[Plaintiffs, Appellees] As indicated in the list of plaintiffs in the attached sheet. (Plaintiff 1 and 547 others) (Attorney Lim Jong-gil, counsel for the plaintiffs)
[Defendant, Appellant] Seoul Medical Center, Seoul Metropolitan Government (Law Firm I&S, Attorneys Cho Young-gil and 4 others, counsel for the defendant)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 2016Na3364, decided October 12, 2016
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
[Reasoning] The court determines the grounds of appeal.
1. Course of the Case
A. The Defendant is a special corporation established by the Seoul Metropolitan Government for purposes including medical treatment services. The Plaintiffs are workers employed by the Defendant, engaged in duties such as nurses, physical therapists, radiological technologists, and clinical pathologists.
B. The Defendant, in accordance with its "Guidelines for the Operation of the Selective Welfare System," has implemented a system (hereinafter "the Selective Welfare System in this case") whereby its employees and officers, including the Plaintiffs, may select desired welfare items and levels of benefit from among various pre-designed welfare categories within the limit of welfare points allocated to each individual, and has granted the Plaintiffs a certain amount of welfare points (hereinafter "the Welfare Points in this case") every year.
The Defendant allocated to incumbent employees, based on the last day of the previous year, common points uniformly granted to all employees as of January 1 of the relevant year, and seniority points granted differentially according to years of service, and paid these in equal installments in January (first half) and July (second half). For employees on leave or those who resigned mid-year, points were allocated and paid on a pro-rata basis according to the actual period worked in the relevant year. For new employees, until 2012, those hired in the first half of the year were paid half of the allocated amount in July, and those hired in the second half were paid in January of the following year; from 2013 onward, except for those hired in December, the amount was calculated and allocated on a pro-rata basis according to the period worked.
The Plaintiffs used their allocated welfare points immediately when purchasing goods, etc. on the "Internet Welfare Hall," an online shopping site exclusively for the Defendant's employees, or purchased goods, etc. in advance using a welfare card at the Internet Welfare Hall, affiliated welfare merchants, etc., and then applied for the use of welfare points to receive a refund of the amount equivalent to the welfare points used.
Meanwhile, the Welfare Points in this case expire if not used by December 20 of each year, and the items for which they may be used are also limited.
C. The Defendant has calculated and paid overtime allowances, etc. to the Plaintiffs on the premise that the Welfare Points in this case are excluded from ordinary wages.
D. The Plaintiffs asserted that the Welfare Points in this case, etc. constitute ordinary wages, and filed the instant lawsuit against the Defendant seeking the difference between the overtime allowances, etc. recalculated by including the Welfare Points in this case, etc. in ordinary wages, and the overtime allowances, etc. already paid.
E. The court below found that the Welfare Points in this case constitute ordinary wages and partially upheld the Plaintiffs' claims.
2. Main Issues of the Case and Statutory Provisions
A. Main Issues of the Case
The issue in dispute in this case is whether the Welfare Points in this case constitute ordinary wages under the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), and as a premise thereof, the main issue is whether the Welfare Points in this case constitute "wages" as referred to in the Labor Standards Act.
B. Statutory Provisions
○ Labor Standards Act, Article 2 (Definitions)
(1) The definitions of terms used in this Act are as follows:
5. "Wages" means wages, salary, and any other money and valuables paid by an employer to a worker as compensation for work, regardless of the name of such payment.
○ Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act, Article 6 (Ordinary Wages)
(1) "Ordinary wages" in the Act and this Decree means the hourly wage amount, daily wage amount, weekly wage amount, monthly wage amount, or piece-rate amount agreed to be paid regularly and uniformly to a worker for prescribed working hours or total working hours.
3. Whether the Welfare Points in This Case Constitute Wages and Ordinary Wages (Grounds of Appeal Nos. 1 and 2)
A. In order for money or valuables paid by an employer to a worker to constitute wages, they must first be paid as compensation for work; therefore, even if such money or valuables are paid continuously and regularly, if they cannot be regarded as paid as compensation for work, they cannot be deemed wages. In determining whether certain money or valuables were paid as compensation for work, it must be possible to view the occurrence of the obligation to pay such money or valuables as directly related to, or closely related to, the provision of labor (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da55934, decided May 12, 1995; Supreme Court Decision 2011Da23149, decided July 14, 2011, etc.).
B. Even where an employer implements a selective welfare system and, as in this case, continuously and regularly allocates to workers, based on a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc., welfare points that can be used to purchase goods on an online shopping site exclusively for employees, such welfare points do not constitute wages as referred to in the Labor Standards Act, and consequently do not constitute ordinary wages either. The reasons are as follows.
1) In light of the statutory basis for the selective welfare system, welfare points cannot be regarded as wages.
The selective welfare system, which is the premise for welfare points, is a system established under the Framework Act on Worker Welfare (근로복지기본법). The Framework Act on Worker Welfare regulates the selective welfare system in Section 3 of Chapter 3, "Corporate Worker Welfare." Article 1 of the Framework Act on Worker Welfare provides that its purpose is "to improve the quality of life of workers and to contribute to the balanced development of the national economy by prescribing matters necessary for establishing worker welfare policy and conducting welfare projects." In particular, Article 3(1) provides that "worker welfare (excluding basic working conditions such as wages and working hours; the same shall apply hereinafter) policy shall expand opportunities for workers' economic and social participation…," expressly excluding wages from the concept of worker welfare. Ultimately, it is a reasonable interpretation of the norm that welfare points based on the selective welfare system, which constitutes corporate worker welfare under the Framework Act on Worker Welfare, are excluded from working conditions such as wages.
Of course, the argument that whether welfare points constitute wages should be determined from the perspective of the Labor Standards Act is valid. However, in determining whether welfare points constitute wages, it is appropriate to also fully consider the provisions of related statutes and reach a determination that harmonizes the norms. It is clear from the provisions of the Framework Act on Worker Welfare set out above that the legislature's basic regulatory approach to the selective welfare system is premised on the understanding that welfare points are not wages, and this is an important circumstance making it difficult to affirm the wage-nature of welfare points.
2) Even in light of the history and background of the introduction of the selective welfare system, it is difficult to regard welfare points as wages.
A) The selective welfare system, which originated in the United States, is a new system that transformed the traditional corporate welfare or corporate fringe benefit system. Whereas the traditional welfare system was designed by assuming an average standard worker and designing a system deemed necessary for such a worker, with individual workers receiving benefits when the circumstances specified by the system arose, the selective welfare system differs, and is novel, in that the content and level of benefits of the welfare system vary based on the individual worker's choice. The selective welfare system introduced by our legal system and corporate practice was not at all initiated for the purpose of raising or preserving workers' wages, but rather constructed a new corporate welfare system reflecting workers' desires in connection with non-wage welfare systems within the company. Ultimately, in light of this history, it is not appropriate to retroactively interpret welfare points under the selective welfare system as wages.
