[Plaintiff (Selected Party), Appellee and Appellant] Plaintiff (Selected Party) (Attorney Kwak Yong-seop, Counsel)
[Plaintiffs, Appellees] Plaintiff 2 and 1 other (Attorney Kwak Yong-seop, Counsel)
[Defendant, Appellant and Appellee] ○○○ Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorneys Yang Tae-hun and 1 other of Haemaru Law Firm, Counsel)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Judgment 2018Na2037060, decided June 19, 2020
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. Of the costs of appeal, the portion arising from the appeal of the Plaintiff (Selected Party) shall be borne by the Plaintiff (Selected Party), and the portion arising from the appeal of the Defendant shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Whether the amounts constitute ordinary wages (Defendant's third ground of appeal)
A. The need to re-establish the concept of ordinary wages as clarified by prior precedent
1) Ordinary wages serve as the standard wage for calculating additional pay for extended, night, and holiday work (hereinafter "extended work, etc.") or dismissal notice allowances under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법; hereinafter, in parentheses, referred to simply as "the Act"), and constitute the minimum floor for average wages. Ordinary wages are an instrumental concept in that they carry significance primarily as a standard for calculating statutory allowances, etc., rather than having independent significance in themselves. Since extended, night, and holiday work allowances are calculated by applying an additional rate of 50% or more to ordinary wages (Article 56 of the Act), the scope of ordinary wages has a significant impact on the total amount of wages and on the interests of labor and management, and legal disputes surrounding this issue frequently arise.
2) However, the Labor Standards Act does not present clear criteria regarding the scope of ordinary wages. The provision defining ordinary wages in the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법 시행령) is also insufficient to serve as a practical standard for determining whether something constitutes ordinary wages in specific cases. Under these circumstances, the courts have, over a long period, accumulated precedents forming an interpretive theory concerning ordinary wages. In particular, the Supreme Court En Banc Decision 2012Da89399, decided December 18, 2013, and the En Banc Decision 2012Da94643, decided on the same date (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "2013 En Banc Decisions"), specifically clarified the criteria for determining ordinary wages and the meaning of their conceptual indicia. Those decisions held that whether a given wage falls within ordinary wages should be determined based on its objective nature, according to whether it is money or valuables paid as consideration for prescribed work that is paid regularly, uniformly, and with fixity. With respect to fixity, the decisions established the general standard that "a wage whose payment is scheduled to occur as a matter of course upon the employee's provision of prescribed work on any given day, regardless of whether additional conditions are satisfied, and whose payment or amount is determined in advance, possesses fixity," and also presented detailed criteria by wage type. Among these were standards such as: wages paid only to employees who remain employed at a specific point in time (hereinafter "employment-status-conditional wages") and wages paid only if a certain number of working days is satisfied (hereinafter "working-days-conditional wages") lack fixity because the fulfillment of the condition is uncertain.
3) Although this was part of an effort to clarify the scope of ordinary wages, controversy over fixity and the determination of ordinary wages has continued even thereafter. In academia and in practice, there have been continuing attempts to criticize the concept of fixity as defined by the 2013 En Banc Decisions or to circumvent it and determine whether something constitutes ordinary wages from a different angle. Based on this awareness of the problem and the accumulated discussion, it is necessary, through a fundamental reconsideration of ordinary wages, to present a concept of ordinary wages that can consistently govern not only the issue at stake in this case—whether "employment-status-conditional wages" constitute ordinary wages—but also other wage types where fixity is at issue, such as "working-days-conditional wages."
B. Direction for re-establishing the concept of ordinary wages
The concept of ordinary wages must, above all, be newly established in a direction consistent with the nature and function of ordinary wages as required of a standard wage, as follows.
