[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Attorneys Kim Sang-eun and 2 others, Counsel for the Plaintiffs)
[Defendant, Appellee] ○○○ Co., Ltd. (Attorneys Lee Je-ho and 3 others, Counsel for the Defendant)
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul Central District Court Decision 2022Na75299, decided October 12, 2023
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Central District Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Whether wages payable only upon satisfaction of a certain number of working days constitute ordinary wages
A. Legal principles concerning ordinary wages
Article 6(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법 시행령) defines ordinary wages as "the hourly wage, daily wage, weekly wage, monthly wage, or piece-rate wage that is determined to be paid regularly and uniformly to an employee for prescribed working hours or total working hours." Interpreting the concept of ordinary wages faithfully to the definition and purpose of the statute, ordinary wages refer to wages that are determined to be paid regularly and uniformly as consideration for prescribed work. If an employee fully performs the prescribed work, then wages that are determined to be paid regularly and uniformly as consideration therefor constitute ordinary wages regardless of the existence or the possibility of fulfillment of any conditions attached thereto. Even where a certain wage is subject to a condition that it be paid only if a certain number of working days is satisfied (hereinafter "working-day condition"), if such a condition is one that an employee who fully provides the prescribed work would satisfy—that is, a working-day condition set within the number of prescribed working days—the mere fact that such a condition is attached does not negate the ordinary-wage nature of that wage. Even if an employee's actual number of working days falls short of the prescribed number of working days such that the employee fails to receive the working-day-conditional wage, so long as that wage possesses the characteristics of being consideration for prescribed work, regularity, and uniformity, it must be included in the ordinary wage for the purpose of calculating statutory allowances for extended, night, and holiday work (hereinafter "extended work, etc."). This is because ordinary wages are a standard wage determined to reflect the value of prescribed work, regardless of the actual number of working days or the wages actually received. On the other hand, a working-day-conditional wage requiring a number of working days exceeding the prescribed working days is not paid merely because the prescribed work was provided, but rather as consideration for additional work beyond the prescribed work, and therefore does not constitute an ordinary wage. The specific grounds are as follows.
1) The Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399, decided December 18, 2013 (hereinafter the "2013 En Banc Decision") set forth "fixedness"—meaning that whether and how much wages are to be paid is fixed in advance regardless of whether a condition is fulfilled—as a conceptual indicium of ordinary wages, and accordingly held that working-day-conditional wages lack fixedness because the fulfillment of the condition of "satisfying a certain number of working days" is uncertain. However, this concept of fixedness has no basis anywhere in labor-related statutes, including Article 6(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act, which is the provision defining ordinary wages. The concept of fixedness narrows the scope of ordinary wages without any statutory basis. This results in a failure to provide fair compensation for extended work, etc., which is inconsistent with the purpose of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) to discourage extended work, etc. Moreover, treating fixedness as a conceptual indicium of ordinary wages creates the risk that the parties to an employment relationship could easily exclude a wage from ordinary wages by attaching payment conditions such as a working-day condition, thereby undermining the mandatory nature of ordinary wages. Since ordinary wages are a legal and mandatory concept, they must in principle be interpreted faithfully to the statutory definition and purpose, in a manner that the parties cannot arbitrarily alter.
2) Since the essence of ordinary wages lies in being a standard wage evaluating the value of the work that an employee has agreed to provide during prescribed working hours, it must fully reflect the value of the prescribed work itself, independent of actual work performed. Ordinary wages are a hypothetical instrumental concept, and the employee presupposed by that concept is "an employee who fully provides the prescribed work." If an employee and an employer agree in advance that "if 40 hours of prescribed work per week are provided, KRW 1,000,000 will be paid as consideration therefor," then the amount predetermined by the parties reflecting the value of 40 hours of prescribed work is "KRW 1,000,000." So long as this amount possesses regularity and uniformity, it is evaluated as an ordinary wage. In this way, the premise that "the employee will fully provide the predetermined prescribed work" is inherently embedded in the concept of ordinary wages. Of course, the premise of "full provision of prescribed work" is not always realized in fact. An employee may, due to personal circumstances, provide only 30 hours of actual work per week. An employee may have wages reduced due to disciplinary action for misconduct. However, even in such cases, ordinary wages must be calculated on the premise that the "provision of 40 hours of prescribed work" as predetermined by the employee and employer is fully realized, and it suffices to do so. The subsequent fact that only 30 hours of actual work were provided can affect only the actual wages, not the ordinary wage.
