[Plaintiff, Appellant and Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellee] Korea Ilsun Co., Ltd., Litigation Representative: Attorney Park Woo-dong of Dongseo Jonghap Law Firm (법무법인 동서종합법률사무소)
[Judgment Below] Busan High Court Decision 93Na395, rendered November 26, 1993
[Order]
The part of the judgment below against which the Defendant lost is reversed, and the judgment of the first instance court concerning this part is vacated.
The Plaintiff's action seeking confirmation of invalidity of dismissal is dismissed.
The Plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the lawsuit, including all instances, shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
1. First, we examine the grounds of appeal submitted by the Plaintiff's litigation representative (to the extent that the supplementary brief on the grounds of appeal, submitted after the expiration of the period for submission of the grounds of appeal, supplements the said grounds of appeal).
As to Ground 1:
A. Even if the Rules of Employment (취업규칙) or other regulations provide that the occurrence of a certain cause shall constitute a ground for automatic retirement and prescribe a procedure different from that for ordinary dismissal or disciplinary dismissal, if the employer unilaterally terminates the employment relationship regardless of the employee's intention, the employer's measure of automatic retirement based thereon shall be deemed, by its nature, to be a dismissal. Therefore, in order for such a measure of automatic retirement to be valid, there must be a justifiable reason as provided in Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) (see this Court's Decision 92Da54210, rendered October 26, 1993).
However, where labor and management, through a genuine meeting of minds, regard a certain cause as one that should be treated differently from other grounds for disciplinary dismissal applicable at the workplace concerned, on the basis of reasonable grounds, and provide in the collective bargaining agreement (단체협약) or the like that upon the occurrence of such cause, the employment relationship shall automatically terminate, or the employee shall automatically retire, on the date of occurrence of such cause or on a prescribed date, merely by the occurrence of such cause, such an automatic retirement provision must be construed either as prescribing a ground for automatic extinction of the employment relationship, or as intending that a disposition of retirement with respect to the employee concerned be deemed to have occurred on the prescribed date. In such a case, it cannot be said that a separate disposition by the employer is required for the employment relationship to terminate.
B. Now, according to the collective bargaining agreement of the Defendant company that was in effect at the time the cause for automatic retirement in this case arose, Article 23(4)(c) provides: "Even before the expiration of the leave-of-absence period, if the cause for the leave of absence has been resolved and the employee submits an application for reinstatement together with supporting documents, or if the employee submits an application for reinstatement within 10 days after the expiration of the period, the employee shall be reinstated to an equivalent position." The same Article, item (d), provides: "If, after the expiration of the leave-of-absence period, the cause for the leave of absence has not been resolved, and the party concerned applies within 10 days, together with supporting documents, for an extension of the leave-of-absence period, such period may be extended (provided, however, that the extension of the leave of absence shall be limited to within three months)." The same Article, item (e), provides: "If, after the expiration of the leave-of-absence period, neither of the measures under items (c) or (d) above has been taken, the employee shall be deemed to have automatically retired." In addition, Article 28(1) provides: "A union member shall be deemed retired in any of the following cases: (a) where the member wishes to retire; (b) where the member has died; (c) where the member has reached the retirement age," and paragraph (2) of the same Article provides: "The date of retirement shall be the scheduled date stated in the application for retirement, the date on which the member reached the retirement age, or the date of expiration of the leave-of-absence period."
In light of the fact that the Defendant company's collective bargaining agreement thus provides that, where an employee fails, within the prescribed period after the expiration of the leave-of-absence period, to submit an application for reinstatement despite the cause of the leave of absence having been resolved, or fails to submit an application for extension of the leave of absence on the ground that the cause has not been resolved, the employee shall be deemed to have automatically retired, and further provides that in such a case the date of expiration of the leave-of-absence period shall be deemed the date of retirement, it appears that in the case of the Defendant company, the above provisions were established with the intent that, upon the occurrence of the aforementioned cause for automatic retirement as prescribed in the collective bargaining agreement, the employment relationship would be terminated by deeming that a disposition of retirement with respect to the employee had occurred on the date prescribed in the collective bargaining agreement, without any separate disposition by the employer. In such a case, it cannot be said that a separate disposition by the employer is necessary in order to terminate the employment relationship (and, as will be seen below, the disposition of retirement deemed to have occurred with respect to the Plaintiff due to the occurrence of the above cause for automatic retirement in this case was justified).