First, since ordinary wages is a legal concept, it must in principle be interpreted faithfully to the statutory definition (conformity with statute). Second, since ordinary wages is a mandatory concept, the parties must not be able to arbitrarily alter the statutory scope of ordinary wages (mandatory nature). Third, ordinary wages must be a concept capable of fully capturing the value of prescribed work (reflection of the value of prescribed work). Fourth, ordinary wages must be capable of being calculated clearly in advance (advance calculability). Fifth, the concept of ordinary wages must be consistent with the policy goal of the Labor Standards Act of restraining extended work, etc. (conformity with policy).
Considering the foregoing requirements comprehensively, it is proper to exclude the concept of fixity, as presented in the prior precedents, from the conceptual indicia of ordinary wages.
C. Reasons why fixity cannot be regarded as a conceptual indicium of ordinary wages
1) The concept of fixity has no basis in statute or regulation
The concept of fixity referred to in the 2013 En Banc Decisions—meaning that "the payment or amount of the wage is fixed in advance"—has no basis anywhere in the statutes or regulations. Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act defines ordinary wages as "the hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, or piece-rate amount agreed to be paid to an employee regularly and uniformly for prescribed work or total work." Here, the language "agreed to be paid" means a state in which payment has been predetermined, i.e., "scheduled nature" (所定性). Such scheduled nature is a feature common to all wages, and cannot be regarded as a conceptual indicium unique to ordinary wages. Transforming and interpreting this as the "fixity" referred to in the 2013 En Banc Decisions, and treating it as a conceptual indicium of ordinary wages, lacks a sufficient textual basis. Nor is such an interpretation consistent with legislative intent or the purpose of the Labor Standards Act.
Ordinary wages is a concept that converts the value of prescribed work into a wage, and the essential criterion for determining ordinary wages as defined by statute is "the nature of consideration for prescribed work." "Regularity" and "uniformity" are typical attributes of a wage having this "nature of consideration for prescribed work," and they serve the function of enabling the scope of ordinary wages to be rationally determined in advance by requiring that the timing of payment and the persons to whom payment is made be predetermined to a certain degree. However, adding to this, without any statutory basis, the indicium of "fixity"—meaning "the payment or amount is determined in advance without exception"—improperly narrows the legitimate scope of ordinary wages, which ought to be derived centered on prescribed work.
2) It is inconsistent with the mandatory nature of the concept of ordinary wages
The concept of fixity is inconsistent with the mandatory character of ordinary wages. Ordinary wages, as a tool for calculating statutory allowances, is related to mandatory statutory provisions requiring appropriate compensation as set by law for extended work, etc. Accordingly, ordinary wages is a mandatory concept whose meaning or scope the parties cannot arbitrarily alter. The employer and employee may freely determine the wage structure and system, the type and content of individual wage items, and the total amount of wages, and may also freely attach conditions with respect to wages. Such conditions are effective unless a separate ground for invalidity exists, such as violation of a mandatory provision or constituting an act evading the law. However, the question of the validity of a condition must be distinguished from the question of whether the wage item to which the condition is attached constitutes ordinary wages. The former belongs to the realm of "autonomy," while the latter belongs to the realm of "paternalistic protection." For example, even if a certain wage item has an employment-status condition attached such that, under it, the wage is not paid to an employee who is not employed on the reference date, whether that wage item constitutes ordinary wages that forms the basis for calculating other statutory allowances is a separate matter to be determined independently.
From this perspective, the 2013 En Banc Decisions have the fundamental problem of improperly linking "conditions," which belong to the realm of autonomy, with "ordinary wages," which belongs to the realm of paternalistic protection. The 2013 En Banc Decisions presented the legal doctrine that, where the parties to an employment relationship attach a condition to a certain wage item such that its payment or amount cannot be determined in advance, fixity is lacking and the wage does not constitute ordinary wages. This resulted in permitting the parties to easily control the scope of ordinary wages, which has a mandatory character. It also created the risk that an employer, from a position of superiority, could improperly narrow the scope of ordinary wages by attaching conditions to wages.
