[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant] Gaenari Apartment Residents' Representative Council, Attorney Lee Geon-ho, Counsel for the Defendant
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 91Na29462 rendered on November 26, 1991
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
We examine the grounds of appeal.
As to Ground 2
1. The facts as found by the court below are as follows.
A. The Plaintiff was working as a boiler engineer at the Gaenari Apartment management office. On August 25, 1988, at around 23:30, he was discovered by the Defendant's representative and residents drinking alcohol in his underwear together with five or six co-workers in the engine room of the said apartment complex. In addition to the fact of this drinking, the Defendant referred the Plaintiff to disciplinary action on the additional ground that, after being caught, rather than showing remorse, the Plaintiff responded with abusive language to the Defendant's representative and the residents who reprimanded him, saying things such as "Then I'll just quit, won't I? Is there a law against drinking?" The Defendant, without giving the Plaintiff even an opportunity to explain, dismissed the Plaintiff by way of disciplinary action on August 31 of the same year, based solely on a written resolution of the disciplinary committee members.
B. However, it was not the Plaintiff but Nonparty 1, who was drinking together with him, who responded with abusive language to the Defendant's representative and others who reprimanded them after being discovered at the drinking scene, and there is no evidence to show that the Plaintiff joined in doing so. Moreover, the fact that the Plaintiff and others were in their underwear at the time of discovery appears to have been an unavoidable act arising from the Plaintiff's situation of having to work in the engine room (boiler room), which was full of heat during the summer heat, rather than resulting from a laxity in work discipline.
C. Meanwhile, the drinking occasion in question arose incidentally when Nonparty 2, who had worked together with the Plaintiff in the engine room and was about to retire, received his wages that evening, bought alcohol and food, and visited the engine room where the Plaintiff was on duty, proposing that they console each other in light of their long-standing relationship. The Plaintiff worked a 24-hour shift every other day, and ordinarily, after coming to work at 09:00, handling routine tasks such as machine inspection and repair of defects, and finishing operation of the boiler by around 18:00, he was in a position where he could have relatively free time until he had to operate the boiler again at around 05:00 the next day, so long as he did not leave the engine room, his place of work. Given the circumstances, he was not in a position to refuse Nonparty 2's proposal, out of consideration for their relationship, and thus joined the drinking occasion in question.
D. The Defendant's personnel regulations provide six grounds for disciplinary action, including: where an employee has engaged in conduct contrary to the duties of an employee; where an employee has failed to perform official duties or has been negligent in the performance of duties; where an employee with a poor work record shows no sign of repentance; and where an employee has failed to comply with the regulations or other official orders. The regulations also enumerate six types of disciplinary measures: reprimand, salary reduction, suspension from attendance, suspension from duty, recommended resignation, and disciplinary dismissal (discharge).
2. Judgment of the court below
According to the above findings of fact, the Plaintiff's misconduct in drinking alcohol together with co-workers during working hours at the place of work falls under the grounds for disciplinary action prescribed in the Defendant's personnel regulations, namely, conduct contrary to the duties of an employee, failure to perform official duties or negligence in the performance of duties, or failure to comply with the regulations or official orders. However, even where an employee's misconduct falls under a ground for disciplinary action prescribed in the personnel regulations, in order for the employer to impose dismissal, the heaviest of the various disciplinary measures, on that ground, the degree of misconduct must be objectively so serious that it can be recognized that it would be manifestly unjust or unfair to the employer to maintain and continue the employment relationship with the employee in question. In this case, there were mitigating circumstances behind the Plaintiff's commission of the misconduct in question. Moreover, although the drinking occurred during working hours, in light of the Plaintiff's work pattern, the Plaintiff was in a position to use his time relatively freely after 21:00 until 05:00 the next day, when the boiler needed to be operated, so long as he did not leave the engine room, his place of work. In addition, the Plaintiff had worked relatively faithfully for more than ten years since being hired by the Defendant without committing any particular misconduct. In light of these circumstances, the misconduct found above is not of such a degree that maintaining the employment relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant would be manifestly unjust or unfair. Therefore, the Defendant's disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff based solely on the above misconduct exceeded the scope of the Defendant's discretionary authority to impose discipline, and is void, without any need to examine whether the procedure was lawful.
3. Judgment of this Court
If the facts are as found by the court below, the court below's determination that the Defendant's disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff was unlawful as exceeding the scope of discretionary authority is justified and may be upheld, and the argument disputing this is without merit.
As to Ground 1
1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the Defendant's argument that, since the Plaintiff, immediately after the dismissal, received without objection the advance dismissal notice allowance (해고예고수당) paid by the Defendant, thereby acquiescing in the effect of the dismissal, the Plaintiff could no longer dispute the effect of the dismissal, holding instead that the mere fact that the Plaintiff received the advance dismissal notice allowance from the Defendant without objection could not be deemed to constitute the Plaintiff's acquiescence in the effect of the dismissal, and that this could not render a dismissal that was void ab initio valid; therefore, the Defendant's argument on this point was without merit.
2. However, in this case, the Defendant's argument is not based solely on the fact that the Plaintiff received the advance dismissal notice allowance without objection.
