[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff (Attorney Lee Yong-cheol, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Daehan Investment Finance Co., Ltd. (Attorneys Lee Jae-hoo and 3 others, Counsel for the Defendant)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 94Na19442 rendered on July 7, 1995
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
A collective agreement is an agreement concluded between a labor union and an employer or an employer association concerning working conditions and other matters arising from labor-management relations. Where a labor union enters into a collective agreement with the employer that retroactively consents to or approves the existing standards for determining working conditions such as wages, working hours, and retirement allowances, the effect of such consent or approval extends to the union members or employees who, after the collective agreement takes effect, are engaged in the business and become subject to the application of the agreement (see this Court's Decision 91Da34073 rendered on July 24, 1992). Accordingly, even in cases where, because the amendment of the rules of employment is disadvantageous to employees and the employer amended the rules without obtaining the consent of the employees through a collective decision-making method, thereby infringing upon the vested interests of existing employees, the former rules of employment would ordinarily have to be applied to such existing employees whose vested interests are infringed—nevertheless, if the labor union enters into a new collective agreement with the employer, the agreement takes effect, in principle, with respect to the union members or employees who will be subject to the agreement, regardless of whether it was known that the former rules of employment should be applied to the existing employees whose vested interests are infringed. Therefore, the rules of employment as amended in accordance with the content of such collective agreement must be applied to the employees.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the lower court found the following facts: the Plaintiff joined the Defendant company as an employee on February 19, 1975, and retired on October 12, 1990; on May 21, 1975, the Defendant enacted the Retirement Consolation Payment Regulations, providing that employees ("sawon") and clerical staff ("gowon") who had served for at least one year would, upon retirement, be paid a retirement allowance calculated by multiplying the average monthly wage at the time of retirement (base pay plus position allowance) by a retirement payment rate based on a highly progressive rate (with the progressive rate for "sawon" being higher than that for "gowon") (hereinafter the "Former Regulations"); that around August 1976, in accordance with the directive of the Ministry of Labor, the Defendant changed the base wage for calculating retirement allowances to the average wage, which caused the base wage for calculating retirement allowances to become approximately double the previous amount, while the retirement payment rate remained unchanged; that on June 27, 1978, the Defendant amended the Retirement Consolation Payment Regulations to unify the retirement payment rates, which had previously been differentiated between "sawon" and "gowon," while adjusting the rate downward (hereinafter the "1978 Regulations"), and that at the time, since no labor union had yet been established, this amendment was made only through a resolution of the board of directors, without going through the collective decision-making method of obtaining the consent of a labor union or a majority of the employees; that on July 23, 1987, a labor union was established at the Defendant company, and 130 out of approximately 180 total employees joined the labor union; that on November 6, 1987, as a result of negotiations with the labor union regarding an upward adjustment of the retirement payment rate, the Defendant entered into a collective agreement providing for a rate slightly higher than that under the 1978 Regulations, and on February 4, 1988, amended the Retirement Consolation Payment Regulations in accordance with the content of the collective agreement (hereinafter the "1988 Regulations"); and that on October 12, 1990, the Defendant paid the Plaintiff, upon his retirement, the retirement allowance calculated pursuant to the 1988 Regulations. Based on these findings, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff's claim in this case, which sought payment of the difference between the retirement allowance calculated under the Former Regulations and that calculated under the 1988 Regulations, on the ground, as stated in its reasoning, that the 1988 Regulations, as amended pursuant to the above collective agreement, were valid.
If the facts are as found by the lower court, then the collective agreement concluded between the Defendant and its labor union on November 16, 1987 shall have effect with respect to the union members and employees who, after the agreement took effect, were engaged in work at the Defendant company and became subject to the application of the agreement. Accordingly, the 1988 Regulations, as amended in accordance with the content of the above collective agreement, must be applied to the Plaintiff, and therefore the Plaintiff's claim in this case is without merit.
The judgment below, having reached the same conclusion, is correct, and there is no illegality therein such as incomplete deliberation or misapprehension of the legal principles as pointed out in the grounds of appeal. This Court's Decision 92Da20309 rendered on April 12, 1994, cited in the grounds of appeal, concerns a case in which the retirement allowance payment provisions in the rules of employment were amended to the disadvantage of employees without the consent of the employees as a group, and no particular agreement regarding retirement allowance payment was thereafter reached in a collective agreement; therefore, it cannot be relied upon in this case.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, with the unanimous concurrence of the Justices involved.
Justice Lee Im-soo (Presiding Justice), Jeong Gwi-ho, Lee Don-hee (Justice in charge)