Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 92누6082

Revocation of Retrial Decision on Remedy for Unfair Labor Practice (부당노동행위구제재심판정취소)부당노동행위구제재심판정취소

Decided1992. 11. 13. Court대법원Employer won
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

This case involved a worker who was on leave of absence after being indicted and detained, and who was later sentenced to actual imprisonment. The Supreme Court ruled that the employer's decision to terminate the worker's employment under the company's work rules (취업규칙) did not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence (무죄추정원칙), because the termination was based on the objective fact that the worker could no longer perform his job duties due to long-term detention, not on the criminal conviction itself.

Key takeaways
  • CaseA worker on leave of absence due to pretrial detention was sentenced to actual imprisonment, and the company terminated his employment under its work rules.
  • OutcomeThe court ruled that the termination was legitimate because it was based on the objective fact that long-term detention made it impossible for the worker to perform his job duties.
  • LessonWhen a worker cannot work for an extended period due to imprisonment following a criminal sentence, an employer may lawfully terminate employment based on the company's work rules.
Issues
  • How to interpret the term 'conviction' as used in the company's work rules (취업규칙)
  • Whether termination following a criminal conviction after pretrial detention violates the constitutional presumption of innocence (무죄추정원칙)
  • What standard should be used to determine the legitimacy of a termination decision
  • Whether formal disciplinary procedures are required before such termination
Key reasoning

The Court explained that the termination following the criminal sentence was not a disciplinary punishment imposed because of the criminal conduct itself, but rather a personnel action based on the objective and practical impossibility of continuing to provide labor due to prolonged imprisonment. Because the basis for termination was this factual inability to work—not a judgment on guilt or innocence—it did not conflict with the presumption of innocence principle under the Constitution. The Court further held that such termination satisfied the requirement of 'justifiable cause' under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), since it was grounded in an objective circumstance rather than a subjective disciplinary motive. Consequently, the employer was not required to follow separate formal disciplinary procedures before enacting the termination.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] The phrase "when a guilty verdict is rendered in a leave of absence due to indictment while under detention," as stipulated as a ground for retirement resulting from leave of absence due to indictment in the rules of employment, means that a guilty verdict, that is, a sentence of actual imprisonment, is rendered upon an employee who has been placed on leave of absence due to indictment while under detention, the content of which does not resolve the original substantive ground for the leave of absence—namely, the physical detention that makes actual provision of labor impossible—even by the time the first instance judgment is pronounced, which is the time when the period of leave of absence prescribed in the rules of employment and the collective bargaining agreement expires.

[2] Interpreting the provision such that an employee who has been placed on leave of absence due to indictment while under detention is treated as having retired when a guilty first instance judgment (actual imprisonment) is rendered against him does not mean that the criminal facts that were the subject of the guilty verdict are deemed to have been conclusively established by the pronouncement of the judgment, and that the disadvantageous disposition of retirement is imposed based on those criminal facts. Rather, it means that the disposition of retirement is imposed based on the fact itself that the employee has become unable to provide labor, which is the basic obligation under the labor contract, due to circumstances on the employee's side, namely, long-term absence from work resulting from long-term detention, both up to the time of the pronouncement of the first instance judgment when the period of leave of absence expires and thereafter. Therefore, the provision of the rules of employment referred to in item "[1]" above does not violate the constitutional principle of presumption of innocence, under which a criminal defendant is presumed innocent until a guilty verdict becomes final. Moreover, notwithstanding the form of the provision, it already carries an inherent limitation that it must not be abused from the outset, and therefore the provision of the rules of employment does not, merely because of its form, immediately violate the provision of Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법).

[3] Where an employer, by its unilateral declaration of intent, terminates the labor contract relationship with an employee pursuant to the provision of the rules of employment referred to in item "[1]" above, in order for such termination to be recognized as justified, there must ultimately exist "justifiable cause" as referred to in Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act, and whether such justifiability exists must be reasonably determined by comprehensively considering all relevant circumstances, such as the possibility of early release at the time of expiration of the leave of absence period, the impact of the detention on the workplace, and the nature of the criminal case in question.

[4] Since the disposition of retirement pursuant to the provision of the rules of employment referred to in item "[1]" above is not stipulated as one of the disciplinary actions in the rules of employment or the collective bargaining agreement, it is not necessary to go through a disciplinary procedure, such as granting the employee concerned an opportunity to give an explanation, in imposing the disposition of retirement based thereon.

