[Plaintiff, Appellant]
[Defendant, Appellee] Kia Motors Corporation, Litigation Representative Attorney Ha Juk-bong and 1 other
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul High Court, Judgment rendered on August 25, 1993, Case No. 93Na7091
[Order]
The appeal is dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
[Reasoning]
The Court considers Grounds of Appeal Nos. 1 through 4 raised by the Plaintiff together.
1. If the facts are as lawfully established by the court below, the lower court's determination that the Plaintiff's act of submitting a resume and personal history card falsely stating his educational background and career history at the time he joined the Defendant company constitutes grounds for disciplinary action under Article 65, Item 1 of the Defendant company's Rules of Employment (취업규칙; hereinafter abbreviated as "Rules of Employment") is justified and acceptable. Even assuming, as argued in the grounds of appeal, that the Plaintiff continued to work faithfully as a production worker after joining the Defendant company, such circumstance alone would not change the above conclusion. Therefore, the argument on this point is without merit.
2. As determined by the lower court, the Plaintiff, dissatisfied with the terms of the 1988 wage negotiation agreement reached between the Defendant company and the Defendant company's labor union, led a rally around 12:30 on May 7, 1988, during lunch break, together with about 40 sympathizing workers, without the Defendant company's permission, demanding the resignation of the company-controlled union and the implementation of a 29.2% increase in base pay, and staged a sit-in protest (hereinafter abbreviated as the "first sit-in act"). Further, from around 19:30 on August 9, 1988 to around 16:00 on August 9, 1988, the Plaintiff, together with about 70 sympathizing workers, refused to work and staged a sit-in protest demanding, among other things, the resignation of the executive body of the company-controlled union, the withdrawal of unjust disciplinary measures, and the implementation of a direct election system for the union president (hereinafter abbreviated as the "second sit-in act"). These acts were not conducted pursuant to any resolution or instruction of the labor union; moreover, in light of the nature and content of such sit-in acts, they cannot be regarded as legitimate activities of the labor union, and there is no material to find that the labor union approved of such sit-in acts even implicitly. Therefore, the lower court's determination that the Plaintiff's above acts constitute grounds for disciplinary action under Article 65, Item 25 of the Rules of Employment, namely disturbing order in the workplace, is justified, and it cannot be said that the lower court's judgment erred in its understanding of the legal doctrine regarding the scope of legitimate activities for labor union affairs, as argued in the grounds of appeal. Therefore, the argument on this point is also without merit.
3. The lower court determined that the fact that the Plaintiff, despite having received a disciplinary measure of 20 days' suspension from attendance from the Defendant company on the ground of having disturbed order in the workplace due to the first sit-in act, nevertheless committed the second sit-in act again, constitutes the disciplinary ground under Article 65, Item 7 of the Rules of Employment, namely "a person who has received a reprimand again and is found to have no room for future improvement." This determination by the lower court may be understood to include, by implication, the rejection of the Plaintiff's argument that, since the Defendant company had expunged the record of the above disciplinary measure from the commendation/punishment column of the Plaintiff's personnel record card, that disciplinary measure could not be regarded as a prior reprimand. Moreover, according to the relevant evidence and the record, the lower court's determination rejecting the Plaintiff's above argument is justified and acceptable, and it cannot be said that the lower court's judgment erred by violating the rules of evidence in finding the facts, or erred in its interpretation of "prior reprimand" under Article 65, Item 7 of the Rules of Employment, as argued in the grounds of appeal. Therefore, the argument on this point is also without merit.
4. The lower court merely stated that the Plaintiff's misconduct in this case falls under Article 65, Items 1, 7, and 25 of the Rules of Employment, which prescribe grounds for disciplinary action of pay reduction or higher, and on that basis determined that the Plaintiff's argument that the Defendant company's disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff was made without just cause and is therefore void, is without merit.
"Just cause" under Article 27, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), in the case of disciplinary dismissal, means that there exists a cause attributable to the worker of such a degree that, in light of common social norms, the labor contract can no longer be maintained. Therefore, in a case such as this one, where the worker's conduct falls under provisions of the Rules of Employment prescribing grounds for disciplinary action of pay reduction or higher, the court should have examined whether such grounds for discipline were indeed so serious, in light of common social norms, that the labor contract could not be maintained, and then, based on that determination, should have judged whether the employer's disciplinary dismissal of the worker was made with just cause.
Nevertheless, without stating anything as to whether the Plaintiff's misconduct was serious enough that the labor contract could not be maintained, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff's argument that his dismissal was without just cause, solely on the ground that the Plaintiff's misconduct fell under grounds for disciplinary action of pay reduction or higher as prescribed in the Rules of Employment. Thus, it must be said that the lower court's judgment is defective in that it fails to properly state its reasoning.
However, examining the nature, content, and degree of the Plaintiff's misconduct on the premise of the facts lawfully established by the lower court, it is determined that the Defendant company's dismissal of the Plaintiff on the ground of the above misconduct was made with just cause. Accordingly, the lower court's conclusion rejecting the Plaintiff's argument that his dismissal was made without just cause and is therefore void is justified, and since the above-mentioned defect committed by the lower court did not affect the judgment, the argument criticizing this point also cannot be accepted.
5. As to the Plaintiff's argument that his disciplinary dismissal violated the procedure prescribed under Article 21 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (단체협약) concluded between the Defendant company and the Kia Industries Labor Union of the National Federation of Metal Workers' Unions (전국금속노동조합연맹 기아산업 노동조합), and is therefore void, the lower court determined as follows:
Although Article 21 of the above Collective Bargaining Agreement provides that the conditions for dismissal of employees shall be governed by the Rules of Employment, but that if the party concerned and the labor union raise an objection, recognition of the Labor Relations Commission (노동위원회) shall be obtained, this provision is to be interpreted as meaning that only where both the party concerned and the labor union raise an objection to the dismissal, must the Defendant company, in consideration of its relationship with the labor union, obtain the recognition (approval) of the Labor Relations Commission with respect to the dismissal of the worker concerned. Since there is no evidence to find that the Defendant company's labor union raised an objection to the Plaintiff's disciplinary dismissal, the lower court determined that the Plaintiff's argument was without merit.
Under the provisions of the current laws and regulations, the Labor Relations Commission has no authority to grant prior recognition or approval regarding an employer's dismissal of a worker; therefore, even if the Defendant company failed to obtain the recognition of the Labor Relations Commission pursuant to the above provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in dismissing the Plaintiff, this cannot be held to affect the validity of the dismissal. Accordingly, regardless of whether the labor union raised an objection to the Defendant company's disciplinary dismissal of the Plaintiff, it is clear that the Plaintiff's above argument is without merit in any event. Therefore, the argument on this point cannot be accepted either.
6. Therefore, the Plaintiff's appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff, the losing party. The opinions of the participating Justices being unanimous, judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order.
Justice Ahn Yong-deuk (Presiding Justice), Ahn Woo-man, Kim Yong-jun (Justice in charge), Cheon Gyeong-song