[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant] Seongnam City (Attorneys at Law, Donghaek Law Firm, Cho Young-chan and 6 others, Representing the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2009Na74153 rendered on November 18, 2011
[Order]
The part of the judgment below concerning the defendant's loss, specifically the portion regarding the claim for extended-work premium wages for holiday work, is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal (including the descriptions in the reference briefs submitted after the period for submitting the grounds of appeal had expired, to the extent they supplement the grounds of appeal) are examined as follows.
1. Course of the case
A. The Plaintiffs are persons who were employed by the Defendant and worked as environmental sanitation workers before retiring, or their heirs.
B. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement concluded with the labor union to which the Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Plaintiffs' side") belonged, the Defendant implemented a 40-hour workweek system from July 1, 2005, designating Saturdays and Sundays as paid holidays. From October 2005 until their retirement, the Plaintiffs' side worked in excess of 40 hours per week, working 4 hours each on Saturdays and Sundays as well.
Regardless of whether the 40-hour weekly limit was exceeded, the Defendant did not calculate extended work allowance for the Plaintiffs' side's holiday work, and paid only holiday work allowance.
C. The Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit seeking payment of unpaid holiday work allowance, annual leave allowance, etc., calculated on the basis of ordinary wages under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), and argued that, with respect to holiday work, extended work allowance should be paid in addition to and overlapping with holiday work allowance, expanding the claim in the lower court.
D. The lower court accepted the Plaintiffs' argument on this point and rendered a judgment partially in favor of the Plaintiffs, and the Defendant, dissatisfied with this, filed the present appeal.
2. Issue
The core issue in this case is whether, where work is performed on a holiday in excess of the standard weekly working hours of 40 hours under the former Labor Standards Act (2018. 3. 20. Act No. 15513, before amendment; hereinafter the "former Labor Standards Act," the amended version referred to as the "amended Labor Standards Act," and when referring to both collectively, simply the "Labor Standards Act"), such work should be regarded as extended work, such that additional wages for extended work must be paid in duplication with additional wages for holiday work. As a premise for this, it is necessary to examine how the term "one week" should be interpreted.
3. Statutory provisions and their interpretation
A. Statutory provisions
The provisions of the former Labor Standards Act relevant to the issue in this case are as follows.
Article 50 (Working Hours)
(1) The working hours per week, excluding rest hours, shall not exceed 40 hours.
(2) The working hours per day, excluding rest hours, shall not exceed 8 hours.
Article 53 (Restriction on Extended Work)
(1) Where the parties agree, the working hours under Article 50 may be extended by up to 12 hours per week.
Article 55 (Holidays) An employer shall grant employees at least one paid holiday per week on average.
Article 56 (Extended, Night, and Holiday Work) An employer shall pay an amount not less than 50/100 added to the ordinary wage for extended work (work extended pursuant to Article 53, Article 59, and the proviso to Article 69), night work (work performed between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.), or holiday work.
B. Whether the regulation of weekly working hours also applies to holidays
(1) In principle, law is a universally valid social norm having equal binding force on an unspecified number of persons, and therefore must be interpreted so as to clarify its standard meaning and achieve objective validity, and consistency that can be accepted by everyone as far as possible must be maintained so that legal stability is not undermined. On the other hand, since positive law is enacted with universal and typical matters in mind, it is also required to be interpreted and applied so as to provide the most reasonable solution suited to the specific matter among the diverse matters that arise in social reality. In short, the goal of legal interpretation should ultimately be to find concrete reasonableness within a range that does not undermine legal stability. Furthermore, to that end, while adhering to the principle of interpreting as faithfully as possible to the ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute, one must additionally employ systematic and logical interpretive methods that take into account the legislative purpose and objective, the history of enactment and amendment, harmony with the legal order as a whole, and the relationship with other statutes, so as to arrive at a reasonable interpretation that meets the above requirements of legal interpretation (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2011Da83431 delivered on January 17, 2013).
(2) Comprehensively considering the content and system and purpose of the provisions of the former Labor Standards Act and the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act, the history of enactment and amendment of the statutory provisions and the legislative purpose and objective discernible therefrom, and the perception of the parties to labor relations and existing labor practices, it is reasonable to hold that holiday working hours are not included in the "standard weekly working hours of 40 hours" under Article 50(1) of the former Labor Standards Act or the "weekly extended working hours of 12 hours" under Article 53(1). The detailed reasons are as follows.
(A) Article 30 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act provides that a paid holiday of at least one day per week on average shall be granted only to an employee who has performed the prescribed work for the week without absence. It goes without saying that "one week" in this provision does not include holidays. However, since in practice the standard working hours are ordinarily set as the prescribed working hours, it can be said that a paid holiday is ultimately granted only where the standard weekly working hours have been fulfilled. If so, it cannot be concluded that "one week" in Article 50(1) of the former Labor Standards Act, which sets the standard weekly working hours, necessarily means seven days including a holiday.
Rather, Articles 55 and 56 of the former Labor Standards Act guarantee a paid weekly holiday and provide for additional wages for holiday work at the same additional rate as for extended work and night work. Although working on a holiday, when there is no obligation to provide labor, has similarities to extended work, holiday work is regulated separately from extended work. In light of the content and manner of regulation of these related provisions, it is understood that the standard weekly working hours and weekly extended working hours set forth in Article 50(1) and Article 53(1) of the former Labor Standards Act were intended to regulate working hours with respect to prescribed working days that are not holidays.
(B) Whether "one week" under the former Labor Standards Act includes holidays is fundamentally a matter belonging to the realm of legislative policy. Therefore, in interpreting the law on this point, the intent of the legislator must be respected to the maximum extent possible in a manner that maintains the unity and systematic legitimacy of the legal order. However, the legislative intent discernible through the history of the enactment and amendment of the Labor Standards Act appears clearly to be that holiday work and extended work were to be clearly distinguished, such that holiday working hours were not to be included in extended working hours.
