[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Seok-su, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Commissioner of the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency
[Judgment Below] Busan High Court Decision 97Gu12495 rendered on February 27, 1998
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Busan High Court.
[Reasoning]
1. Summary of the Judgment Below
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found, based on the evidence presented, the following facts: The Plaintiff was appointed as a police official on May 27, 1978, and had served as the chief of a police substation under the Nambu Police Station of the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency since May 3, 1996. The Defendant took the position that, taking advantage of the Plaintiff's personal acquaintance with Non-party 1, the owner of Bar 1 located in Gamjeon-dong, Sasang-gu, Busan, the Plaintiff engaged in the following conduct: ① On May 21, 1995, when the above establishment was cracked down on for operating an obscene business, the Plaintiff requested Non-party 2, the chief of the jurisdictional police substation, to "handle the case well because he is well acquainted with Non-party 1"; ② On June 21 of the same year, when Bar 2, operated by Non-party 3, the brother-in-law of Non-party 1, was cracked down on for operating an obscene business, the Plaintiff requested the said Non-party 2 to "handle it well because his own position is difficult; since Non-party 3 is wanted, please book Non-party 3 rather than booking his wife, who is the current operator"; ③ On June 5, 1996, when the said Bar 1 was cracked down on for operating without a license, the Plaintiff requested the said Non-party 2 to "please show leniency by booking only the unlicensed operation portion, excluding the prostitution-related portion"; ④ On June 10 of the same month, when the said Bar 1 was cracked down on for solicitation activities by its employees, the Plaintiff requested the said Non-party 2 to "please show leniency so that it is not referred to a summary trial"; ⑤ In early June of the same month, the Plaintiff made several phone calls or visited in person requesting favorable treatment; and ⑥ At around 09:00 on January 22, 1997, when the said Bar 1 was cracked down on for operating an obscene business, the Plaintiff requested the said Non-party 2 and Senior Police Officer Non-party 4 to "please bundle it into one matter, since it was only about lending out the girls; please quickly release the female employees and see to it that they are not turned over to the Women's Protection Center." Thereafter, when custody of the female employees was handed over, the Plaintiff said, "Since the female employee was struck, it would be good for Non-party 2, the substation chief, to apologize and settle the matter well," and when this was refused, said, "If you get sued, you will be the only one who loses out. Let's settle this amicably between us," among other things. The Defendant took the position that such conduct by the Plaintiff violated the superiors' orders concerning the eradication of collusive corruption with entertainment establishments and damaged the dignity befitting a police officer, and that the Plaintiff's conduct as described above violated Articles 56, 57, and 63 of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법) and constituted grounds for disciplinary action under each subparagraph of Article 78, Paragraph 1 of the same Act. The court below found that, following a resolution of the Ordinary Disciplinary Committee, the Defendant dismissed the Plaintiff on May 17, 1997.
The court below then found as follows: While serving at the Bukbu Police Station of the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency from around September 1979 to around October 1986, the Plaintiff came to know Non-party 5, who was regarded as an elder brother figure in the Plaintiff's family, by chance, and through him came to know Non-party 1, who was then an employee at an amusement arcade for youths operated by Non-party 5. Thereafter, Non-party 1 operated Bar 1 in Gamjeon-dong (commonly known as "Poplar Street"), Sasang-gu, Busan. The court below found that this area had approximately 190 bars that employed runaway minors and other underage individuals to engage in prostitution and other obscene conduct, becoming a target of social condemnation, and that the jurisdictional police substation had designated this area as a priority target for cleanup and had continuously conducted crackdowns. The court below further found that when Non-party 1 was cracked down on for operating an obscene business by the jurisdictional police substation on May 21, 1995, Non-party 1 asked the Plaintiff, whom he had known previously, to seek favorable treatment in the matter, and that the Plaintiff, in response, telephoned Non-party 2, the chief of the said jurisdictional police substation, who was a close friend of the Plaintiff as a fellow police officer, and made the requests described in disciplinary grounds ①, ②, ③, ④, and ⑥ above. The court below also found that the Defendant had, since around March 1994, designated collusive corruption between police officers and entertainment establishments as a priority target for cleanup and had made this known to police officers under his command, and found that there was no evidence to support disciplinary ground ⑤.