Full text (English, AI translation) 11,198 chars

[Plaintiff, Appellant] Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. Labor Union (Attorneys Yoon Jong-hyun and 3 others, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor for the Defendant] Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (Attorney Lee Bong-gu, Counsel)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 91Gu10970 dated March 26, 1992

[Order]

The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

[Reasoning] As to the grounds of appeal by the Plaintiff's litigation counsel

1. According to Article 8 of the Rules of Employment (취업규칙) and Article 22 of the Collective Agreement (단체협약) of the Intervenor company, the grounds for leave of absence for employees of the Intervenor company are limited to five cases: illness unrelated to work, physical or mental disability, indictment while under detention, conscription pursuant to statute, and other circumstances on the employee's side that make it actually impossible or very difficult for the employee to provide labor for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, among the four grounds for retirement set forth in Article 14, Items 5 through 8 of the Rules of Employment, applicable when an employee on leave of absence for such reasons fails to return to work and is instead treated as having retired, all grounds other than that set forth in Item 7 — namely, "where, in the case of a leave of absence due to indictment while under detention, a guilty verdict is rendered" — pertain to cases where, even though the prescribed period of leave has expired or the ground for leave has ceased to exist such that there is no impediment to the employee's return to work, the employee fails to submit an application for reinstatement, thereby indicating an absence of any intention to return to work, or to cases where, even after the expiration of the leave period, the ground for the leave has not ceased to exist, such that actual provision of labor remains difficult or impossible. In light of the content of these grounds for leave of absence and the content of the other grounds for retirement applicable to employees on leave, it is reasonable to construe the ground for retirement prescribed for leave due to indictment — "where, in the case of a leave of absence due to indictment while under detention, a guilty verdict is rendered" — as meaning that the employee who has been placed on leave due to indictment while under detention has, by the time of the pronouncement of the first-instance judgment (at which point the period of leave prescribed under Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of Employment and Article 23, Paragraph 2 of the Collective Agreement expires), received a guilty verdict — that is, a sentence of actual imprisonment — the content of which fails to resolve the original substantive ground for the leave, namely, the physical detention that renders actual provision of labor impossible.

Moreover, construing the matter such that an employee who has been placed on leave due to indictment while under detention is treated as having retired where he or she receives a guilty first-instance judgment (a sentence of actual imprisonment) as described above does not mean that the criminal facts that were the subject of the guilty judgment are deemed to be conclusively established by the pronouncement of that judgment, and that the disadvantageous disposition of retirement is imposed on the basis of those criminal facts. Rather, it means that the disposition of retirement is imposed based on the fact itself that the employee has become unable to provide labor — the fundamental obligation under the labor contract — due to circumstances on the employee's side, namely, prolonged absence resulting from prolonged detention, both by the time of the pronouncement of the first-instance judgment when the leave period expires and thereafter. Therefore, Article 14, Item 7 of the above Rules of Employment does not violate the constitutional principle of presumption of innocence, under which a criminal defendant is presumed innocent until a guilty verdict becomes final. Meanwhile, since the provision of the Rules of Employment at issue in this case provides that an employee who is placed on leave due to indictment while under detention and who receives a guilty verdict shall be treated as having retired, it appears, as the argument points out, as though the retirement disposition based thereon may be imposed arbitrarily merely upon satisfaction of the requirements under the provision, and there is indeed room for arbitrary abuse. Accordingly, where the employer terminates the labor contract relationship with an employee by unilateral declaration of intent pursuant to the above provision, in order for such termination to be recognized as legitimate, there must ultimately exist "justifiable cause" as referred to in Article 27, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), and the existence of such justifiable cause must be reasonably determined by comprehensively considering all relevant circumstances, including the possibility of early release at the time of expiration of the leave period, the impact of the detention on the workplace, and the nature of the relevant criminal case. Viewed in this light, the provision of the Rules of Employment concerning the employer's personnel authority to impose a retirement disposition on an employee already inherently contains, notwithstanding the form of the provision as described above, an intrinsic limitation to the effect that it must not be abused from the outset. Therefore, it cannot be said that the provision of the Rules of Employment violates Article 27, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act merely because of its formal wording.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that, since it is difficult to view Article 14, Item 7 of the Rules of Employment as violating the constitutional principle of presumption of innocence or Article 27, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act, the retirement disposition against Nonparty 1 taken pursuant to the said provision of the Rules of Employment was also legitimate. This reasoning appears to suggest that the legitimacy of a specific retirement disposition taken pursuant to the said provision of the Rules of Employment may be recognized solely on the ground that the formal requirements under the Rules of Employment were satisfied, without comprehensively considering the various circumstances discussed above that should be taken into account in determining such legitimacy. Although the reasoning set forth by the court below is thus insufficient, the record shows that Nonparty 1, as found by the court below, had a prior record of having been sentenced on June 5, 1989 by the Ulsan Branch of the Busan District Court to one year and six months' imprisonment, suspended for two years, for obstruction of business and other offenses. Nonetheless, Nonparty 1 was again indicted while under detention for similar criminal conduct — namely, obstructing the business of the Intervenor company by, among other things, forcibly leading a collective early departure from work together with other union members — and was placed on leave of absence, during which he was sentenced on June 18, 1990 by the same court, as the court of first instance, to one year's actual imprisonment. It is also found that, at the time of and immediately after the pronouncement of that first-instance judgment, the above suspension period had not yet expired, such that the possibility of Nonparty 1's early release through bail, cancellation of detention, or the like was extremely slim. In light of these circumstances, it cannot but be said that the Intervenor company's retirement disposition, taken on the ground that a guilty verdict of the above content had been rendered, was legitimate, and it cannot be said that this constituted an arbitrary abuse of the personnel authority under Article 14, Item 7 of the Rules of Employment. Accordingly, this has no effect on the conclusion of the judgment below that the Intervenor company's retirement disposition against Nonparty 1 was legitimate. There is no error of misapprehension of the law in the judgment below as argued.