3) Considering that ordinary wages are an instrumental concept for calculating statutory allowances such as extended-work allowances, the requirement of "ex ante calculability" must also be given significant weight. That is, the standard for determining ordinary wages must be clear and predictable. The prior precedent's declaration of the legal principle that "if the fulfillment of a condition is uncertain, fixedness is lacking and the wage is not an ordinary wage" may have originated from a direction seeking to present an outwardly clear and easily applicable standard. However, as discussed above, this concept of fixedness fails to satisfy the requirements of conformity with statute, mandatory character, and reflection of the value of prescribed work, and thus cannot serve as a conceptual indicium of ordinary wages.
The "ex ante determinacy" that forms the core of the existing concept of fixedness is also an indicator that can never be perfectly achieved from the outset. This is because no one can perfectly determine in advance whether circumstances such as absence from work, disciplinary action, or retirement will arise in the future to frustrate the payment of all or part of the wages. Ultimately, the ex ante calculability of ordinary wages can be achieved by excluding future factors that cannot be determined in advance and by adhering faithfully to the premised concept of "full provision of prescribed work." Therefore, where the number of working days imposed as a condition falls within the prescribed number of working days, whether the wage constitutes an ordinary wage should be determined on the premise that the employee works all of the prescribed working days, without linking the possibility of fulfilling the condition to the status as an ordinary wage.
4) "An employee who fully provides the prescribed work" may not necessarily coincide with the typical appearance of employees at the relevant workplace. Depending on the industry, the actual working conditions of employees, and the period, there may be cases where a considerable number of employees fail to provide the prescribed work. However, whether a wage subject to a payment condition constitutes an ordinary wage cannot be determined based on the standard of "whether it is a condition that employees at the relevant workplace can ordinarily satisfy," taking into account the specific working conditions of the employees. The standard for determining ordinary wages must be one that can be consistently applied to the wide variety of wage types. If "the ordinary possibility of fulfilling the condition" is adopted as the standard, then, for example, in the case of a continued-employment-conditional wage, it might be possible to determine ordinary-wage status on the logic that "it is ordinary for an employee to remain employed at the workplace, and retirement is merely an exceptional event." However, in the case of working-day-conditional wages, it is not easy to determine what number of working days would be recognized as one for which "the ordinary possibility of fulfilling the condition" exists. This can only be determined under the influence of various variables, such as the perspective on what is "ordinary," the characteristics and practices of the workplace, and the work patterns of employees. Because the determination of "how many days out of the prescribed working days it is ordinary to actually work" is unclear, it would ultimately be necessary, in each individual case, to assess statistics on the rate of satisfaction of the working-day condition at the relevant workplace and gauge ordinariness after the fact, thereby seriously undermining the ex ante calculability of ordinary wages. In light of this, in order to secure clarity and predictability in determining ordinary wages, it is appropriate to determine whether a wage constitutes an ordinary wage on the premise of "full provision of prescribed work."
5) Among workplaces that pay working-day-conditional wages, there are some that include days on which leave was used in the number of working days when determining whether the condition is satisfied, and there are also workplaces that have so-called "actual-working-day-conditional wages," which count only days actually worked toward the number of working days. In the latter case, for example, a wage paid on condition that the employee actually works all of the prescribed working days requires the employee to have a perfect attendance record for the prescribed working days without using any leave, and there is some room to view this as imposing an additional condition beyond the prescribed work. However, since the accrual and use of leave vary individually and fluidly by workplace and by employee, it is difficult to clearly determine whether an employee's use of a few days of leave while maintaining perfect attendance for the remaining prescribed working days constitutes "full provision of prescribed work." Even if this could be calculated by reference to, for example, the actual work status of employees, doing so would link the determination of ordinary wages to "actual work," thereby significantly reducing the ex ante calculability of ordinary wages. In light of this, it is appropriate to determine the ordinary-wage status of actual-working-day-conditional wages collectively based on whether the number of working days imposed as a condition exceeds the number of prescribed working days, without considering whether leave accrued or was actually used.
