Workbear재주넘는곰
대법원 98두6951

Revocation of Dismissal Disposition해임처분취소

Decided1999. 11. 26. Court대법원Case remanded (파기환송) - the officer's dismissal was overturned as an abuse of disciplinary discretion
AI-generated English translation (summary, key points, decision summary and full text) for reference only — not an official translation and without legal effect. The Korean original below is authoritative.
AI Easy read — AI summary of this decision
AI-generated summary for reference only — the Korean original below is authoritative.

A police officer was dismissed from service for improperly soliciting favors related to the enforcement/crackdown on entertainment establishments (유흥업소 단속). The Supreme Court (대법원) found that the disciplinary authority had abused its discretionary power in imposing dismissal, and remanded the case (파기환송) back to the lower court. In reaching this conclusion, the Court took into account the officer's 20 years of faithful service, concluding that dismissal was an excessively harsh punishment under the circumstances.

Key takeaways
  • CaseIncident: A police officer with 20 years of faithful service was dismissed for soliciting favors related to a crackdown on entertainment establishments.
  • OutcomeResult: The Supreme Court ruled that dismissal was excessively harsh relative to the misconduct and constituted an abuse of disciplinary discretion, revoking the disposition.
  • LessonLesson: Disciplinary action against public officials must comply with the principle of proportionality, taking into account the severity of the misconduct, work attitude, and length of service.
Issues
  • Whether there were limits to and abuse of the disciplinary agency's discretionary power
  • Whether dismissal was an appropriate disciplinary measure for soliciting favors related to enforcement against entertainment establishments
Key reasoning

The Supreme Court held that a disciplinary action is unlawful if it is so clearly unreasonable by common social standards that it constitutes an abuse of discretionary power. Disciplinary measures must comply with the principle of proportionality (비례원칙), the principle of equality (평등원칙), and the principle of public interest (공익원칙); a measure violating these principles exceeds the bounds of permissible discretion and is therefore unlawful. In determining whether discretion was abused, courts must comprehensively consider the nature and content of the misconduct, the administrative purpose of the disciplinary action, and applicable disciplinary sentencing guidelines. Applying this framework, the Court found that dismissal was disproportionately severe given the officer's long and faithful service record.

Summary of Decision (English, AI translation)

[1] When there are grounds for disciplinary action against a public official subject to discipline, the determination of what disposition to take is left to the discretion of the disciplinary authority; however, such disciplinary disposition made in the exercise of that discretion may be held unlawful only where it is found to have clearly lost reasonableness by common social standards, thereby constituting an abuse of the discretion entrusted to the disciplinary authority. In order to find that a disciplinary disposition against a public official has clearly lost reasonableness by common social standards, it must be the case that, upon comprehensive consideration of various factors depending on the specific case—such as the content and nature of the misconduct that gave rise to the disciplinary action, the administrative purpose sought to be achieved by the discipline, and the standards for determining the degree of discipline—the content of the discipline can be objectively and clearly recognized as unjust. Even where the exercise of disciplinary power is left to the discretion of the appointing authority, such disciplinary disposition shall be deemed unlawful as exceeding the limits of discretion where it violates the principle of public interest, which requires that disciplinary power be exercised for a public-interest purpose; where it violates the principle of proportionality by selecting an excessively harsh disciplinary disposition that is imbalanced in relation to the degree of misconduct generally regarded as grounds for discipline; or where it violates the principle of equality by selecting a disciplinary disposition that lacks fairness, deviating without reasonable cause from the standards generally applied to misconduct of the same degree.

[2] In a case where a police officer (경찰공무원) referred to the disciplinary committee for soliciting favors relating to the crackdown on entertainment establishments was dismissed from office, the court held that this disposition exceeded and abused the bounds of disciplinary discretion.

Full text (English, AI translation) 21,132 chars

[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Seok-su, Counsel for the Plaintiff)
[Defendant, Appellee] Commissioner of the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency
[Judgment Below] Busan High Court Decision 97Gu12495 rendered on February 27, 1998

[Order]

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Busan High Court.

[Reasoning]