① Under the Labor Standards Act as enacted in 1953, since the standard weekly working hours limit at that time was 48 hours, if an employee worked without absence for 6 prescribed working days at 8 hours per day, working on the weekly holiday would naturally exceed the standard working hours limit. Nevertheless, the enacted Labor Standards Act merely guaranteed a paid weekly holiday and did not provide that work on the weekly holiday would be subject to additional allowance for extended work, nor did it recognize additional wages for holiday work. This clearly reveals that the legislator intended that work performed on the weekly holiday, even if performed in a situation exceeding the standard weekly working hours limit of 48 hours, would be recognized as paid holiday work but not regarded as extended work.
② The amended Labor Standards Act also naturally presupposes that, under the interpretation of the former Labor Standards Act, holiday working hours are not included in extended working hours.
That is, while the amended Labor Standards Act added a definitional provision in Article 2(1)(7) stating that "'one week' means seven days including holidays," it also established Article 1(2) of the Addenda, setting different effective dates for the definitional provision depending on the size of the workplace. In addition, Article 53(3) of the amended Labor Standards Act, and Articles 1(3) and 2 of the Addenda, allow special extended work of up to 8 hours per week on a temporary basis (from July 1, 2021 to December 31, 2022) for workplaces with fewer than 30 employees.
Such amended Labor Standards Act is understood to have added the definitional provision in Article 2(1)(7), premised on the interpretation that holiday working hours under the former Labor Standards Act were not included in the standard weekly working hours and weekly extended working hours, so as to include holiday working hours in each of those working hours going forward, while, in order to prevent the socio-economic disruption that would arise from a drastic reduction in the maximum weekly working hours to 52 hours (standard weekly working hours of 40 hours + weekly extended working hours of 12 hours) if the amended statute were to take effect immediately, setting different effective dates depending on the size of the workplace and even allowing temporary special extended work.
(C) Considering the following circumstances, it can be assessed that the proposition that holiday working hours are not included in the standard weekly working hours and weekly extended working hours has become established as a kind of social norm among the parties to labor relations, and this must be given significant weight in interpreting the relevant provisions of the former Labor Standards Act. Interpreting otherwise would be contrary to the long-standing trust of the parties to labor relations and would cause legal confusion, and is thus difficult to accept.
① The Ministry of Employment and Labor has consistently interpreted, over a long period, that holiday working hours are not included in weekly extended working hours, and has applied this interpretation in industrial settings. Based on the administrative interpretation of the Ministry of Employment and Labor, labor and management have, for a long time, carried out holiday work without particular objection, such as claiming that the weekly extended working hours limit was exceeded due to holiday work, on the premise that holiday work is not included in extended work.
② From the 1960s, when the provision for additional wages for holiday work was introduced into the Labor Standards Act, until around the time this lawsuit was filed—a period of more than half a century—there was no explicit filing of a lawsuit or claim by employees premised on holiday work being included in extended work. Moreover, although failure to pay additional allowance for excess work is subject to criminal punishment, it is difficult to find any example of an employer being criminally reported or prosecuted and subjected to criminal punishment on the ground of failing to pay additional allowance for extended work with respect to holiday work.
(D) If it is interpreted that holiday work is included in extended work under the former Labor Standards Act, such that the maximum weekly working hours are 52 hours, this creates a contradiction with the Addenda provisions of the amended Labor Standards Act, which the National Assembly, as the representative body of the people, prepared over a long period by coordinating the conflicting interests of labor and management and gathering diverse opinions from all sectors, and it is difficult to avoid unreasonable and confusing results in the process of its application, thereby undermining legal stability.
① If "one week" as provided in the former Labor Standards Act is interpreted to include holidays, then before the effective date of the newly established provision defining "one week" separately for each workplace size under the Addenda of the amended Labor Standards Act has even arrived, the legal effect of uniformly applying a maximum weekly working hours limit of 52 hours regardless of workplace size would immediately appear, and the Addenda provisions of the amended Labor Standards Act would thereby lose their meaning.
② Furthermore, if such interpretation were applied consistently, an incomprehensible situation would arise in which, for workplaces with fewer than 30 employees, work would be possible up to a maximum of 52 hours per week until June 30, 2021, but then, from July 1, 2021 to December 31, 2022, work would temporarily become possible up to a maximum of 60 hours per week.
(3) In conclusion, holiday working hours under the former Labor Standards Act must be held not to be included in the standard weekly working hours and weekly extended working hours, and as a natural logical consequence, additional wages for holiday work and additional wages for extended work cannot be paid in duplication.
C. Judgment on this case
Nevertheless, the lower court determined that holiday work of up to 8 hours performed in excess of the standard weekly working hours also constitutes extended work, and held that additional wages for extended work must be paid in duplication with additional wages for holiday work. This determination by the lower court contains an error that misunderstands the meaning of "one week" under Articles 50 and 53 of the former Labor Standards Act, and the legal principles concerning the payment of additional wages for holiday work and extended work under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act, which error affected the judgment.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the part of the lower court's judgment adverse to the Defendant concerning the claim for additional wages for extended work with respect to holiday work is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. This judgment is unanimous among the participating Justices except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Kim Shin, Justice Kim So-young, Justice Cho Hee-dae, Justice Park Jung-hwa, and Justice Min Yoo-sook, and there is a concurring opinion of Justice Park Sang-ok and a concurring opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung with respect to the majority opinion, and a concurring opinion of Justice Kim Shin with respect to the dissenting opinion.
5. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kim Shin, Justice Kim So-young, Justice Cho Hee-dae, Justice Park Jung-hwa, and Justice Min Yoo-sook
A. The gist of the majority opinion is that holiday working hours are not included in the "standard weekly working hours of 40 hours" under Article 50(1) of the former Labor Standards Act or the "weekly extended working hours of 12 hours" under Article 53(1), and that, as a result, additional wages for holiday work and additional wages for extended work cannot be paid in duplication. However, for the following reasons, the logic of the majority opinion is difficult to accept.
B. First of all, the regulation of weekly working hours under the former Labor Standards Act naturally applies to holiday work as well.
(1) In interpreting a statute, the principle should be to interpret as faithfully as possible to the ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute, and where the language of the statute itself consists of relatively clear concepts, in principle there is no need to resort to other methods of interpretation, or such methods are limited (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035 delivered on April 23, 2009).
Meanwhile, "working hours" means the time during which an employee provides labor under a labor contract under the direction and supervision of the employer, that is, actual working hours (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da14406 delivered on October 9, 1992).
(2) Based on the above legal principles, considering the following circumstances comprehensively, holiday working hours are also included in the maximum weekly working hours of 52 hours, which is the sum of the "standard weekly working hours of 40 hours" under Article 50(1) of the former Labor Standards Act and the "weekly extended working hours limit of 12 hours" under Article 53(1).
(A) "One week" ordinarily means seven days on the calendar, from Monday to Sunday, or from Sunday to Saturday.
(B) Article 50(1) of the former Labor Standards Act, which sets the standard weekly working hours, does not contain a separate provision excluding holidays from that "one week," and there is no reason to exclude actual working hours from actual working hours merely because the day on which the work was actually performed was a holiday.
(C) Article 53(1) of the former Labor Standards Act, which likewise sets the maximum limit of extendable working hours per week, also does not specially exclude any particular day within the week. There is no basis for interpreting "one week" and "working hours" here differently from the meanings stated above.
(D) The former Labor Standards Act, in Article 55, provides that an employer shall grant employees at least one paid holiday per week on average, and in Article 56, provides that additional wages must be paid where work is performed on a holiday, but it does not otherwise impose any special restriction such as prohibiting holiday work.
(E) The Labor Standards Act strictly regulates extended work by setting a limit on the extension of the standard working hours, and imposes even criminal punishment for violation thereof (Article 110(1)). If holiday work performed in excess of the standard weekly working hours is deemed not to constitute extended work, then work exceeding the maximum limit of extendable working hours becomes possible, which does not accord with the purpose of the Labor Standards Act in strictly setting and enforcing the upper limit on extended working hours as described above.
(3) Therefore, where the working hours on non-holiday working days are less than 40 hours but the total weekly working hours, including holiday working hours, exceed 40 hours, the portion of holiday work performed in excess of 40 hours, or holiday work performed additionally where 40 hours or more had already been worked on non-holiday working days, all constitute extended work.
C. Where holiday work and extended work overlap, additional wages for holiday work and additional wages for extended work must each be paid.
(1) Such interpretation is a natural consequence of the language and structure of Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act.
(A) Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act provides: "An employer shall pay an amount not less than 50/100 added to the ordinary wage for extended work and night work, or holiday work." Breaking this down, it consists of three sentences: "If it constitutes extended work, an amount not less than 50/100 of the ordinary wage must be paid," "If it constitutes night work, an amount not less than 50/100 of the ordinary wage must be paid," and "If it constitutes holiday work, an amount not less than 50/100 of the ordinary wage must be paid," which are merely connected into one sentence using "and" and "or."
Since Article 56 sets forth the respective standards of economic compensation for extended, night, and holiday work, it accords with the form and structure of the language of this provision to interpret it such that, if any one of the types of work set forth in the provision is met, the employer must pay the additional wage therefor, and where other requirements are cumulatively satisfied, the additional wages must be paid cumulatively. The absence of language stating that "each additional wage must be paid cumulatively" in the provision should not be interpreted to mean that duplicate payment is prohibited.
(B) There is no dispute that, where night work simultaneously constitutes extended work, additional wages for night work and additional wages for extended work must be paid in duplication, and that where night work simultaneously constitutes holiday work, additional wages for night work and additional wages for holiday work must be paid in duplication. Moreover, there is no provision stating that any particular type of work among extended, night, and holiday work should be treated differently. Nevertheless, interpreting that additional wages should not be paid in duplication only in the case of holiday work and extended work, despite the fact that extended work, night work, and holiday work are set forth in parallel in Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act, amounts to interpreting provisions of the same structure in different ways, which cannot be permitted.
(2) In addition to the above literal interpretation of Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act, considering the following various circumstances comprehensively, additional wages for extended work, as well as additional wages for holiday work, must be paid for holiday work performed in excess of the standard weekly working hours.
(A) Holiday work differs in nature from extended work when compared, and the purposes of compensation and regulation for additional wages under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act are also entirely different.
① Extended work concerns the length of total working hours, with the absolute total amount of time being the important criterion for determination and the basis for restriction, whereas night work concerns a specific time period within a day, and holiday work concerns a specific day within the week—that is, the location of the working hours is the criterion for determination and the basis for restriction—such that each has a different purpose of protection and nature.
② Holiday work has as its purpose the provision of a minimum rest period on a weekly basis, protection of health, and provision of opportunities for employees' self-development and leisure, and thereby serves the purpose of guaranteeing the rights of workers and the right to a life worthy of human dignity as provided under the Constitution, so, like night work, it has very great independent value as compensable work. Extended work also shares some of the same nature as holiday work in terms of the purpose of guaranteeing employees' rest time, but it is sufficient in itself to be recognized as having independent compensable value in that it plays an important role in protecting employees through limiting the total amount of working hours on a daily or weekly basis and in determining working conditions under the labor contract.
