[Plaintiffs, Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other
[Defendant, Appellee] Daewoo Electronics Co., Ltd., Attorney Kim Hyung-su, counsel for the defendant
[Court Below] Daegu High Court Decision 90Na5512 rendered on August 22, 1991
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to Ground of Appeal No. 1
The selection of evidence and the finding of facts fall within the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, so long as it does not exceed the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the court below's selection of evidence and finding of facts are found to be justified, and there is no illegality therein as pointed out in the argument. The ground of appeal is without merit.
2. As to Ground of Appeal No. 2(a)
The court below found the following facts: Article 4 of the Defendant Company's Rules on Rewards and Punishments provides, as a disciplinary procedure, that when grounds for discipline arise, each department shall notify the competent department of the details thereof, and upon receiving the request for discipline, the competent department shall notify the person subject to discipline of the matters requested for discipline and require a written statement of circumstances from that person. On November 3, 1989, when the Defendant Company convened a personnel committee meeting at 16:00 concerning the discipline of the Plaintiffs, it mailed to the Plaintiffs' homes on the morning of that day a notice to appear before the personnel committee specifying the grounds and basis for discipline, and attempted to deliver the notice to appear to the Plaintiffs immediately before the personnel committee meeting was to be held; when the Plaintiffs refused to accept it, the Defendant read aloud to them the grounds and basis for discipline as stated above and requested their attendance, and thereafter held the personnel committee meeting as scheduled and resolved to dismiss the Plaintiffs for disciplinary reasons in their absence. The court below also found that on November 9, 1989, the Defendant Company mailed to the Plaintiffs a notice of the results of the disciplinary action, and the Plaintiffs, dissatisfied therewith, filed a request for reexamination, but the reexamination personnel committee held on December 4, 1989 resolved in the same manner as before. Based on these findings, the court below determined that, although there was a procedural defect in that the Defendant Company mailed the notice to appear to the Plaintiffs on the morning of the day of the disciplinary action and read the notice to appear to them just before the personnel committee meeting was held without requiring a written statement of circumstances, given the situation in which it was uncertain when the Plaintiffs might again commit the unlawful acts as described above, the disciplinary dismissal resolution could not be deemed void even though the Defendant Company did not allow sufficient time to deliver the notice to appear or require a written statement of circumstances before holding the personnel committee meeting. Furthermore, the court below determined that, since the Plaintiffs, after receiving the notice of the disciplinary results, requested reexamination and were given an opportunity to prepare their defense until the reexamination committee was held after a considerable period of time had passed, and had the propriety of the disciplinary action judged through the reexamination procedure, the procedural defect of the Defendant Company's personnel committee having urgently notified the Plaintiffs of the grounds for discipline and failed to require a written statement of circumstances was thereby cured.
The purpose of provisions in a collective agreement or employment rules requiring notification of disciplinary matters to the person subject to discipline and requiring a written statement of circumstances is, on the one hand, to guarantee the person subject to discipline an opportunity to prepare and submit exculpatory materials favorable to himself in order to defend against the alleged disciplinary misconduct, and on the other hand, to enable the disciplinary authority to accurately ascertain the facts of misconduct and handle the matter fairly. Therefore, a disciplinary action in violation of such procedures is, in principle, void. Even where there is no special provision regarding the timing of notification of disciplinary matters, notification must be given with a reasonable period of time allowed for the preparation of a defense and exculpatory materials. Even if there is a risk that the person subject to discipline may commit other unlawful acts apart from the grounds for discipline, that fact alone cannot, absent special circumstances, constitute a justifiable reason for omitting procedures that must ordinarily be followed in disciplinary proceedings.
However, the reexamination procedure for a disciplinary action, together with the original disciplinary procedure, constitutes a single disciplinary process as a whole (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da1769, delivered on June 9, 1981), and the legitimacy of the procedure must be judged with respect to the entire disciplinary process. Therefore, even if there was a procedural defect in the original disciplinary process, if it was cured during the reexamination process, such procedural defect is deemed cured.
It was erroneous for the court below to have determined that the disciplinary dismissal resolution, made without following the procedures prescribed in the disciplinary rules, could not be deemed void merely because of the circumstance that the Plaintiffs might commit unlawful acts. However, as found by the court below, the Plaintiffs were notified of the disciplinary matters immediately before the personnel committee meeting was held, and after the resolution of the personnel committee, were notified of the disciplinary results including the grounds and basis therefor, and requested reexamination thereof (according to the record, the Plaintiffs stated their arguments and defense in the request for reexamination); and it appears that the Plaintiffs had sufficient time to submit favorable defense and supporting materials until the reexamination personnel committee was held. Therefore, the procedural defect of delayed notification of the disciplinary matters to the Plaintiffs and the failure to require a written statement of circumstances was thereby cured. Accordingly, the judgment below, having reached the same conclusion, is justified, and there is no illegality in the judgment below, as pointed out in the argument, of misapprehending the legal principles or failing to state reasons, affecting the outcome of the judgment. This ground of appeal is also without merit.