The court below then determined that, even setting aside item ⑤, the remaining grounds for discipline constituted conduct in violation of Articles 56, 57, and 63 of the State Public Officials Act and fell under the grounds for discipline set forth in Article 78, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 1 and 3 of the same Act. The court below further determined that, in light of the fact that the Defendant had designated collusive corruption between police officers and entertainment establishments as a priority target for cleanup and had made this known to police officers under his command, and that the jurisdictional police substation had continuously conducted crackdowns on illegal and obscene conduct at bars in the Gamjeon-dong area, the Plaintiff, as a police official, forgot his duty and instead, upon request from a person caught engaging in illegal and obscene business operations, made repeated requests to the chief of the jurisdictional police substation and others for lenient treatment in the matter. In light of these circumstances, the court below determined that, even taking into account all of the mitigating circumstances asserted by the Plaintiff, including that the Plaintiff had served as a police officer for approximately 20 years without any particular fault and had received various commendations more than 20 times, the disposition in this case could not be found to have exceeded or abused the bounds of discretion.
2. Determination on the Grounds for Appeal
A. As to Ground No. 1
Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the factual findings set forth in the judgment below are deemed correct, and there is no illegality of misapprehension of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds for appeal.
B. As to Grounds No. 2 and 3
Where a public official subject to discipline has grounds for disciplinary action and a disciplinary disposition is to be imposed, the determination of what disposition to impose is entrusted to the discretion of the disciplinary authority. However, only where a disciplinary disposition imposed by the disciplinary authority in the exercise of such discretion is found to have manifestly lost reasonableness under generally accepted social norms, thereby constituting an abuse of the discretion entrusted to the disciplinary authority, may such disposition be deemed unlawful. In order to find that a disciplinary disposition against a public official has manifestly lost reasonableness under generally accepted social norms, it must be found, upon comprehensive consideration of various factors according to the specific case—including the content and nature of the misconduct that gave rise to the discipline, the administrative purpose sought to be achieved by the discipline, and the standards for determining the degree of discipline—that the content of the discipline is objectively and clearly unreasonable (see Supreme Court Decision 97Nu14637 rendered on November 25, 1997). Even though the exercise of disciplinary authority is entrusted to the discretion of the appointing authority, where the disciplinary authority exercises such power in violation of the principle of public interest, which requires that disciplinary authority be exercised for public interest purposes, or where it selects an excessively harsh disciplinary disposition that is disproportionate to the degree of misconduct generally regarded as grounds for discipline, thereby violating the principle of proportionality, or where, without reasonable cause, it selects a disciplinary disposition that departs from and is inequitable in comparison with the standards generally applied to misconduct of a similar degree, thereby violating the principle of equality, such disciplinary disposition exceeds the limits of discretion and is unlawful (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu11308 rendered on September 26, 1992).
As found by the court below, among the Plaintiff's acts of solicitation, the portions other than ⑥ the request "not to turn the female employees over to the Women's Protection Center" constitute acts in violation of the duty of good faith under Article 56 of the State Public Officials Act and the duty to maintain dignity under Article 63 of the same Act, and thus constitute grounds for discipline under Article 78, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 1 and 3 of the same Act. However, we cannot agree with the judgment below's determination that the Plaintiff's aforesaid acts of solicitation also violated the duty of obedience under Article 57 of the same Act, which requires public officials to obey the official orders of their superiors in performing their duties, and that the disposition in this case, which selected dismissal (haeim)—a disciplinary measure no different from removal (pamyeon), the most severe disciplinary disposition, in that it deprives the person of the status of public official and excludes him from the public official relationship—was not unlawful, for the following reasons.
