[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff (Attorneys Kim Sang-eun and 7 others, Counsel for the plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellant] ○○○ Co., Ltd. (Attorneys Lee Im-su and 9 others, Counsel for the defendant)
[Judgment below] Daejeon District Court Decision 2012Na4372 Decided August 22, 2012
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Daejeon District Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal (including the descriptions in the reference briefs submitted after the expiration of the period for submitting the grounds of appeal, to the extent they supplement the grounds of appeal) are examined as follows.
1. Legal principles concerning ordinary wages
A. The meaning of ordinary wages
1) Wages that a worker receives from an employer constitute one of the most important working conditions, serving as the resource by which a worker maintains a basic standard of living. Accordingly, Article 32, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution (헌법) imposes on the State a duty to endeavor to guarantee appropriate wages and a duty to implement a minimum wage system as prescribed by law, and Paragraph 3 of the same Article provides that standards for working conditions shall be determined by law so as to guarantee human dignity.
In line with this purpose, the Minimum Wage Act (최저임금법) contains provisions concerning minimum wage standards, and further, the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) provides in Article 2, Paragraph 1, Item 5 that "wages mean wages, salary, and any other money and valuables paid by an employer to a worker as remuneration for work, regardless of how they are termed," and, in addition, establishes various working conditions concerning money and valuables paid as remuneration for work—that is, wages—and regulates matters so that wage payments to workers are made appropriately on that basis.
2) However, while wages paid by an employer to a worker are determined by the labor contract between the employer and the worker, they may increase, decrease, or fluctuate depending on the worker's actual working hours or work performance, and whether or not wages are paid, as well as the amount paid, may be governed by conditions unrelated to the actual quality or quantity of work.
The Labor Standards Act, taking into account such increase, decrease, and fluctuation of wages, has established the categories of standard wages known as "average wage" (평균임금) and "ordinary wage" (통상임금), and through these has set standards for working conditions; it then provides that where the working conditions set forth in a labor contract fall short of those standards, the portion falling short shall be invalid, and the invalidated portion shall be governed by those standards, thereby seeking to guarantee and improve the basic livelihood of workers.
This reflects a regulatory approach whereby wages are, in principle, left to be determined by agreement between labor and management, but for certain matters the Labor Standards Act sets mandatory standards for working conditions and enforces them—that is, an approach that respects labor-management autonomy in wage determination while drawing certain boundaries around it.
3) The first sentence of Article 2, Paragraph 1, Item 6 of the Labor Standards Act provides that "average wage means the amount obtained by dividing the total amount of wages paid to the worker during the three months prior to the date on which the cause for calculation arose by the total number of days in that period," and this average wage serves as the standard wage for calculating retirement allowances, leave-of-absence allowances under the Labor Standards Act, and temporary layoff benefits, disability benefits, survivors' benefits, injury-disease compensation annuities, and funeral expenses, etc. under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (산업재해보상보험법).
Such average wage increases, decreases, or fluctuates depending on an individual worker's actual working hours or work performance, and, since it is calculated based on the total amount of wages actually paid to the worker during the statutory period, it may be described as the worker's ordinary living wage calculated retrospectively on the basis of past working hours or work performance, etc.
4) Meanwhile, the Labor Standards Act provides for "ordinary wage" as the standard wage that guarantees a minimum floor for average wage—which, as noted above, may increase, decrease, or fluctuate depending on actual working hours or work performance—and that is used to calculate additional pay for overtime, night, and holiday work, dismissal notice allowance, and annual leave allowance, etc. Although the Labor Standards Act does not contain a direct definitional provision concerning ordinary wage, Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법 시행령) provides that "in the Act and this Decree, ordinary wage means the hourly wage amount, daily wage amount, weekly wage amount, monthly wage amount, or piece-rate amount that is set to be paid regularly and uniformly for prescribed working hours or total work."
Given the reality in Korea, where it is not uncommon for workers to habitually engage in overtime, night, or holiday work, the most notable function that the Labor Standards Act assigns to ordinary wage, as described above, is that it serves as the standard wage for calculating additional pay, etc. for overtime, night, and holiday work.
The Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay at least 50% in addition to the ordinary wage for overtime, night, and holiday work; the purpose of this is, on the one hand, to deter overtime, night, and holiday work by imposing a monetary burden on the employer, and, on the other hand, to provide corresponding monetary compensation because such work causes greater fatigue and tension to the worker than work performed within statutory working hours, and restricts the free time in the worker's daily life (see Supreme Court Decision 90Daka12493, delivered on December 26, 1990).
Considering that ordinary wage, as noted above, functions as the standard wage for calculating additional pay, etc. when a worker provides work exceeding the working hours set within the statutory working hours as agreed between the worker and the employer (hereinafter referred to as "prescribed working hours"), it must necessarily be a monetary evaluation of the value of the work that the worker ordinarily provides during the prescribed working hours, and it must also be fixed in advance before the worker actually provides overtime work, etc. Only then can the employer and the worker predict the cost or degree of compensation for overtime work, etc. provided in excess of the prescribed working hours and make decisions regarding whether to provide such overtime work, etc., and, when overtime work, etc. is actually provided, additional pay can be calculated immediately based on the previously fixed ordinary wage.
Also, just as Article 2, Paragraph 1, Item 5 of the Labor Standards Act provides that money and valuables paid by an employer to a worker as remuneration for work constitute wages subject to regulation under the Labor Standards Act regardless of their designation, among such wages, anything that evaluates the value of work ordinarily provided by the worker during the prescribed working hours and that can be fixed in advance should be regarded as falling within ordinary wage, regardless of its designation.
5) The Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Da26721, delivered on December 21, 1995, held that since all wages, as remuneration for work, mean "compensation for work provided by a worker under the direction of the employer," there can be no such thing as a so-called "livelihood-guaranteeing wage" arising merely from the status of being a worker without presupposing the actual provision of work, and that there is no legal basis for distinguishing wages into an exchange portion paid as consideration for the provision of work and a livelihood-guaranteeing portion received by virtue of the worker's status; through this holding, absent special provisions in a collective agreement, etc., the Court established the "no work, no pay" principle, under which a worker's right to claim wages that stand in a relationship of consideration for the duty to provide work does not arise during a period of industrial action in which the worker did not provide work.
Prior to the above en banc decision, the previously prevailing case law's "two-category theory of wages" divided wages into an exchange portion having the character of consideration for work and a livelihood-guaranteeing portion arising merely from the worker's status; however, in practice it was often impossible to clearly classify all wage items into these two categories, and in these circumstances, using as the criterion for determining whether a given wage falls within ordinary wage the question of whether it is a "fixed wage set to be paid regularly and uniformly within one wage calculation period" was, to some extent, an unavoidable approach.
However, since the above en banc decision abolished the two-category theory of wages by recognizing all wages as consideration for the provision of work, thereby eliminating the legal basis for distinguishing between an exchange portion for the provision of work and a livelihood-guaranteeing portion unrelated to the provision of work, there is no longer any reason to determine differently whether a wage falls within ordinary wage based on its formal designation, and the method of determining ordinary wage based on the "one wage calculation period" criterion likewise no longer has any basis to stand on.
Accordingly, immediately after the above en banc decision abolishing the two-category theory of wages was rendered, the Supreme Court Decision 94Da19501, delivered on February 9, 1996, held that even wages paid to a worker at intervals exceeding one month may be included in ordinary wage if they are paid regularly, uniformly, and in a fixed manner. Thereafter, the Supreme Court has consistently held that ordinary wage is money and valuables paid to a worker as consideration for prescribed work (or, in the case of piece-rate workers, total work) that the worker ordinarily provides during prescribed working hours, paid regularly, uniformly, and in a fixed manner, and whether such wage is paid within "one wage calculation period" has no longer been presented as a criterion for determination (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da28421, delivered on April 24, 1998; Supreme Court Decision 2010Da91046, delivered on March 29, 2012; etc.).
This is not only a definition suited to the essential nature of ordinary wage, formulated in consideration of the legislative purpose of the Labor Standards Act as discussed above, the literal meaning of "ordinary wage," and the function and necessity of ordinary wage, but it also accords with general societal understanding and sound common sense.
Ultimately, whether a given wage falls within ordinary wage must be determined based on its objective character, according to the criterion of whether it is money and valuables paid to a worker as consideration for prescribed work, paid regularly, uniformly, and in a fixed manner, and not based on formal criteria such as the designation of the wage or the length of its payment cycle.
Here, "consideration for prescribed work" means money and valuables that the employer and the worker have agreed to pay in respect of the work that the worker has agreed to ordinarily provide during the prescribed working hours. Wages additionally paid by the employer because the worker has provided work exceeding the prescribed working hours or has specially provided work other than that agreed to be provided under the labor contract, or wages paid unrelated to work during the prescribed working hours, cannot be regarded as consideration for prescribed work and therefore do not fall within ordinary wage.
As noted above, what constitutes consideration for prescribed work must be determined comprehensively based on how the worker and the employer have evaluated the value of the work that the worker has agreed to ordinarily provide during the prescribed working hours, and how much money and valuables they have agreed to pay for that work; the mere fact that such money and valuables are not paid immediately after, or within a period close in time to, the work performed during the prescribed working hours cannot, by itself, mean that they are not consideration for prescribed work.
However, in actual workplaces, various types of allowances and bonuses exist, and the conditions for their payment, etc. are complex and diverse, such that there may be cases in which it is difficult to determine whether a given wage is included in ordinary wage. Below, the meanings of regularity, uniformity, and fixedness—the conceptual indicia of ordinary wage—are specifically set forth, and further, specific criteria are presented for determining which types of wages fall within ordinary wage in actual workplaces where wage payment conditions, etc. are highly diverse.
B. The meanings of regularity, uniformity, and fixedness, the conceptual indicia of ordinary wage
1) Regularity
That a given wage must possess regularity in order to fall within ordinary wage means that the wage must be paid continuously at fixed intervals.
Where a wage possessing the character required to fall within ordinary wage is paid regularly at intervals exceeding one month, this simply means that, pursuant to agreement between labor and management, etc., the consideration for work that the worker ordinarily provides during the prescribed working hours is being paid in installments at intervals exceeding one month; it is clear that this circumstance does not suddenly cause the wage to lose its character as consideration for prescribed work or to lose its regularity. Accordingly, in the case of a wage paid at a fixed cycle, such as a regular bonus, it cannot be said that the wage is excluded from ordinary wage merely because its payment cycle exceeds one month.
Furthermore, although Article 43, Paragraph 2 of the Labor Standards Act provides that wages shall be paid at least once a month on a fixed date, this is intended to promote the stability of workers' livelihoods by compelling employers to pay wages to workers without fail on a regularly fixed date each month (see Supreme Court Decision 85Do1262, delivered on October 8, 1985; etc.), and this provision cannot be interpreted as a basis for excluding from ordinary wage a wage that is regularly paid at intervals exceeding one month.
Moreover, while Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act, noted above, uses the terms "hourly wage amount, daily wage amount, weekly wage amount, monthly wage amount, or piece-rate amount" in defining ordinary wage, this expression cannot be interpreted as meaning that the provision limits the scope of ordinary wage to wages calculated or paid on a monthly basis. Article 31 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act, prior to its amendment by Presidential Decree No. 10898 on August 13, 1982, provided for methods of calculating hourly ordinary wage for wages set on the basis of various unit periods such as "hour, day, week, month, or a fixed period other than a week or month"; through the above amendment, a definitional provision for ordinary wage was newly inserted as Article 31, Paragraph 1, and, following the abolition and re-enactment of the former Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act by Presidential Decree No. 15320 on March 27, 1997, the location of that definitional provision was moved to Article 6, Paragraph 1. In light of the fact that, through the above amendment and the abolition/re-enactment process and thereafter, the method of calculating hourly ordinary wage for wages set on the basis of a fixed period other than a day, week, or month continued to be provided in the same content, merely with its location moved to Article 31, Paragraph 2 or Article 6, Paragraph 2, it should be understood that Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act does not limit the scope of ordinary wage to wages calculated or paid on a monthly basis, but merely illustrates forms of wages calculated and paid on the basis of various periods.