B) It is difficult to deny that, as a result of the traditional corporate welfare system in our labor-management practice having been operated by creating various welfare allowance items and paying money uniformly to workers, such payments could not differ in legal character from wages, which are compensation for work paid to individual workers. However, the selective welfare system newly transformed the corporate welfare system by limiting the uses to which welfare points may be put in accordance with welfare purposes, and by granting workers the possibility of enjoying welfare benefits according to their own preferences and needs, including the possibility of settlement after the worker's expenditure. That is, it changed its form and content in order to move away from the previous welfare allowance-centered system, which had wage-like characteristics, and to establish the substance of a non-wage corporate welfare system. Ultimately, even considering the specific background of the introduction of the selective welfare system in this manner, it is undesirable to interpret welfare points as wages.
3) Even considering the following circumstances comprehensively, welfare points cannot be regarded as compensation for the provision of labor.
A) Due to the purpose and the specific background of the introduction of the selective welfare system, the use of welfare points is limited to travel, health care, cultural life, self-development, etc., and typically, if not used within one year, they are not carried over but expire, and they are also non-transferable. In this way, welfare points have many characteristics that make it inappropriate to evaluate them as wages, which workers receive from the employer as compensation for the provision of labor and use as the basis for their livelihood.
B) Moreover, welfare points are typically allocated all at once at the beginning of each year, regardless of the worker's provision of labor. Wages in such a form are not easily found in our actual labor-management practice. This should not be understood merely as a simple characteristic of welfare points, but can be understood as an affirmative indication that they are not compensation for work.
C) Furthermore, in most individual workplaces that have introduced the selective welfare system, welfare points are not expressly designated as "remuneration" or "wages" in collective agreements, rules of employment, etc. It can be said that the parties to the employment relationship themselves recognize that welfare points are not compensation for work. The fact that the Ministry of Employment and Labor (고용노동부) does not reflect welfare points in the collectively-agreed wage increase rates that it surveys and publishes annually allows one to indirectly infer that the government, too, does not perceive welfare points as wages.
C. Meanwhile, the view that affirms the wage-nature of the Welfare Points in this case and regards the allocation of welfare points as the payment of wages holds that the mere allocation of welfare points constitutes the payment of wages, even in the absence of any expenditure by the employer for settlement or acquisition of economic benefit by the worker. This view presents the following problems.
1) The mere allocation of welfare points cannot be evaluated as the "payment" of money or valuables.
A) The legal relationship between the employer and worker surrounding welfare points has as its content that, where the worker purchases goods, etc. within the limited scope of use and method of use, the employer reimburses the worker's expenditure within a certain limit. The rights and obligations of the two parties as described above are established through a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc., and the actual performance thereunder occurs only when the employer makes a disbursement to reimburse the worker's expenditure. The act by which an employer, based on a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc., allocates a certain amount of welfare points to a worker is merely a factual act by the employer confirming that, up to a maximum of the amount equivalent to the allocated welfare points, the employer will ultimately bear the obligation to pay the price if the worker later purchases goods, etc. using welfare points or a welfare card.
A worker obtains an actual benefit only after going through a procedure such as using the welfare card in accordance with the use and time period set forth in a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc., and, upon the employer's approval, having welfare points deducted, thereby receiving from the employer money equivalent to the deducted welfare points, or having the amount equivalent to such welfare points deducted by the welfare card issuing company, etc. Meanwhile, a worker may also purchase goods, etc. with welfare points on the employee-exclusive online shopping site without using a welfare card. However, a worker can use allocated welfare points only on the employee-exclusive online shopping site unilaterally established by the employer, and moreover, the goods, etc. that may be purchased are also limited. A worker cannot freely use welfare points to a degree equivalent or similar to currency. If the shopping site is closed or does not function properly, the worker may be unable to purchase goods using welfare points. Ultimately, this limited possibility of use on such a shopping site alone cannot support the conclusion that a worker obtains an actual benefit at the time welfare points are allocated. Moreover, directly settling the purchase price of goods, etc. using welfare points on the employee-exclusive online shopping site is merely one of the methods of using welfare points. A worker may, instead of this method, choose the method of using a welfare card to purchase goods, etc. at an affiliated merchant and having welfare points deducted upon the employer's approval. Ultimately, one cannot generalize only the case of directly using welfare points on the employee-exclusive online shopping site and evaluate that the payment of money or valuables has already occurred at the stage of allocation of welfare points.
In this way, the factual act of the employer's allocation of welfare points neither results in a worker obtaining an actual benefit nor in the employer incurring an expenditure. Ultimately, the mere fact that welfare points have been allocated cannot be evaluated as the employer having made a payment of money or valuables to the worker. For example, even if an employer, having already entered into an annual salary employment contract with a worker to pay 36 million won per year, reconfirms at the beginning of the year that it will pay 36 million won as annual salary, this cannot be evaluated as the 36 million won having been paid to the worker as wages at that time. The allocation of welfare points is fundamentally no different from this.
B) Even where there is an agreement between the parties to an obligatory legal relationship that, prior to the stage of actual performance of the obligation, a hypothetical object of performance such as welfare points is created and, through a two-stage performance process, the obligatory relationship is ultimately resolved, the essential nature of the legal relationship does not change thereby. Of course, this is limited to cases where the intermediate object of performance has significance only between the parties themselves. That is, examining the legal relationship surrounding welfare points, the employer merely bears an obligation to ultimately pay, within a certain limit, the price if the worker purchases goods, etc. in the future, but divides this process of performance into two stages: first, creating something called hypothetical welfare points and allocating them to the worker, and next, fulfilling that obligation through the process of bearing the cost of goods, etc. purchased by the worker using welfare points. The fact that hypothetical welfare points are interposed in the middle does not essentially change the obligation borne by the employer, nor does the mere fact that the employer allocated welfare points extinguish this obligation of the employer, nor does the worker receive performance at that point in time. This differs from a case where the object of performance has significance vis-à-vis a third party, such as where an employer purchases airline mileage and gives it to a worker. Airline mileage is itself the object of performance between the parties, not a hypothetical intermediate object of performance created by dividing the performance process into two stages between the parties to the legal relationship. If an employer, as part of a selective welfare system, purchased airline mileage and gave it to a worker, the employer's obligation to pay would be fulfilled by the act of transferring the mileage, and the subsequent use of the mileage would be a separate legal relationship between the worker and a third party.
Furthermore, it is possible to legally and factually describe the legal relationship between the employer and worker surrounding welfare points without using the term "welfare points" at all. For example, in the case of a workplace where the collective agreement or rules of employment provide that 700 welfare points, having a value of 700,000 won, are to be allocated to workers each year, the employer has agreed to ultimately bear, up to a limit of 700,000 won, the price of goods, etc. purchased by workers in accordance with the designated use and period, and where a worker has purchased goods using 300 welfare points, it can be explained that the employer bears an obligation to bear that amount, such as by directly paying the worker 300,000 won for the goods purchased, and continues to bear this obligation up to the remaining limit of 400,000 won. Ultimately, welfare points are nothing more than a hypothetical numerical figure introduced to facilitate linguistic expression by adding the connotation of being welfare-related, and it is difficult to say that they have any legally significant substance.