Of course, depending on the type and content of a condition, the status as ordinary wages of the wage item to which the condition is attached may indeed be denied. However, this is not because the payment or amount of the wage in question is controlled by the condition attached to that wage item, but because, in the process of substantively determining whether the wage constitutes ordinary wages based on its objective nature, the condition is considered as one of the factors negating the nature of consideration for prescribed work, regularity, or uniformity. For example, an accident-free allowance paid by a transportation company on condition that no traffic accident occurs during a certain period is denied status as ordinary wages not because the fulfillment of the accident-free condition is uncertain, but because it is paid as compensation for achieving an additional qualification requirement of being accident-free, beyond the mere provision of prescribed work, and thus lacks the nature of consideration for prescribed work.
3) It fails to fully reflect the value of prescribed work
Ordinary wages is a concept evaluating the value of prescribed work, and therefore must fully reflect the value of prescribed work itself, independent of actual work performed. In this respect, ordinary wages is distinguished from average wages, which are calculated retrospectively based on the total amount of wages actually paid to the employee during a statutory period. Ordinary wages is a hypothetical instrumental concept, and the employee presupposed by this concept is "an employee who fully provides the prescribed work." Once the requirement of "full provision of prescribed work" is satisfied, the hypothetical wage paid on that basis is the ordinary wage. In other words, a wage item that is not paid solely on the ground that prescribed work was fully provided (for example, performance-based pay in the pure sense) is not ordinary wages. Separating ordinary wages from actual work performed or actual wages in this manner is not only consistent with the statutory text but is also a way of fully reflecting the value of prescribed work. By interpreting it in this way, the possibility that fluctuations in actual wages would be reflected in ordinary wages can be prevented, thereby preserving the essential nature of ordinary wages as a standard wage.
The Supreme Court has also consistently held that ordinary wages must be calculated without regard to the actual number of days worked or the wages actually received (see Supreme Court Decision 78Da1372, decided October 10, 1978; Supreme Court Decision 90Daka6948, decided November 9, 1990, etc.). However, the 2013 En Banc Decisions' definition of a wage possessing fixity as "a wage scheduled to be paid as a matter of course upon the employee's provision of prescribed work on any given day, regardless of the fulfillment of performance, achievement, or other additional conditions," under which fixity is deemed lacking whenever the payment of a wage is linked to the fulfillment of a condition, is inconsistent with the above legal doctrine. This is because, if the condition relates not to prescribed work but to actual work performed, such as "the actual number of days worked," then through such a condition, factors related to actual work performed come to affect the concept of ordinary wages.
4) It weakens the possibility of calculating ordinary wages in advance
Ordinary wages must be capable of being calculated before extended work, etc. is provided. Only then can the employer and employee predict the cost or degree of compensation for extended work, etc., and make decisions regarding whether to provide extended work, etc., and can additional pay be calculated immediately once extended work, etc. is actually provided. Linking "actual work performed," which is subject to retrospective fluctuation through conditions, with "ordinary wages" weakens the possibility of calculating ordinary wages in advance. The possibility of calculating ordinary wages in advance can be properly secured only when it is linked not to actual work performed but to predetermined prescribed work. However, the 2013 En Banc Decisions have the problem of attempting to determine whether something constitutes ordinary wages—which ought to be determined in advance—based on whether the payment or amount of the wage is fixed. Whether a wage will be paid, and how much that amount will be, are matters belonging to the future, and it is impossible to determine these completely in advance. The same is true of "whether the employee remains employed," which is at issue in this case, or "whether the number of working days is satisfied" in working-days-conditional wages.
What must be considered with respect to ordinary wages is how much the wage was set to be, in the case where prescribed work is fully provided. "The possibility of actually satisfying the condition and receiving the wage" need not be considered with respect to ordinary wages. For example, in the case of a wage that is set to be paid if the employee works 20 or more days out of 22 prescribed working days in a month, the possibility of actually working 20 or more days need not be considered with respect to ordinary wages. If the number of working days provided as a condition is within the number of prescribed working days, it suffices to calculate ordinary wages on the premise that the employee worked all of the prescribed working days.