Meanwhile, Article 6, Paragraph 4 of the Minimum Wage Act excludes, from the "comparison wage" to be compared with the minimum wage, wages other than those paid regularly at least once a month among the wages paid by an employer to a worker, as prescribed by the Minister of Employment and Labor. However, since the purpose of the minimum wage system—to guarantee a minimum level of wages so as to stabilize workers' livelihoods and improve the quality of labor—differs from the purpose of the ordinary wage system, which is to calculate additional pay, etc. for overtime, night, and holiday work, it is not appropriate to hold, on the basis of the above provision of the Minimum Wage Act, that ordinary wage must be limited to wages paid regularly at least once a month.
2) Uniformity
In order for a given wage to fall within ordinary wage, it must possess the character of being paid uniformly. Being paid "uniformly" includes not only wages paid to "all workers" but also wages paid to "all workers meeting a certain condition or standard." Here, in light of the concept of ordinary wage, which seeks to derive a fixed and average wage, the "certain condition" must be a fixed condition (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da20316, delivered on May 27, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 2011Da6106, delivered on July 26, 2012; etc.).
Even where a collective agreement or rules of employment, etc. provide grounds for restricting payment of a specific wage to persons on leave of absence, persons returning from leave, or persons subject to disciplinary action, etc., this merely restricts payment of that wage in consideration of the individual particular circumstances of the relevant worker, and such circumstances should not be used as grounds for denying the uniformity of payment of the wage with respect to workers maintaining a normal employment relationship.
Meanwhile, considering that ordinary wage is a concept that evaluates the value of prescribed work, the "certain condition or standard" that serves as the criterion for determining whether a wage paid to all workers within a certain scope possesses uniformity must be a condition related to the evaluation of the value of prescribed work, such as the content of the work, skill, or experience, etc. Accordingly, a wage paid on the basis of a matter unrelated to the evaluation of the value of prescribed work as a condition, such as a family allowance paid only to workers with dependents, cannot be regarded, even if paid to all workers meeting that condition, as being based on the "certain condition or standard" referred to above, and thus its uniformity cannot be recognized, meaning it cannot be regarded as falling within ordinary wage (see Supreme Court Decision 99Da10806, delivered on December 22, 2000; Supreme Court Decision 2003Da56588, delivered on December 26, 2003; etc.).
However, where a basic amount is paid to all workers under the name of family allowance while an additional fixed amount is paid to workers who actually have dependents, that basic amount is nothing other than consideration for prescribed work and therefore falls within ordinary wage (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da5501, delivered on July 14, 1992; etc.).
3) Fixedness
In order for a given wage to fall within ordinary wage, it must be paid in a fixed manner. This is the element that clearly distinguishes ordinary wage from other general wages or average wage, and, as noted above, it is an essential character derived from the requirement that, in order for ordinary wage to function as the standard wage for calculating additional pay for overtime, night, and holiday work, it must be fixed in advance.
"Fixedness" refers to "the character whereby it is determined that payment will inevitably be made for work provided by the worker, regardless of performance, results, or other additional conditions," and a "fixed wage" may be defined as "the minimum wage that a worker who has worked the prescribed working hours on any given day is inevitably and definitively entitled to receive as consideration for that one day's work, even if that worker were to retire the following day, regardless of the wage's designation."
A wage possessing fixedness is one that, if a worker provides prescribed work on any given day, is scheduled to be paid inevitably regardless of whether additional conditions are satisfied, so that whether it is paid and the amount paid can be said to be fixed in advance. In contrast, a wage that is paid only if an additional condition is satisfied even though the worker provides prescribed work, or a portion of a wage whose payment amount varies depending on whether such a condition is satisfied, cannot be regarded as possessing fixedness.
The Supreme Court has consistently excluded from ordinary wage wages in the form of items whose payment or amount varies depending on a worker's actual work performance, because such wages lack fixedness (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da19501, delivered on February 9, 1996; Supreme Court Decision 2011Da106426, delivered on March 15, 2012; etc.).
C. Specific criteria for determining whether various types of wages fall within ordinary wage
Since the conditions for payment of wages, etc. are highly diverse in actual workplaces, the specific criteria for determining which types of wages may be regarded as falling within ordinary wage are examined below, based on the meanings of regularity, uniformity, and fixedness—the conceptual indicia of ordinary wage discussed above.
1) Wages linked to length of service
There is a type of wage whose payment or amount is linked to length of service, such as where payment of a wage is conditioned on service for a certain minimum period, or where the method of calculating the wage differs, or the amount paid differs, depending on length of service.
Length of service is closely related to a worker's level of skill and may therefore be regarded as a "certain condition or standard" related to the evaluation of the value of prescribed work, and since a wage corresponding thereto is paid to all workers who have served for a certain minimum length of service or more, it can be said to possess uniformity. Also, at the point in time when a worker provides overtime, night, or holiday work on any given day, length of service is not a condition whose satisfaction is uncertain, but rather an already-established fact of how long the worker's length of service is; thus, a worker who has reached a certain length of service can definitively receive the wage linked to length of service if he or she provides work on any given day, regardless of whether other additional conditions are satisfied, and fixedness is thus recognized. Accordingly, the circumstance that the payment or amount of a wage is linked to length of service does not constitute an obstacle to regarding that wage as falling within ordinary wage.
2) Wages linked to number of days worked
Where it is set that a certain fixed amount of wage is paid for each day worked, such that the wage is paid on a pro rata basis according to the number of days actually worked, although the amount paid varies according to the number of days actually worked, since it is fixed that the worker will receive a certain amount if he or she provides prescribed work on any given day, such a wage constitutes a fixed wage.
However, a wage that is paid only upon satisfying a certain minimum number of days worked is paid only upon the satisfaction of an additional condition—namely, satisfaction of a certain minimum number of days worked—in addition to the provision of prescribed work, and since whether this condition is satisfied cannot be determined at the point in time when overtime, night, or holiday work is provided on any given day, such a wage cannot be regarded as possessing fixedness.
Meanwhile, even where the method of calculation or the amount paid differs depending on a certain minimum number of days worked, if it is fixed that at least a certain minimum amount of wage will be paid upon the provision of prescribed work, fixedness can be recognized to the extent of that minimum fixed amount. For example, where a specific item of payment is paid in full if the number of days worked is 15 or more, and is calculated on a pro rata basis according to the number of days worked if less than 15 days, since it is fixed that, so long as prescribed work is provided, at least the pro rata amount will be paid, fixedness is recognized to that extent. On the other hand, where the method of calculation does not differ depending on the number of days worked but the wage is simply calculated on a pro rata basis according to the number of days worked, there is no substantial difference from the case, discussed above, of payment for each day worked, and fixedness can likewise be recognized.
3) Wages paid only to workers who are employed at a specific point in time
A wage that is set to be paid only to workers who are employed at a specific point in time, such as the payment date or otherwise, regardless of whether the worker provided prescribed work, has, as a qualifying requirement for receiving the wage, that the worker be employed at that specific point in time. It is generally the case that such a wage is not paid to a person who previously provided work but is not employed at the specific point in time, whereas it is paid to a person who is employed at that specific point in time regardless of the content of that person's prior provision of work. If a wage is paid under such conditions, it is difficult to regard that wage as having the character of consideration for so-called "prescribed work," and, since a worker who retires before the specific point in time arrives will not receive the wage at all even though he or she provided work on any given day, it must be regarded that, at the point in time when the worker provides overtime, night, or holiday work on any given day, whether the payment condition will be satisfied is uncertain, and thus fixedness is also lacking.
However, where a wage is paid in proportion to the number of days worked even if the worker retires before the specific point in time, there is no substantial difference from a wage paid for each day worked, as discussed above, and thus fixedness is not denied to the extent that the wage is paid in proportion to the number of days worked.
4) Wages conditioned on special skill, experience, etc.
Where possession of a special skill or possession of particular experience, etc. is added as a condition for payment of a wage, since, at the point in time when a worker provides overtime, night, or holiday work on any given day, whether the worker possesses the special skill or particular experience is not a condition whose satisfaction is uncertain but rather an already-established fact, such a payment condition does not constitute an obstacle to recognizing fixedness.
5) Wages linked to work performance
A wage whose payment or amount is determined based on an evaluation of a worker's work performance during the payment target period may generally be regarded as lacking fixedness. However, if a minimum amount of payment is fixed, such as where a certain amount is paid even if the worker receives the lowest rating for work performance, that minimum amount of wage can be regarded as a fixed wage.
Where the payment or amount of a specific wage in a given year is determined based on a worker's work performance in the previous year, since the payment or amount of that wage is fixed for that given year, the wage should be regarded, for that given year, as a fixed wage. However, where there are special circumstances suggesting that this is, in substance, merely a case in which what would ordinarily have been paid in the previous year has had only its payment timing delayed, fixedness cannot be recognized. Nevertheless, even in such a case, if it is set that a certain amount is guaranteed as a minimum even if the worker receives the lowest rating for work performance, that minimum amount can be regarded as a fixed wage to that extent.
D. The effect of labor-management agreements concerning ordinary wage
Since the working conditions prescribed by the Labor Standards Act constitute minimum standards (Article 3 of the Labor Standards Act), a labor contract that sets working conditions falling short of those standards is invalid only with respect to that portion, and the invalidated portion is governed by the standards set forth in the Labor Standards Act (Article 15 of the Labor Standards Act). Since ordinary wage is a conceptual tool established by law in order to set the above standards for working conditions, it is not something whose meaning or scope may be separately agreed upon by the employer and workers through a collective agreement, etc.
Accordingly, even if labor and management agree to exclude from ordinary wage a wage that, in accordance with the criteria set forth above, falls, by its nature, within ordinary wage under the Labor Standards Act, such agreement has no effect. Since the provision of the Labor Standards Act requiring payment of at least 50% in addition to the ordinary wage for overtime, night, and holiday work sets the minimum standard for calculating wages for each type of such work, where labor and management have agreed to calculate additional pay for overtime, night, and holiday work by excluding, in part, a wage having the character of ordinary wage, if the amount calculated in accordance with that labor-management agreement falls short of the above standard set forth in the Labor Standards Act, the labor-management agreement is invalid to the extent of the shortfall (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da4816, delivered on May 11, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 2008Da45101, delivered on December 10, 2009; etc.), and the invalidated portion must be governed by the standards set forth in the Labor Standards Act.
E. Supreme Court decisions to be modified
Supreme Court Decision 95Da56767, delivered on March 22, 1996, which held that, where the condition for payment of a continuous-service allowance is set such that, for a number of days worked below a certain minimum, the allowance is paid on a pro rata basis, and for a number of days worked equal to or exceeding that minimum, the allowance is paid in full, the minimum amount paid on a pro rata basis should nevertheless not be regarded as a fixed wage on the ground that its payment or amount varies depending on actual work performance, and thus is not ordinary wage, notwithstanding that it should instead be regarded as a fixed wage, must be modified. Likewise, Supreme Court Decision 2006Da13070, delivered on June 15, 2007, and other decisions to the same effect, which held that a certain fringe-benefit-type payment at issue constituted ordinary wage merely on the ground that it was set to be paid uniformly and regularly under a collective agreement, etc., without examining whether that payment was conditioned on being employed at the time of the payment date, must likewise be modified to the extent inconsistent with the views expressed in this decision.
2. Determination as to this case
A. As to whether the bonus at issue in this case falls within ordinary wage
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the evidence duly adopted by the court below, it can be seen that the Defendant (the Defendant's predecessor, △△△ Yuhan Hoesa [limited liability company], was established on June 7, 2004, changed its trade name to ○○○ Yuhan Hoesa on December 23, 2009, and thereafter, on August 20, 2010, converted its organizational form to become the Defendant; hereinafter, these companies are referred to collectively as the "Defendant" without distinction) paid the bonus at issue in this case, pursuant to its bonus payment rules, in full to workers whose length of service exceeded two months, and, for new employees whose length of service did not exceed two months, employees who had returned to work after a leave of absence of two months or more, and employees on leave of absence, in an amount calculated by applying a predetermined rate corresponding to the relevant period within the bonus payment target period, and, for workers who retired during the bonus payment target period, on a pro rata basis according to the number of days worked.
Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles set forth above, although the amount of the bonus at issue in this case varies depending on length of service, since a fixed amount of bonus is definitively paid to workers who have reached a certain length of service, the bonus at issue in this case may be regarded as one whose payment is fixed so long as prescribed work is provided, and it therefore constitutes ordinary wage, being a fixed wage paid regularly and uniformly.
The court below's determination, to the same effect, that the bonus at issue in this case constitutes ordinary wage is justified, and there is no error therein, such as a violation of Supreme Court precedent concerning the concept, requirements, and scope of ordinary wage, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
B. As to whether the assertion of the invalidity of the labor-management agreement excluding the bonus at issue in this case from ordinary wage, in order to claim additional statutory allowances, violates the principle of good faith
1) The principle of good faith and trust (hereinafter "the good faith principle") refers to the abstract norm that parties to a legal relationship must not exercise rights or perform obligations in a manner or content that disregards the other party's interests, contravenes equity, or betrays trust; in order to deny the exercise of a right on the ground that it violates the good faith principle, the party asserting such violation must have extended trust to the other party, or the other party must objectively be in a state where it is legitimate for it to have placed trust, and the exercise of the right in violation of such trust of the other party must reach a degree that cannot be tolerated in light of the concept of justice (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da3802, delivered on December 10, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 2003Da18401, delivered on May 26, 2006; etc.).
Where the content of a labor-management agreement, such as a collective agreement, is invalid because it violates a mandatory provision of the Labor Standards Act, if an assertion of such invalidity were rejected on the ground that it constitutes an exercise of rights in violation of the good faith principle, this would result in undermining the legislative purpose of the mandatory provision; therefore, as a matter of principle, such an assertion cannot be regarded as violating the good faith principle. However, this does not mean that application of the good faith principle is excluded without exception with respect to an assertion of invalidity of a labor-management agreement merely because the content of that agreement violates a mandatory provision of the Labor Standards Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Da15422, 15439, delivered on May 29, 2001). Only in exceptional cases where the general requirements for applying the good faith principle set forth above are satisfied, and where there exist special circumstances that justify giving priority to the good faith principle notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the Labor Standards Act, may an assertion of invalidity of the labor-management agreement be regarded as violating the good faith principle and thus be impermissible.
2) Sound finances are like a lifeline for an enterprise. Deterioration of finances leads to business difficulties, and if this intensifies, the very existence of the enterprise is jeopardized. In particular, wages are among the factors that most significantly affect an enterprise's finances. In the course of wage negotiations, labor and management determine how much money and valuables are to be paid to workers as consideration for work, at what time, and in what form and under what conditions. Such wage negotiations take into account various factors, including the enterprise's business performance, workers' labor productivity, the inflation rate, and the general wage increase rate in the same industry, but since the continued existence and growth of the enterprise is a common goal that both labor and management should pursue together, wages cannot be raised to the extent of causing serious damage to the enterprise's finances, resulting in management difficulties, or affecting the very foundation of the enterprise's existence. Accordingly, there is an inherent limit whereby wage increases must be made within the enterprise's capacity to bear labor costs, based on the revenue that the enterprise can earn through its production and sales activities, etc., and this may be said to be a matter understood between labor and management.
Thus, when labor and management autonomously negotiate wages, they set wages within the scope that both sides have agreed is appropriate, based on the enterprise's limited revenue; and the practice in Korea is generally such that, in wage negotiations, the wage increase rate is set on the basis of total wages, and the total wage figure includes not only the base pay but also the bonus paid at fixed intervals exceeding one month in correspondence with work provided during a certain target period (hereinafter "regular bonus"), various allowances, and even statutory allowances such as overtime, night, and holiday pay calculated on the basis of ordinary wage, the scale of which is predicted and included. Under this method of wage negotiation, the base pay, regular bonus, various allowances, etc., and the various statutory allowances calculated based on ordinary wage are not determined independently and separately from the total wage amount; rather, within the scope of the total wage amount agreed between labor and management, amounts are allocated to each wage item in accordance with that purpose, and the form and timing of payment for each are determined, meaning that they are mutually interrelated in this sense.
However, in most enterprises in Korea, on the premise that a regular bonus does not, in itself, constitute ordinary wage, the practice of labor and management agreeing, during wage negotiations, to exclude the regular bonus from ordinary wage has continued for a long period, and this labor-management agreement appears to have become generalized and settled as a practice. The main reasons for the settlement of this practice appear to be as follows: bonuses originated as a discretionary or commendatory form of profit-sharing or performance pay; even though, since the Korean economy entered a growth phase, bonuses have in many cases come to be paid regularly and uniformly as consideration for work, they are still in some cases paid in the nature of performance pay, recognition of merit, or an incentive for continued service, and their payment form and conditions, etc. are diverse, such that their character is in some cases unclear; the Ministry of Employment and Labor's "Guidelines for Calculating Ordinary Wage," which has had a profound influence on both labor and management in the field since its enactment on January 14, 1988, has consistently excluded regular bonuses from ordinary wage; and, in terms of Supreme Court precedent, prior to the rendering of Supreme Court Decision 2010Da91046 (the so-called "□□ Limousine Decision") on March 29, 2012, there were only Supreme Court decisions denying that bonuses fall within ordinary wage (Supreme Court Decision 89Daka2292, delivered on February 27, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 94Da19501, delivered on February 9, 1996; etc.), and there was no Supreme Court decision explicitly recognizing that a regular bonus could fall within ordinary wage—these circumstances appear to be the main reasons why both labor and management came to accept, without question, that regular bonuses are excluded from ordinary wage.
If, without taking into account the structure and limits of wage negotiations as described above, the methods and processes of wage negotiation in actual workplaces, the methods and content of determining each wage item, and the practice, etc., a labor-management agreement that previously excluded a regular bonus from ordinary wage is now held invalid on the ground that it violates a mandatory provision of the Labor Standards Act, and statutory allowances are additionally paid based on a newly calculated ordinary wage that includes the regular bonus, the total amount of wages that the worker receives could far exceed the scope of the total wage amount originally agreed upon between labor and management, resulting in an outcome markedly different from what both labor and management intended at the time of the wage negotiations.
As noted above, a labor-management agreement concerning wages has the substantive character of allocating amounts to each wage item within the scope of the total wage amount agreed upon based on the enterprise's limited revenue, and setting the individual payment timing, form, and conditions, etc. for each item. Accordingly, so long as the basis of the enterprise's revenue remains the same, if both labor and management, at the time of the wage negotiations, had recognized that the regular bonus could fall within ordinary wage, it is reasonable to view that they would have reached a labor-management agreement by devising other alternatives within the scope of the enterprise's ability to bear the burden—for example, by adjusting the rate of increase of the base pay and allowances, etc., and changing the form or conditions of payment, etc., on the premise that the relevant regular bonus is included in ordinary wage—such that, as a result, the total amount of wages paid to the worker, including the various statutory allowances calculated based on ordinary wage, would show no substantial difference between the case where the regular bonus is included in ordinary wage and the case where it is not.
Nevertheless, if, without considering these circumstances at all, and citing legal grounds entirely different from what both labor and management had commonly understood at the time of the agreement, an obligation is imposed on the employer to pay additional statutory allowances based on ordinary wage including the regular bonus, then, on the one hand, the worker's side would receive all the wages determined based on the enterprise's limited revenue, in accordance with the premise and basis mutually understood by labor and management at the time of the wage negotiations, while, on the other hand, asserting that such premise or basis is invalid and thereby receiving additional statutory allowances exceeding the enterprise's limited revenue; whereas the employer's side, having managed the enterprise while maintaining a balance of revenue and expenditure in reliance on the labor-management agreement, would come to bear an unforeseen financial burden, and as a result could face serious management difficulties or a situation in which the very existence of the enterprise is shaken. This constitutes an act that, in a labor-management relationship that has maintained an autonomous and harmonious relationship based on mutual trust through labor-management agreements and pursued common interests, breaks down the foundation of mutual trust for an unexpected reason and undermines the mutually beneficial relationship that labor and management have pursued, and could ultimately have a negative impact on workers' working environment and working conditions as well, leading to the enterprise's financial collapse and thereby also risking the loss of the very workplace itself, causing harm to both labor and management.
Accordingly, where, in a labor-management agreement reached through the wage negotiation process described above, labor and management, mistakenly believing that the regular bonus does not in itself fall within ordinary wage, agreed to exclude the regular bonus from the criteria for calculating ordinary wage and set the wage level on that premise, if the worker's side, disregarding the method and background of the wage negotiations described above and their substantive purpose and outcome, cites grounds that were never contemplated at the time of the wage negotiations to add the regular bonus to ordinary wage and, on that basis, seeks payment of additional statutory allowances, thereby pursuing an unexpected benefit far exceeding the wage level agreed upon by labor and management, and thereby imposing on the employer an unforeseen new financial burden that causes serious management difficulties or jeopardizes the enterprise's existence, this would ultimately cause harm reaching even the worker's side as well, resulting in an outcome that benefits neither labor nor management; it is clear that, in light of the concepts of justice and equity, this is significantly contrary to good faith and simply cannot be tolerated. Therefore, in such a case, the worker's claim for additional statutory allowances is not acceptable, as it violates the good faith principle.
3) Comprehensively examining the evidence adopted by the court below and the record, the following circumstances can be ascertained.
A) Except for the fact that the Defendant temporarily paid the bonus at issue in this case monthly to office workers from January 2009 to February 2010, the Defendant paid the bonus at issue in this case to both office workers and production workers by applying the same payment rate and payment standard, in accordance with its bonus payment rules.
[Reasoning]
나) The Defendant and the National ◇◇ Labor Union of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (hereinafter referred to as the "Labor Union") set the scope of wages to be included in ordinary wages in the collective agreement concluded on October 8, 2008, and, on the premise that the bonus in this case does not fall under ordinary wages as prescribed by the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), excluded the bonus in this case from inclusion in ordinary wages. It appears that the Defendant and the Labor Union had previously set the scope of inclusion in ordinary wages in this manner through collective agreements as well. Furthermore, it appears that the Defendant and the Labor Union, in conducting wage negotiations, determined matters such as the rate of increase of the basic salary and the increase in various allowances, and the scale of statutory allowances premised on the ordinary wage under the collective agreement, based on the total wage amount.
다) The Defendant has applied the collective agreement, which excludes the bonus in this case from inclusion in ordinary wages, even to administrative staff who are not members of the Labor Union, and has calculated and paid statutory allowances based on ordinary wages excluding the bonus in this case. It appears that, prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the administrative staff, including the Plaintiff, did not raise any particular objection to this.
라) Meanwhile, according to the above collective agreement, for production staff, the ordinary wage is calculated as the sum of the basic salary plus various allowances such as position allowance, production allowance, and hazard allowance, and the bonus paid in even-numbered months is calculated as 600% per annum of the amount obtained by adding 20,000 won and the equivalent of 35 hours of overtime work to the wage that forms the basis for calculating the above ordinary wage. In light of this method of calculating ordinary wages and bonuses and their scale, it appears that if the bonus in this case were included in addition to the wages originally used as the basis for calculating ordinary wages under the collective agreement, the amount of ordinary wages would far exceed the amount of ordinary wages contemplated by the collective agreement.
In particular, the Defendant has approximately 400 production staff alone, excluding administrative staff, and for production staff, overtime work such as extended, night, and holiday work is performed on a regular basis, and the bonus in this case, paid in even-numbered months, exceeds 600% per annum of the wage forming the basis for calculating ordinary wages as set forth in the collective agreement. In light of these circumstances, if the bonus in this case were included in ordinary wages, the additional premium wages for overtime work that the Defendant would bear would significantly exceed the scope of premium wages that labor and management used as a basis for negotiation at the time of the wage negotiations, and if workers were to receive additional statutory allowances, their actual wage increase rate would far exceed the wage increase rate mutually understood by labor and management at the time of the wage negotiations. Meanwhile, although administrative staff do not perform overtime work on a regular basis like production staff, if the bonus in this case were included in ordinary wages, it would lead to an increase in premium wages for intermittent overtime work and unused annual leave allowances, which would also constitute a new financial burden on the Defendant overall.