C) Evaluating the allocation of welfare points as the payment of wages is also unreasonable in the following respects.
Suppose a workplace has established a system whereby "wage points" corresponding to the annual wage amount agreed between the worker and employer are first allocated to the worker at the beginning of each year, and then, each time the worker provides labor each month, the monthly salary is paid in currency, while simultaneously deducting wage points corresponding to the amount of salary paid. If the logic of regarding the allocation of welfare points as the payment of wages were applied consistently to such wage points, then even if the employer does not pay wages in currency but merely allocates, at the prior stage, wage points that are nothing but a conceptual figure, this would have to be evaluated as wages having already been paid. Although not entirely clear, it would be difficult to find a view that would evaluate even such an allocation of wage points as the payment of wages. However, under such a wage point system, a worker need only provide the agreed labor for the allocated points to be deducted and for the worker to receive the corresponding money; by contrast, under the welfare point system, the structure is such that only when the worker purchases goods, etc. in accordance with the designated use and method of use are the allocated points deducted, and only then can the worker be reimbursed the corresponding money from the employer, etc. Comparing the two, it cannot be denied that the allocation of wage points is more likely to be evaluated as the payment of wages. Ultimately, it is not logically valid to view the allocation of wage points as not constituting the payment of wages, while viewing the allocation of welfare points as constituting the payment of wages. This contradictory situation is the result that occurs when the allocation of welfare points is forcibly evaluated as the payment of wages.
D) Accordingly, evaluating the act of allocating welfare points—which is merely an act of the employer acknowledging an obligation as described above—as the payment of money or valuables by the employer to the worker is tantamount to treating money or valuables not yet paid as if they had already been paid, which is not appropriate, and it is also difficult to find a basis for this even from the perspective of civil law.
2) According to the view that affirms the wage-nature of welfare points and regards the allocation of welfare points as constituting the payment of money or valuables, the mere allocation of welfare points would result in the application of the Labor Standards Act to the wage claim being excluded, and thereafter the relationship would be governed solely by civil law—an unjust result.
In the case of a workplace where the collective agreement, rules of employment, etc. provide that, with respect to the amount used by a worker with a welfare card, the employer is to directly pay that amount to the worker along with the deduction of welfare points, if it is considered that the payment of wages is completed upon the allocation of welfare points, then paradoxically, the monetary claim held by the worker against the employer could no longer be regarded as a wage claim. As a result, the application of the various provisions that the Labor Standards Act intends to apply with respect to wages would be excluded. If the employer merely allocates a certain amount of welfare points at the time set forth in the collective agreement, rules of employment, etc., then thereafter, even if the employer does not directly pay the worker in money the amount equivalent to the welfare points used by the worker, the criminal penalty provision for non-payment of wages (Articles 109 and 43 of the Labor Standards Act) would not apply, the top-priority right to repayment of wage claims (Article 38(2) of the Labor Standards Act) would not be recognized even if the employer loses the ability to pay due to bankruptcy, etc., and likewise the prescription provision concerning wage claims (Article 49 of the Labor Standards Act) would not apply. For example, if a worker who purchased goods, etc. at a welfare card affiliated merchant and then applied for settlement of the amount equivalent to the welfare points used is refused by the employer without justifiable reason, or if a worker who was allocated welfare points but has not used them finds that the employer has lost the ability to pay and an auction procedure has commenced against the employer's property, the employer who refused settlement could not be criminally punished for wage arrears, and the worker could not exercise the top-priority right to repayment of wage claims with respect to the amount equivalent to the unused welfare points.
It is highly unreasonable that the mere fact that an employer allocated welfare points as a factual act acknowledging a certain obligation would result in the complete exclusion of the application of the provisions concerning wages under the Labor Standards Act, which should naturally apply between the employer and the worker. According to the view that evaluates the allocation of welfare points as the payment of wages, from the point in time of the allocation of welfare points onward, the legal relationship between the parties to the employment relationship would cease to be governed by the operation of the Labor Standards Act for the protection of wage claims and would instead be left to general civil law regulation. This view, absorbed in the goal of including welfare points in wages and ordinary wages, ultimately opens a path by which, in the broader framework, the mandatory nature of the Labor Standards Act for the protection of wage claims could be circumvented, resulting in a legal order biased in favor of employers.
3) The view that affirms the wage-nature of welfare points and regards the allocation of welfare points as the payment of wages is inconsistent with the purpose of the Labor Standards Act's principles governing the payment of wages, and also produces unjust results with respect to the issue of the employer's criminal liability.
A) Article 43 of the Labor Standards Act prescribes the principles that wages must be paid in currency, in full, directly, and at least once a month at fixed intervals. This establishes basic principles concerning the payment of wages in order to ensure that workers can receive wages, which are their means of livelihood, with certainty, promptness, and predictability.
However, evaluating welfare points as wages risks shaking the very foundation of the currency-payment principle and, going forward, broadening the normative scope for permitting employers to pay wages in something other than currency, thereby potentially undermining the purpose for which the Labor Standards Act established this provision to secure workers' actual receipt of wages. This is not appropriate.
B) The Labor Standards Act contains a provision punishing an employer who violates the principles concerning the payment of wages (Article 109(1)), and with respect to the currency-payment principle, recognizes as an exception only cases where there is a special provision in statute or a collective agreement (proviso to Article 43(1)). Ultimately, if one adopts the view that welfare points constitute wages, an employer who allocates welfare points instead of currency could be criminally punished unless there is a basis in statute or a collective agreement.
However, there are numerous workplaces, as in this case, that have no basis in a collective agreement with respect to the allocation of welfare points. And although the Framework Act on Worker Welfare has provisions on the selective welfare system, since there is no clear reference to welfare points themselves, the provisions of the Framework Act on Worker Welfare are insufficient to be regarded as a statute affirmatively recognizing an exception to the currency-payment principle.
It does not appear that any employer operates a selective welfare system with the awareness, in the process of allocating welfare points, that doing so violates the principles concerning the payment of wages under the Labor Standards Act, and it appears that the awareness of workers using welfare points is likewise the same. Ultimately, it is severely unjust for the employer to be placed at risk of criminal punishment, contrary to the awareness of the parties who grant and use welfare points based on the selective welfare system.
4) Moreover, the fact that, if welfare points are held to constitute wages, this would in effect become an obstacle to the promotion of the selective welfare system as a new form of corporate welfare, is also an important consideration that cannot be overlooked. For a worker, receiving the amount equivalent to welfare points directly in currency would be procedurally simpler and much more advantageous, such as having no restriction on the purposes of use, compared to receiving welfare points, and workers would inevitably prefer the latter. Nor is there any need for an employer to operate a complicated, cumbersome, costly welfare system that is not even preferred by workers, merely to pay the same amount of wages. The view that welfare points constitute wages could result in negating the purpose and significance of the existence of the selective welfare system, and there is even a concern that this could lead to the effective abolition of the system.