③ The Labor Standards Act separately provides protective provisions restricting holiday work and night work for women, pregnant women, and persons under the age of 18 (Article 70), thereby making clear that holiday work has a particularity distinguishing it from extended work.
④ Examining the purpose of the provision for additional wages under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act from the perspective of working hours regulation, in the case of extended work, the purpose is to promote compliance with the standard working hours by increasing the monetary burden on employers so as to deter work performed in excess of the standard working hours, while in the case of holiday work, the purpose is likewise to promote the effectiveness of the holiday system by increasing the monetary burden so as to deter work performed on holidays, when there is no obligation to provide labor. Thus, the additional wage system for extended work and the additional wage system for holiday work have different regulatory purposes.
(B) Examining Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act together with the related provisions, Articles 50 and 53, it accords with the systematic interpretation and conceptual definitions of the related provisions to interpret that holiday working hours are included in extended working hours, which are subject to additional wages under Article 56.
Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act specifies the scope of work subject to additional wages as "extended work (work extended pursuant to Article 53, Article 59, and the proviso to Article 69), night work (work performed between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.), or holiday work." "Work extended pursuant to Article 53" means work exceeding the standard working hours under Article 50, namely 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week, and does not distinguish whether such work was performed on a holiday or at night. In contrast, night work is specifically defined as "work performed between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.," and is thus used as a concept separate from extended work, and holiday work itself is also conceptually distinct from extended work in that it refers to work on a specific day, namely a holiday. In this way, Article 56 understands extended work as a concept distinct from night work or holiday work, from which it can be seen that extended work performed at night or on a holiday is not excluded from the conceptual category of extended work subject to additional wages merely because it was performed at night or on a holiday. That is, even night work or holiday work, if it falls within the concept of extended work, can be calculated as extended working hours as set forth in Article 56, and it is merely that, due to the particularity that such work also constitutes night work or holiday work, additional wages as night work or holiday work are paid in duplication pursuant to Article 56.
D. Meanwhile, the logic of the majority opinion has the following difficulties, and its conclusion is also unreasonable in certain respects, making it difficult to accept as it stands.
(1) Above all, according to the majority opinion, it is not even clearly established how many hours the maximum weekly working hours contemplated by the former Labor Standards Act would be.
(A) The majority opinion is understood to presuppose that the maximum weekly working hours are not 52 hours, but rather, as in the administrative interpretation of the Ministry of Employment and Labor, a total of 68 hours, being the sum of the standard weekly working hours of 40 hours, the weekly extended working hours of 12 hours, and 8 hours each of holiday work on the 2 days that are not prescribed working days (typically Saturday and Sunday).
However, our Labor Standards Act does not prohibit holiday work, and does not have a separate provision limiting the maximum limit of holiday working hours. If, as the majority opinion holds, the provision allowing extended work up to a maximum of 12 hours per week in addition to the standard working hours of 40 hours per week does not regulate holiday work as well, then it is unclear whether holiday work is permitted only up to 8 hours per day pursuant to Article 50(2) of the Labor Standards Act, or whether extended work exceeding 8 hours per day is possible even on holidays if there is agreement between the parties. Ultimately, depending on the interpretation, the maximum weekly working hours permitted under the former Labor Standards Act would not be limited to the 68-hour limit noted above, but could be even more.
(B) Even if holiday work is permitted only up to 8 hours per day, there is also the problem that the maximum weekly working hours permitted under the former Labor Standards Act would vary depending on how many days of the week the employee and employer agree to designate as prescribed working days, on which there is an obligation to work, and as holidays.
For example, suppose a workplace where the labor contract or collective bargaining agreement designates Monday through Thursday, 4 days, as prescribed working days, and Friday through Sunday as holidays (Friday and Saturday being agreed unpaid holidays, and Sunday being a paid weekly holiday). In this case, on the working days from Monday to Thursday, work would be possible up to 52 hours, the sum of the standard weekly working hours of 40 hours plus 12 hours of extended work (13 hours per day), and on the holidays from Friday to Sunday, holiday work of 8 hours each day for 3 days, totaling 24 hours, would be possible. According to the majority opinion, the strange conclusion is reached that the former Labor Standards Act permits as much as 76 hours as the maximum weekly working hours for such a workplace. Ultimately, a problem arises whereby the maximum weekly working hours derived from the interpretation of the former Labor Standards Act fluctuates depending on how the prescribed working days and holidays are set through separate agreement between labor and management or with individual employees.
(2) Furthermore, the majority opinion does not accord with the process of change in the regulation of working hours under the Labor Standards Act, which has repeatedly reduced the standard weekly working hours in order to improve the quality of employees' lives.
As is generally known, since its enactment, the Labor Standards Act has maintained the provisions for at least one weekly holiday and a limit of 12 hours of extended work per week unchanged, while reducing the standard weekly working hours from 48 hours to 44 hours, and then to the current 40 hours. However, if the majority opinion, which does not include holiday work (presupposing 8 hours per day) in the standard weekly working hours and extended working hours, is applied consistently, then the incomprehensible conclusion is reached that the maximum weekly working hours under the Labor Standards Act decreased from 68 hours (= standard working hours of 48 hours + extended work of 12 hours + holiday work of 8 hours) to 64 hours (= standard working hours of 44 hours + extended work of 12 hours + holiday work of 8 hours), and then increased again to 68 hours [= standard working hours of 40 hours + extended work of 12 hours + total holiday work of 16 hours (= 8 hours + 8 hours)]. This does not accord with the legislature's consistent direction of amendment aimed at gradually reducing working hours.