5) It is inconsistent with the policy goal of restraining extended work, etc.
The concept of ordinary wages must be consistent with the policy goal of the Labor Standards Act of restraining extended work, etc. Under the Labor Standards Act, when concluding a labor contract, the employer must specify the "prescribed working hours" (Article 17, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Act), and working hours per week, excluding rest periods, may not exceed 40 hours (Article 50, Paragraph 1 of the Act). Because extended work, etc. imposes greater fatigue and tension on employees and restricts the free time in life that employees may enjoy, the Labor Standards Act contains provisions restricting extended work (Article 53 of the Act), while requiring the payment of wages with an additional rate of 50% or more of ordinary wages for extended work, etc. (Article 56 of the Act), and also contains penal provisions for violations of provisions concerning extended work, etc. (Articles 109 and 110 of the Act). The purpose of this is to restrain extended work, etc. in order to guarantee a humane standard of living for employees, and to provide monetary compensation commensurate with the value of extended work, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2020Do15393, decided December 7, 2023, etc.). However, the concept of fixity narrows the scope of ordinary wages without statutory basis, preventing ordinary wages from performing its function as a unit wage that appropriately evaluates the value of prescribed work. This produces a result inconsistent with the policy goal of the Labor Standards Act of restraining extended work, etc. and providing compensation commensurate therewith.
D. Re-establishment of the concept of ordinary wages and the criteria for determination
For the reasons examined above, it is proper to exclude fixity, as presented in the prior precedents, from the conceptual indicia of ordinary wages, and therefore the concept of ordinary wages and the criteria for its determination must be newly established.
1) Concept of ordinary wages and criteria for determination
Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act provides that ordinary wages means "the hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, or piece-rate amount agreed to be paid to an employee regularly and uniformly for prescribed work or total work." Interpreting the concept of ordinary wages faithfully to the statutory definition and purpose, ordinary wages refers to a wage agreed to be paid regularly and uniformly as consideration for prescribed work. Since ordinary wages serves as the standard for calculating the various wages provided for in the Labor Standards Act, its essence lies in being the standard wage evaluating the value of the work that the employee has agreed to provide during the prescribed working hours. Regularity and uniformity are conceptual indicia supporting the fact that a wage is consideration for prescribed work. A wage that is set to be paid regularly and uniformly as consideration when an employee fully provides prescribed work constitutes ordinary wages, regardless of the existence or the likelihood of fulfillment of any condition attached thereto. A condition attached to a wage may be considered as one of the factors negating the nature of consideration for prescribed work, regularity, or uniformity, in the process of substantively determining the objective nature of the wage in question, but the mere circumstance that fulfillment of the condition is uncertain cannot, by itself, be regarded as negating the status of ordinary wages.
Even without the yardstick of fixity, whether something constitutes ordinary wages can properly be determined through the concepts of "nature of consideration for prescribed work"—being consideration for the work that the employee and employer agreed to provide during the prescribed working hours—and "regularity" and "uniformity," which require that the timing of payment and the persons to whom the wage is paid be predetermined to a certain degree. Since this concept constituting ordinary wages inherently implies "a certain advance regulation regarding the payment of wages," money or valuables paid on a temporary or fluctuating basis, unrelated to the provision of prescribed work, are still excluded from ordinary wages. Even excluding fixity from the conceptual indicia of ordinary wages, statutory allowances such as the weekly holiday allowance (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da74144, decided January 28, 2010, etc.), which by their nature are calculated on the basis of ordinary wages, cannot conceptually themselves constitute ordinary wages, and therefore do not fall within ordinary wages.
