[Plaintiff, Appellee] Plaintiff (Counsel: Attorney Byun Min-hyeok)
[Defendant, Appellant] ○○○ Hospital (Counsel: Government Legal Service, Attorney Shim Hye-jin and 6 others)
[Lower Court Judgment] Cheongju District Court Judgment of November 8, 2018, Case No. 2017Na14667
[Order]
The part of the lower court judgment against the Defendant is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Cheongju District Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal (to the extent supplemented by documents submitted after the submission period) are examined.
1. Whether the diligence allowance and special welfare benefits constitute ordinary wages (regarding the second and third grounds of appeal)
A. Ordinary wages refer to wages that are determined to be paid regularly and uniformly as consideration for prescribed work. Wages determined to be paid regularly and uniformly as consideration when an employee fully provides the prescribed work constitute ordinary wages regardless of the existence or likelihood of fulfillment of any condition attached thereto. A condition attached to wages may be considered as one of the factors negating the character of consideration for prescribed work, regularity, or uniformity in the process of substantively determining the objective nature of the relevant wage, but the mere fact that the fulfillment of the condition is uncertain cannot be deemed to negate the character of ordinary wages.
Since ordinary wages are a tool concept reflecting the value of prescribed work as distinguished from actual work, they must be calculated based on an employment relationship premised on the continuous provision of prescribed work. An employee's continued employment is a natural premise for providing prescribed work under the employment contract. Therefore, the mere fact that a condition requiring that an employee be employed as of a specific point in time in order to receive certain wages (hereinafter “employment-status condition”) is attached does not negate the character of such wages as consideration for prescribed work or their character as ordinary wages (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2020Da247190, decided December 19, 2024).
Even if a wage is attached with a condition that it be paid only when a certain number of days of work is satisfied (hereinafter “number-of-workdays condition”), if such a condition is one that would be satisfied by an employee who fully provides the prescribed work, that is, a number-of-workdays condition set within the number of prescribed working days, the mere fact that such a condition is attached does not negate the character of the wage as ordinary wages. Even if an employee's actual number of workdays falls short of the prescribed number of working days such that the employee fails to receive the wage subject to the number-of-workdays condition, so long as the wage possesses the character of consideration for prescribed work, regularity, and uniformity, it must be included in ordinary wages when calculating statutory allowances for extended, night, and holiday work (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2023Da302838, decided December 19, 2024).
B. Diligence allowance subject to an employment-status condition
According to the reasoning of the lower court judgment and the record, it can be seen that the Defendant's collective agreement and remuneration regulations provide that a diligence allowance, in an amount corresponding to a certain percentage of the monthly base salary depending on years of service, is to be paid to full-time officers and employees on the pay dates of January and July each year, and that a provision states, "The recipients of the diligence allowance shall be those who hold the status of an officer or employee as of the first day of the month of payment of the allowance and are paid remuneration, and who have received remuneration for six months prior to the first day of the month of payment of the diligence allowance."
In light of the above facts and the legal principles set forth above, the diligence allowance at issue, which is paid in an amount corresponding to a certain percentage of the monthly base salary on the pay dates of January and July each year, constitutes ordinary wages paid regularly and uniformly as consideration for prescribed work, notwithstanding the employment-status condition. Although the part of the lower court's judgment that assumed fixedness (immutability) as a conceptual indicator of ordinary wages, in accordance with precedent prior to its modification, is inappropriate, the lower court's conclusion recognizing the diligence allowance at issue as ordinary wages is justified, and there is no error affecting the judgment, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning ordinary wages, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
C. Special welfare benefits subject to a number-of-workdays condition
1) According to the reasoning of the lower court judgment and the record, the following facts can be known.
A) The collective agreement and special welfare benefits regulations in this case provided for the payment of special welfare benefits in an amount equal to 120% of the base salary, to be paid 60% each in April and October of each year.
B) The special welfare benefits regulations in this case included a provision stating, "Special welfare benefits shall be paid to those who have continuously worked for six months prior to the payment date, and if the period of service is less than six months, the amount shall be calculated on a monthly pro-rata basis; provided, however, that no payment shall be made if the period of service is less than 15 days."
C) The collective agreement in this case provides, "Working hours shall be based on a five-day work week, with 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week as the standard working hours."
2) In light of the above facts and the legal principles set forth above, at the Defendant's place of business, which operates on a five-day work week system, 15 days of work constitutes a number of workdays that would be satisfied by an employee who fully provides the prescribed work. The special welfare benefits at issue are wages paid in an amount equal to 60% of the salary for the relevant month on the pay dates of April and October each year, and thus constitute money or valuables agreed to be paid for work that an employee is ordinarily scheduled to provide during prescribed working hours. Even with the number-of-workdays condition described above attached, they constitute ordinary wages determined to be paid regularly and uniformly as consideration for prescribed work. As stated above, although the lower court's determination regarding fixedness is inappropriate, the lower court's conclusion recognizing the special welfare benefits at issue as ordinary wages is justified, and there is no error affecting the judgment, such as a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the meaning of consideration for prescribed work or ordinary wages, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
2. Whether welfare points constitute ordinary wages (regarding the fourth ground of appeal)
A. In order for money or valuables paid by an employer to an employee to constitute wages, such money or valuables must first be paid as compensation for work; even if such money or valuables are paid continuously and regularly, if they cannot be regarded as paid as compensation for work, they do not constitute wages. In determining whether certain money or valuables were paid as compensation for work, it must be possible to view the obligation to pay such money or valuables as directly related to, or closely related to, the provision of work (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da55934, decided May 12, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 2011Da23149, decided July 14, 2011, etc.).