(3) The majority opinion's conclusion that, although holiday work constitutes extended work, additional wages need not be paid respectively, also causes the following unacceptable results.
(A) Comparing the case where holiday work simultaneously constitutes extended work with holiday work that does not constitute extended work, the former requires a greater sacrifice from the employee, and thus the need for employee protection and working hours regulation is greater. It is entirely reasonable to pay additional wages in duplication for such work. Nevertheless, treating the former and the latter identically with respect to the payment of additional wages amounts to treating unequal things equally, which is contrary to the concept of justice.
(B) Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act is a mandatory provision that provides that extended work, night work, and holiday work are each subject to additional wages if any one of them is applicable, and imposes criminal punishment for its violation (Article 109(1) of the Labor Standards Act). However, interpreting that, even where two or more of the above grounds for addition are met, one of the additional wages need not be paid, results in circumventing the mandatory provisions of the Labor Standards Act.
E. Therefore, it should be interpreted that, where work is performed on a holiday in excess of the standard weekly working hours of 40 hours under the former Labor Standards Act, additional wages for extended work must be paid together with additional wages for holiday work.
F. In the same vein, the lower court's determination—that holiday work exceeding 40 hours per week simultaneously constitutes extended work, such that additional wages for extended work must be paid in addition to additional wages for holiday work—is justified. There is no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, in misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the limit of extended work, the requirements for payment of additional wages for extended work and holiday work, or whether additional wages may be paid in duplication, nor is there any error exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience.
For the foregoing reasons, we state that we cannot agree with the majority opinion.
6. Concurring Opinion of Justice Park Sang-ok with respect to the Majority Opinion
A. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (hereinafter simply the "Constitution") is based on the principle of separation of powers, which distributes and assigns national functions among different state organs in accordance with their respective functions, and maintains mutual checks and balances, thereby protecting the constitutional order and the fundamental rights of the people from the concentration and abuse of state power.
The scope and limits of the authority and duties held by state organs under the Constitution must be exercised and observed as granted by the Constitution. This is the principle of checks and balances based on the principle of separation of powers on which our Constitution is founded. State organs, by fulfilling the functions assigned to each of them within such checks and balances, ensure the efficient operation of state functions and enable the formation of an integrated state will.
The Constitution provides that, among the powers of the state, legislative power belongs to the National Assembly, and judicial power belongs to the courts composed of judges (Article 40 and Article 101(1) of the Constitution).
Therefore, the authority of the courts regarding the interpretation and application of statutory provisions must be exercised only within a scope that does not infringe upon the legislative power of the National Assembly under Article 40 of the Constitution or the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
B. Article 50(1) and Article 53(1) of the former Labor Standards Act, which are the provisions at issue in this case, did not have a separate definitional provision regarding the meaning of "one week." Other provisions of the former Labor Standards Act that use the term "one week" likewise did not otherwise define its meaning.
Therefore, interpreting "one week" according to its dictionary meaning—seven days on the calendar, from Monday to Sunday, or from Sunday to Saturday—may be an interpretation faithful to the language. Following this interpretation, as in the dissenting opinion, work performed on a holiday in excess of the standard weekly working hours under the former Labor Standards Act would also be regarded as extended work.
C. However, when the National Assembly amended the Labor Standards Act on March 20, 2018, it clarified, for the following reasons, that the regulation of standard weekly working hours under the former Labor Standards Act did not extend to holiday work.
(1) The amended Labor Standards Act added a definitional provision in Article 2(1)(7) stating that "'one week' means seven days including holidays," thereby making clear that the maximum weekly working hours are 52 hours, not 68 hours. However, Article 1(2) of the Addenda set different effective dates for this newly added definitional provision depending on the size of the workplace (July 1, 2018 for workplaces with 300 or more employees; January 1, 2020 for workplaces with 50 or more but fewer than 300 employees; and July 1, 2021 for workplaces with 5 or more but fewer than 50 employees). In addition, for workplaces with fewer than 30 employees, special extended work of 8 hours per week was allowed on a temporary basis (from July 1, 2021 to December 31, 2022) (Article 53(3), Articles 1(3) and 2 of the Addenda).
(2) The establishment of the above definitional provision and Addenda in the amended Labor Standards Act can only be interpreted as reflecting the legislature's recognition that the maximum weekly working hours under the former Labor Standards Act were 68 hours, and its intent to improve this in stages to 52 hours.
If the legislature had considered that the maximum weekly working hours under the former Labor Standards Act were also 52 hours, the same as under the amended Labor Standards Act, there would have been no need to establish the definitional provision or the provisions in the Addenda deferring its effective date, nor would there have been any reason to establish a provision that, contrary to the legislative purpose of the Addenda of gradually reducing the maximum weekly working hours, would rather temporarily increase the maximum working hours to 60 hours for workplaces with fewer than 30 employees.
D. The interpretation of law should, as a principle, be faithful to the ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute, while comprehensively considering the legislative purpose and objective, the history of enactment and amendment, and the systematic position within the legal order.
However, in this case, if only the literal interpretation is adhered to, the provisions of the amended Labor Standards Act—which the legislature finalized after long deliberation, giving full consideration to the positions of labor and management, the interested parties—would be rendered nugatory. Furthermore, this would force the legislature to enact new legislation to again ease the burden on businesses that was considered at the time of enacting the amended Labor Standards Act, thereby creating a situation of conflict between judicial power and legislative power. Ultimately, this would cause enormous socio-economic confusion at the national level.
With respect to matters of a strongly legislative-policy nature, such as the maximum weekly working hours, the courts need to interpret the statute before and after amendment harmoniously so as to maintain the unity of the legal order and prevent social confusion. This point must be considered as a limitation on the literal interpretation discussed above.