D. Examining the facts found above in light of the foregoing legal principles, the Welfare Points in this case, based on the Selective Welfare System in this case, cannot be regarded as wages as referred to in the Labor Standards Act, and consequently cannot be included in ordinary wages either.
Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below, which determined, contrary to the foregoing, that the Welfare Points in this case are included in ordinary wages, erred in misapprehending the legal principles concerning the wage-nature of welfare points. The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, without determining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. Justice Kim Jae-hyung's separate opinion and the dissenting opinion of Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Kim Seon-su, and Justice Kim Sang-hwan are appended, and apart from these, the opinions of the Justices participating in the decision were unanimous, and there is a supplementary opinion by Justice Kim Seon-su and Justice Kim Sang-hwan regarding the dissenting opinion.
5. Separate Opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung
A. The issues to be determined in this case are whether the Welfare Points in this case constitute money or valuables paid as compensation for work, and, if this is affirmed, whether they also constitute ordinary wages.
The first issue can be understood from the perspective of whether the employer's allocation of welfare points (the court below used the expression "allocation and payment," but this does not include use by the worker) and the worker's use of welfare points can be regarded as the payment of wages. Whether the mere allocation of welfare points can be evaluated as the "payment" of money or valuables, or whether the use of welfare points or settlement by the employer can be regarded as the "payment" of money or valuables, is a matter to be determined at the stage of, after affirming the wage-nature of welfare points, determining the timing and amount of wage payment. In determining the legal relationship between the employer and worker surrounding welfare points, one should not place excessive emphasis on the currency-payment principle, nor should one develop an interpretive theory by considering even criteria for determining ordinary wages, such as so-called "fixedness." The currency-payment principle concerns not whether something constitutes wages (Article 2(1)(5) of the Labor Standards Act) but the method of payment of wages (main text of Article 43(1) of the Labor Standards Act), and whether something constitutes ordinary wages is a matter to be addressed only after it has been determined to constitute wages.
B. Whether money or valuables paid by an employer to a worker constitute wages is determined by whether they were paid as compensation for work, and the mere fact that they have the character of welfare benefits does not uniformly exclude their character as wages. The Labor Standards Act comprehensively defines wages as "any money or valuables paid by an employer to a worker" and expressly states that the name given to the payment has no bearing on the determination of whether it constitutes wages. Therefore, the label "welfare" is no obstacle to determining whether something constitutes wages. There is no reason to view the Welfare Points in this case differently.
Considering the character of the Welfare Points in this case as a means of online electronic payment, the method of use, and the settlement relationship, etc., the series of processes in which the employer allocates the Welfare Points in this case to the worker and the worker uses them can be evaluated as the payment of wages. It is reasonable to view the legal relationship between the employer and worker surrounding the Welfare Points in this case as a relationship in which the employer pays compensation for work to the worker in the form of the Welfare Points in this case. The detailed reasons are as follows.
1) Article 43(1) of the Labor Standards Act sets forth the currency-payment principle. Except where there is a special provision in statute or a collective agreement, this is intended to promote workers' actual securing of wages by requiring wages to be paid in currency with legal tender status.
In the reality of employment relationships, there are cases where wages are paid by putting cash or a cashier's check in a pay envelope, but in most cases, the monthly salary amount is transferred to a bank account or the like held by the worker. As the means of payment become increasingly diverse, it is necessary, when determining whether the currency-payment principle set forth in the Labor Standards Act has been complied with, to consider changes in economic reality, transaction methods, and the general public's perception of the concept of currency. The currency-payment principle should not be interpreted and applied excessively strictly without considering the transaction reality and normative circumstances, which have changed since the time it was introduced into the Labor Standards Act.
2) The legal relationship surrounding welfare points also needs to be approached from this perspective.
The purchase of various goods and services in the virtual space of the internet has become common, and various online electronic payment methods are diversifying. Workers' livelihood-sustaining activities using wages are already being fulfilled to a considerable degree through consumption activities in the virtual space of the internet. Given such changed transaction reality and normative circumstances, where an employer pays, as wages, an online electronic payment method that can be used in daily consumption life, a flexible interpretation is required to the extent that it does not undermine the currency-payment principle. That is, it cannot simply be concluded that an employer's payment of various online electronic payment methods as compensation for work always violates the currency-payment principle; rather, it is necessary to examine and evaluate the substance, including the method and scope of use of the electronic payment method and the settlement relationship. This case, in which the character of the legal relationship surrounding the allocation of welfare points is at issue, is also in line with this context.
3) Examining specifically the legal relationship between the employer and worker surrounding the Welfare Points in this case, the following conclusion can be reached.
In this case, the employer allocates to the worker, based on a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc., a certain amount of welfare points annually and regularly and continuously, and the worker can use the welfare points, among other methods, to purchase goods on the employee-exclusive online shopping site. In such a case, the employer bears an obligation, through a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc., to pay wages as compensation for work up to a maximum amount equal to the monetary value of the welfare points annually allocated to the worker.
A worker who has been allocated welfare points by the employer uses the welfare points either by purchasing goods, etc. with welfare points on the employee-exclusive online shopping site, or by using a welfare card to purchase goods, etc. at other offline stores, etc., and then having welfare points deducted. In the former case, no settlement relationship remains between the employer and the worker in connection with the use of welfare points, and only a settlement issue remains between the employer and the operator of the online shopping site, etc. In the latter case, the worker who used welfare points is refunded money equivalent to the deducted welfare points from the employer.
As can be seen from this process of use and settlement of welfare points, the welfare points annually allocated by the employer have the character of an online electronic payment method. It is not appropriate to evaluate such welfare points, as the majority opinion does, as merely hypothetical figures, or to evaluate the granting thereof to workers as an act by the employer confirming the bearing of an obligation. The employer allocates welfare points to the worker in fulfillment of its obligation to pay wages to the worker.
However, when welfare points are used as an online electronic payment method, the space of use may be limited to the employee-exclusive online shopping site established by the employer, or the items that may be used may be limited. Where a worker uses welfare points through a welfare card, an actual benefit accrues to the worker only upon receiving settlement from the employer. For the employer as well, only through the process of settling with the worker, etc. in accordance with the worker's use of welfare points does the employer actually incur an expenditure as compensation for work.
Examining the substance by comprehensively considering the character of welfare points, the method and scope of use, the settlement relationship, etc., it is reasonable to view that, in the legal relationship surrounding welfare points, the employer's fulfillment of its obligation to pay wages to the worker is completed only through a series of processes beginning with the employer's allocation of welfare points and proceeding through the worker's acquisition of a benefit from the use of welfare points. As a result, the mere fact that the employer allocated welfare points should not be evaluated as wages having been paid; rather, it should be viewed that the employer's payment of wages is finally made only to the extent of the amount corresponding to the welfare points actually used by the worker, among the welfare points allocated by the employer at the beginning of the year.
