[Plaintiff, Appellant and Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellee and Appellant] Korea Broadcasting System, Attorney Lee Min-su, Counsel for the Defendant
[Judgment Below]
Daegu High Court Decision 92Na8737, dated April 1, 1993
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.
[Reasoning]
1. As to the Defendant's grounds of appeal
(1) As to Grounds Nos. 2 and 3
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the court below, comprehensively considering the evidence cited therein, found the following facts: the Plaintiff had been working as a viewing-fee collector at a broadcasting station under the Defendant since July 26, 1982; on March 3, 1990, the Plaintiff was arrested on suspicion of falsely posing as a reporter of the Defendant Corporation and raping, threatening, and inflicting bodily injury upon a Nonparty; when this matter was reported in a news broadcast by Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation, the Defendant Corporation, through a resolution of its Personnel Committee, dismissed the Plaintiff by way of disciplinary action on March 26, 1990, on the ground that the above misconduct constituted grounds for disciplinary action under the Defendant Corporation's regulations; the Plaintiff thereafter asserted that the allegations of impersonating a reporter or committing rape were untrue, and that he had merely been engaged in an adulterous relationship with the Nonparty since around September 1987, during which he had, on two occasions, inflicted bodily injury upon her arising from a minor dispute, and that the Nonparty had filed the criminal complaint merely to end the relationship with the Plaintiff; the Plaintiff was ultimately prosecuted by summary order for the said bodily injury offense, which was then referred to formal trial, and on February 8, 1991, the Daegu District Court sentenced him to a fine of 2,000,000 won, which became final; and Article 93, Paragraph 1, Item 4 of the Defendant Corporation's Regulations on Handling of Viewing Fee Collection Business (시청료징수업무처리규정) provides that it constitutes grounds for disciplinary action where a collector damages the reputation of the Defendant Corporation or tarnishes the dignity of collectors, while Paragraph 2 of the same Article enumerates five types of disciplinary action according to the degree of misconduct: reprimand, salary reduction, suspension, dismissal, and removal. Having found these facts, the court below determined that, while the above misconduct did constitute grounds for disciplinary action as set forth by the Defendant Corporation, in light of the fact that the content of the misconduct concerned the Plaintiff's private life and had no relation to the duties he performed, and thus had no material effect on the Defendant Corporation's management order or business activities, as well as the degree of the misconduct, the resulting criminal punishment, the nature of the viewing-fee collection work performed by the Plaintiff, and the fact that the Plaintiff had worked relatively faithfully for the Defendant Corporation for more than eight years since joining, maintaining the employment relationship with the Plaintiff would not be so markedly unreasonable or unfair to the Defendant as to justify termination; therefore, the Defendant's dismissal of the Plaintiff based solely on the above misconduct constituted an abuse of the right to discipline and was void, without even needing to examine the legality of the disciplinary procedure. This determination by the court below is deemed proper and acceptable, and there is no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, arising from insufficient deliberation, misapprehension of facts in violation of the rules of evidence, or misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning discretion in the exercise of the right to discipline. This ground of appeal is without merit.
(2) As to Ground No. 1
Where an employee dismissed by an employer receives severance pay, etc. without raising any reservation of objection or condition, it shall be deemed, absent special circumstances, that the employee acknowledged the validity of the dismissal; accordingly, filing a lawsuit disputing the validity of the dismissal a long time thereafter is not permissible, as it violates the principle of good faith or the doctrine of estoppel (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da29811, dated August 14, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 91Da38686, dated January 26, 1993). However, even in such a case, where there exist objective circumstances indicating that the employee did not acknowledge the validity of the dismissal and was in fact disputing it, or where other circumstances indicate that the severance pay was received under conditions giving rise to a reasonable explanation to the contrary, it should not be uniformly concluded that the employee acknowledged the validity of the dismissal merely because the employee received the severance pay without expressly reserving an objection.