E. Therefore, while it may be regarded as the ordinary meaning of the language that "one week" under the former Labor Standards Act includes seven days including holidays, the legislature, by establishing the definitional provision and the Addenda provisions in the amended Labor Standards Act, made clear its intent that, contrary to this, holiday working hours under the former Labor Standards Act are not included in the standard weekly working hours and weekly extended working hours.
If the courts were to interpret statutory provisions contrary to the clearly confirmed intent of the legislature, this could be misconstrued as exceeding the limits of judicial power and violating the principle of separation of powers. If the exercise of judicial power vested in the courts were instead to provoke conflict among state organs or delay the organic and integrated decision-making of the state, this would only cause confusion for the people. The courts should refrain from such conduct.
The foregoing is stated as a concurring opinion with respect to the majority opinion.
7. Concurring Opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung with respect to the Majority Opinion
A. Even if holiday working hours under the former Labor Standards Act are included in the standard weekly working hours and weekly extended working hours, the majority opinion's conclusion that additional wages for holiday work and additional wages for extended work cannot be paid in duplication can be derived through the interpretation of Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act.
B. Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act specifies that additional wages must be paid for the three types of work: extended work, night work, and holiday work, but there is no explicit provision regarding whether additional wages must also be paid cumulatively where a particular instance of work falls under two or more of these types simultaneously. Cases where the grounds for wage addition overlap may arise not only among different types of work but also within the same type of work, such as where work is both extended work exceeding the standard weekly working hours and extended work exceeding the standard daily working hours.
In such cases, whether additional wages should be paid cumulatively is basically a matter of legislative policy, but where the relevant statutory provision is unclear, this must be resolved through legal interpretation.
Comprehensively considering the content of the provisions on additional wages for extended work, etc. under the Labor Standards Act, the legal nature of extended work and holiday work, the history and legislative purpose, and comparative legal materials, and interpreting the provision literally, systematically, and teleologically, it cannot be recognized that there is an obligation to pay, in duplication with additional wages for holiday work, additional wages for extended work, even where holiday work constitutes extended work performed in excess of the standard weekly working hours of 40 hours set by the Labor Standards Act. The detailed reasons are as follows.
(1) The literal interpretation alone of Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act cannot yield a conclusion regarding whether additional wages for extended work and holiday work should be paid cumulatively.
Looking at Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act, extended work, night work, and holiday work are connected by the particle "and (와)" and the adverb "or (또는)." "And (와)" is a connecting particle that links two or more objects with equal standing, while "or (또는)" is an adverb meaning "otherwise." It is generally understood that using "and (와/과)" versus using "or (또는)" to connect two or more words each carries a different meaning. Therefore, listing three words while using both of these connectors together is highly unusual, and interpretive controversy inevitably arises as a result.
Where two or more requirements are listed using "or (또는)," compared to the case of using "and (와/과)," there is more room to view the requirements as having greater relatedness or commonality, such that a single legal effect is recognized even if the underlying facts satisfy only one of the requirements. Therefore, since holiday work, unlike "extended work and night work," is connected with "or," it may be a somewhat more natural interpretation to hold that, where work constitutes extended work and simultaneously constitutes holiday work, it is sufficient to pay an amount not less than 50/100 added to the ordinary wage.
However, in statutes, "and/과" and "or/또는" are not always used with the same meaning in every case, and their interpretation may vary depending on the context. The statute neither explicitly affirms nor denies whether additional wages must be paid cumulatively for extended work and holiday work. The literal interpretation alone of Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act cannot clearly determine whether additional wages for these two types of work should be paid cumulatively.
The meaning that the language of a statute carries must be determined in accordance with the linguistic usage of the members of our society. The very fact that opinions among the members of our society were divided over the issue of cumulative payment of additional wages, to the point that the provision was ultimately amended, itself shows that the language of the provision was unclear.
While it is clear that literal interpretation is the foundation and starting point of statutory interpretation, in such a contentious matter, it is desirable to reach a conclusion by examining the meaning of the provision from multiple angles, including the legislative intent and purpose, rather than attempting to resolve the issue simply through literal interpretation.
(2) Even if holiday work simultaneously constitutes extended work, holiday work not exceeding 8 hours per day cannot be regarded as having an independent evaluative value distinct from ordinary extended work.
(A) Holiday work and extended work both share the commonality of being work performed during time when there is no obligation to provide labor, with the grounds for compensation being the disruption of the employee's rest, the restriction of free time in daily life, and the need for greater compensation for work performed despite the absence of an obligation to work. Both holiday work and extended work commonly involve additional work performed after the completion of the obligatory work as the common cause for the premium, and by their nature share the same basis for wage addition. Where holiday work also constitutes extended work in terms of weekly working hours regulation, this merely results in a different legal evaluation of the same time period, without there being any difference in evaluation in terms of the quantitative aspect of working hours; therefore, a single form of compensation is sufficient to achieve the purpose of wage addition.
For example, where extended work exceeding 8 hours on a prescribed working day that is not a holiday simultaneously constitutes extended work exceeding the standard weekly working hours, it is not considered that additional wages for extended work of the same type must be paid cumulatively. Cumulative payment in such a case would constitute double evaluation. The same applies to holiday work and extended work.
(B) Since the prescribed working hours for a working day are typically set in advance in accordance with the standard weekly working hours, most holiday work performed after the completion of the prescribed work for the week constitutes extended work exceeding the standard working hours.
[Reasoning] (continued)
Therefore, even if holiday work simultaneously constitutes extended work, this merely amounts to "extended work performed on a holiday" or "extended holiday work," which is in fact simply a typical type of holiday work. Ultimately, it is sufficient to pay the additional wage for holiday work pursuant to Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), and to additionally treat this as extended work and pay a duplicative additional wage would constitute double evaluation of the same work performed during a specific time period.