1. Summary of the Judgment Below

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found, based on the evidence presented, the following facts: The Plaintiff was appointed as a police official on May 27, 1978, and had served as the chief of a police substation under the Nambu Police Station of the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency since May 3, 1996. The Defendant took the position that, taking advantage of the Plaintiff's personal acquaintance with Non-party 1, the owner of Bar 1 located in Gamjeon-dong, Sasang-gu, Busan, the Plaintiff engaged in the following conduct: ① On May 21, 1995, when the above establishment was cracked down on for operating an obscene business, the Plaintiff requested Non-party 2, the chief of the jurisdictional police substation, to "handle the case well because he is well acquainted with Non-party 1"; ② On June 21 of the same year, when Bar 2, operated by Non-party 3, the brother-in-law of Non-party 1, was cracked down on for operating an obscene business, the Plaintiff requested the said Non-party 2 to "handle it well because his own position is difficult; since Non-party 3 is wanted, please book Non-party 3 rather than booking his wife, who is the current operator"; ③ On June 5, 1996, when the said Bar 1 was cracked down on for operating without a license, the Plaintiff requested the said Non-party 2 to "please show leniency by booking only the unlicensed operation portion, excluding the prostitution-related portion"; ④ On June 10 of the same month, when the said Bar 1 was cracked down on for solicitation activities by its employees, the Plaintiff requested the said Non-party 2 to "please show leniency so that it is not referred to a summary trial"; ⑤ In early June of the same month, the Plaintiff made several phone calls or visited in person requesting favorable treatment; and ⑥ At around 09:00 on January 22, 1997, when the said Bar 1 was cracked down on for operating an obscene business, the Plaintiff requested the said Non-party 2 and Senior Police Officer Non-party 4 to "please bundle it into one matter, since it was only about lending out the girls; please quickly release the female employees and see to it that they are not turned over to the Women's Protection Center." Thereafter, when custody of the female employees was handed over, the Plaintiff said, "Since the female employee was struck, it would be good for Non-party 2, the substation chief, to apologize and settle the matter well," and when this was refused, said, "If you get sued, you will be the only one who loses out. Let's settle this amicably between us," among other things. The Defendant took the position that such conduct by the Plaintiff violated the superiors' orders concerning the eradication of collusive corruption with entertainment establishments and damaged the dignity befitting a police officer, and that the Plaintiff's conduct as described above violated Articles 56, 57, and 63 of the State Public Officials Act (국가공무원법) and constituted grounds for disciplinary action under each subparagraph of Article 78, Paragraph 1 of the same Act. The court below found that, following a resolution of the Ordinary Disciplinary Committee, the Defendant dismissed the Plaintiff on May 17, 1997.

The court below then found as follows: While serving at the Bukbu Police Station of the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency from around September 1979 to around October 1986, the Plaintiff came to know Non-party 5, who was regarded as an elder brother figure in the Plaintiff's family, by chance, and through him came to know Non-party 1, who was then an employee at an amusement arcade for youths operated by Non-party 5. Thereafter, Non-party 1 operated Bar 1 in Gamjeon-dong (commonly known as "Poplar Street"), Sasang-gu, Busan. The court below found that this area had approximately 190 bars that employed runaway minors and other underage individuals to engage in prostitution and other obscene conduct, becoming a target of social condemnation, and that the jurisdictional police substation had designated this area as a priority target for cleanup and had continuously conducted crackdowns. The court below further found that when Non-party 1 was cracked down on for operating an obscene business by the jurisdictional police substation on May 21, 1995, Non-party 1 asked the Plaintiff, whom he had known previously, to seek favorable treatment in the matter, and that the Plaintiff, in response, telephoned Non-party 2, the chief of the said jurisdictional police substation, who was a close friend of the Plaintiff as a fellow police officer, and made the requests described in disciplinary grounds ①, ②, ③, ④, and ⑥ above. The court below also found that the Defendant had, since around March 1994, designated collusive corruption between police officers and entertainment establishments as a priority target for cleanup and had made this known to police officers under his command, and found that there was no evidence to support disciplinary ground ⑤.

The court below then determined that, even setting aside item ⑤, the remaining grounds for discipline constituted conduct in violation of Articles 56, 57, and 63 of the State Public Officials Act and fell under the grounds for discipline set forth in Article 78, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 1 and 3 of the same Act. The court below further determined that, in light of the fact that the Defendant had designated collusive corruption between police officers and entertainment establishments as a priority target for cleanup and had made this known to police officers under his command, and that the jurisdictional police substation had continuously conducted crackdowns on illegal and obscene conduct at bars in the Gamjeon-dong area, the Plaintiff, as a police official, forgot his duty and instead, upon request from a person caught engaging in illegal and obscene business operations, made repeated requests to the chief of the jurisdictional police substation and others for lenient treatment in the matter. In light of these circumstances, the court below determined that, even taking into account all of the mitigating circumstances asserted by the Plaintiff, including that the Plaintiff had served as a police officer for approximately 20 years without any particular fault and had received various commendations more than 20 times, the disposition in this case could not be found to have exceeded or abused the bounds of discretion.

2. Determination on the Grounds for Appeal

A. As to Ground No. 1

Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the record, the factual findings set forth in the judgment below are deemed correct, and there is no illegality of misapprehension of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds for appeal.

B. As to Grounds No. 2 and 3

Where a public official subject to discipline has grounds for disciplinary action and a disciplinary disposition is to be imposed, the determination of what disposition to impose is entrusted to the discretion of the disciplinary authority. However, only where a disciplinary disposition imposed by the disciplinary authority in the exercise of such discretion is found to have manifestly lost reasonableness under generally accepted social norms, thereby constituting an abuse of the discretion entrusted to the disciplinary authority, may such disposition be deemed unlawful. In order to find that a disciplinary disposition against a public official has manifestly lost reasonableness under generally accepted social norms, it must be found, upon comprehensive consideration of various factors according to the specific case—including the content and nature of the misconduct that gave rise to the discipline, the administrative purpose sought to be achieved by the discipline, and the standards for determining the degree of discipline—that the content of the discipline is objectively and clearly unreasonable (see Supreme Court Decision 97Nu14637 rendered on November 25, 1997). Even though the exercise of disciplinary authority is entrusted to the discretion of the appointing authority, where the disciplinary authority exercises such power in violation of the principle of public interest, which requires that disciplinary authority be exercised for public interest purposes, or where it selects an excessively harsh disciplinary disposition that is disproportionate to the degree of misconduct generally regarded as grounds for discipline, thereby violating the principle of proportionality, or where, without reasonable cause, it selects a disciplinary disposition that departs from and is inequitable in comparison with the standards generally applied to misconduct of a similar degree, thereby violating the principle of equality, such disciplinary disposition exceeds the limits of discretion and is unlawful (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu11308 rendered on September 26, 1992).