Although Article 16 of the Defendant company's Rules of Employment provides: "A union member shall be retired in any of the following cases: 1. Where the member has submitted a letter of resignation and completed the prescribed procedures; 2. Where the member has died; 3. Where the leave-of-absence period has expired without reinstatement; 4. Where the member has reached the retirement age," this provision is merely a reiteration of the grounds for retirement prescribed in the collective bargaining agreement as set out above, and the expression "shall be retired" in this provision cannot be construed as providing that a separate disposition of retirement by the company is required upon the occurrence of the above causes. Moreover, the precedents relied upon by the Plaintiff's litigation representative do not conflict with the foregoing legal principles.
Therefore, although the reasoning of the court below is somewhat insufficient, its conclusion that, in the Plaintiff's case, the employment contract relationship with the Defendant company terminated upon the occurrence of such a cause for automatic retirement without any separate disposition, is justified. Accordingly, the argument to the contrary is without merit.
As to Ground 2:
A. As noted above, the Defendant company's collective bargaining agreement provides that, unlike the case where the cause of the leave of absence has been resolved and an application for reinstatement is submitted (in which case, as noted above, the company must reinstate the employee), where an employee on leave of absence applies within the prescribed period, after the expiration of the leave-of-absence period, for an extension of the leave of absence on the ground that the cause has not been resolved, the company may extend the period within a limit of three months. According to this provision, whether or not to grant such extension is left to the discretion of the company. In other words, the company may, in its discretion, comprehensively and specifically consider various circumstances, such as the content and degree of the cause of the leave of absence, the likelihood of its prompt resolution, and the impact that the company has suffered or will suffer as a result of the leave of absence or its extension, in deciding whether to grant the extension.
B. In this case, the Plaintiff not only failed to submit an application for reinstatement or an application for extension of the leave of absence after the expiration of the original three-month leave-of-absence period, but was also arrested and indicted on May 12, 1990, for violation of the National Security Act (국가보안법) and other offenses, and was sentenced by the Masan District Court on October 31 of the same year to one year's imprisonment, and, having waived his right to appeal, the sentence became final at that time. Accordingly, this was not a case in which the cause of the leave of absence had substantially been resolved. Therefore, even if the Plaintiff had submitted an application for reinstatement within 10 days from October 31, 1990, the expiration date of the leave-of-absence period as found by the court below, such application for reinstatement would have had no effect, and it cannot be said that the Defendant company was obligated to reinstate the Plaintiff. Moreover, even if the Plaintiff had applied for an extension of the leave of absence within the prescribed period, in light of the content and degree of the cause of the leave of absence, the fact that there was no likelihood that the state of physical detention—which made it substantially impossible for the Plaintiff to provide actual labor and which constituted the substantive basis of the leave of absence—would be resolved within a short period, and the impact on the company's business that it had suffered or would suffer as a result of an extension of the leave of absence, it does not appear that there was any possibility that the Defendant company would have approved such an extension of the leave of absence.
C. In conclusion, in light of the fact that, even after the expiration of the Plaintiff's leave-of-absence period, the cause of the leave of absence had not been substantially resolved, and there was no possibility of an extension of the leave of absence being granted, regardless of whether the Plaintiff submitted an application for reinstatement or an application for extension of the leave of absence within the period prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement, the cause for automatic retirement as prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement, as found by the court below, arose due to the lapse of the period prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement for applying for extension of the leave of absence. Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, a disposition of retirement with respect to the Plaintiff must be deemed to have occurred on October 31, 1990, the expiration date of the leave-of-absence period, and in light of the circumstances noted above, this measure of automatic retirement is deemed to have a justifiable reason as provided in Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's automatic retirement must be deemed to have taken effect as of that date.