(다) Holiday work and extended work are different in nature from night work, which reflects the qualitative characteristics of working hours. That is, night work is qualitatively distinguished from holiday work having the character of extended work, in terms of physical and mental fatigue and the intensity of labor.
Considering these differences between night work and holiday/extended work, even if duplicative payment of additional wages is recognized between night work combined with extended work, or night work combined with holiday work, this cannot be conclusively deemed inequitable or unreasonable in comparison with the issue of duplicative payment of additional wages for holiday work combined with extended work.
(3) In light of the legislative history of Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act, it is clear that duplicative payment of additional wages for extended work, on top of the additional wage for holiday work, was not contemplated.
(가) At the time of the enactment of the Labor Standards Act, the original draft Article 48 provided: "Where an employer extends working hours pursuant to Articles 44 and 45, the employer shall pay an additional amount of not less than 30% of the ordinary wage for the excess portion, and where an employer causes work to be performed on a holiday or between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., the employer shall pay an additional amount of not less than 50% of the ordinary wage for the excess portion." Thus, like the former Labor Standards Act, it contained provisions for additional payment for extended, night, or holiday work, but set different additional rates for each.
The reason the original draft of the enacted Labor Standards Act set a higher additional rate for holiday work than for extended work is understood to be that, although both extended work and holiday work are performed during time when there is no obligation to provide labor and both equally infringe upon the worker's right to rest, the degree of infringement on the right to rest was considered to be greater for holiday work than for extended work on an ordinary working day that is not a holiday. This appears to have focused on distinctly treating holiday work and extended work separately, rather than having contemplated from the outset the possibility of duplicative payment of additional allowances.
(나) However, during the deliberation process in the National Assembly, upon adopting the paid holiday system, it was determined that since holiday wages are paid even if the worker does not work on the holiday, merely paying additional wages for work performed on that day would be sufficient regulation and compensation for holiday work. Accordingly, an amendment was passed (Article 46 of the enacted Labor Standards Act) providing: "An employer shall pay an additional amount of not less than 50% of the ordinary wage for extended-hour work (overtime work extended pursuant to Articles 42 and 43) and night work (from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.), and with respect to holiday work (work on a wage-payment holiday as defined by this Act), the employer may not refuse to pay the wage due for the holiday as prescribed by this Act on the ground that the employer pays the wage due for that day." This made clear that no separate additional wage was recognized for holiday work itself, and at the same time, that the additional wage for extended work did not apply either.
(다) Article 46 of the Labor Standards Act as amended in 1961 (before amendment by Act No. 2708 on December 24, 1974; hereinafter referred to as "the 1961 Labor Standards Act") provided: "An employer shall pay an additional amount of not less than 50% of the ordinary wage for extended-hour work, night work, or holiday work," thereby first adopting a provision in the same manner as Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act. This maintained the overall form of the provisions concerning additional wages for extended work etc., while changing the position to recognize the payment of an additional wage for holiday work itself, which had been controversial under the enacted Labor Standards Act.
(라) Immediately thereafter, Article 24-3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act as amended on September 25, 1962 (before the full amendment by Presidential Decree No. 4220 on November 10, 1969) provided: "Holiday work as prescribed in Article 46 of the Act means work performed on a holiday other than a paid holiday (paragraph 1), and the wage paid to a worker who works on a paid holiday under Articles 45, 47, and 48 of the Act includes both the wage that is naturally paid as a paid holiday and the prescribed ordinary wage for the work performed on that paid holiday (paragraph 2)." According to this provision of the Enforcement Decree, the additional-wage provision for holiday work under the 1961 Labor Standards Act applied only to unpaid holidays other than paid holidays, and it can be seen that, as under the enacted Labor Standards Act, no additional wage was paid for work on paid holidays beyond the wage for that day's work. Ultimately, in a situation where no additional wage at all was paid for work on paid weekly holidays, which comprise most holidays, it cannot be considered that duplicative recognition of an additional wage for extended work, on top of that for holiday work, was intended.
The above Enforcement Decree provision was finally deleted around January 29, 1981. As a result, even though this changed the practice to paying an additional wage for holiday work regardless of whether it was a paid holiday, this merely began paying the additional wage that had not previously been paid for paid holidays, and it is difficult to view this as having further compelled the additional payment of the wage for extended work that had not previously been paid.
(4) As also mentioned in the majority opinion, in the several decades since the provision on additional wages for holiday work was newly enacted in 1961, disputes over duplicative payment of additional wages on the ground that holiday work performed in excess of the standard weekly working hours constitutes extended work have hardly arisen. This has not become a social issue, nor has it been discussed in depth in academic circles. Administrative interpretations by administrative agencies also did not recognize such duplicative payment, and there have been no criminal or administrative measures taken on the ground of failure to pay the additional wage for extended work in connection with holiday work performed in excess of the standard weekly working hours.
Taking these circumstances together, it can be seen that both employers and workers lacked awareness that holiday work performed in excess of the standard weekly working hours constitutes extended work, and, through repeated practice, the principle that "an additional wage for extended work shall not be paid in duplication with the additional wage for holiday work" had come to be established as a kind of social norm governing labor relations, even though it had not reached the point of being recognized or enforced as a legal norm through legal conviction and awareness.
(5) Looking at foreign legislative examples concerning additional wages for extended work etc., it can generally be seen that cases of duplicative payment of additional wages for extended work and additional wages for holiday work are rare, that the additional rates for extended work and holiday work are each generally below 50%, and that regulation is structured so that an addition of 50% or more applies only in cases meeting special requirements. In contrast, our former Labor Standards Act Article 56 sets a high additional rate of 50% or more for both extended work and holiday work from the outset. This is understood as intended to protect workers' rights by setting a high additional rate from the outset as a means of compensation and deterrence for extended work and holiday work, so that holiday work, like extended work, could itself constitute sufficient compensation on its own. Ultimately, it cannot be considered that duplicative addition was contemplated even where holiday work constitutes extended work.