As found by the court below, among the Plaintiff's acts of solicitation, the portions other than ⑥ the request "not to turn the female employees over to the Women's Protection Center" constitute acts in violation of the duty of good faith under Article 56 of the State Public Officials Act and the duty to maintain dignity under Article 63 of the same Act, and thus constitute grounds for discipline under Article 78, Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs 1 and 3 of the same Act. However, we cannot agree with the judgment below's determination that the Plaintiff's aforesaid acts of solicitation also violated the duty of obedience under Article 57 of the same Act, which requires public officials to obey the official orders of their superiors in performing their duties, and that the disposition in this case, which selected dismissal (haeim)—a disciplinary measure no different from removal (pamyeon), the most severe disciplinary disposition, in that it deprives the person of the status of public official and excludes him from the public official relationship—was not unlawful, for the following reasons.

First, the court below regarded item ⑥, the request "not to turn the female employees over to the Women's Protection Center," as also constituting an act of solicitation forming grounds for discipline. Here, the "Women's Protection Center" is presumed to refer to a temporary shelter (Article 11, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 1 of the same Act) or a rehabilitation and protection facility (Subparagraph 2 of the same paragraph) that persons in need of protection—as defined in Article 2, Subparagraph 2 of the Prevention of Prostitution Act (윤락행위등방지법) (persons who habitually engage in prostitution and persons who, in light of their environment or conduct, are markedly likely to engage in prostitution)—enter pursuant to Article 9 of the same Act for the purpose of guidance and protection. However, under Article 9 of the same Act, such admission for guidance and protection purposes requires the consent of the person concerned if the person in need of protection is an adult, or the consent of the legal representative if the person is a minor (provided that, in cases where it is difficult to obtain such consent because the whereabouts of the legal representative are unknown or for other reasons, the consent of the person concerned suffices until the legal representative submits a written request for discharge). Under this provision, whether admission occurs depends on the will of the person in need of protection or the legal representative, and if the chief of a police substation, disregarding the will of the person in need of protection or the legal representative, arbitrarily requests admission of the person in need of protection to such a facility (Article 3 of the Enforcement Rules of the same Act) or hands the person over to a mayor, county head, or ward head, etc., who has been delegated authority for guidance and protection measures by the mayor/governor, this would constitute an unlawful measure. In this case, even if the Plaintiff requested that the female employees not be turned over to the Women's Protection Center, there is no indication in the record that the Plaintiff requested that they not be turned over to the Women's Protection Center even if the female employees (or, if the female employees were minors, their legal representatives) consented to such admission. Accordingly, this cannot be regarded as an unlawful solicitation.

Article 6, Paragraph 1, Proviso of the Rules on Disciplinary Standards for Police Officials, etc. (경찰공무원징계양정등에관한규칙) (National Police Agency Directive) provides that "disciplinary action may not be mitigated for misconduct constituting a priority target for cleanup," and Article 6, Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 1 of the same Rules provides that "where an act of receiving money or valuables in connection with one's duties, or other misconduct designated as a priority target for cleanup, has been committed," disciplinary responsibility may be aggravated and a request for disciplinary resolution may be made based on a higher standard of severity, thereby providing that severe discipline is to be imposed for so-called priority-target misconduct. In this case, it is presumed that the Plaintiff was determined to have committed such priority-target misconduct and was thus subjected to the severe disciplinary action of dismissal. However, in light of the fact that where conduct is interpreted as constituting designated priority-target misconduct, disciplinary responsibility is aggravated and the conduct is also excluded from mitigation, such designation must be strictly construed. According to the "Notice of Police Priority Cleanup Target Misconduct" sent by the Commissioner General of the National Police Agency around March 1994 (Record pp. 145-146; it appears that the Defendant received this and transmitted it as is to police officers under his jurisdiction), while "collusive corruption with target establishments such as entertainment establishments" is designated as one type of priority-target misconduct to which Article 6 of the Rules on Disciplinary Standards for Police Officials, etc. is to be applied, the same notice also designates as priority-target misconduct such matters as "internal customary exchange of money and valuables (payment of tribute)," "receipt of a fixed monthly sum under the pretext of operating expenses for branch offices/substations," "wrongful acts related to personnel and accounting matters," "receipt of money or valuables in connection with the enforcement of drunk driving regulations and the handling of traffic accidents," "human rights violations such as assault and cruel treatment of suspects," and "acts undermining the chain of command and reform-reversing conduct such as complacency," among others. In light of these designations, given that Bar 1 was not even an establishment under the jurisdiction of the police substation where the Plaintiff worked, and that, as found by the court below, the Plaintiff merely made a telephone solicitation to Non-party 2, the chief of the jurisdictional police substation and the Plaintiff's close friend, based on a personal acquaintance with Non-party 1, the owner of Bar 1, it is difficult to find that this constitutes the aforesaid priority-target misconduct of "collusive corruption with target establishments such as entertainment establishments," or that it violated superiors' orders concerning the eradication of such corruption.

