[Order]
The appeal is dismissed in its entirety.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning]
First, we examine Grounds of Appeal Nos. 1 and 3 of the Plaintiffs' litigation representative together.
The argument appears to be nothing more than a criticism of the judgment below on the basis of the selection and weighing of evidence and fact-finding, which fall within the exclusive authority of the court below as a fact-finding court. However, upon examination of the record, we find no error in the selection and weighing of evidence by which the court below found the facts as stated in its judgment, such as would violate the rules of evidence as argued, nor can it be said that there was any failure to exhaust the deliberation.
This argument is without merit in its entirety.
Next, we examine Ground of Appeal No. 2.
Under Article 27-2, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), when an employer intends to dismiss a worker, the employer must give at least 30 days' advance notice thereof, provided that this shall not apply where the dismissal is due to a cause attributable to the worker. Furthermore, in dismissing a worker for disciplinary reasons, if the disciplinary provisions of the rules of employment or other regulations do not provide for procedures such as notification of the facts constituting the disciplinary charge or affording an opportunity to present a defense, it is appropriate to interpret that a dismissal carried out without such procedures cannot be deemed invalid on that ground alone
(see Supreme Court Decision 78Da304, decided January 30, 1979).
In this case, according to the facts as established by the court below, when the Intervenor Assisting the Defendant took over management of the barbershop business at issue on November 26, 1974, a contract was concluded with the U.S. Eighth Army Exchange Service to the effect that only licensed barbers would be employed as barbers. Around June 1975, the U.S. Eighth Army Exchange Service issued an instruction to identify and root out any unlicensed barbers among those employed in the barber section of the Yongsan District, having heard rumors that such unlicensed persons existed. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the barber licenses submitted by the Plaintiffs were all forged. In order to fulfill the contract with the U.S. Eighth Army Exchange Service as agreed, the Intervenor Assisting the Defendant dismissed the Plaintiffs pursuant to Article 22, Item 6 of the rules of employment between the Intervenor Assisting the Defendant and the Plaintiffs, which provides that an employee may be dismissed where the employee violates regulations of the U.S. Eighth Army authorities or is cited in an ordered inspection, thereby causing embarrassment or harm to the business owner. This must ultimately be regarded as a dismissal due to a cause attributable to the Plaintiffs, and therefore, as noted above, the 30-day advance notice of dismissal was not required. Furthermore, upon examination of the rules of employment (Evidence B No. 1-2) between the Intervenor Assisting the Defendant and the Plaintiffs as contained in the record, it is clear that no procedures such as notification of the facts constituting the disciplinary charge or affording an opportunity to present a defense are provided for when disciplinarily dismissing an employee. In the same vein, the judgment of the court below, which held that the dismissal of the Plaintiffs by the Intervenor Assisting the Defendant was lawful and that it could not constitute an unfair labor practice against the Plaintiffs, is justified, and it cannot be said that there was an error in violating lawful disciplinary procedures as argued.
This point of the argument is also without merit.
Accordingly, since this appeal is without merit, it is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order by unanimous opinion.
Supreme Court Justice Min Mun-gi (Presiding Judge), Lee Il-gyu, Kim Yong-cheol, Jeong Tae-won