(6) One might question whether this interpretation runs counter to the recent trend of working-hour regulation that has emerged as a topical issue of our times. However, it cannot be denied that the system of additional wages, which seeks to deter extended work and holiday work etc. in advance by imposing a monetary burden on employers, has, due to a convergence of interests between employers who wish to avoid hiring additional new personnel and workers who wish to receive more wages, also brought about the negative result of extremely long working hours. The desirable direction of regulation that the Labor Standards Act, as a mandatory provision, should establish for holiday work is not duplicative payment of additional wages, but rather a direction that, in principle, prohibits holiday work and, even where there are exceptional and unavoidable grounds for recognizing it, guarantees a substitute holiday. Despite the recent amendment to the Labor Standards Act, this remains an area requiring more desirable legislation to be prepared from a long-term perspective.
The foregoing is set forth as the supplementary opinion to the majority opinion.
8. Supplementary Opinion to the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kim Shin
As pointed out in the majority opinion, according to the dissenting opinion, it is naturally confirmed, even under the interpretation of the former Labor Standards Act, that the maximum weekly working hours are 52 hours, and as a result, there is a problem that the supplementary provisions etc. established by the amended Labor Standards Act become meaningless. Nevertheless, the following sets forth why the dissenting opinion must be taken.
가. As argued in detail in the dissenting opinion, notwithstanding the past administrative interpretations of the Ministry of Employment and Labor (고용노동부), it is clear under the interpretation of the former Labor Standards Act that the maximum weekly working hours, including holiday working hours, are 52 hours. And the fact that the Labor Standards Act was amended during the pendency of this lawsuit cannot cause this interpretive theory regarding the former Labor Standards Act to change before and after the point of amendment. That is, until the promulgation of the amended Labor Standards Act, it was the natural interpretive theory that only up to 52 hours of work per week were permitted under the former Labor Standards Act, but the promulgation of the amended Labor Standards Act cannot suddenly change the interpretation to hold that the former Labor Standards Act permitted maximum weekly working hours of 68 hours or more.
Of course, if the amended Labor Standards Act were amended in order to regulate existing legal relationships from the time when the former Labor Standards Act was applicable, there might be room for a different view, but this is a matter of retroactive legislation, not a matter of interpretation of the former Labor Standards Act. Meanwhile, there is no provision in the amended Labor Standards Act intending retroactive legislation, nor can any related legislative materials confirming such intent be found.
나. When a court interprets a statute, if the text itself is not clear, it is appropriate to interpret it by comprehensively considering the legislative purpose and intent, and even in that case, the legislative purpose and intent that the court must explore in the process of statutory interpretation and legal discovery are those concerning the statute currently to be applied.
However, it needs no further discussion that it is natural to interpret the maximum weekly working hours under the text of the former Labor Standards Act as 52 hours. Furthermore, since the amended Labor Standards Act intends to regulate future legal relationships after its promulgation, and its legislative intent is likewise directed toward the future, the interpretation of the former Labor Standards Act applicable to this case should not be governed by the legislative purpose and intent of the amended Labor Standards Act.
Moreover, it is questionable whether there exists a single legislative intent regarding the amended Labor Standards Act as mentioned in the majority opinion, and whether such intent can be explicitly confirmed. Even if this is affirmed, its essence is understood as an intent to gradually secure the substantive normative force of the provision of the former Labor Standards Act regarding the 52-hour maximum weekly working hours, on the premise of the labor reality in which working-hour regulation has, in fact, been carried out pursuant to the administrative interpretation of the Ministry of Employment and Labor. It cannot be said, going further, that the legislature, despite not being vested with the authority to interpret statutes under the constitutional principle of separation of powers, interpreted the former Labor Standards Act and reached the conclusion that holiday work is not extended work such that the maximum weekly working hours are 68 hours, and then legislated the amended Labor Standards Act on that premise. Even examining the stated reasons for the amendment to the Labor Standards Act—"to resolve the pressing task of our times of reducing actual working hours ... and to make clear that the maximum weekly working hours, including holiday work, are 52 hours"—it can be seen that the legislation was made for the purpose and intent of reducing actual working hours in the workplace, at the level of clearly confirming that the maximum weekly working hours are 52 hours. Ultimately, the dissenting opinion's interpretive theory regarding the provisions of the former Labor Standards Act does not clearly conflict with the legislative intent expressed in the amended Labor Standards Act so as to exceed the court's authority of statutory interpretation or infringe upon legislative power.
다. Of course, apart from such legal debate, it would be desirable for the highest court to finally resolve the parties' legal dispute through statutory interpretation, and thereby also ultimately resolve the social conflict among the interested parties surrounding them. Nevertheless, the essence of the judiciary lies in guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the people and safeguarding constitutional values, and the court cannot abandon a legitimate statutory interpretation in response to the people's demand for protection of their rights, out of consideration for economic circumstances or political compromise. Notwithstanding some incongruity with the amended Labor Standards Act and concerns thereabout, the court must declare, as it stands, the interpretation legitimately derived with respect to the former Labor Standards Act, based on the authority of statutory interpretation vested in the court by the Constitution.
The foregoing sets forth the supplementary opinion to the dissenting opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justice Ko Young-han, Justice Kim Chang-seok, Justice Kim Shin (Justice in Charge), Justice Kim So-young, Justice Cho Hee-dae, Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Cho Jae-yeon, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Min Yu-sook