Examining the circumstances leading to the disciplinary action in this case based on the record, after the female employees who had been brought into custody at the jurisdictional police substation were released, they filed a complaint against Non-party 2, Non-party 4, and five other substation staff members with the Busan District Public Prosecutors' Office on charges including abuse of authority and violence, and this fact was extensively reported in Busan daily newspapers. As a result, Non-party 2 and Non-party 4 were transferred to another police substation as of March 4, 1994, in a personnel action amounting to censure, and while the prosecutorial investigation was proceeding, Non-party 4 sent a personal letter to the Defendant in early March, following which the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency commenced an audit and disciplinary investigation of the Plaintiff. In the course of that investigation, Non-party 4 stated that the content of the female employees' complaint was false; that the Plaintiff and the owner Non-party 1 were on considerably close terms and that the Plaintiff had been involved in the process leading to the complaint; that it was widely known among longtime staff of the Bukbu Police Station and business owners on the so-called Poplar Street that the Plaintiff and Non-party 1 had previously jointly operated an amusement arcade; and that although the jurisdictional police substation was strongly enforcing crackdowns for the purpose of cleaning up the establishments, there were many obstacles to enforcement due to the Plaintiff's solicitations. It can also be seen from the record that the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency investigated whether the Plaintiff was the mastermind behind the aforesaid complaint and whether the Plaintiff had jointly operated an adult amusement arcade with Non-party 1, but was unable to establish these facts.

In addition, according to the record, there is no material from which it can be found that Non-party 2, having received the Plaintiff's telephone solicitations, in fact granted any specific favorable treatment in accordance with such solicitations. (Non-party 2 stated that, with respect to item ①, he booked Non-party 1's wife (who was registered as the operator in official records); with respect to item ②, contrary to the solicitation, he booked Non-party 3's wife and referred the case to the prosecution not only for violation of the Food Sanitation Act but also for violation of the Prevention of Prostitution Act; with respect to item ③, although prostitution was not the subject of the booking, this was because there was no evidence to prove prostitution due to the absence of the counterpart (customer) (Record p. 108); with respect to item ④, contrary to the solicitation, he referred the soliciting employee to summary trial; and with respect to item ⑥, contrary to the solicitation, he booked Non-party 1's wife (who was registered as the operator in official records).) Furthermore, the Plaintiff was appointed as a patrolman on May 27, 1978, and was promoted to senior patrolman on October 15, 1982, to assistant inspector on July 1, 1988, and to inspector on February 11, 1991, having served faithfully as a police officer for approximately 19 years, and had received more than 20 commendations of various kinds, including two commendations from the Director General of the National Police Headquarters and five commendations from the Commissioner of the Busan Metropolitan Police Agency (which, under the proviso to Article 6, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 2 of the Rules on Disciplinary Standards for Police Officials, etc., may constitute grounds for mitigation of discipline in the case of the Plaintiff, a police official of the rank of senior inspector or below). There are also mitigating circumstances in that the Plaintiff, while in active service, was admitted at the age of 39 in around February 1993 as the top-ranked entrant across the entire school at Busan Polytechnic University, and graduated in around February 1997.

In light of these mitigating circumstances, together with the motive and circumstances leading to the conduct at issue in this case, the relationship between the Plaintiff and Non-party 2, the recipient of the solicitations, the outcome of the solicitations, the circumstances under which the disciplinary proceedings were commenced, and all other circumstances appearing in the record, the disposition in this case, dismissing the Plaintiff based solely on the aforesaid grounds for discipline, must be found to have exceeded or abused the bounds of discretion in the disciplinary disposition.

Nevertheless, the court below's determination that the disposition in this case was lawful contains an illegality affecting the judgment due to a misapprehension of the legal principles concerning abuse of discretion in disciplinary dispositions. The portion of the grounds for appeal pointing this out is well-founded.

3. Therefore, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination. This Decision is rendered as set forth in the Order, with the unanimous concurrence of the Justices participating in the decision.

Presiding Justice Cho Mu-je
Justice Kim Hyeong-seon (Justice in charge)
Justice Lee Yong-hoon
Justice Lee Yong-woo

