[Plaintiffs, Appellees and Appellants] Plaintiff 1 and 14 others (Attorneys of Myeongin Law Firm, Yoon Jong-hyun and 5 others, as counsel)
[Defendant, Appellant and Appellee] Kumkang Rubber Co., Ltd. (Attorney Kim Kwang-jeong, as counsel)
[Judgment Below] Seoul High Court Decision 99Na48032, decided March 7, 2000
[Order]
Of the judgment below, (1) the portion in which the Defendant lost against Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, Plaintiff 4, Plaintiff 5, Plaintiff 6, Plaintiff 7, Plaintiff 8, and Plaintiff 9, and (2) the portion in which Plaintiff 10, Plaintiff 11, Plaintiff 12, Plaintiff 13, Plaintiff 14, and Plaintiff 15 lost, are each reversed, and this portion of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The Defendant's appeal against Plaintiff 10, Plaintiff 11, Plaintiff 12, Plaintiff 13, Plaintiff 14, and Plaintiff 15, and the appeal by Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, Plaintiff 4, Plaintiff 5, Plaintiff 6, Plaintiff 7, Plaintiff 8, and Plaintiff 9, are each dismissed.
[Reasoning]
1. As to the Defendant's grounds of appeal (with respect to the supplementary grounds of appeal submitted after the deadline, only to the extent they supplement the original grounds)
A. Ground of Appeal No. 6 (concerning Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others)
The court below found, based on undisputed facts and evidence, as follows: the Plaintiffs each joined and later retired from the Defendant company as indicated in Attached List 1 of the judgment below; due to the economic downturn that the Defendant began experiencing from late 1997, the Defendant planned to reduce the number of its nationwide retail stores from 215 to 171 and to have a substantial number of employees retire, including Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 3, Plaintiff 4, Plaintiff 5, Plaintiff 6, Plaintiff 7, Plaintiff 8, and Plaintiff 9 (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others"), who were then working as branch managers; to this end, on March 22, 1998, the Defendant dismissed the above Plaintiffs from their positions as branch managers, and on March 31 of the same year, had the above Plaintiffs each retire by recommendation ("gwongo sajik"), paying them severance pay as indicated in the judgment; however, when the Defendant received an order from the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission to reinstate the above Plaintiffs and pay them wages from the date of the recommended retirement until reinstatement, on the ground that each such recommended retirement constituted unfair dismissal, the Defendant reinstated the above Plaintiffs on June 16, 1998, and then had them retire again; the Defendant paid the above Plaintiffs their base pay, meal allowance, monthly leave allowance, family allowance, and vehicle maintenance allowance during the period from April 1, 1998 (the day after the date of recommended retirement of Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others) until the date the above Plaintiffs retired, namely June 30 of the same year (September 30 of the same year for Plaintiff 9), but did not pay overtime allowance or sales allowance on the ground that the above Plaintiffs had already been removed from their positions and were on standby status before their recommended retirement; and that, prior to their removal from their positions, the above Plaintiffs, while working as branch managers, had been paid overtime allowance for providing overtime work and had also been paid sales allowance every month according to a fixed payment standard through their sales activities as branch managers.
The court below further held, on the premise that the scope of wages a worker may claim during a period of unfair dismissal includes the entirety of wages the worker would have received had he or she continued working, that the removal of the above Plaintiffs from their positions was a preliminary measure taken in order to have the above Plaintiffs retire by recommendation, and that, since the Defendant acknowledged that the recommended retirement of the above Plaintiffs constituted unfair dismissal and complied with the reinstatement order of the Seoul Regional Labor Relations Commission, absent special circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the removal from position was also carried out without justifiable grounds; therefore, it can be fully anticipated that, had the above Plaintiffs not been removed from their positions, they would have continued providing overtime work and engaging in sales activities as branch managers as before, and would have received overtime allowance and sales allowance; accordingly, the court below determined that the Defendant is obligated to pay the above Plaintiffs the overtime allowance and sales allowance that the Defendant would have paid during the period from April 1, 1998 (the day after the date of recommended retirement) to the date of retirement, namely June 30 of the same year (September 30 of the same year for Plaintiff 9).