4) Taking into account all of the foregoing circumstances, it appears that the Defendant concluded a collective agreement with the Labor Union excluding the bonus in this case from ordinary wages without recognizing that the bonus in this case constitutes ordinary wages, and that there was an express or implied labor-management agreement or practice between the Defendant and the administrative staff regarding the application of the ordinary wage standard under this collective agreement even to administrative staff who are not union members. There are considerable circumstances showing that if the bonus in this case were included in ordinary wages, workers would be able to expect unexpected benefits exceeding the benefits they originally received through wage negotiations between labor and management, while the Defendant would bear an unforeseen new financial burden, which could be seen as causing significant managerial difficulties.
However, as noted above, while the bonus payment rule providing for payment of the bonus once every even-numbered month existed, the Defendant temporarily paid the bonus in this case monthly, limited to administrative staff, from January 2009 to February 2010. If this was done with the intention of guaranteeing actual wages by including the bonus in this case in ordinary wages for all administrative staff without any conditions, differently from production staff, limited to this period, there is room to view that, with respect to this portion, including the bonus in this case in ordinary wages and calculating statutory allowances on that basis would not impose an unforeseen new financial burden on the Defendant.
If so, the lower court should have examined, based on the legal principles set forth above, the actual state of wage negotiations between the Defendant and the Labor Union, whether an express or implied labor-management agreement or practice was formed between the Defendant and the administrative staff to exclude the bonus in this case from ordinary wages, and, if the bonus in this case were included in ordinary wages, the additional amount of statutory allowances that the Defendant would bear, the rate of actual wage increase compared to the previous year and its average over the past several years, the Defendant's financial and managerial condition, the specific method of payment of the bonus in this case to the Defendant's administrative staff and the details, motives, and circumstances of any changes thereto, and whether the changed payment method applied to the Plaintiff, and thereby should have examined whether the Plaintiff's claim in this case seeking payment of unused annual leave allowances, etc. for the period from 2007 to 2010 violates the good faith principle.
Nevertheless, contrary to this, the lower court, without properly examining the above circumstances, hastily concluded that the Plaintiff's claim in this case does not violate the good faith principle based solely on the circumstances stated in its judgment. Such a determination by the lower court contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the good faith principle and failing to conduct the necessary examination. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further examination and adjudication, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. Except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Lee In-bok, Justice Lee Sang-hoon, and Justice Kim Shin regarding the application of the good faith principle, and the separate opinion of Justice Kim Chang-seok regarding the standard for determining ordinary wages, all Justices concurred in this judgment, and there are supplementary opinions by Justice Kim Yong-deok, Justice Ko Young-han, and Justice Kim So-young in support of the majority opinion.
4. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lee In-bok, Justice Lee Sang-hoon, and Justice Kim Shin
가. This case is a case in which a worker seeks payment of wages in accordance with the Labor Standards Act from the employer on the ground that the worker did not receive proper wages for the labor provided. The gist of the majority opinion on this matter is as follows. That is, the regular bonus constitutes ordinary wages, and even if the worker and the employer agreed to exclude it from ordinary wages, such agreement is indeed invalid as it violates the Labor Standards Act, but it is said that it violates the good faith principle for a worker to assert the invalidity of that agreement and additionally claim allowances and retirement pay calculated by including the regular bonus in ordinary wages.
However, the logic of the majority opinion, which recognizes the mandatory nature of the Labor Standards Act while using the good faith principle to reject that mandatory nature, is so unfamiliar that it is even bewildering. And no matter how many times we examine it, we cannot find rationality in that logic.
나. The reasons why we consider the reasoning and conclusion of the majority opinion to be unjust are as follows.
1) Regarding the point that asserting the invalidity of a labor-management agreement that violates a mandatory provision of the Labor Standards Act is not disallowed as violating the good faith principle
가) As the majority opinion states, the good faith principle is an abstract norm requiring that parties to a legal relationship, out of consideration for the other party's interests, must not exercise rights or perform obligations in a manner or with content that is inequitable or that betrays trust. However, if one attempts to resolve concrete problems using this abstract good faith principle, this could infringe upon the principle of adjudication according to law and could destabilize legal relationships, and thus the Supreme Court has declared that the good faith principle must be strictly interpreted and applied (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da33469, decided May 29, 2008, etc.).
In particular, altering the content of rights and obligations clearly recognized by individual provisions of positive law on the ground of the good faith principle could cause serious disruption to the legal system and pose a great threat to the authority of law and legal stability. Applying the good faith principle to limit such statutory rights is merely a measure to be considered as a last resort, and only within a scope not contradicting the spirit of the law or the legislator's decision, in cases where applying the law as it stands due to the peculiarities of an individual case would bring about an unbearably unjust result.
나) A mandatory provision pursuing the public interest restricts the principle of freedom of contract by denying the validity of acts violating that provision in order to achieve its legislative purpose. And mandatory provisions apply regardless of whether the actor is aware of the provision concerned.
Using the good faith principle to maintain the validity of a legal act that violates a mandatory provision results in the good faith principle, which should operate within the overall legal order, running counter to that legal order. It is the established view of precedent that if a party to an agreement violating a mandatory provision asserts the invalidity of that agreement, and that assertion is rejected on the ground that it constitutes an exercise of rights in violation of the good faith principle, this would amount to realizing the result that the mandatory provision seeks to exclude, thereby completely nullifying the legislative purpose, and thus such an assertion does not violate the good faith principle (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Da17482, decided March 10, 2011, etc.). In this way, the good faith principle cannot take precedence over mandatory provisions.
다) Most working conditions, and particularly wages among them, are a matter of survival for workers. For this reason, the Constitution imposes on the State a duty to strive to guarantee workers an appropriate wage (Article 32(1) of the Constitution), requires that the standards of working conditions be determined by law so as to guarantee human dignity (Article 32(3) of the Constitution), and the Labor Standards Act, following from this, contains various mandatory provisions concerning working conditions. Article 15 of the Labor Standards Act declares that a labor contract setting working conditions falling short of the standards prescribed by that Act is invalid to that extent, thereby making clear its mandatory nature. Nevertheless, attempting to restrict, through the application of the good faith principle, the basic rights of workers guaranteed as mandatory statutory rights, such as the right to claim wages, directly contravenes such constitutional values or the mandatory nature of the Labor Standards Act.
Even where the Labor Standards Act guarantees certain rights to workers as mandatory provisions, if the worker or the employer entered into a labor-management agreement with content contrary to that mandatory provision, the employer's mistaken trust cannot be given priority over the worker's rightful pursuit of legitimate rights by invoking the good faith principle.
The employer's economic difficulties cannot be a ground for sacrificing the worker's rights either. The employer's economic difficulties may serve as a basis for seeking the worker's understanding and concession in the process of establishing working conditions, but they cannot be a reason for exempting the employer from the legal obligation to be performed according to already established working conditions. The employer is paying appropriate compensation for the labor provided to it; the employer is not suffering any "damage."
Thus, from any perspective, the majority opinion holding that asserting the invalidity of a labor-management agreement violating a mandatory provision of the Labor Standards Act is impermissible as violating the good faith principle is unjust. It is incomprehensible how it could be "manifestly contrary to good faith in light of the concept of justice and equity," and why it is "clearly utterly unacceptable," for a worker, who was unaware of rights guaranteed by mandatory legal provisions enacted through law by the representatives of the people based on the Constitution, to now assert a claim to reclaim those rights in accordance with the law.
2) Regarding the requirements set forth by the majority opinion for cases where the assertion that a labor-management agreement excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages is invalid constitutes a violation of the good faith principle
가) The majority opinion premises that, in order for a worker's assertion of the invalidity of a labor-management agreement violating the mandatory Labor Standards Act to be found impermissible as violating the good faith principle, it must satisfy the "general requirements for applying the good faith principle," and furthermore, there must be "special circumstances justifying giving priority to the good faith principle notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the Labor Standards Act." Based on this premise, the majority opinion states that a worker's assertion that a labor-management agreement excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages is invalid satisfies all of these requirements and thus violates the good faith principle.
나) First, it cannot be said that the "general requirements for applying the good faith principle" have been satisfied with respect to a worker's assertion that a labor-management agreement excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages is invalid.
In order to deny the exercise of a right on the ground that it violates the good faith principle, the other party must have been given trust, or it must be objectively legitimate for the other party to have such trust, and the exercise of the right in violation of the other party's trust must reach a degree that is utterly unbearable in light of the concept of justice. Here, the trust of the other party to be protected through the application of the good faith principle must be legitimate trust; thus, where one negligently trusted something that was not worthy of trust, or where one knew that something was not worthy of trust, protection of that trust cannot be asserted. Moreover, protection of trust is not recognized merely because the other party trusts a certain state of affairs and it is reasonable for them to have such trust; there must also be grounds attributable to the party who would suffer disadvantage due to the protection of that trust, justifying that disadvantage.
In this regard, the majority opinion cites, as grounds, circumstances such as the origin of bonuses, the ambiguity of their nature, and the Ministry of Employment and Labor's guidelines, which are said to have led to the establishment, as a practice, of labor-management agreements excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages.
However, in this case, no evidentiary basis can be found to recognize that such a labor-management agreement has become established as a practice. The majority opinion merely presumes unilaterally, from the employer's perspective, that such a practice appears to exist.
Furthermore, even if such a practice of labor-management agreements exists, this cannot be evaluated as the provision of trust by the worker. Mandatory provisions of the Labor Standards Act apply uniformly even to those who are unaware of the existence of the provision or who did not properly understand it, and ignorance of the law or mistakes regarding legal evaluation cannot avoid its application. Even if there exists a practice of labor-management agreements that are invalid for violating mandatory provisions, unless that practice was induced by the worker or the main cause thereof lies with the worker, it cannot be justified for the employer to trust that the worker will not assert that such an invalid practice of labor-management agreements is invalid for violating mandatory provisions. Such trust on the part of the employer is not worthy of protection, and moreover, protecting it first would result in giving priority to a practice that violates the law over the mandatory provision.
Not only is there no basis for finding that a practice of labor-management agreements excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages exists, but even if, by any chance, such a practice exists, there is no basis whatsoever for finding that it was induced by the worker or that the main cause thereof lies with the worker. The majority opinion, without any explanation on this point, merely states that such a practice exists. The premise that the employer trusted that the worker would not assert the invalidity of this has itself not been proven, but even if that "trust" exists, it cannot be said to be legitimate.
Ultimately, the majority opinion's position—that, premised on the general requirements of the good faith principle being satisfied, special circumstances justifying giving priority to the good faith principle notwithstanding the mandatory provisions of the Labor Standards Act have also been satisfied—is unjustified even at its premise.
다) The grounds or standards put forward by the majority opinion for holding that a worker's assertion of invalidity regarding a labor-management agreement excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages violates the good faith principle also lack rationality.
(1) The majority opinion states that if labor and management had known, at the time of the wage negotiations, that the labor-management agreement excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages was invalid for violating a mandatory provision of the Labor Standards Act, they would have taken measures such as lowering the rate of increase of the basic salary or changing the payment form or conditions of bonuses/allowances, so that the total amount of wages paid to workers, including various statutory allowances calculated based on ordinary wages, would not substantially differ from the total wage amount, including various statutory allowances calculated based on the ordinary wage originally set in the labor-management agreement.
However, the premise that such labor-management consultation would have taken place is nothing more than a subjective, hypothetical intent viewed solely from the employer's perspective. From the worker's perspective, it is entirely possible that labor-management consultation would have proceeded in the direction of reducing overtime work such as extended, night, and holiday work while maintaining the wage level. This perspective of the worker is, in fact, more consistent with the basic spirit of the Labor Standards Act, which seeks to guarantee workers a humane life by limiting overtime work as much as possible. Accepting a hypothetical intent like that of the majority opinion as a matter of course and using it as the starting point for applying the good faith principle is a leap in logic.
(2) The majority opinion states that what a worker gains by asserting the invalidity of a labor-management agreement excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages is an "unexpected benefit," and cites this as an important ground for finding a violation of the good faith principle.
However, the right to claim overtime allowance that a worker acquires by performing overtime work is a right of the worker explicitly recognized by the Labor Standards Act. It is not an unexpected benefit, i.e., a windfall. It is merely the worker seeking to receive now what he or she should rightfully have received in the past. This is a legitimate right of the worker guaranteed by the Labor Standards Act through a mandatory provision specifically so that it cannot be deprived even by agreement of the parties.