【판결요지】

[1] 공무원인 피징계자에게 징계사유가 있어서 징계처분을 하는 경우 어떠한 처분을 할 것인가는 징계권자의 재량에 맡겨진 것이고, 다만 징계권자가 재량권의 행사로서 한 징계처분이 사회통념상 현저하게 타당성을 잃어 징계권자에게 맡겨진 재량권을 남용한 것이라고 인정되는 경우에 한하여 그 처분을 위법하다고 할 수 있고, 공무원에 대한 징계처분이 사회통념상 현저하게 타당성을 잃었다고 하려면 구체적인 사례에 따라 징계의 원인이 된 비위사실의 내용과 성질, 징계에 의하여 달성하려고 하는 행정목적, 징계 양정의 기준 등 여러 요소를 종합하여 판단할 때에 그 징계 내용이 객관적으로 명백히 부당하다고 인정할 수 있는 경우라야 하고, 징계권의 행사가 임용권자의 재량에 맡겨진 것이라고 하여도 공익적 목적을 위하여 징계권을 행사하여야 할 공익의 원칙에 반하거나 일반적으로 징계사유로 삼은 비행의 정도에 비하여 균형을 잃은 과중한 징계처분을 선택함으로써 비례의 원칙에 위반하거나 또는 합리적인 사유 없이 같은 정도의 비행에 대하여 일반적으로 적용하여 온 기준과 어긋나게 공평을 잃은 징계처분을 선택함으로써 평등의 원칙에 위반한 경우에 이러한 징계처분은 재량권의 한계를 벗어난 처분으로서 위법하다 할 것이다.

[2] 유흥업소 단속에 관한 청탁행위로 징계위원회에 회부된 경찰공무원에 대하여 해임처분을 한 사안에서 징계재량권의 범위를 일탈·남용한 것으로 본 사례.

【참조조문】

[1] 국가공무원법 제56조, 제57조, 제63조, 제78조 제1항, 제79조, 행정소송법 제1조[행정처분일반], 제27조

[2] 국가공무원법 제56조, 제57조, 제63조, 제78조 제1항, 제79조, 윤락행위등방지법 제2조, 제9조, 행정소송법 제1조[행정처분일반], 제27조

【참조판례】

[1] 대법원 1992. 9. 26. 선고 91누11308 판결(공1992, 2298), 대법원 1997. 11. 14. 선고 97누7325 판결(공1997하, 3874), 대법원 1997. 11. 25. 선고 97누14637 판결(공1998상, 123), 대법원 1998. 11. 10. 선고 98두12017 판결(공1998하, 2880), 대법원 1999. 9. 3. 선고 97누2528, 2535 판결(공1999하, 2103)

【주문】·【이유】 전문 6,873자 · 펼쳐 보기

【원고, 상고인】 원고 (소송대리인 변호사 김석수)

【피고, 피상고인】 부산광역시 지방경찰청장

【원심판결】 부산고법 1998. 2. 27. 선고 97구12495 판결

【주 문】

원심판결을 파기하고 사건을 부산고등법원에 환송한다.

【이 유】 1. 원심판결의 요지

원심판결의 이유에 의하면 원심은, 그 내세운 증거에 의하여, 원고는 1978. 5. 27. 경찰공무원으로 임용되어 1996. 5. 3.부터 부산지방경찰청 남부경찰서 소속 파출소장으로 근무하여 왔는데, 피고는 원고가 부산 사상구 감전동에 있는 주점 1의 업주 소외 1과 친분관계가 있음을 기화로 ① 1995. 5. 21. 위 업소가 퇴폐영업으로 단속되자 관할 파출소장 소외 2에게 '소외 1과 잘 아는 사이이므로 사건을 잘 처리해 달라'고 청탁하고, ② 같은 해 6. 21. 위 소외 1의 처남 소외 3이 경영하는 주점 2가 퇴폐영업으로 단속되자 위 소외 2에게 '자신의 입장이 곤란하므로 잘 처리해 달라. 소외 3이 수배 중이니 현영업주인 그의 처를 입건하지 말고 소외 3을 입건해 달라'고 청탁하고, ③ 1996. 6. 5. 위 주점 1이 무허가영업으로 단속되자 위 소외 2에게 '윤락행위 부분은 빼고 무허가 부분만 입건하는 방향으로 선처해 달라'고 청탁하고, ④ 같은 달 10. 위 주점 1이 종업원의 호객행위로 단속되자 위 소외 2에게 '즉결심판에 회부되지 않도록 선처해 달라'고 청탁하고, ⑤ 같은 달 초순경 직접 수회 전화를 하거나 찾아가서 잘 봐달라고 청탁하고, ⑥ 1997. 1. 22. 09:00경 위 주점 1이 퇴폐영업으로 단속되자 위 소외 2와 경장 소외 4에게 '아가씨만 빌려준 것이니까 한 곳으로 묶어달라. 여종업원들을 빨리 보내주도록 해주고 부녀보호소에 넘기지 않도록 해달라'고 청탁하고 그 후 여종업원들의 신병이 인계되자 '여종업원이 맞았는데 파출소장인 소외 2가 사과하고 잘 수습하는 게 좋겠다'고 하여 이를 거절하자 '고소당하면 너만 손해다. 서로 좋게 하라'고 하는 등 유흥업소 유착비리 근절에 대한 상부의 명령을 위배하고 경찰관으로서의 품위를 손상시켰다는 이유로 원고의 이와 같은 행위는 국가공무원법 제56조, 제57조, 제63조에 위배되어 같은 법 제78조 제1항 각 호 소정의 징계사유에 해당한다고 하여 보통징계위원회의 의결을 거쳐 1997. 5. 17. 원고를 해임처분한 사실을 인정한 다음, 원고는 1979. 9.경부터 1986. 10.경까지 부산지방경찰청 북부경찰서에 근무할 당시 집안 형님뻘 되는 소외 5를 우연히 알게 됨으로써 당시 소외 5가 경영하던 청소년 오락실의 종업원인 소외 1을 알게 되었고, 그 후 소외 1은 부산 사상구 감전동(속칭 포플라 마치)에서 주점 1을 경영하여 온 사실, 위 지역에는 약 190여 개의 주점이 가출소녀 등 미성년자를 고용하여 윤락 등 퇴폐행위를 자행함으로써 사회적으로 지탄의 대상이 되고 있었으므로 관할 파출소에서는 이를 중점정화대상으로 삼아 지속적으로 단속을 실시하여 온 사실, 소외 1은 1995. 5. 21. 관할 파출소에 의하여 퇴폐영업으로 단속되자 전부터 알고 있던 원고에게 사건의 선처를 부탁하고, 이에 원고는 같은 경찰관으로서 절친한 친구 사이인 위 관할 파출소장 소외 2에게 전화로 위 징계사유 ①, ②, ③, ④, ⑥과 같이 청탁한 사실, 한편 피고는 1994. 3.경부터 경찰관과 유흥업소와의 유착비리를 중점정화대상 비리로 지정하여 그 척결을 소속 경찰관들에게 주지시켜 온 사실을 인정하고, 위 징계사유 중 ⑤항은 이를 인정할 증거가 없다고 한 다음, ⑤항을 제외한 나머지 징계사유만 보더라도 이는 국가공무원법 제56조, 제57조, 제63조에 위배되는 행위로서 같은 법 제78조 제1항 제1, 3호 소정의 징계사유에 해당한다고 할 것이고, 나아가 피고가 경찰관과 유흥업소와의 유착비리를 중점정화대상 비리로 지정하여 그 척결을 소속 경찰관들에게 주지시키는 한편 관할 파출소에서도 감전동 일대 주점의 불법 퇴폐행위에 대하여 지속적으로 단속을 실시하여 오고 있는 터에 경찰공무원인 원고가 그 직분을 망각한 채 도리어 불법, 퇴폐영업으로 적발된 사람의 부탁을 받아 여러 차례 관할 파출소장 등에게 사건의 선처를 청탁한 점 등에 비추어 보면, 원고가 경찰관으로서 약 20년 동안 별다른 잘못 없이 근무하여 오면서 20여 회에 걸쳐 각종 표창을 받았다는 등의 원고가 주장하는 모든 정상을 참작하더라도 이 사건 처분이 재량권의 범위를 일탈하였거나 남용한 것이라고 볼 수 없다고 판단하였다.

