment between the Defendant, the insurer, and Nonparty 1, the insured, does not extend to this case, and accordingly re-examined and determined anew the existence or non-existence of Nonparty 1's right to claim insurance proceeds against the Defendant; this is proper. Furthermore, on the premise that the victim's direct right to claim insurance proceeds can be exercised only where the insured's right to claim insurance proceeds is established, the court below, after going through a lawful process of evaluating evidence, did not adopt the prior judgment between Nonparty 1 and the Defendant as evidence, and instead, based on other evidence, rejected all of the Defendant's assertions that Nonparty 1 had no right to claim insurance proceeds due to the existence of a cause for exemption from liability, and thereby lawfully recognized the Plaintiffs' direct right to claim insurance proceeds. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the judgment below erred in its legal interpretation regarding the victim's direct right to claim insurance proceeds, nor that it omitted to make a judgment. The portion of the grounds of appeal pointing to this issue is without merit.
2. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, it is proper and acceptable that the court below found that Plaintiff 1 was not in a relationship of jointly operating the business referred to in its holding as "Sejeong" together with Nonparty 1, but was merely an employee of said Nonparty 1, and thus was not in the position of an operator of the vehicle involved in this accident; there is no violation of the rules of evidence in the process of evaluating evidence undertaken in reaching this conclusion. Furthermore, given the court below's finding that Plaintiff 1, as an employee of said Nonparty 1, was merely riding in the passenger seat of the accident vehicle at the time of this accident, then even if, as pointed out by the Defendant in the grounds of appeal, said Plaintiff had driven the vehicle the day before the accident as the person in charge of the work being performed at that time, such circumstance alone cannot render said Plaintiff a person falling under the cause for exemption from liability provided in Article 10, Paragraph 2, Item 3 of the insurance policy terms as a consenting insured under Article 11 of this insurance policy terms. The portion of the grounds of appeal pointing to this issue is also without merit.
3. The purport of Article 10, Paragraph 2, Item 4 of the insurance policy terms, which provides as a cause for exemption from liability the case where an employee of the insured who bears liability for compensation and who is entitled to receive disaster compensation under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) dies or is injured, is to have losses arising from occupational accidents occurring in labor relations compensated in principle through industrial accident compensation insurance; it is not intended to treat cases falling under an occupational accident under the Labor Standards Act, but which cannot be compensated under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법), as also subject to the application of the above cause for exemption from liability. This is the established view that the Supreme Court has repeatedly set forth (see Supreme Court Decisions 91Da6634 rendered on May 14, 1991; 93Daka25499 rendered on January 21, 1992 [sic]; 91Da38297 rendered on August 18, 1992; 93Da5192 rendered on June 8, 1993; 93Da58622 rendered on March 11, 1994, among others), and there is no reason to change it. According to the facts as determined by the court below, although the business called "Sejeong," where Plaintiff 1 was working at the time of this accident, is a wholesale and retail business dealing in electric motor parts and is a workplace to which the Labor Standards Act applies, it does not fall under a business that is a mandatory subscriber under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act and its Enforcement Decree as in effect at the time, nor had the business owner voluntarily subscribed to said insurance. Therefore, it cannot be said that this accident falls under the subject of exemption from liability provided in the above insurance policy terms. The portion of the grounds of appeal pointing to this issue is also without merit.
4. Therefore, the Justices unanimously agree to dismiss the appeal and to have the costs of the appeal borne by the Defendant, the Appellant, and render judgment as stated in the Order.
Supreme Court Justice Park Jun-seo (Presiding Justice), Park Man-ho, Kim Hyeong-seon, Lee Yong-hun (Justice in Charge)