C. In sum, it is the correct legal interpretation, consistent with the changed normative reality, to view that wages as compensation for work are paid through the series of processes consisting of the allocation of the Welfare Points in this case and the worker's use of the welfare points. The majority opinion, which holds that the legal relationship surrounding the Welfare Points in this case has nothing to do with the payment of wages, or that the allocation of welfare points cannot be evaluated as part of the process of paying wages, is not valid.
D. Examining the reasoning of the judgment of the court below in light of these legal principles, the determination of the court below, which understood that the Defendant paid compensation for work to the Plaintiffs in the form of the Welfare Points in this case, is valid. However, the determination of the court below, which viewed that the payment of wages was completed by the mere allocation of welfare points and, on that premise, held that the entire annual amount of allocated welfare points constitutes ordinary wages without considering the amount of unused welfare points for each individual worker, erred in misapprehending the legal principles concerning the wage-nature and ordinary-wage-nature of welfare points, and failed to conduct the necessary examination.
For the foregoing reasons, although the conclusion is the same as the majority opinion in that the judgment of the court below is reversed, since the reasoning differs, I set forth this separate opinion.
6. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Kim Seon-su, and Justice Kim Sang-hwan
A. The majority opinion determined that welfare points continuously and regularly allocated by an employer to workers in accordance with a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc., while implementing a selective welfare system, do not constitute wages as prescribed by the Labor Standards Act, and consequently do not constitute ordinary wages either. However, for the following reasons, it is difficult to agree with the logic of the majority opinion.
1) Welfare points that are continuously and regularly allocated, and with respect to which the employer is obligated based on a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc., must be regarded as money or valuables paid as compensation for work.
A) (1) Article 2(1) of the Labor Standards Act defines "wages" as "wages, salary, and any other money and valuables paid by an employer to a worker as compensation for work, regardless of the name of such payment" (Item 5), and defines "labor contract" as "a contract concluded for the purpose of a worker providing labor to an employer, and the employer paying wages therefor" (Item 4). Considering the content of these provisions of the Labor Standards Act and the legislative purpose of protecting workers, it is reasonable to understand that, absent other special circumstances, money or valuables that a worker receives from an employer for providing labor pursuant to a labor contract concluded with the employer are directly related to, or closely related to, the provision of labor. Here, "cases where there are other special circumstances" may include, for example, cases where the money or valuables in question are paid for reimbursement of actual expenses or for benevolent reasons, or are paid due to special and incidental circumstances unrelated to the individual worker's provision of labor.
(2) In examining whether welfare points constitute wages paid as compensation for work as well, it is reasonable to construe them as directly or closely related to the provision of labor, absent other special circumstances. From this perspective, welfare points annually allocated in accordance with a collective agreement or rules of employment cannot be evaluated as being granted due to special and incidental circumstances of an individual worker unrelated to the provision of labor. Since a certain amount of welfare points is allocated equally to all employees each year, they cannot be regarded as reimbursement for actual expenses either. Since welfare points are typically allocated continuously and regularly on an annual basis, and since the employer is obligated to make the allocation through the workplace's rules of employment or collective agreement, etc., they are also not money or valuables paid by the employer out of benevolence.
Moreover, considering the typical methods and criteria for allocating welfare points, welfare points can sufficiently be recognized as money or valuables directly related to, or closely related to, a worker's provision of labor. Workplaces implementing a selective welfare system generally have provisions for pro-rating the allocation of welfare points on a daily or monthly basis according to the period worked in the relevant year in cases of mid-year hiring, resignation, or leave of absence. And looking at the detailed criteria for allocating welfare points, in addition to common points or basic points equally granted to all workers, they are composed of seniority points granted differentially according to years of service, family points additionally granted according to family composition, etc., each of which substantially corresponds to basic salary, seniority allowance, and family allowance, all of which are recognized as having wage character. These circumstances support the conclusion that welfare points are money or valuables directly related to, or closely related to, the provision of labor.
(3) Ultimately, it is clear that welfare points continuously and regularly allocated by an employer based on a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc. constitute wages, which are compensation for work.
B) The fact that welfare points are paid in the name of welfare benefits does not negate their character as compensation for work. Family allowances, housing allowances, etc., which can be said to be representative allowances paid in the name of welfare benefits, are also, although their connection to the provision of labor is weak in the sense that they do not correspond directly or proportionally to working hours, substantially paid as compensation for the worker's actual provision of labor. To regard such allowances, etc. as not being compensation for actual work performed would be a mere fiction that disregards the reality of wage payment (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Da26721, decided December 21, 1995). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that, where a basic amount is paid as a family allowance to all workers while an additional amount is paid to workers who actually have dependents, the basic amount constitutes ordinary wages (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da89399, decided December 18, 2013, etc.). There is no reason to treat welfare points, which the employer continuously and regularly grants based on an obligation to pay under a collective agreement, rules of employment, etc., and which cannot be regarded as reimbursement for actual expenses or as being paid out of benevolence, differently from these allowances, etc.
C) Among the various allowances that constitute wages under the Labor Standards Act, there are allowances that do not correspond directly or proportionally to the number of working days or working hours, allowances subject to certain payment conditions such that they are not paid despite the provision of labor, and allowances that are paid in advance on the premise of future labor. The fact that welfare points are not allocated to those hired in December or to those returning from leave, or that welfare points are allocated all at once at the beginning of the year before labor is provided, cannot mean that they are not wages, which are compensation for work.
[Reasoning]
(라) Even in cases where welfare-oriented wages that an employer regularly and continuously pays to employees based on a collective agreement or employment rules are not classified under the category of "remuneration" or "wages" in the collective agreement or employment rules, this is merely a result of classification by nominal designation for convenience. The same applies to welfare points based on the selective welfare system. It is self-evident that such formal classification cannot serve as an important and substantive criterion in determining whether something constitutes remuneration for work, and it is not reasonable to conclude, based on this, that the parties to the employment relationship perceive welfare points as not being remuneration for work.
Contrary to what the majority opinion points out, it is more consistent with reality to view that individual employees who are allocated welfare points perceive welfare points as "a separate wage, only not received in cash." For example, in a workplace where 1,000 annual welfare points are allocated at the beginning of the year, and each point can be used to purchase goods or services worth 1,000 won per point, employees perceive that an additional 1,000,000 won per year, the converted amount of welfare points, is included in the wages that serve as the source for forming and maintaining their livelihood. This is supported by the fact that nearly all employees use the entirety of their welfare points as if they were cash, and that, although the scale varies by workplace, a certain annual amount of welfare points is used as a means of payment for purchasing various goods and using services and facilities. Sufficient consideration of this reality is necessary when making normative judgments in the field of labor law.