2) Employment-status-conditional wages
Since ordinary wages is an instrumental concept reflecting the value of prescribed work as distinct from actual work performed, it must be calculated based on an employment relationship premised on the continuous provision of prescribed work. An employee's remaining employed is a natural precondition for providing prescribed work under the labor contract. "Retirement," together with the arrival of the mandatory retirement age, death, dismissal, etc., is merely an obstructing cause that terminates the employment relationship and prevents the provision of actual work, and has no conceptual connection whatsoever with the consideration for the work that the employee and employer agreed to provide during the prescribed working hours. Accordingly, the mere circumstance that a condition is attached requiring that an employee be employed at a specific point in time in order to receive a certain wage does not negate the nature of that wage as consideration for prescribed work or its status as ordinary wages.
3) Working-days-conditional wages
a) In the case of a working-days condition that an employee who fully provides prescribed work would satisfy—that is, a working-days condition set within the number of prescribed working days—the mere circumstance that such a condition is attached does not negate the status of that wage as ordinary wages. Even if the employee's actual number of days worked falls short of the number of prescribed working days such that the employee does not receive the working-days-conditional wage, so long as that wage possesses the nature of consideration for prescribed work, regularity, and uniformity, it must be included in ordinary wages when calculating statutory allowances for extended work, etc. This is because ordinary wages is a standard wage determined to reflect the value of prescribed work, regardless of the actual number of days worked or wages actually received. On the other hand, a working-days-conditional wage where the number of working days exceeds the number of prescribed working days is not paid merely because prescribed work was provided, but is consideration for additional work exceeding prescribed work, and therefore does not constitute ordinary wages.
b) Among workplaces that pay working-days-conditional wages, there are some that include days on which leave was used in the number of working days when determining whether the condition is satisfied, and others that have so-called "actual-working-days-conditional wages," which include only days actually worked in the number of working days. In the latter case, for example, a wage paid on condition that the employee actually works the entirety of the prescribed working days may, to some extent, be considered to have an additional condition attached exceeding prescribed work, in that it requires the employee to attend without absence for all prescribed working days without using leave. However, the number of days of annual paid leave granted under the Labor Standards Act differs depending on each employee's continuous period of service, and the contractual leave set varies by workplace. Even for the same employee, the number of days of annual paid leave accruing varies by year, and the number of leave days actually used also varies by month. In a situation where the accrual and use of leave is individual and fluctuating depending on the workplace or employee, it is difficult to clearly determine whether an employee's using a few days of leave and otherwise attending without absence on the remaining prescribed working days constitutes "full provision of prescribed work." Even if this could be calculated by referring to the work status of the employee concerned or of other employees at the workplace, the moment this is done, the determination of ordinary wages becomes linked to "actual work performed," significantly reducing the possibility of calculating ordinary wages in advance. Accordingly, in view of the fact that ordinary wages is a standard wage for calculating statutory allowances and a hypothetical instrumental concept reflecting the value of prescribed work, it is proper that actual-working-days-conditional wages also be uniformly determined as to their status as ordinary wages based on whether the number of working days set as a condition exceeds the number of prescribed working days, without regard to the accrual or actual use of leave.
c) Meanwhile, the number of prescribed working days refers to the number of days set by the employee and employer, within the scope determined by the Labor Standards Act, as days on which there is an obligation to work, and is a matter that the parties may freely determine. However, even though setting the number of prescribed working days basically falls within the realm of "autonomy," where doing so constitutes an act evading the law, "paternalistic protection" may operate. Where the number of prescribed working days is set in a manner divorced from actual work conditions solely with the intent to exclude a certain working-days-conditional wage from ordinary wages, and thereby to circumvent the mandatory nature of ordinary wages, the effect of such an agreement may be denied.
4) Performance-based pay
Performance-based pay, paid according to an employee's work performance, is not paid merely because prescribed work was provided, but is paid only when a certain level of work performance is achieved or an evaluation result reaches a certain standard, and therefore generally cannot be regarded as possessing the "nature of consideration for prescribed work." Accordingly, even excluding fixity from the conceptual indicia of ordinary wages, performance-based pay in the pure sense as described above still cannot be regarded as constituting ordinary wages. However, where it is set that a minimum fixed amount is to be paid regardless of work performance, that amount constitutes consideration for prescribed work.