Moreover, since neither the Rules of Employment nor the Collective Agreement provides that a retirement disposition under Article 14, Item 7 of the Rules of Employment constitutes one form of disciplinary action, it is not necessary, in imposing such a retirement disposition, to follow disciplinary procedures such as affording the employee concerned an opportunity to explain (see this Court's Decision 91Nu10480 dated May 8, 1992). The holding of the court below to the same effect is therefore justified. This ground of appeal is without merit.

2. According to the record, it is found that the Intervenor company, with respect to its employee Nonparty 2, who was indicted while under detention on charges of causing a traffic accident and fleeing the scene and who was sentenced on April 13, 1990 to one year's actual imprisonment in the first instance and to eight months' actual imprisonment in the second instance on July 19, 1990, did not process his retirement pursuant to Article 14, Item 7 of the Rules of Employment, but instead reinstated him immediately after he completed his full sentence while on leave and was released. Accordingly, the court below's statement, in rejecting the Plaintiff's allegation regarding unfair labor practice, that the Intervenor company had, without exception, applied Article 14, Item 7 of the Rules of Employment to process the retirement of employees who were indicted while under detention and sentenced to actual imprisonment in the first instance, cannot be said to be correct, as the argument points out.

However, even though Nonparty 2 was sentenced to actual imprisonment as described above, the content of the criminal facts was a traffic accident, which did not cause any direct harm to the Intervenor company, and there was some expectation of a reduced sentence on appeal following the first-instance judgment. It thus appears that the Intervenor company withheld processing his retirement for these reasons, which is recognized as having been, in its own right, a reasonably justifiable measure. Therefore, it cannot be concluded, based on this point alone, that Nonparty 1 alone was subjected to an unfair and inequitable retirement disposition by the Intervenor company in connection with his labor union activities. Accordingly, the determination of the court below that the retirement disposition against Nonparty 1 did not constitute an unfair labor practice committed with anti-union intent is justified, and there is no error of misapprehension of the law regarding unfair labor practices as argued by the Plaintiff. This ground of appeal is without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.

Justice Yoon Kwan (Presiding Justice), Choi Jae-ho, Kim Ju-han, Kim Yong-jun

【판결요지】

가. 취업규칙에 기소휴직에 따른 퇴직사유로 규정된 "구속기소로 인한 휴직에 있어서 유죄판결을 받았을 때"라는 것은, 구속기소로 인하여 휴직처리된 종업원이 취업규칙과 단체협약에서 정한 그 휴직기간이 만료되는 제1심판결 선고시까지도 현실적인 근로제공이 불가능한 신체구속이라는 당초의 실질적인 휴직사유가 해소되지 아니하는 내용의 유죄판결 즉 실형의 판결을 선고받는 것을 의미한다.