(마) There are many workplaces that require mandatory use of a portion of allocated welfare points for life and injury insurance premiums, etc., but this circumstance cannot serve as grounds for denying that welfare points constitute remuneration for work. The Supreme Court has previously affirmed the wage character of personal pension insurance premiums, personal pension subsidies, and protection-type insurance premiums, among others (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da13762, decided October 13, 2005; Supreme Court Decision 2012Da90764, decided December 11, 2014; Supreme Court Decision 2014Da45720, decided March 10, 2016, etc.). Considering this precedent, the fact that mandatory use items as described above are set for welfare points allocated by the employer cannot negate their character as remuneration for work.
2) The allocation of welfare points can be evaluated as the employer's payment of money or goods to the employee.
(가) Although the welfare points that an employer allocates to an employee based on the selective welfare system have some restrictions on their purpose of use, the employee can at least freely use them within that scope of purpose, and the employer cannot interfere with or refuse settlement for use within the scope of purpose. In that the employee forms and maintains their livelihood through this, welfare points are substantively no different from having the corresponding amount paid in currency. Therefore, it cannot be said that welfare points are not money or goods, or that their allocation is not the payment of money or goods, merely because the possibility of their use is limited.
Moreover, as in this case, insofar as an employee can directly purchase goods, etc. using welfare points on an employee-exclusive online shopping site, the employer's allocation of welfare points must be viewed as the payment of money or goods that actually confers a proprietary benefit on the employee. In other words, an employee's receipt of allocated welfare points is equivalent to receiving from the employer an electronic payment instrument that can be used like cash to purchase goods, etc. on the exclusive online shopping site, and thus it can be evaluated that money or goods having such substance were paid at the point in time when the welfare points were allocated to the employee. And insofar as the employer has granted the employee welfare points having the character of an electronic payment instrument in this way, it cannot be evaluated, as the majority opinion does, that there was no expenditure by the employer. In this regard, the majority opinion states that the allocation of welfare points is not the payment of money or goods on the ground that only limited goods can be purchased on an online shopping site unilaterally established by the employer. However, the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) presupposes that wages may also be paid in kind rather than in currency (Article 2, Paragraph 1, Item 5; proviso to Article 43, Paragraph 1), and it cannot be said that electronic payment instruments or similar items that can be used to purchase goods, etc. on internet sites are excluded from the "goods in kind" referred to therein. Furthermore, insofar as goods in kind other than currency are permitted, there is no need for them to necessarily possess a degree of circulability or usability equal or similar to that of currency. Therefore, it cannot be said that welfare points are not money or goods, or that their allocation is not the payment of money or goods, merely because the possibility of their use is limited. Of course, as the majority opinion points out, it is not the case that an employee must necessarily use welfare points only on the online shopping site, and the employee may also choose to use welfare points via a welfare card. However, insofar as the employee can use the entirety of the welfare points allocated by the employer as an electronic payment instrument on the online shopping site immediately upon allocation, the circumstance that other methods of use exist cannot serve as grounds for denying the character of welfare points as similar to an electronic payment instrument, nor can it easily serve as grounds for the conclusion that no payment of money or goods took place.
The employer's allocation of welfare points can be evaluated as an act of definitively vesting in the employee the disposal right over the corresponding proprietary benefit, and it is not reasonable to reduce its meaning by characterizing it merely as a simple factual act confirming that the employer bears the ultimate obligation to pay the price when the employee later purchases goods, etc. using welfare points or a welfare card, or by characterizing welfare points as a virtual figure introduced merely to facilitate linguistic expression and thus lacking any substance. Ultimately, with the allocation of welfare points, a certain performance by the employer toward the employee is completed, and the allocation of welfare points should not be evaluated merely as a part of the process of the employer's performance toward the employee. The deduction and refund of points following the employee's purchase of goods, etc. is merely the setting of concrete procedures for the use of welfare points premised on the transfer of the disposal right between the employer and the employee.
(나) The "wage points" cited as an example by the majority opinion have a different substance from the welfare points at issue in this case, making a comparison between them inappropriate. As emphasized above, welfare points can be used for the purpose of purchasing goods, etc. on an online shopping site, and thus have a character similar to an electronic payment instrument. In contrast, the wage points cited by the majority opinion are, in themselves, merely a virtual object of performance as an intermediate step for the payment of wages. In other words, they are merely a virtual figure, and it is difficult to say that they have any legally meaningful substance. Moreover, since it is difficult to find any basis whatsoever in statutes or collective agreements, virtual wage points that violate the principle of payment in currency should not be simply compared with welfare points.
(다) The majority opinion also cites the restriction on the purpose of use of welfare points, their extinction upon non-use within one year, and their non-transferability as important grounds for denying their wage character, but this is not reasonable for the following reasons.
(1) First, the criteria that the Supreme Court has consistently presented when determining whether something constitutes wages under the Labor Standards Act, as shown in Supreme Court Decision 94Da55934, decided May 12, 1995, and Supreme Court Decision 2011Da23149, decided July 14, 2011, among others, which the majority opinion also cites, are whether there is a relationship to the provision of labor, whether payment is continuous and regular, and whether the employer has an obligation to pay; unlimited use of purpose or transferability, etc., are not among these criteria. Moreover, since wages may also be paid in kind rather than in currency, in the case of payment in kind, the use is naturally restricted by its very nature, transferability is likewise restricted, and depending on the circumstances, the goods may even lose their value of utility if not used within a certain period. Ultimately, the majority opinion's denial of wage character on the basis of the above circumstances does not accord with the established case law doctrine, nor does it accord with the provisions of the Labor Standards Act that affirm payment in kind other than currency.
(2) Even if unused welfare points are extinguished without being carried over, this is because the employee, having already been granted the disposal right over the corresponding proprietary benefit through the allocation of welfare points, disposed of it according to their own will, and thus this cannot be used as a ground to deny wage character. The fact that it is an electronic payment instrument with a set period of use, rather than cash, cannot serve as grounds for denying its character as wages.
Furthermore, considering that it is a reality that nearly all employees use the entirety of the welfare points allocated to them by the employer, denying wage character by emphasizing extinction upon non-use is difficult to regard as an interpretation that accords with the substance.
(라) Ultimately, it accords with the substance to view that, following the employer's allocation of welfare points, the disposal right over the corresponding proprietary benefit is transferred to the employee and definitively vests in the employee.
3) The wage character of welfare points cannot be denied merely on the basis of the statutes governing the selective welfare system.
(가) The majority opinion, which holds that welfare points are not wages, cites as an important ground the fact that Article 3 of the Employee Welfare Basic Act (근로복지기본법), which governs the selective welfare system, excludes wages from the concept of employee welfare.