E. Decisions to be modified
Of the 2013 En Banc Decisions, the portions treating fixity as a conceptual indicium of ordinary wages, the portions determining, on that basis, the status of employment-status-conditional wages, working-days-conditional wages, and performance-based pay as ordinary wages according to whether fixity was recognized, and the portions holding that employment-status-conditional wages lack the nature of consideration for prescribed work due to the attachment of the condition, along with prior decisions to the same effect, are all modified to the extent inconsistent with the views expressed in this decision.
F. Scope of the effect of the new legal doctrine
The above modification of precedent re-establishes the concept of ordinary wages, which forms the foundation of the wage system, and therefore has a significant impact on employment relationships concerning the payment of wages, which is a collective legal relationship. Applying the new legal doctrine retroactively across the board would directly affect the validity of numerous legal relationships formed in reliance on the prior precedents, thereby undermining legal stability and running counter to the protection of reliance. Accordingly, it is proper that the new legal doctrine apply to the calculation of ordinary wages only from the date this decision is rendered onward. However, in the case at bar and in cases currently pending before the courts as of the date this decision is rendered, in which the legal doctrine modified by this decision is a premise of the adjudication and the status as ordinary wages is disputed (hereinafter "parallel cases"), the new legal doctrine must be applied retroactively, given the essential nature of the judiciary, which is to provide relief of rights in specific cases. Accordingly, statutory allowances for extended work, etc. provided on or after December 19, 2024, the date this decision is rendered, must be calculated based on the scope of ordinary wages under the new legal doctrine, while statutory allowances for extended work, etc. provided up to and including December 18, 2024 must, except in the case at bar and the parallel cases, be calculated based on ordinary wages determined under the prior legal doctrine. The specific reasons are as follows.
1) The need to limit the retroactive effect of the modification of precedent
In principle, a legal doctrine declared by the court applies also to facts predating that declaration. This holds true equally where precedent is modified, such that the new legal doctrine, as the originally correct content of the law, governs facts occurring in the past as well. Legal instability arising from modification of precedent is something anticipated by our judicial system and must, in principle, be accepted. Nevertheless, notwithstanding this principle, there may be extremely exceptional cases in which the point in time from which a new precedent applies must be limited, based on the principle of protection of reliance, which is derived from the rule of law, a fundamental constitutional principle. This is because the causes and forms of modification of precedent, and the degree of reliance infringed by such modification, exist in various patterns. In the real world, precedent that concretizes the law undeniably constitutes part of the legal order and, in the field of daily life, sometimes exerts normative force no less powerful and real than abstract statutory law itself. In such cases, there may be situations in which the need to protect reliance on the precedent being modified is overwhelmingly stronger than the need to enforce the new precedent retroactively. However, limiting the scope of effect of a new legal doctrine must be confined to extremely exceptional cases. Whether a given case falls into this category must be determined carefully and strictly, through a detailed weighing of the need to enforce the new precedent against the need to protect reliance, comprehensively considering the background and content of the prior precedent, its clarity and specificity, the degree and value of reliance placed on the prior precedent, the content and importance of other legal relationships formed under such reliance, the scope and scale of the parties and interested persons affected by the modification of precedent, and the ripple effects or social costs arising from the modification of precedent. Considering the following circumstances, this case falls within the exceptional category in which it is necessary to limit the scope of effect of the new legal doctrine.