First, the court below regarded item ⑥, the request "not to turn the female employees over to the Women's Protection Center," as also constituting an act of solicitation forming grounds for discipline. Here, the "Women's Protection Center" is presumed to refer to a temporary shelter (Article 11, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the same Act) or a rehabilitation and protection facility (Subparagraph 2 of the same paragraph) that persons in need of protection—as defined in Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the Prevention of Prostitution Act (윤락행위등방지법) (persons who habitually engage in prostitution and persons who, in light of their environment or conduct, are markedly likely to engage in prostitution)—enter pursuant to Article 9 of the same Act for the purpose of guidance and protection. However, under Article 9 of the same Act, such admission for guidance and protection purposes requires the consent of the person concerned if the person in need of protection is an adult, or the consent of the legal representative if the person is a minor (provided that, in cases where it is difficult to obtain such consent because the whereabouts of the legal representative are unknown or for other reasons, the consent of the person concerned suffices until the legal representative submits a written request for discharge). Under this provision, whether admission occurs depends on the will of the person in need of protection or the legal representative, and if the chief of a police substation, disregarding the will of the person in need of protection or the legal representative, arbitrarily requests admission of the person in need of protection to such a facility (Article 3 of the Enforcement Rules of the same Act) or hands the person over to a mayor, county head, or ward head, etc., who has been delegated authority for guidance and protection measures by the mayor/governor, this would constitute an unlawful measure. In this case, even if the Plaintiff requested that the female employees not be turned over to the Women's Protection Center, there is no indication in the record that the Plaintiff requested that they not be turned over to the Women's Protection Center even if the female employees (or, if the female employees were minors, their legal representatives) consented to such admission. Accordingly, this cannot be regarded as an unlawful solicitation.
Article 6, Paragraph 1, Proviso of the Rules on Disciplinary Standards for Police Officials, etc. (경찰공무원징계양정등에관한규칙) (National Police Agency Directive) provides that "disciplinary action may not be mitigated for misconduct constituting a priority target for cleanup," and Article 6, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 1 of the same Rules provides that "where an act of receiving money or valuables in connection with one's duties, or other misconduct designated as a priority target for cleanup, has been committed," disciplinary responsibility may be aggravated and a request for disciplinary resolution may be made based on a higher standard of severity, thereby providing that severe discipline is to be imposed for so-called priority-target misconduct. In this case, it is presumed that the Plaintiff was determined to have committed such priority-target misconduct and was thus subjected to the severe disciplinary action of dismissal. However, in light of the fact that where conduct is interpreted as constituting designated priority-target misconduct, disciplinary responsibility is aggravated and the conduct is also excluded from mitigation, such designation must be strictly construed. According to the "Notice of Police Priority Cleanup Target Misconduct" sent by the Commissioner General of the National Police Agency around March 1994 (Record pp. 145-146; it appears that the Defendant received this and transmitted it as is to police officers under his jurisdiction), while "collusive corruption with target establishments such as entertainment establishments" is designated as one type of priority-target misconduct to which Article 6 of the Rules on Disciplinary Standards for Police Officials, etc. is to be applied, the same notice also designates as priority-target misconduct such matters as "internal customary exchange of money and valuables (payment of tribute)," "receipt of a fixed monthly sum under the pretext of operating expenses for branch offices/substations," "wrongful acts related to personnel and accounting matters," "receipt of money or valuables in connection with the enforcement of drunk driving regulations and the handling of traffic accidents," "human rights violations such as assault and cruel treatment of suspects," and "acts undermining the chain of command and reform-reversing conduct such as complacency," among others. In light of these designations, given that Bar 1 was not even an establishment under the jurisdiction of the police substation where the Plaintiff worked, and that, as found by the court below, the Plaintiff merely made a telephone solicitation to Non-party 2, the chief of the jurisdictional police substation and the Plaintiff's close friend, based on a personal acquaintance with Non-party 1, the owner of Bar 1, it is difficult to find that this constitutes the aforesaid priority-target misconduct of "collusive corruption with target establishments such as entertainment establishments," or that it violated superiors' orders concerning the eradication of such corruption.