Even where an employer implements a selective welfare system and continuously and regularly allocates welfare points to employees based on a collective agreement or employment rules, etc., which can be used for purchasing goods on an online shopping site exclusively for employees or in similar ways, such welfare points do not constitute wages as referred to in the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), and as a result, do not constitute ordinary wages either (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2016Da48785, decided August 22, 2019).
B. According to the reasoning of the lower court judgment and the record, the following facts can be known.
1) The Defendant has implemented a selective welfare system under which welfare points allocated individually to each employee can be used according to the employee's own preferences and needs to select welfare items and levels of benefits, and accordingly, employees belonging to the Defendant were allocated welfare points annually according to their job category, years of service, and family relationships.
2) Welfare points under the selective welfare system are designated for use in items such as health management, capability development, culture and leisure, and family-friendliness, and cannot be used for speculative or unwholesome items, purchase of securities, or beauty-related medical procedures not intended for treatment purposes.
3) Welfare points are used by an individual selecting an item among the pre-designated usable items and paying with a welfare card, and employees belonging to the Defendant must use their welfare points within the year in which they were allocated; any remaining welfare points after use cannot be carried over to the following year or claimed in cash.
C. In light of the above facts and the legal principles set forth above, it is reasonable to hold that even though the Defendant continuously and regularly allocated welfare points to its employees while implementing a selective welfare system, such welfare points do not constitute wages as referred to in the Labor Standards Act, and as a result, do not constitute ordinary wages either.
Nevertheless, the lower court's determination that welfare points under the selective welfare system constitute ordinary wages contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the wage character of welfare points, thereby making "a determination contrary to Supreme Court precedent" as provided in Article 3, Item 2 of the Small Claims Act (소액사건심판법).
3. The scope of application of Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings (regarding the fifth ground of appeal)
A. Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings (소송촉진 등에 관한 특례법; hereinafter the "Act on Expedition of Legal Proceedings") provides, "Where it is deemed reasonable for the debtor to contest the existence or scope of the obligation to perform prior to the rendering of a fact-finding judgment declaring that the debtor is obligated to perform, Paragraph 1 shall not apply to the extent deemed reasonable." This provision sets forth the circumstances under which the application of Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Act on Expedition of Legal Proceedings, which is a special provision concerning the statutory interest rate serving as the basis for calculating damages for delay in the performance of a monetary obligation, may be excluded. If the debtor disputed the existence and scope of the obligation to perform and such argument was accepted at the first instance, then even if such argument is rejected at the appellate court, the argument may be deemed to have a reasonable basis; in such a case, the interest rate on damages for delay set forth in Paragraph 1 of the same Article cannot be applied until the date of pronouncement of the appellate judgment, pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Act on Expedition of Legal Proceedings (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da30356, decided September 12, 2013, etc.).
B. In this case, the first instance court partially accepted the Defendant's argument, recognizing only the meal subsidy, transportation subsidy, and physical fitness allowance among the Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant as ordinary wages, and dismissed all of the Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant. The lower court overturned the conclusion of the first instance and accepted the remainder of the Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant, excluding a portion of the damages for delay. Since the Defendant's argument was accepted at the first instance, such argument must be deemed to have a reasonable basis; therefore, even in accepting the Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant, the lower court could not apply the interest rate on damages for delay set forth in Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Act on Expedition of Legal Proceedings until the date of pronouncement of the lower court judgment, pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the same Act. Nevertheless, the lower court's application of the interest rate on damages for delay set forth in Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Act on Expedition of Legal Proceedings from October 8, 2016, the day after the date of service of the copy of the application for the purport and grounds of claim in this case, until the date of full payment, contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the application of the above provision, thereby making "a determination contrary to Supreme Court precedent" as provided in Article 3, Item 2 of the Small Claims Act.
4. Scope of reversal
The part of the lower court judgment finding that welfare points under the selective welfare system constitute ordinary wages, and the part applying the interest rate on damages for delay set forth in Article 3, Paragraph 1 of the Act on Expedition of Legal Proceedings from October 8, 2016, the day after the date of service of the copy of the application for the purport and grounds of claim in this case, until the date of full payment, contain the grounds for reversal set forth above. Since it is necessary for the lower court, after remand, to newly calculate the scope of the claims to be accepted in consideration of the above purport of reversal, the part of the lower court judgment against the Defendant must ultimately be reversed in its entirety.
5. Conclusion
Without rendering judgment on the remaining grounds of appeal, the part of the lower court judgment against the Defendant is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision.
Justice Shin Sook-hee (Presiding Justice), Justice Noh Tae-ak (Justice in charge), Justice Seo Kyung-hwan, Justice Noh Kyung-pil