2. 상고이유에 대한 판단

가. 제1점에 대하여

원심판결의 이유를 기록에 비추어 살펴본즉, 원심의 그 판시 사실인정은 옳다고 여겨지고 거기에 상고이유 주장과 같은 채증법칙 위배로 인한 사실오인의 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다.

나. 제2, 3점에 대하여

공무원인 피징계자에게 징계사유가 있어서 징계처분을 하는 경우 어떠한 처분을 할 것인가는 징계권자의 재량에 맡겨진 것이고, 다만 징계권자가 재량권의 행사로서 한 징계처분이 사회통념상 현저하게 타당성을 잃어 징계권자에게 맡겨진 재량권을 남용한 것이라고 인정되는 경우에 한하여 그 처분을 위법하다고 할 수 있고, 공무원에 대한 징계처분이 사회통념상 현저하게 타당성을 잃었다고 하려면 구체적인 사례에 따라 징계의 원인이 된 비위사실의 내용과 성질, 징계에 의하여 달성하려고 하는 행정목적, 징계 양정의 기준 등 여러 요소를 종합하여 판단할 때에 그 징계 내용이 객관적으로 명백히 부당하다고 인정할 수 있는 경우라야 하고(대법원 1997. 11. 25. 선고 97누14637 판결 참조), 징계권의 행사가 임용권자의 재량에 맡겨진 것이라고 하여도 공익적 목적을 위하여 징계권을 행사하여야 할 공익의 원칙에 반하거나 일반적으로 징계사유로 삼은 비행의 정도에 비하여 균형을 잃은 과중한 징계처분을 선택함으로써 비례의 원칙에 위반하거나 또는 합리적인 사유 없이 같은 정도의 비행에 대하여 일반적으로 적용하여 온 기준과 어긋나게 공평을 잃은 징계처분을 선택함으로써 평등의 원칙에 위반한 경우에 이러한 징계처분은 재량권의 한계를 벗어난 처분으로서 위법하다 할 것인바(대법원 1992. 9. 26. 선고 91누11308 판결 참조), 원심 인정과 같은 원고의 청탁행위 중 ⑥ '여종업원들을 부녀보호소에 넘기지 않도록 해달라'는 부분을 제외한 나머지 부분은 국가공무원법 제56조에 정한 성실의무와 같은 법 제63조에 정한 품위유지의무에 위반한 행위로서 같은 법 제78조 제1항 제1호, 제3호에 정한 징계사유에 해당한다 할 것이나, 나아가 원고의 위와 같은 청탁행위가 공무원이 직무를 수행함에 있어서 소속 상관의 직무상의 명령에 복종하여야 함을 정한 같은 법 제57조 소정의 복종의무도 위반한 것이고, 공무원의 신분을 박탈하여 공무원관계를 배제하는 징계처분이라는 점에서 가장 무거운 징계처분인 파면과 다를 것이 없는 징계처분인 해임을 선택한 이 사건 처분이 위법하지 아니하다고 한 원심의 판단은 다음과 같은 점에서 수긍할 수 없다.

