[Order]
All appeals are dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by each appellant.
[Reasoning]
1. As to the grounds of appeal by the Plaintiffs.
A. Regarding the actual working hours underground,
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found as follows: With respect to the Jangseong Mine of the Defendant Corporation (although the Plaintiffs worked at the Eunseong Mine under the Defendant Corporation, the Plaintiffs and Defendant assert and prove their claims on the premise that the working patterns at each pit of the various mines operated by the Defendant Corporation are identical, taking as a sample the Jangseong Pit of the Jangseong Mine, which has the largest number of workers, and this Court follows that approach), the underground shift work, including entry into and exit from the pit and rest periods, is divided into three shifts: the first shift (갑방) from 08:00 to 16:00, the second shift (을방) from 16:00 to 24:00, and the third shift (병방) from 24:00 to 08:00 the following day. In the case of a first-shift worker at the Jangseong Pit (workers on the second and third shifts follow the same pattern of work), ① the worker reports to the office at the pit entrance, receives work clothes and a safety lamp, and completes other attendance confirmation procedures, after which, from around 07:30, a work meeting (취업회) is held for about 10 minutes during which the worker receives safety education and work instructions from the safety officer in charge and work teams are organized; ② entry into the pit begins at around 07:40 at the pit entrance and is completed by around 08:40 to 08:50; ③ from around that time until around 15:20, when the operation of the air compressor stops, the worker engages in work; and ④ after finishing work at around 15:20, the worker begins the process of exiting the pit in the same manner as described above, completing the exit by around 16:20. During the course of the work, the worker takes at least two rest breaks of about 10 minutes each near the underground worksite, and moves to a relatively dust-free main haulage tunnel or similar location for meals, taking about 30 minutes to rest and eat a packed lunch brought from home. Having found these facts, the court below determined that, excluding the time spent entering and exiting the pit and rest periods (including meal times), even if the approximately 10 minutes spent at the aforementioned work meeting is included in working hours, the Plaintiffs' actual working hours fall short of the 6-hour workday prescribed under the collective agreement, and accordingly rejected the Plaintiffs' claim regarding overtime work.
Upon examining the record, the above factual findings of the court below are justified and may be affirmed, and the argument that the judgment below is unlawful due to insufficient examination or violation of the rules of evidence in relation to the determination of actual working hours is without merit.
B. Regarding the physical fitness allowance,
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that the Defendant Corporation pays retirement allowances to employees who retire in accordance with the prescribed Retirement Allowance Regulations, and that under these Retirement Allowance Regulations, the physical fitness allowance is excluded from the Defendant Corporation's prescribed "average wage," which serves as the basis for calculating retirement allowances for periods of service up to December 31, 1980, and from the Defendant Corporation's prescribed "base wage," which serves as the basis for calculating retirement allowances for periods of service from January 1, 1981 onward. Furthermore, based on the evidence cited, the court found that, in the case of technical staff (laborers) to which the Plaintiffs belong, the above Retirement Allowance Regulations were established through agreement between labor and management, and thus concluded that there existed an agreement between labor and management to exclude the physical fitness allowance from the Defendant Corporation's prescribed "average wage" or "base wage," which serve as the basis for calculating retirement allowances for technical staff. Examining the record as to the process of evidence-taking undertaken by the court below in making the above factual findings, such findings are justified, and there is no unlawful ground therein, such as a misapprehension of facts due to a violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the argument. The precedent cited in the argument (Supreme Court Decision 90Da6170, decided January 15, 1991) is not appropriately invoked in this case. This ground of appeal is without merit.
2. As to the grounds of appeal by the Defendant.
Ordinary wages refer to wages that are determined to be paid regularly and uniformly for the quantity or quality of the prescribed work, and are general wages paid on a fixed and average basis regardless of the actual days worked or the wages actually received (see Supreme Court Decision 90Daka6948, decided November 9, 1990). Ordinary wages also guarantee the minimum level of average wages (Article 19, Paragraph 2 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법)), which may increase or decrease depending on actual working hours or performance, and serve as the basis for calculating additional allowances for overtime, night, and holiday work under Article 46 of the same Act, and dismissal notice allowances under Article 27-2 of the same Act. Since the above provisions do not stipulate any separate minimum standard other than the applicable rate of increase or the number of days of payment, if the validity of an agreement between labor and management to exclude from ordinary wages various allowances that should, by their nature, be included in ordinary wages were recognized, the purpose of the above provisions—namely, to require the payment of additional allowances for overtime, night, and holiday work, and to require the payment to dismissed employees of wages ordinarily received for a certain period—would be undermined. Therefore, an agreement between labor and management to exclude from ordinary wages allowances that, by their nature, should be included in ordinary wages under the same Act must be regarded as void, being a contract that provides for working conditions failing to meet the standards prescribed by the Act, as set forth in Article 20, Paragraph 1 of the same Act.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found that the Defendant Corporation had provided all employees, only on days of attendance, with meals in kind equivalent to a certain amount, and to employees who did not receive such meals, had provided purchase coupons for use at the company store (구판장) equivalent to the said amount. Having found these facts, the court below determined that the above meal allowance, being fixed as a daily amount, should be regarded, in light of its conditions and content of payment, as wages paid regularly and uniformly as consideration for labor, and thus falls within ordinary wages. Furthermore, with respect to the Defendant's argument that the meal allowance should be excluded from the calculation of ordinary wages because labor and management at the Defendant Corporation had agreed to exclude it from wages on the ground that it constituted a welfare benefit, the court below rejected this argument, holding that even assuming such an agreement existed, an agreement to exclude from wage calculation part of a sum that is paid to an employee as consideration for prescribed work or total work, and which should naturally be included in ordinary wages, violates the provisions of Article 20 of the Labor Standards Act and is therefore void.
The above determination of the court below is justified in all respects in light of the legal principles regarding the concept of ordinary wages and the relationship between ordinary wages and Article 20, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act, as set forth above, and there is no unlawful ground therein, such as a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the legal nature of the meal allowance or ordinary wages. Nor does the above determination violate Ministry of Labor Directive No. 150 (Guidelines for Calculation of Ordinary Wages, dated January 4, 1988) or the Supreme Court precedents cited in the argument. This ground of appeal is without merit.
3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal shall be borne by each appellant, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, as set forth in the Order.
Supreme Court Justice Kim Seok-su (Presiding Justice), Choi Jae-ho (Justice in Charge), Bae Man-un, Choi Jong-yeong