The Supreme Court had consistently held that ordinary wages means "a fixed wage paid regularly and uniformly for prescribed work" (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da19501, decided February 9, 1996, etc.), until the 2013 En Banc Decisions clearly declared the definition of the concept of fixity, an indicium of ordinary wages, thereby providing specific and clear guidance regarding ordinary wages. That decision also made clear that employment-status-conditional wages and working-days-conditional wages lack fixity and therefore do not constitute ordinary wages. In a situation where the Labor Standards Act and other relevant statutes and regulations do not present specific and clear standards regarding the scope of ordinary wages, this precedent-based doctrine has, over a long period, been accepted in labor practice virtually as a mandatory legal order concerning ordinary wages. It formed the foundation for negotiations and agreements between labor and management through administrative guidance (the government's guidelines and explanatory materials for labor-management guidance on ordinary wages, etc.), and became the basis for numerous derivative legal relationships, including statutory allowances for extended work, etc., the calculation of average wages, and the determination of total wage amounts. Considering wage-earning employees together with the employers who employed them, the parties and interested persons affected by a change in the scope of ordinary wages are very numerous, and the scale of the resulting changes in interests is substantial. The social costs arising from legal disputes or litigation seeking additional payment of statutory allowances due to the expansion of the scope of ordinary wages could also be considerable. Depending on the workplace, there are places that, in the course of wage negotiations, appropriately agreed upon the content and amount of other wages based on the scope of ordinary wages founded on the prior precedent-based doctrine, and thereby have maintained stable labor-management relations over a long period without legal disputes over whether individual wage items constitute ordinary wages. It is difficult to conclude that enforcing the retroactive application of the new precedent without exception, even to the past legal relationships of such workplaces, would necessarily be consistent with the notion of substantive justice.
2) Scope of limitation on the retroactive effect of the modification of precedent
Since the Supreme Court declares a new legal doctrine in order to make it the norm for adjudicating the case at bar, the new legal doctrine is, in principle, applied retroactively to the case at bar. However, since setting the scope of retroactive effect is ultimately a matter of weighing, this may be determined through detailed weighing, based on the unique characteristics of the case concerned, considering the need for protection of reliance and the requirements of the principle of equality, among other factors. Considering, together with the various particularities of the prior precedent on ordinary wages and this modification of precedent examined above, the fact that numerous cases in which the status as ordinary wages of employment-status-conditional wages and working-days-conditional wages, among others, is at issue are currently pending before the Supreme Court and the lower courts, it is proper, in this modification of precedent, to include within the scope of retroactive effect the parallel cases pending before the Supreme Court and the lower courts as of the date this decision is rendered. It is difficult to accept a conclusion whereby, among the numerous cases currently pending on the same issue, only the parties to the case at bar, which happened to become the subject case for the modification of precedent, receive relief of rights, while the parties to the remaining parallel cases fail to receive relief of rights. The parties to the parallel cases are also subjects who contributed to the modification of precedent by actively pursuing relief of rights at their own expense and effort, filing suits and disputing the scope of ordinary wages, and therefore their value of protection is equal to that of the parties to the case at bar and differs from that of the group who did not file suit. It would not be proper, while modifying precedent to accord with the awareness of the problem raised in numerous parallel cases thus far, to govern the legal relationships that the parties to the parallel cases actively disputed by filing suit in accordance with the prior precedent-based doctrine.
G. Determination as to this case
1) Whether the employment-status-conditional bonus constitutes ordinary wages
According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, it can be seen that, under the Defendant's salary regulations and remuneration agreement, employees on the grade-based salary system are to be paid a bonus equal to 850% of their monthly standard salary, divided into a regular bonus (paid in even-numbered months), a Lunar New Year/Chuseok bonus, and a summer bonus, to be paid in a total of nine installments per year, and there is a provision stating that "the bonus shall be paid only to employees who are employed as of the payment date, and shall not be paid to employees who retired before the payment date" (hereinafter, the regular bonus, the Lunar New Year/Chuseok bonus, and the summer bonus are collectively referred to as "the bonus at issue in this case").
In light of the legal doctrine set forth above, the bonus at issue in this case, which pays a certain amount equivalent to 850% of the standard salary in installments at fixed intervals, constitutes ordinary wages, being paid regularly and uniformly as consideration for prescribed work, notwithstanding the employment-status condition. While the portion of the judgment below that treated fixity as a conceptual indicium of ordinary wages and made its determination on that premise is erroneous, the conclusion of the judgment below recognizing the bonus at issue in this case as ordinary wages is correct. There is no error affecting the judgment, such as a misunderstanding of the legal doctrine concerning ordinary wages.