Where an employer's disposition to have an employee retire is invalid, since the employment relationship continued to be valid during that period notwithstanding, and the employee was unable to provide labor due to a cause attributable to the employer, the employee may claim payment of the entirety of the wages he or she would have received had he or she continued working (see Supreme Court Decision 90Da8763, decided March 31, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 94Da45753, 45760, decided November 21, 1995, etc.); accordingly, the portion of the judgment below holding that, if the recommended retirement of the above Plaintiffs is finally determined to be unfair dismissal and the Defendant reinstated them, the Defendant is obligated to pay the entirety of the wages that the above Plaintiffs would have received during the period in which they were unable to work as a result thereof, is justified.
However, it is difficult to accept the determination of the court below that the removal of the above Plaintiffs from their positions, which occurred prior to the aforementioned recommended retirement, was also carried out without justifiable grounds, and that the Defendant is therefore obligated to pay overtime allowance and sales allowance. As found by the court below, the above Plaintiffs were working as branch managers, and the Defendant reduced the number of its nationwide retail stores from 215 to 171 due to the economic downturn; given this, absent special circumstances, the Defendant would have had no choice but to remove some employees working as branch managers from their branch manager positions; considering this point, together with the fact that retirement and removal from position are separate personnel measures, it cannot be concluded that, merely because the Defendant's act of having the above Plaintiffs retire was unfair, the removal of the above Plaintiffs from their branch manager positions was equally unfair.
Therefore, the court below should have further examined whether the removal of the above Plaintiffs from their positions violated relevant statutes or the Defendant company's internal regulations and was thus an unfair disposition, and, if the removal from position itself was legitimate, whether the above Plaintiffs would have been entitled to receive overtime allowance and sales allowance assuming they worked in a position other than branch manager, and then should have determined whether the Defendant is obligated to pay the above Plaintiffs overtime allowance and sales allowance; however, without reaching this point, and without any clear basis, the court below hastily concluded that the removal from position was unfair as a preliminary measure to have the above Plaintiffs resign, and determined that the Defendant is obligated to pay the above allowances; this constitutes an error in fact-finding regarding the propriety of the removal from position or a misunderstanding of the applicable law, which affected the judgment, and is therefore unlawful.
B. Ground of Appeal No. 2 (concerning Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others)
The court below determined that, since it is undisputed between the parties that Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others accrued annual paid leave in the year prior to their retirement but did not use it before retiring, and that the amount of annual leave allowance (which appears to be used in the sense of annual leave work allowance) payable by the Defendant accordingly is as indicated in Attached List 3 of the judgment below, the Defendant is obligated to pay the above Plaintiffs the amounts indicated in the said list.
The above finding and determination of the court below, based on the Defendant's admission made at the sixth hearing before the court of first instance, are justified, and there is no unlawfulness of the kind alleged in the grounds of appeal in such measure.
C. Ground of Appeal No. 3 (concerning Plaintiff 10, Plaintiff 11, Plaintiff 12, and Plaintiff 13)
A collective bargaining agreement (단체협약) is an agreement concluded between a labor union and an employer or an employer's association concerning working conditions and other matters arising in labor-management relations; where a labor union concludes a collective bargaining agreement with the employer's side that retroactively consents to or approves the existing standards for determining working conditions such as wages, working hours, and severance pay, the effect of such consent or approval arises only with respect to union members or employees who are employed by the business after the collective bargaining agreement takes effect and are subject to the agreement, and there is no room for such effect to arise with respect to employees who had already retired before the conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da34073, decided July 24, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 98Da13747, decided June 9, 2000).