However, whether welfare points constitute wages must be determined by considering, from the standpoint of the Labor Standards Act, whether there is a need to protect them as wages in light of their substance. It is a fundamental principle that labor law regulation must be interpreted and applied according to substance. In particular, for benefit items whose status as wages is on the borderline, it is important to render a legal judgment by clarifying their substance. The provisions of the Employee Welfare Basic Act cited by the majority opinion merely set the subject matter that the Employee Welfare Basic Act intends to regulate as a matter of policy, and cannot be said to have a legislative intent or purpose that extends to regulating whether welfare points, which constitute the content of a selective welfare system implemented at an individual enterprise, may be evaluated as wages. Nor is it easy to view the provisions of the Employee Welfare Basic Act as having a legislative purpose of denying the application of the criteria for interpreting whether something constitutes wages under the Labor Standards Act. Therefore, it is not reasonable to interpret the provisions of the Employee Welfare Basic Act as being premised on the notion that welfare points are not wages under the Labor Standards Act, or to draw the conclusion, based thereon, that it is difficult to affirm their wage character. Rather, the majority opinion, by emphasizing the content of the provisions of the Employee Welfare Basic Act, effectively substitutes the issue of interpreting and applying the Employee Welfare Basic Act for the issue of interpreting and applying the Labor Standards Act, which is improper.
Meanwhile, affirming the wage character of welfare points, as the dissenting opinion does, does not mean that the selective welfare system becomes a system unrelated to employee welfare, nor does it negate its welfare-oriented character.
(나) Moreover, even before the Employee Welfare Basic Act first regulated the selective welfare system in 2010, various public institutions and private enterprises had already implemented selective welfare systems and paid welfare points. The Defendant in this case likewise has paid welfare points since around 2008 based on its internal regulation, the "Selective Welfare System Operating Guidelines." The majority opinion, which denies the wage character of welfare points by citing the provisions of the Employee Welfare Basic Act, is evaluating the substance of factual legal relationships that had existed from before, based on the form or content of legislation established subsequently, which is not reasonable.
4) The wage character of welfare points cannot be denied even in light of the process of introduction of the selective welfare system and the current state of its operation.
(가) Even if, as the majority opinion points out, the selective welfare system was originally designed from the perspective of a new corporate welfare or corporate fringe benefit system, it is necessary to understand the substance of the selective welfare system and welfare points as actually implemented in the reality of our country, and to examine wage character on that premise.
In Korea, there have been many cases in which group insurance premiums, various commemorative gifts, congratulatory/condolence money, snack expenses, health check-up expenses, etc., which were formerly composed of various wage items and paid in cash or borne by the employer, were integrated into a selective welfare system. In other words, despite the original purpose of the selective welfare system of allowing the content or level of benefit of corporate welfare to vary based on individual employee choice, its substance is merely that originally welfare-oriented wage items were converted into a selective welfare system. Although the form has changed from welfare allowances to a corporate welfare system through the implementation of the selective welfare system, the substance, namely that it is a wage paid as remuneration for work as before, remains unchanged and is still maintained as such. Considering this circumstance, affirming the wage character of welfare points is not unreasonable, and there is sufficient need to protect them as wages; rather, it can be said that the majority opinion, which denies wage character, has failed to reflect the substance by placing excessive emphasis only on the change in outward form.
(나) In determining the wage character of welfare points, the actual manner in which the selective welfare system is designed and operated must also be considered. The items of use of welfare points established by the Defendant in this case consist of travel (accommodation, express buses, taxis, etc.), health management (sports, leisure goods, medical supplies, health clubs, glasses, hospital treatment, etc.), cultural life (movies, music, books, stationery, automobile maintenance, beauty salons, etc.), self-development (foreign languages, etc.), family life (children's kindergarten, cram schools, study rooms, bakeries, children's clothing, toys, workbooks, etc.), and others (large discount stores, general department stores, etc.); as such, most items of use of welfare points consist of expenditure items for ordinary, day-to-day needs. Ultimately, the general selective welfare system in Korea is not significantly different from the payment of wages by an employer. Denying wage character by emphasizing only the historical particularity of it being a new corporate welfare system disregards these circumstances.
(다) It also cannot be said that affirming the wage character of welfare points would be an obstacle to the vitalization of the selective welfare system.
In this case, the Defendant introduced the selective welfare system in 2008, and looking at the scale of the annual amount of welfare points allocated and its changes from around that time until the filing of this lawsuit, it is difficult to say that the utilization or spread of the selective welfare system is directly related to whether the wage character of welfare points is recognized. Employees have simply perceived welfare points as a form of wages. The notion that recognizing the wage character of welfare points would cause the employer to abolish or reduce the selective welfare system is merely an unverified conjecture, and cannot be a factor to be considered in determining the wage character of welfare points. If the wage character of welfare points is recognized, it becomes clear that the abolition or reduction of welfare points constitutes a disadvantageous change to working conditions, and the employer will not be able to unilaterally take such measures. Recognizing the wage character of welfare points helps prevent the unilateral abolition or reduction of the selective welfare system.
Meanwhile, the situation in which the wage character of welfare points becomes an issue is limited to the case where the employer directly operates the selective welfare system. The selective welfare system may also be operated as a business of an in-house employee welfare fund corporation having a legal personality separate from the employer, pursuant to the Employee Welfare Basic Act. Where an in-house employee welfare fund corporation operates the selective welfare system, there is no room for the wage character of welfare points to become an issue, and therefore, recognizing the wage character of welfare points in this case has no effect whatsoever on a selective welfare system operated by an in-house employee welfare fund corporation. Furthermore, corporate employee welfare can be realized through various means other than the selective welfare system, such as employee assistance programs, profit-sharing, and employee stock ownership plans. Therefore, even if, as the majority opinion suggests, there is some concern that the selective welfare system might be somewhat curtailed, this does not immediately mean an overall and general reduction of the corporate welfare system.
Rather, if welfare points are not regarded as wages, one cannot but be concerned about the possibility that employers may evade the regulations under the Labor Standards Act concerning wages and ordinary wages by choosing, instead of raising wages, to additionally allocate welfare points of equivalent value.
5) Contrary to the concerns of the majority opinion, recognizing welfare points as wages does not conflict with the wage-related system or the principles of wage payment under the Labor Standards Act, and it cannot be concluded that this would produce unreasonable results in relation to the criminal punishment of employers, or that it would create a serious deficiency in the application of the Labor Standards Act.
(가) The main text of Article 43, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act provides for, among other things, the principle of payment in currency, and Article 43, Paragraph 2 provides for the principle of regular payment at least once a month. The purpose of the principle of payment in currency is to guarantee the employee's economic freedom and the actual payment of wages by prohibiting payment in kind in principle, and the purpose of the principle of regular payment at least once a month is to stabilize the employee's livelihood by compelling the payment of wages on a fixed date each month. However, these principles concern only the method of wage payment and are not criteria for determining what constitutes wages. The conclusion that something does not constitute wages cannot be drawn merely because remuneration for work was not paid in currency, or was not paid regularly at least once a month.
(나) The proviso to Article 43, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act provides, "Provided, That where there are special provisions in statutes or a collective agreement, a portion of wages may be deducted or paid in something other than currency," thereby recognizing an exception to the principle of payment in currency. Considering that, with respect to welfare points, many workplaces have a basis in a collective agreement, and that, even absent such a basis, Articles 81 and 82 of the Employee Welfare Basic Act can serve as the basis provisions for the allocation of welfare points, the wage character of welfare points cannot be denied merely because the amount corresponding to welfare points was not paid in currency. Also with respect to the issue of the employer's criminal punishment, since it can be normatively evaluated as falling under the exception provided in the proviso to Article 43, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act, the employer does not become subject to criminal punishment merely by allocating welfare points.