3. As to Ground of Appeal No. 2(c)
Based on the evidence cited, the court below found the following facts: Plaintiff 1, believing that the removal of Plaintiff 2 from the position of team leader was unjust, visited the responsible section chief, department head, and executive director to point out the unfairness and demand correction; when his demands were not accepted, he used severe abusive language and verbal abuse toward his superior, Nonparty 1, the section chief. Furthermore, using the morning assembly time set aside for preparation for work, he asserted only the justness of his own claims and incited others to oust Nonparty 1, the section chief, and others, including by singing songs, and by collecting signatures to recruit persons to go and protest at the head office in Seoul, thereby causing disruption to operations. When Plaintiff 2 staged a sit-in demonstration in the middle of the workplace, Plaintiff 1, despite holding the position of team leader who should have striven for normal operations, not only failed to dissuade this but acquiesced in it, causing the night shift work to be suspended for several hours, thereby causing enormous losses to the Defendant Company. As for Plaintiff 2, rather than reflecting on the fact that he had been removed from the position of team leader due to his own neglect of duty causing disruption to the Defendant Company's operations, he merely believed the removal to be unjust and, in demanding correction, used abusive language toward his superior, Nonparty 1, the section chief, because his demands were not accepted. Moreover, he refused to work during working hours and staged a sit-in on the floor of the workplace, shouting slogans and singing songs together with sympathizing colleagues, thereby causing disruption to the day shift operations and causing the night shift operations to be suspended for several hours, inflicting enormous property damage on the Defendant Company. Having found these facts, the court below determined that all of these acts of the Plaintiffs exceeded the legitimate procedures and limits of grievance handling, violating not only the provisions prohibiting assembly, demonstration, and other collective actions within the company without permission under the Defendant Company's employment rules and service regulations, and the provision prohibiting industrial action not directed by the union under the collective agreement, but also constituting an unlawful labor dispute conducted without following the procedures prescribed by the Labor Dispute Mediation Act (노동쟁의조정법), thus falling under the grounds for dismissal set forth in Article 4 of the Defendant Company's Rules on Rewards and Punishments, namely: inciting or coercing other employees to unlawfully resign, or inciting a work slowdown or shutdown; obstructing other employees' work through violence or intimidation; holding assemblies, speeches, demonstrations, or similar acts without the company's permission; and disturbing the order of the company so as to affect other employees. Examining the judgment below in light of the record, the above determination of the court below is found to be justified, and there is no illegality therein, as pointed out in the argument, of omission of judgment or misapprehension of legal principles. Furthermore, so long as the Plaintiffs' acts fall under the grounds for dismissal set forth in the Defendant Company's Rules on Rewards and Punishments, etc., it cannot be deemed unlawful even if the court below did not specifically and individually indicate whether each act of the Plaintiffs corresponded to a ground for discipline. This ground of appeal is also without merit.
4. As to Ground of Appeal No. 2(b)
The court below found that it was not established that Nonparty 2, the executive director and general manager of the Defendant Company's Gumi plant, had promised to overlook the Plaintiffs' acts, and that although Nonparty 2 had made a statement to the effect that this matter should be concluded on terms in which neither side would be harmed, it was difficult to view this alone as a promise to overlook the Plaintiffs' acts. The court below further determined that, even assuming that Nonparty 2 had made such a promise, the authority to discipline employees rests with the president, and there is no evidence to establish that Nonparty 2 was delegated the authority to exempt employees from disciplinary responsibility or to waive the right to discipline. Therefore, it could not be deemed that the Defendant Company exempted the Plaintiffs from responsibility.
Examining the evidence cited by the court below in light of the record, the court below's finding and determination that Nonparty 2 did not promise to overlook the Plaintiffs' acts are found to be justified. Accordingly, since it is not established that Nonparty 2 made such a promise, even if there was insufficient examination, as pointed out in the argument, regarding whether Nonparty 2 actually held substantive disciplinary authority and whether the dismissal in this case violated the principle of good faith, in the alternative determination of the judgment below, such insufficiency cannot be deemed to have affected the outcome of this judgment.
Therefore, this ground of appeal is also without merit.
5. As to Ground of Appeal No. 2(d)
The court below determined that, since all of the Plaintiffs' acts as described above not only violated the provisions prohibiting collective action under the Defendant Company's employment rules and service regulations, but also constituted an unlawful labor dispute conducted without following the procedures prescribed by the Labor Dispute Mediation Act, thereby falling under the grounds for dismissal set forth in Article 4 of the Defendant Company's Rules on Rewards and Punishments, even taking into account that Plaintiff 1 had served the Defendant Company for approximately 12 years and Plaintiff 2 for a little over 5 years prior to this disciplinary action, and that the motive for the Plaintiffs' aforementioned acts was grievance handling, considering that the Defendant Company suffered disruption to the operations of the plant for a considerable period due to the Plaintiffs' aforementioned acts, thereby sustaining no small amount of property damage, and that order and service discipline within the plant were disturbed, having no small effect on the Defendant Company's operation of the plant, the disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiffs could not be deemed to have manifestly lacked reasonableness so as to constitute a deviation from or abuse of discretionary authority. Considering the content of the Plaintiffs' acts as described above and the resulting consequences, it must be said that the Plaintiffs bear grounds attributable to them of such a degree that, in light of common social norms, the employment relationship with the Defendant Company could no longer be continued. Accordingly, there is a justifiable reason for the disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiffs in this case, and it cannot be said that this amounts to an abuse of the right to discipline. The judgment below, having reached the same conclusion, is justified, and there is no illegality therein, as pointed out in the argument, of misapprehending the legal principles concerning abuse of the right to dismiss.
This ground of appeal is also without merit.
6. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed in its entirety, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the Plaintiffs, the losing parties. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Justice Yoon Kwan (Presiding Justice), Choi Jae-ho, Kim Ju-han