Examining the circumstances leading to the disciplinary action in this case based on the record, after the female employees who had been brought into custody at the jurisdictional police substation were released, they filed a complaint against Non-party 2, Non-party 4, and five other substation staff members with the Busan District Public Prosecutors' Office on charges including abuse of authority and violence, and this fact was extensively reported in Busan daily newspapers. As a result, Non-party 2 and Non-party 4 were transferred to another police substation as of March 4, 1994, in a personnel action amounting to censure, and while the prosecutorial investigation was proceeding, Non-party 4 sent a personal letter to the Defendant in early March, following which the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency commenced an audit and disciplinary investigation of the Plaintiff. In the course of that investigation, Non-party 4 stated that the content of the female employees' complaint was false; that the Plaintiff and the owner Non-party 1 were on considerably close terms and that the Plaintiff had been involved in the process leading to the complaint; that it was widely known among longtime staff of the Bukbu Police Station and business owners on the so-called Poplar Street that the Plaintiff and Non-party 1 had previously jointly operated an amusement arcade; and that although the jurisdictional police substation was strongly enforcing crackdowns for the purpose of cleaning up the establishments, there were many obstacles to enforcement due to the Plaintiff's solicitations. It can also be seen from the record that the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency investigated whether the Plaintiff was the mastermind behind the aforesaid complaint and whether the Plaintiff had jointly operated an adult amusement arcade with Non-party 1, but was unable to establish these facts.
In addition, according to the record, there is no material from which it can be found that Non-party 2, having received the Plaintiff's telephone solicitations, in fact granted any specific favorable treatment in accordance with such solicitations. (Non-party 2 stated that, with respect to item ①, he booked Non-party 1's wife (who was registered as the operator in official records); with respect to item ②, contrary to the solicitation, he booked Non-party 3's wife and referred the case to the prosecution not only for violation of the Food Sanitation Act but also for violation of the Prevention of Prostitution Act; with respect to item ③, although prostitution was not the subject of the booking, this was because there was no evidence to prove prostitution due to the absence of the counterpart (customer) (Record p. 108); with respect to item ④, contrary to the solicitation, he referred the soliciting employee to summary trial; and with respect to item ⑥, contrary to the solicitation, he booked Non-party 1's wife (who was registered as the operator in official records).) Furthermore, the Plaintiff was appointed as a patrolman on May 27, 1978, and was promoted to senior patrolman on October 15, 1982, to assistant inspector on July 1, 1988, and to inspector on February 11, 1991, having served faithfully as a police officer for approximately 19 years, and had received more than 20 commendations of various kinds, including two commendations from the Director General of the National Police Headquarters and five commendations from the Commissioner of the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency (which, under the proviso to Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Rules on Disciplinary Standards for Police Officials, etc., may constitute grounds for mitigation of discipline in the case of the Plaintiff, a police official of the rank of senior inspector or below). There are also mitigating circumstances in that the Plaintiff, while in active service, was admitted at the age of 39 in around February 1993 as the top-ranked entrant across the entire school at Busan Polytechnic University, and graduated in around February 1997.
In light of these mitigating circumstances, together with the motive and circumstances leading to the conduct at issue in this case, the relationship between the Plaintiff and Non-party 2, the recipient of the solicitations, the outcome of the solicitations, the circumstances under which the disciplinary proceedings were commenced, and all other circumstances appearing in the record, the disposition in this case, dismissing the Plaintiff based solely on the aforesaid grounds for discipline, must be found to have exceeded or abused the bounds of discretion in the disciplinary disposition.
Nevertheless, the court below's determination that the disposition in this case was lawful contains an illegality affecting the judgment due to a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning abuse of discretion in disciplinary dispositions. The portion of the grounds for appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
3. Therefore, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. This Decision is rendered as set forth in the Order, with the unanimous concurrence of the Justices participating in the decision.
Presiding Justice Cho Mu-je
Justice Kim Hyeong-seon (Justice in charge)
Justice Lee Yong-hoon
Justice Lee Yong-woo