Had labor and management known, at the time of the labor-management agreement, that regular bonuses were included in ordinary wages, the employer would have reduced overtime hours, and the worker, too, would have performed less overtime work. Thus, it is rather the employer's receipt of the worker's overtime labor without paying proper compensation that constitutes, in the majority opinion's own terms, an "unexpected benefit."
To treat wages that the worker should have received as an "unexpected benefit" and to characterize the reclaiming of that as contrary to the concept of justice and equity is itself contrary to the concept of justice.
(3) The majority opinion cites, as another requirement for a violation of the good faith principle, that "the additional payment of statutory allowances imposes an unforeseen new financial burden on the employer, causing significant managerial difficulties or endangering the survival of the enterprise."
However, such "significant managerial difficulties" or "endangering the survival of the enterprise" are all vague and indeterminate in content, such that it is impossible to know exactly how much additional burden would be required to satisfy such requirements.
If such vague and unclear standards are treated as requirements for applying the good faith principle, the likelihood increases that rights guaranteed under the Labor Standards Act would vary from workplace to workplace or from lawsuit to lawsuit, which could result in rights that should be equally guaranteed to workers under the Labor Standards Act being recognized or denied in an inequitable manner.
There is also the problem of determining, based on what range of workers receiving additional statutory allowances, whether such requirements are satisfied. The majority opinion appears to include, through the medium of an "implied agreement," not only the workers actually claiming additional payment but the entire body of union members subject to the collective agreement, and even non-union members who are not directly subject to the collective agreement, within that standard. Such an approach is nothing more than a contrivance employed to derive the conclusion that "significant managerial difficulties" or "endangering the survival of the enterprise" would result.
(4) The majority opinion's determination that the employer concluded the collective agreement without knowing that excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages violated the Labor Standards Act also cannot be accepted as is. Even if the employer did not know this, at the very least there was negligence in not knowing it.
Since the Supreme Court's en banc decision, Supreme Court Decision 94Da26721, decided December 21, 1995, which abolished the two-category wage theory, the Supreme Court has consistently held that whether something constitutes ordinary wages must be determined according to its objective nature, regardless of its nominal designation or payment cycle. In contrast, the Ministry of Employment and Labor, disregarding this precedent, maintained an administrative interpretation excluding wages paid over periods exceeding one month, including bonuses, from ordinary wages. There have been persistent objections raised regarding the confusion in industrial workplaces arising from this discrepancy between precedent and administrative interpretation, and an employer running a business would naturally have known, or should have known, of this situation.
In past cases where the Supreme Court found that bonuses did not constitute ordinary wages in cases where the issue of a bonus's status as ordinary wages arose, the denial of ordinary wage status was based not on the fact that the wage was a "bonus," but on the fact that it "lacked fixedness" (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da19501, decided February 9, 1996, Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81974, decided April 12, 2007, etc.), and this premised that bonuses, too, could constitute ordinary wages if they possessed regularity, uniformity, and fixedness. According to what emerged during the proceedings of this case, it appears that the industrial field had some awareness that, among bonuses, fixed regular bonuses constitute ordinary wages. Despite repeated precedent, some enterprises continue the practice of excluding even wages whose nature as ordinary wages is clear, such as long-service allowances, from ordinary wages, and it is not rare for enterprises to display such an attitude of disregarding or disrespecting the law with respect to the regular bonuses at issue in this case as well.
It appears that the employer was aware that bonuses, too, could constitute ordinary wages depending on their nature, and even if the employer was unaware of the possibility that bonuses constitute ordinary wages, this cannot be regarded as good faith worthy of legal protection.
3) Regarding the specific logic and determination by which the majority opinion applies the good faith principle to this case
가) The majority opinion states that in this case, the employer, the Defendant, applied the ordinary wage standard set forth in the collective agreement to administrative staff who are not union members, and calculated and paid statutory allowances based on ordinary wages excluding the bonus in this case, and that the administrative staff, including the Plaintiff, appear not to have raised any particular objection to this. On this ground, the majority opinion states that there was an express or implied labor-management agreement or practice between the Defendant and administrative staff regarding the application of the ordinary wage standard under the collective agreement even to administrative staff who are not union members, and states that it may violate the good faith principle for the Plaintiff to seek payment of unused annual/monthly leave allowances and retirement pay based on the inclusion of the bonus in this case in ordinary wages.
나) However, this lawsuit is an individual worker's wage claim lawsuit. It is not a claim for monetary payment brought by the labor union, the subject of collective bargaining or collective negotiation.
One of the basic principles of labor law is that "negotiation is conducted collectively, but the exercise of rights is conducted individually." For this reason, the exercise of rights in accordance with already established working conditions, as opposed to a disagreement over claims regarding the determination of working conditions to apply in the future, falls outside the scope of labor disputes. Collective bargaining for the adjustment of interests between labor and management, and the exercise of an individual worker's rights based on the working conditions resulting from that bargaining, are clearly distinguished. Accordingly, even if there was conduct in the process of concluding a collective agreement that gave the employer some trust, the subject of that conduct is the labor union, not the individual worker. In other words, the fact that the labor union agreed with the employer to conclude a collective agreement does not constitute "provision of trust" that would impede an individual worker from demanding that wages be paid in accordance with the Labor Standards Act instead of an invalid collective agreement. Moreover, the Plaintiff is not even a member of the labor union and did not participate in the process of concluding the collective agreement.
다) To recognize the existence of a labor-management agreement merely on the ground that, as in the majority opinion, the employer applied working conditions under the collective agreement to non-union administrative staff and the non-union members did not raise objections to this, and to further use this as a ground for finding a violation of the good faith principle, is to expand the scope of application of the good faith principle unjustifiably, to a degree unprecedented even in the general field of civil law.
First, the mere fact that non-union workers did not raise any particular objection, as described above, cannot establish the existence of an express labor-management agreement. And even if it could be inferred, from the fact that non-union workers did not raise objections, that an implied agreement exists, applying the good faith principle on this basis is unjust. This is because, even if the employer unilaterally applies working conditions under a collective agreement that violates the Labor Standards Act, the mere fact that non-union members did not raise objections would result in the employer's trust regarding the validity of those working conditions under the collective agreement becoming legitimate trust, while non-union members would be denied rights guaranteed as mandatory provisions under the Labor Standards Act.
The logic that a worker who does not actively resist or raise objections to an employer's violation of the Labor Standards Act has thereby given legitimate trust to the employer, such that asserting the invalidity of that unlawful act is contrary to justice, is an idea that disregards the normative force of the Labor Standards Act.
라) Moreover, according to the facts established by the lower court in this case, the employer, the Defendant, not only changed the method of paying regular bonuses from January 2009 to February 2010 to integrate the regular bonus into the basic salary and pay it monthly, but also, during this period, paid to workers who retired, annual/monthly leave allowances and retirement pay calculated by including the regular bonus in ordinary wages, and furthermore, applied to the relevant authorities for employment maintenance subsidies calculated by including the regular bonus in ordinary wages.
It is incomprehensible how this contradictory double standard—that it is acceptable for the employer, the Defendant, to apply for employment maintenance subsidies by including the regular bonus in ordinary wages, while it may be a violation of the good faith principle for the worker, the Plaintiff, to claim overtime allowances calculated by including that same regular bonus in ordinary wages under the same circumstances—can be justified. At least in this case, it should be said that the Plaintiff's assertion that the regular bonus should be included in ordinary wages cannot be considered contrary to the good faith principle; rather, it is the Defendant's defense that the Plaintiff's assertion violates the good faith principle that itself violates the good faith principle.
다. If, as the majority opinion suggests, the practice of labor and management agreeing during wage negotiations to exclude regular bonuses from ordinary wages has continued for a long period and such labor-management agreements have become generalized and established as a practice, the Supreme Court should not, on this ground, reject workers' legitimate exercise of rights, but should rather declare that this practice violates the mandatory provisions of the Labor Standards Act and must be corrected. Otherwise, the Supreme Court would be sanctioning an unlawful practice, and instead of fulfilling its proper role of correctly interpreting and applying the law, it would be doing the opposite—engaging in unlawful interpretation and application.
The matters the majority opinion puts forward as "standards for recognizing special circumstances warranting giving precedence to the good faith principle over mandatory provisions" are nothing more than matters that would be discussed in the forum of labor-management consultation for concluding a collective agreement, yet the majority opinion forcibly brings these into the courtroom—which should be a forum for the realization of rights—by dressing them up as "the concept of justice and equity," using them as grounds for excluding rights. Such an attitude of the majority opinion is no different from allowing judges to arbitrarily deprive a party of the natural right to assert that a legal act violating a mandatory provision, and therefore invalid, is invalid, by invoking the good faith principle. Ultimately, the majority opinion amounts to nothing more than a bare declaration, without reasonable logical support, that "it cannot be tolerated for the Plaintiff to receive additional annual/monthly leave allowances and retirement pay from the Defendant."
The Supreme Court, as the highest institution of legal interpretation, should declare the legal principles concerning ordinary wages in accordance with the law. Minimizing the resulting economic concerns is the role of the government and enterprises. The Supreme Court should correctly establish the legal principles regarding ordinary wages, and the government should implement various labor policies to ensure a soft landing for the conclusions of the Supreme Court's rulings. If, instead, the Supreme Court were to consider labor policies to be implemented in the future and attempt to fit the interpretation of the current law to those policies, this would constitute a distortion of legal interpretation.
For the foregoing reasons, we state that we cannot agree with the majority opinion.
5. Separate Opinion of Justice Kim Chang-seok
I agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the lower court's judgment should be reversed.
However, I cannot accept the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion, which hold that bonuses or allowances paid at intervals exceeding one month are included in ordinary wages if they are paid regularly, uniformly, and in a fixed manner, for the following reasons.
가. Article 32 of the Constitution provides, in paragraph (1), that "the State shall endeavor to promote the employment of workers and to guarantee an appropriate wage through social and economic means, and shall enforce a minimum wage system as prescribed by law"; in paragraph (2), that "the State shall determine, by law, the content and conditions of the duty to work, in accordance with democratic principles"; and in paragraph (3), that "the standards of working conditions shall be determined by law so as to guarantee human dignity." In accordance with this Article 32 of the Constitution, the Labor Standards Act was enacted for the purpose of "guaranteeing and improving workers' basic livelihood and promoting balanced development of the national economy by setting standards for working conditions" (Article 1 of the Labor Standards Act). As specific content setting the standards of working conditions, Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act provides that "the employer shall pay at least 50 percent of the ordinary wage in addition for extended work, night work, or holiday work," while, in order to secure the effectiveness thereof, Article 15 of the Labor Standards Act provides: "(1) A labor contract that sets working conditions falling short of the standards prescribed by this Act shall be invalid to that extent. (2) The part rendered invalid under paragraph (1) shall be governed by the standards prescribed by this Act." Accordingly, the employer bears the legal obligation to pay at least 50 percent of the ordinary wage in addition for extended work, night work, or holiday work (hereinafter referred to as "extended work, etc."), and if it were agreed to pay less than 50 percent of the ordinary wage in addition for extended work, etc., such content would be invalid, and the employer would bear the legal obligation to pay 50 percent of the ordinary wage in addition for extended work, etc.
As such, the legal obligation imposed on the employer under the standards set by the Constitution and the Labor Standards Act is to pay at least 50 percent of the ordinary wage in addition for extended work, etc.; however, regarding what constitutes the ordinary wage that serves as the basis for such addition, neither the Labor Standards Act nor any other statute contains an explicit provision, nor is there a delegation provision allowing the specific standards thereof to be determined. This situation constitutes a gap in the law, and thus raises the question of whether formation of law through judicial interpretation is necessary.