6) Meanwhile, although the number of prescribed working days may in principle be freely determined by the parties to the employment relationship within the scope set by the Labor Standards Act, where the parties, intending solely to exclude a certain working-day-conditional wage from ordinary wages, set a number of prescribed working days that is divorced from actual working conditions, and thereby seek to undermine the mandatory nature of ordinary wages, the effect of such an agreement may be denied.
B. Change of precedent and scope of application of the new legal principle
The portion of the 2013 En Banc Decision that determined the ordinary-wage status of working-day-conditional wages by treating fixedness as a conceptual indicium of ordinary wages, and all prior decisions to the same effect, are hereby changed to the extent inconsistent with the views expressed in this judgment. The new legal principle as changed above shall, in consideration of legal stability and protection of reliance, apply to the calculation of ordinary wages from and after the date of pronouncement of this judgment; provided, however, that with respect to this case and any parallel cases pending before the courts at the time of pronouncement of this judgment, in which the legal principle changed by this judgment serves as a premise for adjudication and the issue of ordinary-wage status is being contested, the new legal principle must be applied retroactively, given the nature of the judiciary's function of providing relief of rights in specific cases.
C. Determination as to this case
1) The lower court determined that the bonus at issue in this case (hereinafter "the instant bonus") is not an ordinary wage, on the grounds, among others, that it is payable only upon fulfillment of the condition that the employee work at least 15 days during the reference period, and that, at the time of the provision of work, whether that condition would be fulfilled was uncertain, such that fixedness was lacking.
2) According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the following facts may be ascertained.
A) The Defendant's collective agreement and bonus regulations provide that, with respect to the instant bonus, 750% of the ordinary wage is to be paid in installments, bimonthly, and at Lunar New Year, Chuseok, and summer vacation. The bonus regulations provide that the reference period for the bimonthly bonuses (100% each) is the two-month period from the first day of the month preceding payment to the last day of the month of payment; for the Lunar New Year bonus (50%), the period from the immediately preceding Chuseok to the day before the relevant Lunar New Year; for the Chuseok bonus (50%), the period from the immediately preceding Lunar New Year to the day before the relevant Chuseok; and for the summer bonus (50%), the period from the start date of the previous year's summer vacation to the day before the start date of the current year's summer vacation.
B) The Defendant's rules of employment provide that "working hours shall be based on 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week," and the bonus regulations provide that "an employee who joined during the reference period and worked fewer than 15 days, or an employee whose actual number of working days during the reference period is fewer than 15 due to authorized or unauthorized absence, unapproved absence, unpaid time for union activities, strike, temporary closure, standby for resignation, leave of absence, suspension from duty, full-time union leave (unpaid), etc." shall be excluded from those eligible to receive the bonus.
3) In light of the legal principles set forth above, since the Defendant's workplace operates on a five-day workweek, the 15 working days required by the instant bonus falls short of the number of prescribed working days corresponding to each reference period, and thus constitutes a number of working days that would be satisfied by an employee who fully provides the prescribed work. The mere fact that such a working-day condition is attached cannot be deemed to negate the ordinary-wage status of the instant bonus. Since the instant bonus is a wage paid in installments at regular intervals in a fixed amount corresponding to 750% of the ordinary wage, it constitutes an ordinary wage determined to be paid regularly and uniformly as consideration for prescribed work, notwithstanding the working-day condition.
Nevertheless, the lower court determined, based solely on the circumstances stated in its judgment, that the instant bonus does not constitute an ordinary wage. This determination by the lower court contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning ordinary wages, which affected the judgment.
2. Whether there was a violation of the duty to inform employees of the rules of employment
The lower court determined that the provision concerning persons excluded from payment under the bonus regulations, as part of the rules of employment, had been sufficiently made known to employees. In light of the relevant legal principles and the record, this determination by the lower court is justified, and it contains no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, in violation of the rules of evidence or of failing to fulfill its duty to deliberate.
3. Conclusion
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, upon the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the judgment, as set forth in the Order.
Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae (Presiding Justice), Justice Kim Sang-hwan, Justice Noh Tae-ak, Justice Lee Heung-koo, Justice Oh Kyung-mi (Justice in charge), Justice Oh Seok-jun, Justice Seo Kyung-hwan, Justice Kwon Young-jun, Justice Um Sang-pil, Justice Shin Sook-hee, Justice Noh Kyung-pil, Justice Park Young-jae, Justice Lee Sook-yeon