With respect to the principle of regular payment at least once a month as well, Article 23, Item 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법 시행령) provides an exception for incentive payments, bonuses, etc. calculated on the basis of matters spanning a period exceeding one month, and since welfare points, which are ordinarily calculated on an annual basis, can be subsumed under this, this does not constitute an obstacle to recognizing wage character, nor does it raise an issue of the employer's criminal punishment.
(다) Meanwhile, even if welfare points are deemed to constitute wages, insofar as the Labor Standards Act clearly specifies the grounds for exception to the principle of payment in currency, an employer cannot arbitrarily convert existing wages into money or goods other than currency, and therefore there is no concern that the principle of payment in currency would be fundamentally undermined as a result.
(라) The majority opinion points out that, if the allocation of welfare points is evaluated as the payment of wages, then in a case where an employee, having been allocated welfare points, fails to use them, or where the employer refuses settlement of an amount equivalent to used welfare points, the monetary claim that the employee holds against the employer cannot be regarded as a wage claim, resulting in the exclusion of the application of the Labor Standards Act and regulation solely under civil law, which is unreasonable. However, this issue is one of the various borderline cases frequently encountered in connection with whether the Labor Standards Act must be mandatorily applied, and should be judged by the court by comprehensively considering the purpose of the Labor Standards Act and the concrete reasonableness of the case, among other factors. For example, where the employment relationship is terminated due to the employer's insolvency, etc., occurring in the middle of the relevant year, it is reasonable to recognize the right to top-priority payment for the amount equivalent to the employee's unused welfare points up to that point in time. Considering the nature of welfare points as wages and the particularity of the use and settlement of welfare points, it accords with the purpose of the Labor Standards Act to treat unused welfare points as equivalent to an employer's unpaid wages and to protect them equally with other wage claims.
Furthermore, the majority opinion, while understanding the legal relationship between the employer and employee concerning welfare points as entirely unrelated to wages and premising that the application of the Labor Standards Act is naturally excluded, on the other hand argues that, if the allocation of welfare points is evaluated as the payment of wages, there would be a deficiency in the protection of wage claims under the Labor Standards Act, which is unreasonable. This point made by the majority opinion disregards the particularity of welfare points as an electronic payment instrument and is based on an exceptional situation, making its purport difficult to clearly discern and its logical consistency difficult to find.
6) Recognizing the wage character and ordinary wage character of welfare points is also desirable from the macro and future-oriented perspective of improving the wage system and enhancing legal stability in the labor field.
(가) Although wages are the most important working condition that must be secured for the guarantee and improvement of employees' basic livelihood, complicated wage systems, in which the names, payment requirements, and payment cycles of allowances, etc. vary widely, are widespread in the labor field, and among the items designated by employers for payments of money or goods, there are some that do not reflect at all the substance of remuneration for work, making it often difficult to discern whether the parties who agreed on remuneration for work have fully exchanged what was agreed. A complexly divided wage system causes confusion and obstacles in determining whether various allowances constitute wages, and further, whether such wages constitute ordinary wages. As a result, it is not easy to determine the scope of ordinary wages, which serves as the basis for calculating statutory allowances such as overtime, night work, and holiday work allowances.
(나) Such a complicated and somewhat deformed wage system places both employers and employees in an unstable legal relationship, seriously undermining legal stability. Even when employees file lawsuits seeking the difference in unpaid wages resulting from the recalculation of ordinary wages, whether their claims are upheld ultimately depends on the final determination of the Supreme Court. Many employees, due to various constraints, are unable even to file a lawsuit seeking payment of statutory allowances calculated on the basis of properly calculated ordinary wages. Employers, too, are similarly in an unstable legal position, in that, depending on the outcome of litigation, they may be required to additionally expend a substantial amount of labor costs that was not originally anticipated. All such instability persists until the Supreme Court renders a determination on the wage character or ordinary wage character of a given benefit item.
(다) Interpreting welfare points, which are paid continuously and regularly and for which the employer bears an obligation to pay under a collective agreement or employment rules, as constituting wages and ordinary wages has the positive effect of promoting the improvement of the wage system and legal stability in the labor field. It must once again be emphasized that this also accords with the purpose of the Labor Standards Act, namely, to seek the balanced development of the national economy through the improvement of working conditions such as wages.
B. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the foregoing legal principles, the welfare points at issue in this case can be said to constitute wages as referred to in the Labor Standards Act.
Furthermore, examining the relevant legal principles and the record, the welfare points at issue in this case constitute ordinary wages, being remuneration for prescribed work that is paid to employees regularly, uniformly, and fixedly.
Ultimately, the judgment below, which reached the same conclusion, contains no error, as asserted in the grounds of appeal, of exceeding the limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of the rules of logic and experience, or of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning wages and ordinary wages under the Labor Standards Act.
For the foregoing reasons, we cannot agree with the majority opinion.
7. Supplementary Opinion to the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kim Seon-su and Justice Kim Sang-hwan
The dissenting opinion, which affirms the wage character and ordinary wage character of the welfare points at issue in this case, is also desirable from the perspective of labor policy aimed at reducing working hours.
A. It is well known that Korean employees work excessively long hours compared to those in advanced countries. By de-wageizing money or goods paid to employees, or excluding them from ordinary wages, employers can save substantially more on labor costs by having existing employees work overtime, rather than hiring new employees, since they need only pay additional wages calculated on the basis of the minimally recognized ordinary wage, even if existing employees work overtime. As a result, the purpose of the statutory additional wage system under the Labor Standards Act—to suppress long working hours by imposing an additional monetary burden on employers, calculated on the basis of ordinary wages, which are the remuneration for prescribed work, with respect to overtime work—fails to function properly. It cannot be denied that part of the responsibility for this state of affairs lies with the fact that the Supreme Court has, for one reason or another, recognized numerous benefit items as excluded from wages or ordinary wages. Because the Supreme Court has readily recognized benefit items as not constituting wages or ordinary wages, employers continue to make efforts to evade the application of the Labor Standards Act.
B. In order to improve this problem, it is necessary to simplify the wage system, such as through a job-based pay system, to clarify the scope of wages and ordinary wages, and to give the parties to the employment relationship an incentive to voluntarily restrain overtime work. Overcoming and improving the current complicated and backward wage system and moving toward reduced working hours are pressing tasks for our society and an irreversible trend. However, by additionally recognizing yet another benefit item as not constituting wages or ordinary wages, the Supreme Court today has failed to respond to these demands of the times.
For the foregoing reasons, we set forth this supplementary opinion to the dissenting opinion.
[Attachment: List of Plaintiffs: omitted]
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justice Cho Hee-dae, Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyeong, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Kim Seon-su (Presiding Reporting Justice), Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Kim Sang-hwan