However, Article 119(1) of the Constitution provides that "the economic order of the Republic of Korea shall be based on respect for the freedom and creative initiative of enterprises and individuals in economic affairs," thereby declaring the principle of a market economy based on private autonomy, and accordingly, labor contracts between labor and management that set working conditions are also fundamentally governed by the principle of private autonomy. Furthermore, Article 33(1) of the Constitution provides that "workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action for the purpose of enhancing working conditions," thereby providing, as a constitutional right, i.e., a fundamental right, the right to determine working conditions through collective bargaining with respect to matters related to working conditions, including wages. Based on these constitutional provisions, Article 4 of the Labor Standards Act provides that "working conditions shall be determined by workers and employers on an equal footing based on their free will," and the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법) contains detailed provisions on collective bargaining and collective agreements, while Article 33 thereof provides: "(1) The portion of the rules of employment or labor contract that violates the standards concerning working conditions or other treatment of workers set forth in a collective agreement shall be invalid. (2) Matters not stipulated in the labor contract, or the portion rendered invalid under paragraph (1), shall be governed by the standards set forth in the collective agreement," thereby concretizing the legal effect of labor-management agreements regarding working conditions. If so, where an explicit labor-management agreement exists as to what is included in and excluded from ordinary wages, in the absence of an explicit provision or delegation provision in the statute determining the content of ordinary wages, such a labor-management agreement is firmly recognized as legally effective by virtue of the aforementioned provisions of the Labor Standards Act and the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, enacted pursuant to the Constitution and its delegation. Even if there were no such provisions, since private autonomy is recognized with respect to working conditions, a labor-management agreement regarding ordinary wages should be recognized as legally effective as long as there is no lawful ground for denying the effect of that agreement. Furthermore, even where there is no explicit labor-management agreement regarding ordinary wages, it can be viewed that there exists a labor-management practice or implied labor-management agreement by which ordinary wages have been calculated for the purpose of paying allowances for extended work, etc., and such labor-management practice or implied labor-management agreement is likewise recognized as legally effective. Accordingly, labor-management agreements or labor-management practices regarding ordinary wages serve as the standard for determining whether a given wage is included in ordinary wages. This is also consistent with the nature of ordinary wages, as discussed below.
Excluding wages paid for extended work, etc., the remaining wages are, in substance, divided into two types: wages for ordinary work (regularly scheduled work) and wages for total work (meaning the entire work including both ordinary work and extended work, etc.). Where the wage a worker receives is recognized as having been determined on the premise that the worker performs only ordinary work, and it is recognized that the worker is to receive an additional wage corresponding to the additional working hours where extended work, etc. is performed, such wage is paid solely as compensation for ordinary work, and thus naturally falls within ordinary wages. Conversely, where it is recognized that a worker receives the same wage regardless of whether the worker performs extended work, etc. in addition to ordinary work, or regardless of how long such extended work, etc. is, such wage is paid as compensation for total work including both ordinary work and extended work, etc., and thus there is no need to pay an additional wage corresponding to the additional working hours even if extended work, etc. is performed, and it therefore naturally does not fall within ordinary wages. Now, the basis for determining the substantive nature of a wage—that is, whether it is compensation for ordinary work (regularly scheduled work) or for total work—can be nothing other than the objectively confirmed intent of labor and management. To summarize, a wage that can be included in ordinary wages can only be a wage that is compensation for ordinary work rather than total work, and whether a given wage is compensation for ordinary work rather than total work can only be determined by the objectively confirmed intent of labor and management. Because of this self-evident nature of the concept of ordinary wages, it cannot be said that a statute must necessarily contain a provision defining ordinary wages, and the absence of such a provision can by no means signify a gap in the law.
Article 6(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법 시행령), which provides that "'ordinary wage' under the Act and this Decree means the hourly, weekly, monthly, or piece-rate amount determined to be paid regularly and uniformly to a worker for regularly scheduled work or for total work," is said to have been provided reflecting the actual practice of labor-management agreements and labor-management practices generally existing. It appears that, both at the time this Enforcement Decree was first established and at present, there is little doubt that labor-management agreements or labor-management practices generally include only the basic salary and allowances paid at intervals of one month or less in ordinary wages. Therefore, regardless of whether Article 6(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act, lacking a delegation provision in the statute, has effect as a legal norm, it should be respected in the sense that it generally confirms labor-management agreements or labor-management practices, and should be interpreted in that sense.
Therefore, interpreting bonuses or allowances paid at intervals exceeding one month as included in ordinary wages is unlawful to the extent it is contrary to labor-management agreements or labor-management practices. This is because the case in which courts may exercise their power of interpretation to form the law is permitted only when there is a gap in the law, whereas here, despite the existence of labor-management agreements or labor-management practices regarding ordinary wages, denying their legal effect and substituting interpretation for the labor-management agreement or practice would occur. Of course, exceptionally, where there are special circumstances allowing recognition that all or part of a bonus or an allowance paid at intervals exceeding one month has been included in ordinary wages by labor-management agreement, or that such a labor-management practice has been established, such validity should also be recognized, and interpretation should follow accordingly.
Ultimately, absent special circumstances, an interpretation including bonuses or allowances paid at intervals exceeding one month in ordinary wages is an unlawful interpretation that denies the legal effect of labor-management agreements or labor-management practices, and, in principle, it should be interpreted that only the basic salary and allowances paid at intervals of one month or less are included in ordinary wages. In this respect, Supreme Court Decision 94Da19501, decided February 9, 1996, etc., which held that even wages paid at intervals exceeding one month are included in ordinary wages if paid regularly, uniformly, and in a fixed manner, should be overruled.
나. Next, the question arises as to whether wages paid at intervals of one month or less should be interpreted as being entirely included in ordinary wages.
As the term "ordinary wage" itself suggests, it cannot be said that all wages are included in ordinary wages. The Supreme Court has previously interpreted that, in addition to the basic salary naturally being included in ordinary wages, allowances paid regularly, uniformly, and in a fixed manner at intervals of one month or less are also included in ordinary wages. Furthermore, in Supreme Court Decision 93Da4816, decided May 11, 1993, etc., the Supreme Court held that, where an allowance that should, by its nature, be included in ordinary wages is excluded from ordinary wages by agreement between labor and management, recognizing the effect of that agreement would nullify the legislative purpose of the Labor Standards Act's provisions on ordinary wages, and thus such a labor-management agreement must be regarded as an agreement setting working conditions falling short of the standards prescribed by the Labor Standards Act under Article 15(1) of the Labor Standards Act, and thus invalid. This interpretation, insofar as it concerns allowances paid regularly, uniformly, and in a fixed manner at intervals of one month or less, functions to protect workers, and its validity should be affirmed. This is also an interpretation consistent with Article 6(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act.
[Reasoning]
Within the scope of such interpretation, it can be said that the legal effect of labor-management agreements or labor-management practices is limited by interpretation. For such limitation of legal effect by interpretation to have legitimacy, there must be a lawful basis. The substantive basis for such interpretation is that an allowance paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly at intervals of one month or less has a substance equivalent to the basic wage. This is because, if an allowance having a substance equivalent to the basic wage were nevertheless, unlike the basic wage, not included in ordinary wages, this could result in condoning an unlawful evasion of the law. This is because an employer could substantially reduce the amount of extended work allowances, etc. that must be paid to workers by paying, in the form of an allowance paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly at intervals of one month or less, wages that should be paid as basic wage. Therefore, an allowance which, by being paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly at intervals of one month or less, has a substance equivalent to the basic wage, must, absent special circumstances, be regarded as having been fixed on the premise of a case where the worker performs only ordinary work (prescribed work) without performing any extended work, etc. at all; and as a result, where extended work, etc. is performed, an amount of the allowance corresponding to the additional working hours must additionally be paid. Therefore, the basic wage and an allowance which, by being paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly at intervals of one month or less, has a substance equivalent to the basic wage must be included in ordinary wages.
However, even an allowance paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly at intervals of one month or less is not included in ordinary wages in exceptional cases where its exclusion from ordinary wages cannot be evaluated as unjustly reducing the amount of extended work allowances, etc. to be paid to the worker. For example, even if an employer's monthly payment of premiums for a worker's individual pension insurance or group insurance at the workplace could be evaluated as wages paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly, this can only be interpreted as meaning that the same premium is to be paid regardless of whether the worker performs any extended work, etc. at all or, if extended work, etc. is performed, regardless of how many hours it amounts to; it cannot be interpreted, to the contrary, as having been fixed on the premise of a case where only ordinary work is performed, such that, where extended work, etc. is performed, an amount corresponding to the individual pension insurance or group insurance premium corresponding to the additional working hours must additionally be paid. This means that the premiums for a worker's individual pension insurance or group insurance paid monthly by the employer are consideration for the worker's total labor for one month, including not only ordinary work but also extended work, etc., and are not consideration for ordinary work (prescribed work). And an allowance which, although paid at intervals of one month or less, cannot be regarded as paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly is likewise wages as consideration for the total labor for one month.
As examined above, whether any given wage can, in essence, be included in ordinary wages is determined by whether that wage is consideration for ordinary work (prescribed work) or consideration for total labor. Whether any given wage is paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly is merely a secondary criterion for determining whether it also has the formal attribute equivalent to the basic wage. It is a leap in logic to interpret that, once a wage is determined to be paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly, that wage is immediately included in ordinary wages.
Dah. As will be examined below, bonuses or allowances paid at intervals exceeding one month cannot be regarded as having a substance equivalent to the basic wage; rather, they have an entirely different substance, and regardless of whether they are paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly, they do not have the substance of consideration for ordinary work (prescribed work) but have the substance of consideration for total labor. In the end, bonuses or allowances paid at intervals exceeding one month cannot be included in ordinary wages.
1) The logic of the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion appears to be based on the substantive ground that, even bonuses or allowances paid at intervals exceeding one month are, in any event, wages paid as consideration for labor, and if such bonuses or allowances are paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly, they are paid as consideration for ordinary work excluding extended work, etc.; therefore, if such bonuses or allowances were excluded from the ordinary wage that serves as the basis for calculating extended work allowances, etc., then, since a corresponding bonus or allowance would not be paid for extended work, etc., consideration for ordinary work and consideration for extended work, etc. would be treated differentially, which cannot be permitted in light of the concept of equity.
However, this logic seems to originate from a misunderstanding of the nature of bonuses or allowances paid at intervals exceeding one month. This logic can be justified only if it is affirmed that, so long as something has the character of wages paid as consideration for labor and is at the same time paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly, it is thereby paid as consideration for ordinary work rather than total labor, and therefore must, regardless of its type, necessarily be paid in an equivalent manner proportional to working hours, and must not be paid in any other manner.
2) Where labor and management agree to pay a bonus equal to 600% of the basic wage per year, two interpretations may be considered. First, it may be interpreted that they agreed to pay the same 600% of the basic wage per year as a bonus regardless of whether the worker performs any extended work, etc. at all, or, if extended work, etc. is performed, regardless of how many hours it amounts to. In this case, the bonus has the substance of wages paid as consideration for total labor. Alternatively, such an agreement may be interpreted as having been fixed on the premise of a case where only ordinary work is performed, and as an agreement to additionally pay the bonus, where extended work, etc. is performed, corresponding to the additional working hours. In this case, the bonus has the substance of wages paid as consideration for ordinary work (prescribed work). The majority opinion and the dissenting opinion interpret the matter, depending on the manner of payment of the bonus, in the latter manner where the bonus is evaluated as being paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly, thereby including it in ordinary wages, and in the former manner where it is not so evaluated, thereby excluding it from ordinary wages.
The problem is that such an interpretation based on the formal attribute of the manner of paying the bonus does not at all conform to the substance of the bonus as wages. For example, consider the case where, after an agreement to pay a bonus according to business performance, a bonus of 600% of the basic wage is paid, versus the case where, after a prior, definite agreement to pay a bonus of 600% of the basic wage per year regularly, uniformly, and fixedly, that bonus is paid — can it be said that the substance, as wages, of these two bonuses differs? The question is on what substantive basis it can be justified to hold that, in the former case, only the same bonus must be paid as consideration for total labor regardless of whether the worker performs any extended work, etc. at all or, if performed, regardless of how many hours, while in the latter case, since it was fixed on the premise of a case where only ordinary work is performed as consideration for ordinary work, an additional bonus corresponding to the additional working hours must be paid where extended work, etc. is performed. However, no such basis can be found either in statutory provisions, in the intention or practice of labor and management, or from the standpoint of purposive appropriateness.