나. 구속기소로 인하여 휴직처리된 종업원이 유죄의 제1심판결(실형)을 선고받은 경우 퇴직처리한다고 해석하는 것은 유죄판결의 대상이 된 범죄사실이 판결의 선고에 의해 확정적으로 인정되는 것으로 간주하여 그 범죄사실에 의하여 퇴직이라는 불이익처분을 한다는 것이 아니라, 종업원이 휴직기간이 만료되는 제1심판결의 선고시까지는 물론이고 그 이후에도 장기구속에 따른 장기결근이라는 근로자측의 사정으로 말미암아 근로계약에 기한 기본적 의무인 근로의 제공을 할 수 없게 되었다는 사실 그 자체에 기하여 퇴직처분을 한다는 취지이므로 위 "가"항의 취업규칙 규정은 형사피고인이 유죄의 판결이 확정될 때까지는 무죄로 추정된다는 헌법상 무죄추정의 원칙에 어긋나는 것이 아니며, 또한 그 규정형식에도 불구하고 본래부터 남용되어서는 아니된다는 내재적 제약을 이미 갖고 있는 것이라 할 것이므로 위 취업규칙의 규정이 단순한 그 규정형식 때문에 곧바로 근로기준법 제27조 제1항의 규정에 위배되는 것도 아니다.

다. 사용자의 일방적인 의사표시로 위 "가"항의 취업규칙 규정에 의하여 종업원과의 근로계약관계를 종료시키는 경우 그것이 정당한 것으로 인정되기 위하여는 종국적으로 근로기준법 제27조 제1항에서 말하는 "정당한 사유"가 있어야 할 것이고, 또 그 정당성 유무는 결국 휴직기간만료시에 있어서의 조기 석방가능성의 유무, 구속이 직장에 미치는 영향, 당해 형사사건의 성질 등 제반 사정을 종합적으로 고려하여 합리적으로 판단하여야 할 것이다.

라. 취업규칙이나 단체협약에 위 "가"항의 취업규칙 규정에 의한 퇴직처분이 징계처분의 하나로 규정되어 있지 아니하므로 그에 의한 퇴직처분을 함에 있어서 해당 종업원에게 변명의 기회를 부여하는 것과 같은 징계절차를 거칠필요는 없다.

【참조조문】

가.나.다.라. 근로기준법 제94조 / 나.다.라. 같은 법 제27조 제1항 / 나. 헌법 제27조 제4항

【참조판례】

라. 대법원 1992.5.8. 선고 91누10480 판결(공1992, 2024)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 3,894자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고, 상고인】 현대중공업주식회사 노동조합 (소송대리인 변호사 윤종현 외 3인)

【피고, 피상고인】 중앙노동위원회 위원장

【피고보조참가인】 현대중공업주식회사 (소송대리인 변호사 이봉구)

【원심판결】 서울고등법원 1992.3.26. 선고 91구10970 판결

【주 문】

상고를 기각한다.

상고비용은 원고의 부담으로 한다.

【이 유】 원고소송대리인의 상고이유에 대하여

1. 참가인회사의 취업규칙 제8조와 단체협약 제22조의 규정에 의하면, 참가인회사 종업원에 대한 휴직사유는 업무외 질병, 신체상 및 정신상의 장애, 구속기소, 법령에 의한 징소집, 기타 근로자측의 사정에 의하여 상당한 기간 동안 근로의 제공이 현실적으로 불가능하거나 매우 곤란한 5가지의 경우에 한정되어 있고, 나아가 이러한 휴직사유가 있어 휴직중에 있는 종업원이 복직되지 아니하고 퇴직처리되는 취업규칙 제14조 제5호 내지 제8호의 4가지 퇴직사유 중 그 제7호 소정의 사유 즉 "구속기소로 인한 휴직에 있어서 유죄판결을 받았을 때"를 제외한 그 나머지 사유는 소정의 휴직기간이 종료하거나 휴직사유가 소멸되어 복직을 함에 아무런 지장이 없음에도 그 종업원이 복직원을 제출하지 아니하여 복직의 의사가 전혀 없는 것으로 인정되는 경우나, 휴직기간이 종료한 후에도 휴직사유가 소멸되지 아니하여 현실적인 근로제공이 여전히 곤란하거나 또는 불가능한 것으로 인정되는 경우임을 알 수 있으므로, 이상과 같은 휴직사유의 내용과 휴직중에 있는 종업원에 대한 다른 퇴직사유의 내용 등에 비추어 보면, 기소휴직에 따른 퇴직사유로 규정된 "구속 기소로 인한 휴직에 있어서 유죄판결을 받았을 때"라는 것은, 구속기소로 인하여 휴직처리된 종업원이 취업규칙 제9조 제2항과 단체협약 제23조 제2항에서 정한 그 휴직기간이 만료되는 제1심판결 선고시까지도 현실적인 근로제공이 불가능한 신체구속이라는 당초의 실질적인 휴직사유가 해소되지 아니하는 내용의 유죄판결 즉 실형의 판결을 선고받는 것을 의미한다고 새기는 것이 상당하다 할 것이다.