D. Therefore, even if the Defendant company had already taken a disciplinary dismissal measure against the Plaintiff prior to the expiration date of the leave-of-absence period, given the circumstances as described above, it cannot be said that the Defendant's assertion of automatic retirement under the collective bargaining agreement violates the principle of good faith (신의칙); whether the Plaintiff could have been expected to submit an application for extension within the prescribed period has no bearing on the determination that the disposition of automatic retirement with respect to the Plaintiff took effect as described above; and the Defendant's assertion of the Plaintiff's automatic retirement bears no relation to the legal principles concerning bilateral contracts (쌍무계약) as argued by the Plaintiff. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
2. We now examine the grounds of appeal submitted by the Defendant's litigation representative.
As to Ground 1:
A. Even assuming that the dismissal disposition taken against the Plaintiff on September 10, 1990 in this case is invalid, as noted above, the Plaintiff subsequently lost his status as an employee due to automatic retirement resulting from the lapse of the period for applying for extension of the leave of absence after the expiration of the leave-of-absence period prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement.
B. An action for declaratory judgment (확인의 소) is generally permitted in order to remove a danger or uncertainty concerning a present right or legal status. Likewise, an action seeking confirmation of the invalidity of a dismissal is one in which the interest in seeking such confirmation exists only where obtaining a judgment confirming the invalidity of a dismissal—which is, after all, merely a past legal act—constitutes an effective and appropriate means of restoring the original status based on the employment contract, or of removing an existing danger or uncertainty concerning a present right or legal status arising from the dismissal (see this Court's Decision 92Da20149, rendered January 15, 1993).
C. However, the court below reasoned that "generally, the impact of a disciplinary dismissal on the person concerned is not limited merely to the loss of the current job and wage income, but extends to serious consequences including damage to social reputation and restriction of opportunities for re-employment. Therefore, even if it has become impossible for the Plaintiff, having automatically retired, to have his status as an employee of the Defendant company restored, it cannot be said, for that reason alone, that there is no danger or uncertainty whatsoever regarding the Plaintiff's other rights or legal status. Rather, in light of the dispute-resolving and dispute-preventing functions of a declaratory action, obtaining a judgment confirming the invalidity of the dismissal constitutes an effective and appropriate means of removing such danger or uncertainty," and on this basis rejected the Defendant's preliminary objection (본안전 항변) that the Plaintiff, having lost his status as an employee of the Defendant company, has no interest in seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the dismissal in this case.
However, if the reason for seeking a declaratory judgment concerning a dismissal, which is merely a past legal act, is simply to restore damaged social reputation, this cannot be said to be for the purpose of removing a danger or uncertainty concerning a present right or legal status; and even if it is for the purpose of removing the risk of restricted opportunities for re-employment, unless there are special circumstances such as such restriction on re-employment opportunities being prescribed by statute or the like, this constitutes merely a factual disadvantage and not a legal disadvantage (see this Court's Decision 87Nu944, rendered May 24, 1988), and accordingly, it cannot be said that there exists a present danger or uncertainty concerning a right or legal status.
D. In this case, the Plaintiff, while seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the dismissal disposition in question, also seeks wages for the period during which he could have provided labor. Accordingly, the action seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the dismissal in this case appears to be aimed at restoring the status under the employment contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant company. As noted above, since the Plaintiff had already lost his status as an employee of the Defendant company as of the close of argument in the court below, restoration of that status has become impossible. Accordingly, the action seeking confirmation of the invalidity of the dismissal in this case, brought on that basis, lacks the interest required for such confirmation.
Nevertheless, the court below rejected the Defendant's aforementioned preliminary objection for the reasons stated in its judgment. Accordingly, the judgment below is erroneous in that it misapprehended the legal principles concerning the interest in seeking confirmation in an action for confirmation of the invalidity of a dismissal, and it is clear that this error affected the judgment. Accordingly, the argument pointing out this error is well-founded.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, since Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal submitted by the Defendant's litigation representative is well-founded, without need to examine the remaining grounds of appeal, the part of the judgment below against which the Defendant lost is reversed. As to the reversed part, this Court renders its own judgment pursuant to Article 407 of the Civil Procedure Act (민사소송법), vacates the judgment of the first instance court which upheld the Plaintiff's claim with respect to the reversed part, and dismisses the Plaintiff's action with respect to this part, as it lacks the interest required for confirmation as noted above. The Plaintiff's grounds of appeal are all without merit and are accordingly dismissed. The costs of the lawsuit, including all instances, shall be borne by the Plaintiff, the losing party. Accordingly, with the unanimous consent of the participating Justices, it is decided as set forth in the Order.
Presiding Justice Lee Im-su, Justice Kim Seok-su, Justice Jeong Gui-ho (Justice in Charge), Justice Lee Don-hui