While the basic wage has an attribute that inevitably requires it to be fixed in advance and paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly, a bonus has a characteristic such that it may or may not be fixed in advance and paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly. Without considering this characteristic of bonuses, it cannot be said that, merely because a bonus paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly resembles the basic wage in its manner of payment, its substance as wages differs from that of a bonus paid in another manner. Put bluntly, the interpretation by the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion may be said to be based on the formal logic that, if the amount of the bonus can be fixed in advance, it must be included because it can be taken into account in calculating ordinary wages, and if it cannot be fixed in advance, it must not be included because it cannot be taken into account in calculating ordinary wages. If the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion, without incurring such criticism, wish to carry through the substance of "equivalence of labor value," then they should interpret that, even where the standard for paying the bonus is fixed after the fact, once that standard is fixed, the extended work allowances, etc. must be recalculated and additionally paid.
In the end, the interpretation by the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion results in distorting the substance of bonuses having identical substance by differentiating them into bonuses having entirely different substances. This may be said to cause substantive inequality and undermine justice through interpretation. Such a result cannot be evaluated as realizing worker protection in accordance with substance.
3) Regardless of whether the manner of paying a bonus is regular, uniform, and fixed or not, it cannot be denied that the genuine intention of labor and management underlying the agreement on the payment of a bonus is to pay the fixed bonus equally regardless of whether or to what extent extended work, etc. is provided. In other words, the bonus is not consideration for ordinary work (prescribed work) but consideration for total labor. In this respect, it must be pointed out that the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion distort, through interpretation, the lawful intention formed by the autonomy of labor and management, in a manner unrelated to the actual intention of labor and management.
Attention should be paid to why labor and management, rather than including in the basic wage the wages paid as bonuses or allowances, pay them separately in this manner. Even if the reason was to reduce the amount of ordinary wages by not including them in the basic wage and instead paying them as bonuses or as allowances at intervals exceeding one month, the question is whether such a labor-management agreement must necessarily be deemed unlawfully evasive and have its effect denied. However, it should be acknowledged that such a labor-management agreement has a substantive and reasonable basis. Considering the employer's current capacity to pay as well as anticipated future capacity to pay, there is clearly a practical need for labor and management to agree that part of the wages be paid as basic wage or allowances (wages for ordinary work) that affect the wages for extended work, etc., while the remaining part be paid as bonuses or allowances (wages for total labor) that do not affect such wages. And it is naturally within the domain of lawful labor-management autonomy for labor and management to exercise such discretion in forming wages in order to meet this need. This means that the right and responsibility to determine the substance of wages and the corresponding form of payment of wages belong to both labor and management.
Wages formed in this manner can be broadly divided, according to their substance, into basic wage and bonus, and, generally, an allowance paid at intervals of one month or less has a substance equivalent to the basic wage, while an allowance paid at intervals exceeding one month has a substance equivalent to a bonus. Accordingly, the basic wage and an allowance paid at intervals of one month or less come to have the substance of wages for ordinary work, that is, prescribed work, while a bonus and an allowance paid at intervals exceeding one month come to have the substance of wages for total labor. Therefore, the basic wage and an allowance paid at intervals of one month or less correspond to ordinary wages, while a bonus and an allowance paid at intervals exceeding one month do not correspond to ordinary wages.
Nonetheless, if, as in the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion, any wage paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly must always be included in ordinary wages regardless of its type, the result would be that the manner in which an employer pays a bonus or allowance regularly, uniformly, and fixedly without affecting the allowance for extended work, etc. would be fundamentally prohibited. In order to avoid such a prohibition, there would be no choice but to circumvent it by selecting a manner in which the bonus or allowance paid is not evaluated as being paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly. It is difficult to see by what logic such a situation could be justified. In the end, it must be said that the constitutional right of labor and management to form the content of wages is fundamentally infringed without any statutory provision or justifiable substantive basis.
4) As examined above, the scope of ordinary wages is essentially determined not by the form of payment of wages but by the substance of wages, and the fundamental responsibility and right to determine the substance of wages and, accordingly, the scope of ordinary wages, belongs primarily to the parties, labor and management. Nonetheless, it is difficult to agree with the court's attempt to deny the effect of a labor-management agreement or labor-management practice and to itself form wages under a new framework, as this exceeds the limits of interpretation. Worker protection has a limit in that it must be realized harmoniously, on the premise of accepting the constitutional requirement providing for the autonomy of labor and management regarding working conditions, within a scope that does not cause adverse side effects. The interpretation within this limit is the interpretation that only the basic wage and an allowance paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly at intervals of one month or less as consideration for ordinary work (prescribed work) rather than total labor are included in ordinary wages.
Rah. Whether one follows the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion or the separate opinion, since the employer will form and pay wages through negotiation with workers within the scope of its ability to pay, it cannot be said that, in the long run, following one view or the other would be advantageous or disadvantageous to workers. This is because the amount of wage payment is determined by the employer's ability to pay, not by the manner of paying wages.
If the dissenting opinion is followed, the extended work allowance, night work allowance, or holiday work allowance for the past three years for which the statute of limitations has not run must be recalculated and additionally paid, and for retirees, the retirement allowance must be recalculated and additionally paid. Also, if the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion are followed, the employer will bear an obligation to make additional wage payments until an agreement is reached to resolve the burden of the employer's increased future wage payment amount resulting from the change in the scope of items subject to calculation of ordinary wages. While workers would gain the benefit of receiving wages not previously expected, the employer would bear an unexpected burden. Such a situation would become a sudden variable in the employer's management, thereby giving a shock to the national economy.
On the other hand, if the separate opinion is followed, it would have little effect on the currently existing wage payment situation. Where, in the past, a bonus or an allowance paid at intervals exceeding one month has been included in the scope of items subject to calculation of ordinary wages, this has been paid pursuant to the effect of a labor-management agreement or a labor-management practice and remains binding; and since the employer would have to follow the procedure for amending a collective agreement or for disadvantageous amendment of the rules of employment in order to abolish it or change it disadvantageously to workers, it appears that there would be almost no disadvantage to workers.
In the end, whether a sudden shock is caused to the national economy or not depends on how the concept of ordinary wages is understood. Even if the legal doctrine on ordinary wages concerning allowances paid at intervals exceeding one month, formed after the Supreme Court's decision 94Da19501, rendered on February 9, 1996, has persisted for a long time, the magnitude of the impact caused thereby is much smaller than the magnitude of the impact that would be caused by the legal doctrine that most bonuses may be included in the scope of items subject to calculation of ordinary wages. For this reason, it must be emphasized that, from the standpoint of legal stability as well, the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion are difficult to accept.
Mah. The argument that all wages other than those paid for extended work, etc. are paid as consideration for ordinary work is not, in itself, wrong. Rather, it may be said to be valid. It seems that, for this reason, the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion no longer examine the substance of wages further. However, the key to the question of whether a given wage falls under ordinary wages lies not in whether that wage is paid as consideration for ordinary work, but in whether that wage is paid solely as consideration for ordinary work, or as consideration for total labor including not only ordinary work but also extended work, etc. Failing to recognize this difference in the substance of wages, the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion have in effect abandoned the requirement of "prescribed work (ordinary work)," which is essentially important to the concept of ordinary wages, and as a result, it is understood that they have taken the wrong path of judging whether something is an ordinary wage based solely on the formal attributes of regularity, uniformity, and fixedness of wage payment, which have only secondary significance.
A tool concept can be shown to be legitimate only when it can properly perform the function of harmoniously interpreting reality in accordance with norms. However, the logic of the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion creates a serious discrepancy with the reality to which the norm is applied, which conversely proves that it cannot be accepted as a tool concept for interpretation. The fundamental reason for the failure of the logic of the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion to understand the reality to which the norm applies lies in the fact that, in establishing the concept of ordinary wages, without clearly distinguishing between consideration for ordinary work (prescribed work) and consideration for total labor, they excessively denied, without a clear basis for acknowledging it, the legal effect of labor-management agreements or labor-management practices concerning ordinary wages, which have a basis in the Constitution and statutes as well as actually existing in reality, while excessively pursuing, beyond a reasonable scope, the purpose-oriented interpretation of "equivalence of labor value."
And it is thought that this interpretation by the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion cannot be free from the criticism that it undermines the principles of a market economy based on private autonomy, which the Constitution provides for as the fundamental order, by excessively intervening in the formation of wages by labor and management.
Bah. For the foregoing reasons, while I agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion reversing the judgment of the court below, I take a different view as to its rationale, and thus set forth this separate opinion.
6. Concurring Supplementary Opinion of Justices Kim Yong-deok, Ko Young-han, and Kim So-young
We supplement the content of the majority opinion set forth above concerning whether the good faith principle can be applied to a claim for additional statutory allowances made on the ground that the labor-management agreement excluding the bonus in this case from ordinary wages is void.
Gah. The good faith principle functions as a general principle running through the entire legal order in cases where it is necessary to prevent unjust results that could arise from the formal and rigid application of positive law or contracts, and to realize concrete reasonableness. Thus, the good faith principle performs the functions of concretizing, in a manner appropriate to their meaning, the purport of provisions of positive law and the intentions of the parties to a juristic act, restricting bad-faith or unjust exercise of rights, and supplementing the content of positive law or a juristic act.
Nah. There can be no dispute that applying the good faith principle conveniently in the name of realizing concrete reasonableness could not only harm legal stability but also cause confusion in the legal order, and that, in particular, excluding the application of positive law through the good faith principle while acknowledging the mandatory nature of that positive law could disregard the purport of the mandatory provision, and therefore the good faith principle should be applied exceptionally within a limited scope.
However, considering, together with the close relationship between wages and ordinary wages as already explained in detail in the majority opinion, the practice of wage negotiations between labor and management in our country, the circumstances leading to the labor-management agreement to exclude regular bonuses from ordinary wages, the degree of substantive disadvantage suffered by workers as a result thereof, the effect on both labor and management if the assertion of invalidity of the above labor-management agreement were accepted, and other various circumstances, as well as the point that, where the parties were mistaken about matters that they mutually presupposed or that formed the basis of their agreement, it also falls within the domain of the good faith principle to ascertain their hypothetical intention under certain requirements and make a just adjustment of interests, we find that the good faith principle may exceptionally be applied to a claim by workers for additional statutory allowances on the ground that the labor-management agreement excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages is void.
Dah. Absent special circumstances such as a conflict with the Minimum Wage Act (최저임금법), wages are determined by agreement between labor and management and the labor contract based thereon, and ordinary wages refer, among the wages so determined, to money or valuables paid regularly, uniformly, and fixedly as consideration for prescribed work; therefore, whether something is an ordinary wage is determined according to the specific content and payment conditions of wages set forth in the labor-management agreement. A labor-management agreement determining which wages, among those paid to workers, are to be included as ordinary wages cannot be permitted to the extent that it falls short of the standards set by the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법). However, since workers and employers, on an equal footing, may determine the content and payment conditions of wages according to their free will, and thereby divide wages into those having the content and payment conditions corresponding to ordinary wages and those not, it cannot be denied that the specific scope of wages substantively corresponding to ordinary wages is determined or changed through labor-management agreements or labor contracts.
While wages under an individual labor contract are consideration for the labor provided by an individual worker, on the other hand, the total amount of wages for all workers becomes a cost that must be expended for production, and thus, as explained in detail in the majority opinion, wage negotiations are inevitably limited by having to be conducted on the basis of the limited profits of the enterprise. Accordingly, wage negotiations between labor and management in our country have determined, based on the total wage amount, the scale of the basic wage, bonuses, various allowances, together with statutory allowances calculated on the basis of ordinary wages, and determined the wage increase rate and whether to newly establish, abolish, or increase various allowances, as well as the amount, form, and timing of payment of each wage item; and in that process, as noted above, for various reasons, a labor-management practice was formed premised on the understanding that regular bonuses do not fall under ordinary wages, and accordingly did not include them in ordinary wages.