먼저 원심은 ⑥ '여종업원들을 부녀보호소에 넘기지 않도록 해달라'는 부분도 징계사유가 되는 청탁행위라고 보았는바, 여기서 부녀보호소란 윤락행위등방지법 제2조 제2호에 규정된 요보호자(윤락행위의 상습이 있는 자와 환경 또는 성행으로 보아 윤락행위를 하게 될 현저한 우려가 있는 자)의 선도보호를 위하여 같은 법 제9조에 따라 입소하는 일시보호소(동법 제11조 제1항 제1호)나 선도보호시설(같은 조항 제2호)을 뜻하는 것으로 짐작된다. 그러나 같은 법 제9조에 의하면 위와 같은 선도보호를 위한 입소조치는 요보호자가 성년자인 경우에는 본인의 동의가, 미성년자인 경우에는 법정대리인의 동의(다만 법정대리인의 소재를 알 수 없는 등 동의를 얻기가 어려운 사정이 있는 때에는 그 법정대리인이 서면으로 퇴소를 요청할 때까지 본인의 동의)가 있어야 하는바, 위 규정에 의하면 입소 여부는 요보호자나 법정대리인의 의사에 달려 있는 것이고 만약 파출소장이 요보호자나 법정대리인의 의사를 무시하고 임의로 위와 같은 시설에 요보호자의 입소를 의뢰하거나(같은법시행규칙 제3조) 시도지사로부터 선도보호조치 권한을 위임받은 시장·군수·구청장 등에게 요보호자들을 인계한다면 이는 위법한 조치라고 할 것이다. 이 사건의 경우 원고가 여종업원들을 부녀보호소에 넘기지 않도록 하여 달라고 청탁하였다고 하더라도 기록상 여종업원들(여종업원들이 미성년인 경우에는 그 법정대리인)이 동의하더라도 이를 무시하고 부녀보호소에 넘기지 말라고 한 것은 아니라고 보이므로 이를 가지고 위법한 청탁이라고 할 수 없다고 할 것이다.

경찰공무원징계양정등에관한규칙(경찰청예규) 제6조 제1항 단서에 '중점정화대상 비위에 대하여는 징계를 감경할 수 없다'고 규정하고, 같은 규칙 제6조 제2항 제1호에 '직무와 관련한 금품수수행위 및 기타 중점정화대상으로 지정된 비위를 야기하였을 때' 징계책임을 가중하여 높은 양정기준으로 징계의결요구를 할 수 있다고 규정하여, 소위 중점정화대상 비위에 대하여 중한 징계를 내릴 것을 규정하고 있고, 이 사건의 경우 원고가 위와 같은 중점정화대상 비위를 저지른 것으로 판단되어 해임이라는 중징계를 받은 것으로 짐작된다. 그러나 위와 같이 중점정화대상 비위로 지정되었다고 해석되면 징계책임을 가중하고 감경대상에서도 제외하여야 하는 점에 비추어 보면 이를 엄격하게 해석하여야 한다는 점, 경찰청장이 1994. 3.경 발송한 '경찰 중점정화대상 비위 시달'(기록 145, 146면, 피고는 이를 받아 그대로 산하 경찰관들에게 시달한 것으로 보인다)에 의하면 경찰공무원징계양정등에관한규칙 제6조를 적용하여야 할 중점정화대상 비위의 하나로 '유흥업소 등 대상업소 유착비리'가 지정되어 있지만, 동 시달에서 그 밖에도 '대내관행적 금품거래행위(상납)', '지·파출소 운영비명목으로 월정금 수수', '인사 및 경리 관련 부정행위', '음주운전단속 및 교통사고처리관련 금품수수 행위', '피의자 폭행, 가혹행위등 인권유린행위', '지휘권 훼손 및 무사안일 등 개혁 역행행위' 등을 중점정화대상 비위로 지정한 점에 비추어 보면, 주점 1이 원고가 근무하는 파출소의 관할 대상업소도 아니고 원심 판시와 같이 주점 1의 업주 소외 1과의 개인적인 친분관계가 있어 원고와 절친한 친구 사이인 관할 파출소장 소외 2에게 전화로 청탁을 하였을 뿐으로 이를 가지고 위와 같은 중점정화대상 비위인 '유흥업소 등 대상업소 유착비리'에 해당하는 것으로서 그러한 비리의 근절에 관한 상부의 명령을 위배하였다고 보기는 어렵다고 아니할 수 없다.