The court below found, based on undisputed facts and evidence, as follows: the 1997 collective bargaining agreement concluded between the Defendant and the Defendant company's labor union on April 14, 1997 provided that bonuses equal to 700% of annual base pay would be paid in five installments per year, namely 150% at Lunar New Year, 200% in April, 100% at summer vacation, 150% at Chuseok, and 100% at year-end, and that the term of validity of the said collective bargaining agreement was set at one year, from May 1, 1997 to April 30, 1998; Plaintiff 10, Plaintiff 11, Plaintiff 12, and Plaintiff 13 retired on April 23 or April 30, 1998; and the base pay of the above Plaintiffs as of around April 1998 was as indicated in the base pay column of Attached List 4(1) of the judgment below; based on these findings, the court below determined that the Defendant is obligated to pay the above Plaintiffs a bonus equal to 200% of the said base pay. The court below further examined the Defendant's argument that, since the 1997 collective bargaining agreement provided that "the Company shall regularly raise wages every April; provided, however, that if the determination is delayed due to a delay in collective bargaining, it shall be applied retroactively," and the 1998 collective bargaining agreement concluded on May 26, 1998 provided that, for the period from April 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999, bonuses of 100% each would be paid at Chuseok and Lunar New Year while the remaining 500% would not be paid due to the Company's business circumstances, and set the term of validity of the said collective bargaining agreement retroactively to the period from April 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999 (one year), preceding the date of conclusion of the agreement, such that the 1998 collective bargaining agreement retroactively applies even to the payment of the bonus for April 1998, and therefore the Defendant has no obligation to pay the above Plaintiffs the bonus for April 1998; the court below rejected this argument of the Defendant on the ground that the 1998 collective bargaining agreement, concluded after the above Plaintiffs had already retired, cannot be retroactively applied to them.
Examining the relevant evidence in the record in light of the legal principle set forth above, the fact-finding of the court below concerning the circumstances of conclusion and the content of the 1997 and 1998 collective bargaining agreements is justified, and even if the 1998 collective bargaining agreement provided that the bonus payment provision would be retroactively applied as of April 1, 1998, and the 1997 collective bargaining agreement provided that subsequent collective bargaining agreements could be retroactively applied, since the 1998 collective bargaining agreement cannot be retroactively applied to the above Plaintiffs who had already retired before its conclusion, the bonus provision of the 1997 collective bargaining agreement continues to apply to the above Plaintiffs; the determination of the court below to the same effect is therefore also justified. There is no unlawfulness in the court below's measure, such as an error in calculating the bonus due to a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning the effect of a collective bargaining agreement, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
D. Grounds of Appeal Nos. 1 and 4 (concerning all Plaintiffs)
The court below found, based on evidence, as follows: under the Defendant's family allowance regulations, a monthly family allowance is paid for a spouse who has no taxable income requiring year-end tax settlement under tax law and for up to two children under the age of 20, in the amount of KRW 20,000 for a spouse and KRW 10,000 per child; under the Defendant's vehicle management regulations, a vehicle maintenance allowance is paid to employees who have acquired a vehicle registered in their own name and hold a rank of Level 2-A or higher, in the amount of KRW 100,000 per month for a section chief (Level 2-A), KRW 150,000 per month for a deputy department head (Level 1-B), and KRW 200,000 per month for a department head (Level 1-A), and that, as of 1998, each of these amounts was increased by KRW 50,000; however, in actual practice, the Defendant paid a fixed amount uniformly according to rank to employees of section-chief rank and above, regardless of whether they actually owned a vehicle. Based on these findings, the court below included the family allowance and vehicle maintenance allowance received by the Plaintiffs in the average wage and used it as the basis for calculating the Plaintiffs' severance pay.
Examining the relevant evidence in the record, the fact-finding of the court below concerning the payment of family allowance and vehicle maintenance allowance is deemed justified. Furthermore, if a family allowance has been uniformly paid to employees who meet certain requirements, this is not a discretionary or gratuitous payment but constitutes wages having the character of remuneration for labor (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 93Da26168, decided July 11, 1995, etc.); and as for vehicle maintenance allowance, if it was paid on condition of vehicle ownership or was paid to subsidize the costs necessary for using an employee's personally owned vehicle for business purposes, it is in the nature of reimbursement of actual expenses and cannot be regarded as paid as remuneration for labor, but if it was paid uniformly to all employees or uniformly based on a certain rank, it may be regarded as paid as remuneration for labor (see Supreme Court Decision 96Da33037, 33044, decided October 24, 1997, etc.); accordingly, the measure of the court below in including the family allowance and vehicle maintenance allowance received by the Plaintiffs in the average wage is also justified. There is no unlawfulness in the calculation of average wage due to a misunderstanding of the nature of family allowance or vehicle maintenance allowance, as alleged.