2) Whether the head-of-institution performance pay (minimum guaranteed portion) constitutes ordinary wages
The court below determined that, of the head-of-institution performance pay, the monthly minimum of KRW 200,000 constitutes ordinary wages, as it is a monthly minimum guaranteed amount paid even to an employee who retires before a specific point in time, with wages being paid in proportion to the number of days worked.
Regarding this, the Defendant argues that, since the head-of-institution performance pay is customarily paid only to those employed as of a specific point in time, the minimum payment portion thereof also lacks fixity and does not constitute ordinary wages. However, even where an employment-status condition is attached, the monthly minimum guaranteed amount, set to be paid regardless of work performance, constitutes ordinary wages, being paid regularly and uniformly as consideration for prescribed work, and therefore this ground of appeal is without merit.
2. Whether the Plaintiffs are employees engaged in supervisory or managerial work (Defendant's first ground of appeal)
The court below determined that the Plaintiffs (including the Plaintiff as Selected Party) and the Selected Persons (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Plaintiffs"), who worked in positions such as branch manager, center manager, team leader, part leader, and manager for the Defendant, do not fall within the category of employees engaged in supervisory or managerial work as provided in Article 63, Item 4 of the Labor Standards Act and Article 34 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act, on grounds including that there is no evidence that the Plaintiffs participated in decisions regarding labor management, hiring, or working conditions, that although the nature of their occupation involved a great deal of outside work, they were obligated to comply with the working hours set forth in the Defendant's internal regulations and labor contracts, and that although some Plaintiffs were paid KRW 200,000 per month in head-of-institution performance pay, it is difficult to view this as paid in consideration of managerial responsibility borne in a relationship integrated with management, beyond the degree corresponding to the additional duties performed as a branch manager.
In light of the relevant legal doctrine and the record, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as a misunderstanding of the legal doctrine concerning employees engaged in supervisory or managerial work under Article 63, Item 4 of the Labor Standards Act and Article 34 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act.
3. Whether the comprehensive wage agreement was validly formed (Defendant's second ground of appeal)
The court below determined that, even assuming a comprehensive wage agreement was concluded with respect to overtime allowance, the portion of the overtime allowance included in the comprehensive wage agreement that falls short of the amount calculated under Article 56 of the Labor Standards Act is disadvantageous to the employee and therefore invalid.
In light of the relevant legal doctrine and the record, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as a misunderstanding of the legal doctrine concerning comprehensive wage agreements.
4. The standard number of hours for calculating the hourly ordinary wage (Plaintiff (Selected Party)'s ground of appeal)
The court below determined that, since the collective agreement sets the union members' working hours as 8 hours on weekdays while designating Saturdays, Sundays, and statutory public holidays, etc. as paid holidays, and there is no basis for treating the working hours on paid Saturdays as 4 hours rather than 8 hours, the same as Sunday, the hours treated as paid on Saturday should be regarded as 8 hours, and accordingly the standard number of hours for calculating the hourly ordinary wage is 243 hours per month.
In light of the relevant legal doctrine and the record, there is no error in the above determination of the court below, such as a misunderstanding of the legal doctrine concerning the calculation of ordinary wages.
5. Conclusion
All appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are to be borne by each losing party. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the Justices involved.
[Attachment] List of Selected Persons: omitted
Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae (Presiding Judge), Justices Kim Sang-hwan, Noh Tae-ak, Lee Heung-gu, Oh Kyung-mi (Justice in Charge), Oh Seok-jun, Seo Kyung-hwan, Kwon Young-jun, Um Sang-pil, Shin Sook-hee, Noh Kyung-pil, Park Young-jae, Lee Sook-yeon