기록에 의하여 이 사건 징계가 이루어진 경위를 보면, 관할 파출소에 연행되었던 여종업원들이 풀려난 후 소외 2와소외 4 등 파출소 직원 5명을 독직폭행 등의 혐의로 부산지방검찰청에 고소하였고, 이러한 사실이 부산의 일간지에 크게 보도되었으며, 이로 인하여 1994. 3. 4. 자로 소외 2와소외 4는 다른 파출소로 전근발령되는 등 문책성 인사를 당하고 검찰의 수사가 진행되는 상황에서, 소외 4가 3. 초순경 피고에게 친서를 보냄에 따라 부산지방경찰청에서 원고에 대한 감사징계조사를 시작한 사실, 그 조사과정에서 소외 4는 여종업원들의 고소 내용이 허위이고 업주 소외 1과 원고가 상당히 친밀한 사이로 원고가 그 고소과정에 개입하였을 뿐 아니라, 과거에 소외 1과 원고가 오락실을 동업한 사실은 북부경찰서의 오래된 직원이나 속칭 포플라 마치 내 업주들은 모두 안다고 진술하였고, 관할 파출소에서는 업소 정화를 위하여 강력하게 단속하고 있으나 원고의 청탁으로 인하여 단속에 장애가 많은 것처럼 진술한 사실, 부산지방경찰청에서는 원고가 위 고소사건의 배후조종자인지 여부와 소외 1과 성인오락실을 동업하였는지 여부를 조사하였으나 이를 밝히지 못한 사실을 알아볼 수 있다. 여기에다가 기록에 의하면, 소외 2가 원고의 전화 청탁을 받은 결과 그 청탁에 따라 구체적으로 어떠한 선처를 하였다고 볼 만한 자료를 발견할 수 없는 점{소외 2가 ①에 관하여는 소외 1의 처(공부상 업주로 되어 있음)를 입건조치하였고, ②에 관하여는 청탁과는 반대로 소외 3의 처를 입건조치하고 식품위생법위반뿐 아니라 윤락행위방지법위반으로 입건하여 검찰에 송치하였으며, ③에 관하여는 윤락행위를 입건하지 아니하였으나 이는 상간자(손님)가 없어 윤락행위에 관하여 구증하지 못하였기 때문이고(기록 108면), ④에 관하여 청탁과 달리 호객한 종업원을 즉결심판에 회부하였으며, ⑥에 관하여 청탁과 달리 소외 1의 처(공부상 업주로 되어 있음)를 입건조치하였다고 진술하고 있다}과 원고는 1978. 5. 27. 순경으로 임용된 후 1982. 10. 15. 경장으로, 1988. 7. 1. 경사로, 1991. 2. 11. 경위로 승진하는 등 경찰관으로서 약 19년 동안 성실히 근무하여 오면서 치안본부장 표창 2회, 부산지방경찰청장 표창 5회(이상은 경찰공무원징계양정등에관한규칙 제6조 제1항 제2호 단서에 의하여 경감 이하인 경찰공무원인 원고의 경우 징계감경사유가 될 수 있다) 등을 포함하여 20여 회에 걸쳐 각종 표창을 받은 사실, 원고는 재직 중인 1993. 2.경 당시 39세의 나이에 부산공업대학교 전교수석으로 합격을 하고 1997. 2.경 졸업한 점 등 정상참작사유가 있는데다가, 이 사건 행위에 이르게 된 동기와 경위, 청탁의 상대방인 소외 2와의 관계, 청탁의 결과, 징계절차가 개시된 경위, 기타 기록에 나타난 모든 정황을 고려하면 위와 같은 징계사유만으로 원고를 해임한 이 사건 처분은 징계처분에 있어서 재량권의 범위를 일탈하였거나 남용한 것이라고 아니할 수 없다.

그럼에도 원심이 이 사건 처분이 정당하다고 판단한 조치에는 징계처분에 있어 재량권 남용에 관한 법리를 오해하여 판결에 영향을 미친 위법이 있다고 할 것이다. 상고이유 중 이 점을 지적하는 부분은 이유 있다고 하겠다.

3. 그러므로 원심판결을 파기하고 사건을 다시 심리·판단하게 하기 위하여 원심법원에 환송하기로 관여 법관들의 의견이 일치되어 주문과 같이 판결한다.

대법관 조무제(재판장) 김형선(주심) 이용훈 이용우

Related statutes

Similar cases

Cases with high content similarity to this one.

#1
90누8954 · 대법원 1991-07-23
Cancellation of Dismissal Disposition (해임처분취소)
#2
96누3302 · 대법원 1996-07-12
Revocation of Dismissal from Office
#3
92누5157 · 대법원 1992-07-14
Revocation of Dismissal from Office
#4
83누550 · 대법원 1984-02-28
Revocation of Dismissal from Office
#5
83누130 · 대법원 1983-06-28
Revocation of Dismissal Disposition (해임처분취소)

Cases citing this decision

2014두45734 · 대법원 2017-10-31
징계처분취소(상급자의 직무이전명령에 따르지 않았다는 점 등을 사유로 한 검사 징계처분의 취소를 구하는 사건)
2012두10895 · 대법원 2012-10-11
감봉 2월 처분 취소
2010구합1762 · 청주지법 2011-01-13
Revocation of Dismissal from Office
2006두16786 · 대법원 2009-06-23
파면처분취소
2006두19211 · 대법원 2007-05-11
해임처분취소등

Related tools & guides

AI answers need an account (free accounts: 2 per month) — submit and you'll return to this question after logging in. Search and case reading stay free.

Cross-check the original: 국가법령정보센터 (auxiliary link)