In light of the circumstances and limitations of such wage negotiations, it is reasonable to view that, had labor and management known, at the time of the previous wage negotiations, unlike the above labor-management practice, that regular bonuses could fall under ordinary wages and that the amount of ordinary wages would thereby increase correspondingly, they would have conducted considerably different wage negotiations, such as changing the amount, content, and payment conditions of wages, so that the total amount of wages paid to workers, including various statutory allowances calculated on the basis of that ordinary wage, would not substantively differ from the total amount of wages, including various statutory allowances calculated on the basis of the ordinary wage contemplated in the labor-management agreement.
In the end, if labor and management negotiated wage adjustments on the basis of the total wage amount and concluded a new labor contract in accordance with the result of that wage negotiation, this is the result of a choice made according to the free will of labor and management, and the direct purpose for which labor and management concluded that labor contract is that adjusted total wage amount; the trust of labor and management in that labor contract lies not in the detailed payment conditions or calculation method of wages by item, but in the level of that adjusted total wage amount. Therefore, where labor and management, due to a mistake, etc. regarding the scope of wages falling under ordinary wages during the wage negotiation process, failed to properly determine the content and payment conditions of wages by item, thereby affecting the result of the negotiation based on the total wage amount, it is appropriate to respect the trust in the choice made according to such free will and to allow for correcting or avoiding the unjust result arising from the mistake, etc., and this cannot be said to be contrary to the purport of the Labor Standards Act, which sets the minimum standards for working conditions in relation to ordinary wages.
Rah. In response, the dissenting opinion points out that this is merely a subjective and hypothetical intention viewed from the employer's perspective, and that, viewed from the workers' perspective, there is a possibility that labor-management consultations were conducted in the direction of maintaining the wage level while reducing overtime work, and that it is therefore improper to accept such subjective and hypothetical intention as a natural premise and to use it as the starting point for applying the good faith principle.
However, this point made by the dissenting opinion is not only far removed from the actual practice of wage negotiations, which have determined wage levels by, on the basis of the total wage amount, placing importance on the real wage increase rate and predetermining the scale of the basic wage, bonuses, various allowances, and statutory allowances calculated on the basis of ordinary wages, but also overlooks the fact that the wage level determined at the time of wage negotiations was set on the premise of the scale of profit that the enterprise had obtained or could obtain in the future through workers' continued provision of a certain amount of overtime work. If workers did not provide overtime work or reduced it, the enterprise's production and sales volume would decrease, and its profit would likewise decrease; and even if the enterprise, in response, deployed new replacement personnel in an attempt to maintain the previous production and sales volume, it would likewise be difficult to maintain the same level of profit as at the time of the wage negotiations, due to the initial facility costs incurred, the increase in education and training costs, and the decrease in labor productivity of newly hired personnel, among other factors. Therefore, the premise that workers would have maintained the same wage level while reducing overtime work is rather unreasonable.
In light of the above close relationship between wages and ordinary wages, and the process and substance of wage negotiations, it can be said that, in the end, labor and management determined wage levels on the basis of the enterprise's limited profits, placing importance on the real wage increase rate based on the total wage amount, and accordingly, even though statutory allowances for overtime work were paid without including regular bonuses in ordinary wages, the substantive disadvantage suffered by workers as a result thereof cannot be said to be very significant in terms of the total wage amount. On the other hand, if workers belatedly assert that the labor-management agreement excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages is void and seek additional payment of statutory allowances calculated by including regular bonuses in ordinary wages, this shakes the premise or basis mutually understood by the parties at the time of the wage negotiations; on the one hand, they would receive all of the basic wage, bonuses, various allowances, etc., the payment conditions or amounts of which would have been different under the enterprise's limited profits had that premise or basis been different, while on the other hand, asserting that that premise or basis is void, they would claim additional statutory allowances exceeding the enterprise's limited profits under the mistaken assumption that the payment conditions or amounts thereof would remain the same, and it is clear that, as a result, both parties would obtain additional benefits that neither party contemplated.
If such additional benefit is at a level that the enterprise's management or financial condition can bear, this would be one thing; but if it exceeds that level and thereby causes serious managerial difficulty to the enterprise, this would break the foundation of mutual trust in the labor-management relationship, in which labor and management have formed labor-management agreements based on mutual trust and maintained an autonomous and harmonious relationship in pursuit of common interests, due to unforeseen causes.
Mah. Furthermore, considering the insufficiency or ambiguity of the relevant provisions of the Labor Standards Act concerning the criteria for determining ordinary wages, the administrative interpretations of the Ministry of Employment and Labor (고용노동부) which exert considerable influence in the field of labor, and labor-management practices in our country, the trust formed by most employers with average knowledge, who believed that regular bonuses did not fall under ordinary wages and, on that premise, negotiated wages on an equal footing with workers and concluded collective agreements, etc., cannot be said to be trust that cannot be protected under the good faith principle.
And since a labor union is an organization or federation thereof organized autonomously by workers as the main body for the purpose of maintaining and improving working conditions and otherwise enhancing the economic and social status of workers (main text of Article 2, Item 4 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법)), and matters concerning collective agreements must be resolved by a general meeting of the labor union (Article 16, Paragraph 1, Item 3 of the same Act), and the representative of a labor union has the authority to negotiate and conclude collective agreements with the employer or employers' association on behalf of the labor union or its members (Article 29, Paragraph 1 of the same Act), it is likewise inappropriate to deny the application of the good faith principle in relation to individual workers merely because the formal party concluding the collective agreement is the labor union. Even for non-union members, if they have reached an express or implied agreement with the employer that such collective agreement also applies to them, the fact that the party concluding the collective agreement is the labor union does not constitute an obstacle to the application of the good faith principle.
Above all, the reason the majority opinion seeks to apply the good faith principle under certain requirements in order to protect such trust of the employer is that, since both labor and management believed that regular bonuses did not fall under ordinary wages and negotiated wages on that premise, but that premise turned out to be mistaken, resulting in a significantly different outcome from what both labor and management intended, an adjustment of interests accordingly is inevitable; and such adjustment of a significant and unforeseen imbalance of interests is precisely one of the functions performed by the good faith principle.
The Supreme Court has held that "where both parties to a contract are mistaken in the same way regarding a matter that is the premise or basis of the contract, and as a result failed to reach a specific agreement thereon, the contract may be interpreted by supplementing the parties' intention with the content that the parties would appear to have agreed upon had there been no such mistake, and the supplemented intention of the parties here refers not to the actual or subjective intention of the parties, but to the intention for a just adjustment of interests that is objectively inferred in light of the purpose of the contract, transactional practice, applicable statutes, the good faith principle, and the like" (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Da13288, decided November 23, 2006). Comparatively as well, where both parties to a contract are mistaken in the same way regarding a matter that is the premise or basis of the contract, such a method of adjusting interests is widely practiced. The Principles of European Contract Law, prepared in connection with the unification of law within the European Union (EU), provide that, where both parties are mistaken in the same way regarding facts or law, the court may, at the request of either party, adjust the contract to the content that the parties would reasonably have agreed upon (Article 4:105, Paragraph 3); and in Germany as well, where both parties are mistaken in the same way, it was recognized, prior to the 2002 amendment of the Civil Code, that the court could, ex officio, weigh the parties' interests and adjust the content of the contract based on Article 242 of the German Civil Code, which provides for performance in accordance with good faith, and through that amendment, an express provision on this matter (Article 313) was newly established.
Although it is not appropriate to directly apply the above Supreme Court case-law theory to this case, where the issue is not whether a collective agreement, etc. can be interpreted or its content adjusted, the spirit and reasoning of the law, which seeks to adjust the just interests objectively inferred by applying the good faith principle, etc. where both parties to a contract are mistaken in the same way regarding a matter that is the premise or basis of the contract, may equally apply to this case, which is identical or similar in situation.
By contrast, the view that, disregarding the circumstances, goals, and results of the wage negotiations, and premised on the notion that the form and conditions of payment of bonuses and allowances must be maintained as they are, only the portion of the labor-management agreement excluding regular bonuses from ordinary wages should be separated out and deemed void as formally violating the mandatory provisions of the Labor Standards Act, such that regular bonuses must be added to ordinary wages and additional statutory allowances calculated on that basis must be paid, is a view that, disregarding the overall substance and equity of the case, places excessive emphasis on the single aspect that the mandatory nature of the Labor Standards Act must be upheld, thereby seeking to uniformly enforce the formal application of positive law.
Bah. And the reason the majority opinion presents "serious managerial difficulty for the enterprise" as one of the requirements for applying the good faith principle is to prevent the unlimited expansion of the application of the good faith principle by allowing its application only where a significantly inequitable result arises, based on whether the workers' claim for additional statutory allowances is at a level that can be borne in light of the enterprise's financial or managerial condition. Therefore, what circumstances constitute "serious managerial difficulty" can only be determined by comprehensively considering individual and specific circumstances, such as the financial and managerial condition of the individual enterprise and the scale of the additional statutory allowances that would have to be paid if regular bonuses were included in ordinary wages for the calculation of statutory allowances.
However, returning to this case, we examine whether "serious managerial difficulty" can be recognized. The Defendant asserts that, calculating, on the basis of one worker whose length of service was approximately 20 years and 8 months as of January 1, 2010, close to the average length of service of the Defendant's production workers, the additional financial burden to the Defendant for the year 2010 if the bonus at issue in this case, paid every even-numbered month, were included in ordinary wages, the hourly ordinary wage would increase from 8,970 won under the 2010 wage negotiation to 15,246 won, an increase of about 69.9%, and accordingly, the various statutory allowances, including the additional extended work allowance for one worker, would also increase by approximately 11,048,393 won; and that the real wage increase rate for one worker compared to 2009 would more than double, from 19.9% [(2010 total wage payment of 63,865,898 won - 2009 total wage payment of 53,254,158 won) ÷ 53,254,158 won] under the 2010 wage negotiation to 40.6% [(2010 total wage payment of 63,865,898 won + additional statutory allowance amount of 11,048,393 won - 2009 total wage payment of 53,254,158 won) ÷ 53,254,158 won]; and that, if this real wage increase amount for one worker is taken as an average and applied to the 401 production workers, the Defendant would face a situation in which it would have to additionally pay to the production workers an amount equivalent to approximately 99.8% of the 2010 net income of 4,435,313,273 won.
Since this Judgment marks the first pronouncement of the legal doctrine on violation of the good faith principle, and accordingly the lower court's examination on this point was insufficient, the propriety of the above assertion should be examined anew in the court to which the case is remanded; however, if the Defendant's above assertion is true, the additional financial burden imposed on the Defendant by including the bonus at issue in this case in ordinary wages would be sufficient to cause serious managerial difficulty to the Defendant, and thus, in light of the legal doctrine set forth in the majority opinion, there is room to view that the Plaintiff's claim for unpaid annual leave allowances, etc. calculated by including the bonus at issue in this case in ordinary wages violates the good faith principle.
Meanwhile, the dissenting opinion points out, citing the circumstance that the Defendant, from January 2009 to February 2010, temporarily paid the bonus at issue in this case monthly to office workers only, that the application of the good faith principle should be excluded for that period. The majority opinion also acknowledges that, if this was done with the intent of, only for that period and without any conditions, guaranteeing real wages to all office workers, unlike production workers, by including the bonus at issue in this case in ordinary wages, this portion could be excluded from the application of the good faith principle, and thus, in this respect, it does not appear to differ from the view of the dissenting opinion. The only difference is that the majority opinion considers it necessary to clearly examine, and then render a final determination on, the motive and circumstances under which the Defendant, while a bonus payment rule providing for payment of the bonus once every even-numbered month existed, temporarily paid the bonus in the above manner, and whether this could also apply to the Plaintiff, since these matters have not been properly examined.
Sah. In the end, we believe that the majority opinion, which applies the good faith principle to the claim for additional statutory allowances made on the ground that the labor-management agreement excluding the bonus at issue in this case from ordinary wages is void, has sufficient basis and is a reasonable view.
We hereby set forth the above supplementary opinion to the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice), Justices Yang Chang-soo, Shin Young-cheol, Min Il-young, Lee In-bok, Lee Sang-hoon, Park Byong-dae, Kim Yong-deok, Park Bo-young, Ko Young-han (Justice in Charge), Kim Chang-seok, Kim Shin, Kim So-young