그리고 위와 같이 구속기소로 인하여 휴직처리된 종업원이 유죄의 제1심판결(실형)을 선고받은 경우 퇴직처리한다고 해석하는 것은 그 유죄판결의 대상이 된 범죄사실이 그 판결의 선고에 의해 확정적으로 인정되는 것으로 간주하여 그 범죄사실에 의하여 퇴직이라는 불이익처분을 한다는 것이 아니라, 종업원이 휴직기간이 만료되는 제1심판결의 선고시까지는 물론이고 그 이후에도 장기구속에 따른 장기결근이라는 근로자측의 사정으로 말미암아 근로계약에 기한 기본적 의무인 근로의 제공을 할 수 없게 되었다는 사실 그 자체에 기하여 퇴직처분을 한다는 취지이므로, 위 취업규칙 제14조 제7호가 형사피고인이 유죄의 판결이 확정될 때까지는 무죄로 추정된다는 헌법상 무죄추정의 원칙에 어긋나는 것은 아니라 할 것이다. 한편 이 사건에서 문제된 위 취업규칙의 규정이 종업원이 구속기소로 휴직되어 유죄판결을 받았을 때는 퇴직처리한다고 되어 있어, 논지가 지적하는 바와 같이 마치 위 규정상의 요건을 충족시키기만 하면 그에 기한 퇴직처분을 마음대로 할 수 있는 것처럼 보여져 자의적으로 남용될 소지가 없지 않다. 그리하여 사용자의 일방적인 의사표시로 위 규정에 의하여 종업원과의 근로계약관계를 종료시키는 경우 그것이 정당한 것으로 인정되기 위하여는 종국적으로 근로기준법 제27조 제1항에서 말하는 "정당한 사유"가 있어야 할 것이고, 또 그 정당성 유무는 결국 휴직기간만료시에 있어서의 조기 석방가능성의 유무, 구속이 직장에 미치는 영향, 당해 형사사건의 성질 등 제반 사정을 종합적으로 고려하여 합리적으로 판단하여야 할 것이다. 이렇게 본다면 종업원에 대한 사용자의 퇴직처분에 관한 인사권을 정하고 있는 위 취업규칙의 규정은 앞에서 본 바와 같은 그 규정형식에도 불구하고 본래부터 남용되어서는 아니된다는 내재적 제약을 이미 갖고 있는 것이라 할 것이므로 위 취업규칙의 규정이 단순한 그 규정형식 때문에 곧바로 근로기준법 제27조 제1항의 규정에 위배되는 것도 아니라고 하여야 할 것이다.

원심판결 이유에 의하면, 원심은 위 취업규칙 제14조 제7호의 규정이 헌법상의 무죄추정의 원칙이나 근로기준법 제27조 제1항에 위배된다고 보기 어려우므로 위 취업규칙의 규정에 의하여 행하여진 소외 1에 대한 퇴직처분도 정당하다고 판시한 것으로 되어 있는 바, 이는 결국 위 취업규칙의 규정에 의하여 행하여진 구체적인 퇴직처분의 정당성 유무를 판단함에 있어 고려하여야 할 앞서 본 바와 같은 제반사정 등을 종합적으로 고려하지도 아니한 채 위 취업규칙상의 형식적인 요건이 충족되었다는 이유만으로 그 정당성을 인정할 수 있다는 취지로 보여져 그 이유 설시는 미흡하나, 기록에 의하면, 소외 1은 원심판시와 같이 1989.6.5. 부산지방법원 울산지원에서 업무방해 등으로 징역 1년 6월에 집행유예 2년을 선고받은 전력이 있음에도 다른 조합원들과 함께 집단으로 조기퇴근을 강행하는 등으로 참가인회사의 업무를 방해하였다는 등의 동종 범죄사실로 구속기소되어 휴직상태에 있다가 1990.6.18. 제1심인 같은법원에서 징역 1년의 실형을 선고받았고, 그 제1심판결의 선고 당시나 직후에도 위 집행유예기간이 경과되지 아니한 처지여서 소외 1이 보석이나 구속취소 등에 의하여 조기에 석방될 가능성은 극히 희박하였던 사실이 인정되므로, 이러한 사정에 비추어 보면, 위와 같은 내용의 유죄판결이 선고되었음을 이유로 한 참가인회사의 위 퇴직처분은 정당한 것이라 하지 않을 수 없고, 그것이 위 취업규칙 제14조 제7호에 의한 인사권을 남용하여 자의적으로 행사한 것이라고 할 수는 없으므로 소외 1에 대한 참가인회사의 퇴직처분이 정당하다는 원심판결의 결론에는 아무런 영향이 없다 할 것이다. 원심판결에 소론과 같은 법리오해의 위법이 없다.