However, according to the Defendant's Counsel's brief dated November 19, 1992, the Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff, having been notified of the disciplinary dismissal by the Reconsideration Personnel Committee on April 9, 1990, received his severance pay on April 17 of the same month without raising any objection, and had even acknowledged the fact of his dismissal in the criminal trial in which he was prosecuted on the grounds of the disciplinary matter; therefore, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff's filing of the instant lawsuit only on September 26, 1991 was without merit. This assertion by the Defendant cannot but be understood as including an argument to the effect that the filing of the instant lawsuit disputing the validity of the dismissal, a long time after the dismissal, violates the principle of good faith or the doctrine of estoppel. Furthermore, the record shows that after being notified of the disciplinary dismissal, the Plaintiff received severance pay of 3,446,490 won on April 17, 1990, without any conditions, and did not file the instant lawsuit until September 26, 1991, one year and five months later; despite this, the judgment below fails to provide any reasoning on this point.
Accordingly, the court below should have examined the reasons why the Plaintiff received the severance pay, whether he reserved any objection at that time, the reasons why the Plaintiff filed the instant claim for confirmation of invalidity of dismissal, etc. only one year and six months after the dismissal, the Plaintiff's conduct in the interim with respect to the dismissal, and whether there are any indications that he pursued other remedial procedures, and should have determined the merits of the Defendant's above assertion in accordance with the factual relationship thus established; however, the court below erred in failing to do so.
In conclusion, the judgment below is defective in that it failed to sufficiently examine and rendered no determination regarding the Defendant's assertion that the instant lawsuit is impermissible as violating the principle of good faith or the doctrine of estoppel, and this defect affected the outcome of the judgment. Therefore, this ground of appeal pointing out this error has merit.
2. As to the Plaintiff's grounds of appeal
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below, comprehensively considering the evidence cited therein, found that the Defendant Corporation does not pay a fixed monthly wage to viewing-fee collectors, but instead adopts a method of paying a fixed basic salary, an annual bonus of 500%, a performance-based collection allowance paid according to viewing-fee collection performance, and other various allowances; and that the Plaintiff, in February 1990, immediately before the above dismissal, received a basic salary of 224,600 won, a bonus of 93,583 won, an activity allowance of 80,000 won, and a collection allowance of 80,780 won. Based on this finding, the court below determined that, had the Plaintiff not been subjected to the above dismissal, he would have continued to receive the same total amount of 478,963 won every month thereafter as he had received in February 1990, and accordingly held that the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiff the above amount every month from the day following the date of dismissal until his reinstatement.
Where an employer's dismissal of an employee is void, the employment relationship is deemed to have continued validly throughout that period, and the employee's failure to provide labor is attributable to a cause imputable to the employer; therefore, the employee is entitled to claim payment of the entire wages that he or she would have received had he or she continued to work (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da39860, dated December 8, 1992). Accordingly, where a collective bargaining agreement provides that wage increases are to be determined and implemented annually through collective bargaining, and wage increases have in fact been made annually pursuant thereto, the wages of an employee for the period of wrongful dismissal must be calculated based on the wages as increased pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement concluded after the dismissal.
Furthermore, upon examining the record, it can be found that the Defendant Corporation's Collective Agreement for the Field Workers' Labor Union (Exhibit A No. 24) provides that the Defendant and the labor union shall designate April of each year as the wage adjustment period and determine wage increases through collective bargaining, to be applied retroactively from January (Article 47), and that, pursuant thereto, on April 7, 1990, it was decided to increase the detailed wage items. Therefore, the court below should have calculated the Plaintiff's wages during the period of wrongful dismissal based on the above increased wages; however, it failed to sufficiently examine this point and calculated the wages based solely on the wages for February 1990, immediately preceding the dismissal, without considering the above increase. Accordingly, the judgment below is defective in that it fails to sufficiently examine the matter and misapprehends the facts in violation of the rules of evidence, and misunderstands the legal principles concerning the scope of wages that an employee may receive during the period of wrongful dismissal. This ground of appeal pointing out this error has merit.
Therefore, the judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below, and it is so decided as stated in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices.
Presiding Justice Park Man-ho, Justice Kim Sang-won, Justice Yoon Young-cheol (Presiding Reporting Justice)