E. Ground of Appeal No. 5 (concerning Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others)
The court below found that Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others received severance pay from the Defendant at the time of their recommended retirement on March 31, 1998, and did not separately receive severance pay upon their retirement on June 30 or September 30, 1998; having determined the amount of allowances and severance pay payable by the Defendant to Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others, the court below examined the Defendant's defense of set-off, which was premised on the argument that, if the recommended retirement of Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others constitutes dismissal without justifiable cause and is therefore invalid, the above Plaintiffs are obligated to return to the Defendant the amount obtained by deducting the legitimate severance pay amount receivable upon their retirement on June 30 or September 30, 1998 from the severance pay amount already received in connection with the recommended retirement, and that the Defendant seeks to set off its claim for such return against the above Plaintiffs' claims for the above allowances, etc. The court below rejected this defense of set-off, holding that the reason the amount of severance pay already paid to the above Plaintiffs on April 30, 1998 in connection with the recommended retirement exceeds the legitimate severance pay amount that the above Plaintiffs would be entitled to receive upon their retirement on June 30 or September 30, 1998, is that the Defendant, in a gesture of comfort toward the above Plaintiffs' recommended retirement, gratuitously included a bonus (포상금) in the average wage used to calculate severance pay; therefore, this constitutes payment of a non-existent obligation ("bichae byeonje") under Article 742 of the Civil Act (민법), and the return of the excess portion cannot be claimed; accordingly, the Defendant's defense of set-off, premised on the Defendant having a claim for return of the said excess portions against the above Plaintiffs, is without merit.
However, the severance pay that the Defendant paid to the above Plaintiffs on April 30, 1998 should be regarded as having been paid in the belief that the recommended retirement of the above Plaintiffs was valid, and there are no circumstances suggesting that, even if the above Plaintiffs had not followed the Defendant's recommendation to retire and had instead retired later, the Defendant would have calculated and paid severance pay in the same manner at such a high amount; therefore, if the above Plaintiffs filed a petition with the Labor Relations Commission asserting that the recommended retirement constituted unfair dismissal, and the Defendant accepted the Labor Relations Commission's decision and reinstated the above Plaintiffs, then the above Plaintiffs are obligated to return to the Defendant the entire amount of severance pay received, including the amount having the character of consolation money for the recommended retirement; furthermore, even if the above Plaintiffs subsequently retired lawfully, the portion of the severance pay received that exceeds the legitimate severance pay amount must be returned; accordingly, when the above Plaintiffs claim various allowances, etc. in addition to severance pay, the Defendant is permitted to set off such a claim for return of the excess severance pay as an automatic claim (자동채권).
Nevertheless, the court below rejected the Defendant's defense of set-off on the ground that the amount obtained by deducting the legitimate severance pay that the above Plaintiffs should have received from the severance pay already paid by the Defendant was paid gratuitously and constitutes payment of a non-existent obligation under Article 742 of the Civil Act; this constitutes a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning restitution of unjust enrichment, which affected the judgment, and is therefore unlawful.
2. As to the Plaintiffs' grounds of appeal
A. As to the portion of the judgment below in which Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others lost, no grounds of objection are stated in the appellate brief.
B. As to the grounds of appeal of Plaintiff 10, Plaintiff 11, Plaintiff 12, Plaintiff 13, Plaintiff 14, and Plaintiff 15
Regarding the above Plaintiffs' argument that the so-called bonus (포상금) that the Defendant had been paying to employees should also be included in the average wage forming the basis for the calculation of severance pay, the court below found, based on evidence, as follows: since the sale of gift certificates accounted for an absolute proportion of the Defendant's sales, the Defendant paid a certain percentage as an individual bonus to employees who sold gift certificates, a certain percentage as a department bonus to departments, and a certain percentage as an individual bonus and department bonus to the bond team, and separately operated an incentive program selecting employees with especially excellent sales performance to reward them with overseas trips, domestic trips, or products of considerable value; sales performance in gift certificate sales was also significantly reflected in personnel evaluations, such that the Defendant's employees strove to sell gift certificates not only outside working hours but also during working hours, and were paid a bonus at a certain rate according to their gift certificate sales amount; however, the timing of bonus payment was not fixed, being made around December in 1995, around May and December in 1996, around May in 1997, and around January in 1998, and the amount of the bonus was determined according to a rate applied to the sales performance amount, which the Defendant unilaterally determined as needed; there is no provision concerning the above bonus in the Defendant's collective bargaining agreement or employment rules, nor is there any labor-management agreement concerning it; furthermore, most of the Defendant's employees tended to use the bonus for purposes related to the Defendant's business rather than for personal purposes, and the Defendant did not include the bonus in the average wage when calculating severance pay, except that, around March 1998, only in having a total of 52 branch-manager-level employees, including Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others, retire by recommendation, did the Defendant grant the benefit of a consolation payment corresponding to honorable retirement treatment and, in the spirit of the Company's consideration for long-term service, include one year's worth of bonus in the average wage for the purpose of calculating severance pay. Based on these findings, the court below determined that, in order for a bonus to constitute wages as remuneration for labor, it must be paid regularly and continuously by the Defendant to employees, and moreover the amount paid must be fixed or at least predetermined according to a certain standard; however, since the above bonus was paid according to a timing and rate of payment amount that the Defendant unilaterally determined as needed each time, it does not have the character of wages but is a benefit gratuitously paid at the discretion of the Defendant as employer; accordingly, it is reasonable to hold that the above bonus is not included in the average wage forming the basis for calculating the above Plaintiffs' severance pay, and thereby rejected the above Plaintiffs' argument.
