[Plaintiffs, Appellants]
[Defendant, Appellee] Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission
[Intervenor Assisting the Defendant] Shinpoong Paper Co., Ltd., Attorney Kim Yong-cheol, Counsel
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court, Decision of August 23, 1991, Case No. 90Gu11037
[Order]
The appeals are all dismissed.
The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found the following facts based on the evidence presented: the Plaintiffs were employees of the Intervenor Assisting the Defendant company (hereinafter referred to as "the Intervenor Company"); Plaintiff 1 was the chairman of the labor union of the Intervenor Company, and Plaintiff 2 was a union member. During the wage negotiation process between the Intervenor Company and the labor union concerning the 1989 wage increase, from around March 6, 1989 to around early May of the same year, Plaintiff 1 was detained on May 6 of the same year and indicted for violation of the Labor Dispute Adjustment Act (노동쟁의조정법) and other charges, and Plaintiff 2 was also indicted for the same charges without detention. When Plaintiff 1 was detained, the vice-chairman, a non-party (hereinafter "the Non-party"), became the acting chairman of the union, and on May 25 of the same year, concluded an agreement and a memorandum of agreement (Exhibit A No. 2-1, 2) with the Intervenor Company, which contained provisions regarding matters such as basic pay and other wages, as well as an agreement that both labor and management would withdraw all civil and criminal matters arising between the labor union and the Intervenor Company during the wage negotiation period, that the Intervenor Company would make efforts to ensure that the accused employees, including the Plaintiffs, would not suffer any legal disadvantages, and that even if they were sentenced to imprisonment or a heavier penalty, they would be reinstated to their original positions upon release. At the same time, the labor union apologized to the Intervenor Company for the enormous damage caused by its illegal collective actions during that period and pledged not to engage in illegal collective actions obstructing normal operations in the future (Exhibit B No. 1). Accordingly, the Intervenor Company withdrew all civil and criminal lawsuits, applications, complaints, and accusations against the Plaintiffs, and Plaintiff 1 also withdrew his complaint against the representative director of the Intervenor Company. Thereafter, on August 11 of the same year, the Suwon District Court sentenced Plaintiff 1 to one year of imprisonment for obstruction of business and other charges, and sentenced Plaintiff 2 to ten months of imprisonment, suspended for two years, for obstruction of business and other charges; the sentence against Plaintiff 2 became final, and he was reinstated to his original position at the Intervenor Company around that time. Upon the sentencing of Plaintiff 1 as above, the Intervenor Company, pursuant to Article 23, Paragraph 3 of the collective agreement, which provides that a leave of absence may be ordered during the period a union member is detained, ordered Plaintiff 1 to take a leave of absence as of August 11 of the same year. In response, the union members resolved to intensify their struggle to have the leave-of-absence measure against Plaintiff 1 rescinded, and on September 9 and 10 of the same year, the anniversary of the founding of the Intervenor Company, they collectively submitted holiday leave requests and were absent from work, causing a complete halt in factory operations. Furthermore, on September 30 of the same year, at an extraordinary general meeting held to elect a chairman, with Plaintiff 1 and the aforementioned Non-party as candidates, the Non-party was elected chairman, and in the process, factory operations were halted for seven hours. On October 17 of the same year, the Intervenor Company notified the labor union that the halting of factory operations on September 9, 10, and 30 of that year as described above constituted a violation of the pledge, made at the time of the May 25, 1989 memorandum of agreement, not to obstruct normal operations, and that therefore the exemption agreement—under which the application of Article 16, Paragraph 4 of the collective agreement would be withheld and the Plaintiffs would be reinstated to their original positions even if sentenced to imprisonment or a heavier penalty, as stipulated in the aforementioned agreement and memorandum of agreement—had become void. Subsequently, on the 20th and 24th of the same month, the Intervenor Company convened a personnel committee and resolved to dismiss the Plaintiffs pursuant to Article 16, Paragraph 4 of the collective agreement (concerning persons sentenced to imprisonment or a heavier penalty), which stipulates grounds for dismissal, and on the 26th of the same month, when the Suwon District Court, in the appellate trial, sentenced Plaintiff 1 to one year of imprisonment, suspended for two years, the Intervenor Company dismissed Plaintiff 1 pursuant to Article 16, Paragraph 4 of the collective agreement. Having found these facts, the court below determined that, since the labor union had pledged not to engage in illegal collective actions obstructing the normal operations of the Intervenor Company and had thereby entered into the exemption agreement of May 25, 1989, but thereafter the union members engaged in the illegal industrial actions described above on September 9, 10, and 30 of the same year, and the Intervenor Company rescinded the agreement on the ground of this breach, the agreement was lawfully rendered void; and that even if the agreement had not been rescinded, it would be reasonable to hold that, under the principle of good faith, the Intervenor Company could likewise deny the effect of the portion of the agreement providing that the application of Article 16, Paragraph 4 of the collective agreement would be withheld and that the Plaintiffs would be reinstated to their original positions even if sentenced to imprisonment or a heavier penalty; and therefore the Intervenor Company was entitled to dismiss the Plaintiffs ex officio pursuant to Article 16, Paragraph 4 of the collective agreement, such that the dismissal in this case was lawful, and it could not be found that the dismissal was carried out due to hostility toward the Plaintiffs' legitimate labor union activities or with the intent to destroy the labor union. On these grounds, the court below dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim seeking revocation of the Defendant's retrial decision, which had dismissed the Plaintiffs' application for remedy against unfair labor practices.
Upon examining the process by which the court below weighed the evidence, based on the record, the above factual findings of the court below are acceptable, and it cannot be said that the court below committed any illegality of misapprehending the facts in violation of the rules of evidence, as argued in the grounds of appeal. In light of the above findings, the letter of apology (Exhibit B No. 1) referred to in the grounds of appeal may be regarded, together with the agreement and memorandum of agreement dated May 25, 1989 (Exhibit A No. 2-1, 2), as forming part of the content of the agreement; therefore, the subsequent illegal collective actions committed by the union members, as found by the court below, constituted a breach of the said agreement, and accordingly the Intervenor Company was entitled to rescind the agreement on this ground, and by such rescission, the exemption agreement became void. Accordingly, the Intervenor Company was entitled, pursuant to Article 16, Paragraph 4 of the collective agreement, to dismiss ex officio the Plaintiffs, who had been sentenced to imprisonment or a heavier penalty. The judgment of the court below to the same effect is justified, and the argument that the court below erred in misjudging the nature of the letter of apology or the memorandum of agreement is without merit.
Furthermore, since the dismissal in this case is an ex officio dismissal pursuant to Article 16, Paragraph 4 of the collective agreement, and not a disciplinary dismissal as argued in the grounds of appeal, there was no need to follow the procedures for disciplinary dismissal; therefore, the argument that the dismissal in this case is unlawful for failure to follow the procedures for disciplinary dismissal is also without merit.
Accordingly, all the appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing parties, in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, and it is decided as stated in the Order.
Justice Park Man-ho (Presiding Justice), Park Woo-dong, Kim Sang-won, Yoon Young-cheol