또 위 취업규칙이나 단체협약에는 위 취업규칙 제14조 제7호에 의한 퇴직처분이 징계처분의 하나로 규정되어 있지 아니하여 위와 같은 퇴직처분을 함에 있어서 해당종업원에게 변명의 기회를 부여하는 것과 같은 징계철차를 거칠 필요는 없다 할 것이므로(당원 1992.5.8. 선고 91누10480 판결 참조) 같은 취지의 원심판시는 정당하다. 논지는 이유 없다.

2. 기록에 의하면, 참가인회사는 그 종업원인 소외 2가 교통사고를 내고 도주하였다는 범죄사실로 구속기소되어 1990.4.13. 제1심에서 징역 1년의 실형을 선고받고 1990.7.19. 제2심에서도 징역 8월의 실형을 선고받았음에도 취업규칙 제14조 제7호에 의하여 동인을 퇴직처리되지 아니하고 그가 휴직상태에서 만기출소한 후 곧바로 동인을 복직시킨 사실이 인정되므로, 원심이 부당노동행위에 관한 원고의 주장을 배척하면서 참가인회사는 구속기소되어 제1심에서 실형을 선고받은 근로자에 대하여는 예외없이 위 취업규칙 제14조 제7호를 적용하여 퇴직처리를 하여 왔다고 한 것은 논지가 지적하는 바와 같이 옳다고 할 수 없다.

그러나 소외 2가 위와 같이 실형을 선고받았다 하더라도 그 범죄사실의 내용은 교통사고로서 그로 인하여 참가인회사에 어떤 직접적인 피해가 발생하지는 아니하였고, 제1심판결의 선고 후 항소로 인한 감형도 어느 정도 기대해 볼 수 있었던 까닭에 참가인회사가 동인에 대한 퇴직처리를 유보한 것으로 보여져 그것은 또 그 나름대로 수긍이 가는 상당한 조치였다고 인정되므로, 이점을 들어 유독 소외 1만이 그의 노동조합활동과 관련하여 참가인회사로부터 형평에 어긋난 부당한 퇴직처분을 받았다고 단정할 것은 아니라 할 것이다. 따라서 소외 1에 대한 퇴직처분에 대하여 반조합적 의사 하에 저질러진 부당노동행위에 해당되지 아니한다고 한 원심판단은 정당하고 원고가 주장하는 바와 같은 부당노동행위에 관한 법리오해의 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다. 논지는 이유 없다.

이상의 이유로 상고를 기각하고 상고비용은 패소자의 부담으로 하여 관여 법관의 일치된 의견으로 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 윤관(재판장) 최재호 김주한 김용준

Related statutes

Similar cases

Cases with high content similarity to this one.

#1
2013두25382 · 대법원 2014-06-12
Revocation of Retrial Decision on Unfair Dismissal Remedy
#2
92누6099 · 대법원 1992-07-28
Revocation of Retrial Decision on Unfair Dismissal Remedy
#3
92누13189 · 대법원 1992-12-22
Revocation of Reexamination Decision on Unfair Suspension Re
#4
95누12613 · 대법원 1996-02-09
Revocation of Retrial Decision on Unfair Dismissal Remedy
#5
2017누75509 · 서울고등법원 2018-04-06
Revocation of Retrial Decision on Unfair Dismissal Remedy

Cases citing this decision

98다54960 · 대법원 2000-06-23
Confirmation of Invalidity of Dismissal, etc.
98두18848 · 대법원 1999-09-03
Revocation of Retrial Decision on Unfair Dismissal Remedy
95다45934 · 대법원 1996-12-06
퇴직무효등
95누7130 · 대법원 1996-04-12
Revocation of Reexamination Decision on Remedy for Unfair Re
94다42082 · 대법원 1995-03-24
Confirmation of Invalidity of Dismissal

Related tools & guides

AI answers need an account (free accounts: 2 per month) — submit and you'll return to this question after logging in. Search and case reading stay free.

Cross-check the original: 국가법령정보센터 (auxiliary link)