However, the total amount of wages forming the basis for calculating average wage includes all money and valuables paid by the employer to the employee as remuneration for labor, paid continuously and regularly, and for the payment of which the employer is obligated under a collective bargaining agreement, employment rules, etc., regardless of its name; that the employer is obligated to pay money and valuables having the character of remuneration for labor means that the employer cannot arbitrarily decide whether to make such payment; and the basis for such payment obligation may be a collective bargaining agreement, employment rules, remuneration regulations, or an employment contract, or it may be a labor practice, such as where payment has been continuously made in accordance with the employer's policy or practice, forming a custom to the extent that both labor and management regard such payment as a matter of course (see Supreme Court Decision 96Nu15084, decided May 28, 1997, etc.). Although the bonus in this case was not paid by the Defendant every year at the same time and at the same rate, but rather according to the timing, amount, and standard of payment unilaterally determined by the Defendant, since the sale of gift certificates was a business area that the Defendant, whose main business is the sale of footwear products, placed emphasis on, the sales activities that employees engaged in for the sale of gift certificates can be regarded as ultimately part of the labor provided to the Defendant, and thus the bonus should be regarded as paid as remuneration for labor; according to the materials appearing in the record, it can be seen that, although the timing of bonus payment differed from year to year, it became customary for such payment to be made once or twice each year, and therefore it cannot be regarded as an incidental or one-time payment; moreover, since the Defendant determined the payment standard and payment rate in advance each year and paid the bonus calculated accordingly, if employees achieved performance meeting the requirements, the Defendant could not refuse to pay the bonus corresponding to such performance, and therefore it cannot be regarded as a gratuitous benefit either; furthermore, even if most employees used the bonus for purposes related to their work, since there is no material showing that the Defendant required the bonus to be used only for work-related purposes, the use thereof was left to the discretion of the employees, and such circumstances do not negate the character of the bonus as part of the average wage; accordingly, even if the department bonus, or the reward of trips or products given by selecting only a certain number of employees, among the bonuses paid by the Defendant, is not paid individually or is merely a gratuitous benefit and thus cannot be included in the average wage, the individual bonus must be held to be included in the average wage.
Nevertheless, the court below did not include the bonus in the average wage on the ground that it does not have the character of wages but is a gratuitously paid benefit; this constitutes a misunderstanding of the legal principles concerning average wage, which affected the judgment, and is therefore unlawful.
3. Therefore, the portion of the judgment below in which the Defendant lost against Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others (see Paragraphs 1.A and 1.E above) and the portion in which Plaintiff 10, Plaintiff 11, Plaintiff 12, Plaintiff 13, Plaintiff 14, and Plaintiff 15 lost (see Paragraph 2.B above) are each reversed, and this portion of the case is remanded to the court below for further examination and determination; the Defendant's appeal against Plaintiff 10, Plaintiff 11, Plaintiff 12, Plaintiff 13, Plaintiff 14, and Plaintiff 15, and the appeal of Plaintiff 1 and the 9 others, are each dismissed. This judgment is rendered as stated in the Order, by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision.
Justice Yoo Ji-dam (Presiding Justice), Cho Mu-je, Kang Shin-wook, Son Ji-yeol (Justice in Charge)