According to the record, the Defendant's litigation counsel argued at the first instance that, since the Defendant provided the prescribed retirement allowance to the Plaintiff after the disciplinary dismissal and the Plaintiff received it without objection, the Plaintiff acquiesced in the disciplinary dismissal and cannot assert its invalidity (Answer Brief dated November 14, 1990). At the court below, the Defendant argued that where an employee, after being dismissed by the employer, receives the retirement allowance and dismissal allowance provided by the employer without reserving any condition, it must be deemed that the employee acknowledged the employer's dismissal as valid, and that for the Plaintiff to dispute the effect of the dismissal and seek confirmation of its invalidity only in July 1990, after one year and ten months had passed, violates the principle of estoppel and is unlawful. The Defendant further argued that in this case, the Plaintiff received without objection, immediately after the disciplinary dismissal, on October 6, 1988, a dismissal allowance of 270,740 won and the prescribed retirement allowance of 669,380 won from the Defendant, and that around that time, the Plaintiff even withdrew the petition for remedy that had been filed with the competent Labor Relations Commission on the ground that the disciplinary dismissal constituted an unfair labor practice, and that accordingly, the Plaintiff acquiesced in the disciplinary dismissal and cannot assert its invalidity (Preparatory Brief dated October 28, 1991). According to the contents of Defendant's Evidence No. 12-1, 2, 3 (dismissal allowance payment, payment slip, receipt), Defendant's Evidence No. 14-1, 2, 4 (retirement allowance payment, payment slip, receipt), and Defendant's Evidence No. 15-1 through 7 (petition for remedy, submission of answer, answer, statement of circumstances, notice of examination, notice of result of processing), it can be seen that the Plaintiff received a dismissal allowance of 373,690 won and a retirement allowance of 4,780,910 won on October 6, 1988, and that, meanwhile, Nonparty 1, the chairman of the labor union to which the Plaintiff belonged, filed a petition for remedy for unfair labor practice on September 1 of the same year with the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission, seeking reinstatement for himself, Nonparty 3, and the Plaintiff on the ground of unfair dismissal, but withdrew it on October 7 of the same year, while the investigation procedure was in progress, resulting in the case being closed.
3. Where an employee who has been dismissed or disciplinarily dismissed receives the retirement allowance and dismissal allowance without reserving any condition, it is reasonable to view, absent special circumstances, that the employee acknowledged the dismissal as valid, and it should be held that seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the dismissal only after a long period has elapsed thereafter, without reasonable grounds, is not permitted under the principle of good faith (see this Court's Decisions 90Daka25512 rendered on November 23, 1990; 90Da8084 rendered on April 12, 1991; 91Da9275 rendered on May 28 of the same year; and 90Da20428 rendered on October 25 of the same year).
However, even in such a case, where there are objective circumstances indicating that the employee did not acknowledge the effect of the dismissal and was disputing it, or where there are contrary circumstances suggesting that the allowance was received under circumstances involving other reasonable grounds, it should not be uniformly concluded that the effect of the dismissal was acknowledged merely because the retirement allowance or dismissal allowance was received without an explicit reservation of objection (see this Court's Decisions 71Da1635 rendered on June 27, 1972; 90Nu4952 rendered on January 25, 1991; 91Da2663 rendered on May 14 of the same year; and 91Da1806 rendered on June 28 of the same year). Furthermore, even where the filing of a suit for confirmation of the invalidity of dismissal was delayed, if the delay occurred for reasonable grounds, such as first filing a petition for remedy for unfair labor practice, or awaiting the outcome of reinstatement negotiations with the employer, or waiting in reliance on the employer's promise of reinstatement, it should be held that this does not violate the principle of good faith.
In addition, where a petition for remedy for unfair labor practice, once filed, is subsequently withdrawn, this cannot be uniformly evaluated; rather, the reasons and circumstances of the withdrawal must be examined to determine whether it was made with the intention of acknowledging the effect of the dismissal.
4. Therefore, in this case, the court below should have examined the reasons why the Plaintiff received the dismissal allowance and retirement allowance, whether he reserved any objection, the reasons and circumstances under which the chairman of the labor union to which the Plaintiff belonged filed the petition for remedy for unfair labor practice and subsequently withdrew it, whether this was done in consultation with the Plaintiff, and the reasons why the Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the dismissal, among other relief, only one year and ten months after the dismissal, and should have determined the merits of the Defendant's above argument based on these facts. However, according to the record, no such examination was conducted.
Upon examining the record, the Plaintiff argues that the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission urged the Defendant to reinstate the Plaintiff to his original position and the Defendant accepted this, but failed to fulfill this promise up until the date the suit was filed, and that the Plaintiff reported the unfair labor practice of the Defendant's then representative, resulting in a fine being imposed by summary order (Complaint); that if the Plaintiff had acquiesced in the disciplinary dismissal, this lawsuit would never have been filed (Preparatory Brief dated December 17, 1990); and that the Plaintiff had no particular occupation from immediately after the dismissal (Record of the 9th Oral Argument Session of the court below). Accordingly, the court below should also have examined whether the Plaintiff, believing that the Defendant's representative would reinstate him, first received the retirement allowance and dismissal allowance, withdrew the petition for remedy for unfair labor practice and waited, and, when the promise of reinstatement was not fulfilled, belatedly filed the instant lawsuit.
5. The judgment below is unlawful in that it misunderstood the purport of the Defendant's argument, failed to fully examine the matter, and failed to reach a complete determination thereon, and the argument to this extent has merit.
Therefore, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. This decision is rendered as per the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the adjudication.
Justice Kim Seok-su (Presiding Justice), Lee Hoe-chang, Bae Man-un