[Appellant (Petitioner)] Hyundai Precision Industries Co., Ltd. Labor Union and 5 others
Litigation Counsel for the Appellants: Attorney Yoon In-seop
[Lower Court Decision] Busan High Court Decision 93Ra30 dated February 28, 1994
[Order]
All of the special appeals are dismissed.
[Reasoning]
The grounds for special appeal are examined.
1. Judgment on Ground 1
The petitioners stated at the first hearing date of the first instance (June 13, 1993) that they did not dispute the fact that Non-party 1 affixed his signature and fingerprint to the wage agreement (effective from June 1, 1993 to May 31, 1994). Moreover, in light of the entries in Evidence No. 4 submitted by the respondent and the statement of reference witness Non-party 2, the statement of Non-party 3 alone is insufficient to establish that the said wage agreement was forged, and there is no other prima facie evidence to establish this. Furthermore, according to the record, the said Non-party 1, as the representative of the petitioner union, continued negotiations with the respondent company regarding the wage agreement, and since the resulting wage agreement also indicates and records him as the representative of the petitioner union in the designation of the parties to the agreement, the said wage agreement must be viewed as having been executed by the said Non-party 1 not in his individual capacity but in his capacity as the representative of the petitioner union. Even if the court below found that negotiations broke down on June 4, 1993, and yet also found that there was a wage agreement dated the same day, this is merely a statement to the effect that, although negotiations had once broken down, an agreement came into existence in outward form, and setting aside the question of whether that agreement is valid or invalid, this cannot be regarded as a contradiction in reasoning. Accordingly, the decision of the court below, which judged to the same effect, is acceptable, and it cannot be said that there is an error of misapprehension of facts or contradiction in reasoning as argued. Therefore, this ground is without merit.
2. Judgment on Ground 2
The main text of Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Trade Union Act (노동조합법) provides that "the representative of a trade union or a person delegated by the trade union has the authority to negotiate with the employer or employer's association on behalf of the trade union or its members regarding matters such as the conclusion of a collective agreement." The "authority to negotiate" under this provision includes, in addition to the factual act of collective bargaining, the authority to conclude a collective agreement based on the results of the negotiation (see this Court's en banc Decision 91Nu12257 dated April 27, 1993). First, as to who holds the authority to negotiate the collective agreement in this case, absent special circumstances, the party with negotiating authority under the Trade Union Act is interpreted to be only the representative of the trade union. Furthermore, according to the record, under the petitioner union's bylaws (as amended on December 8, 1992, and in effect at the time the wage agreement was concluded, record pp. 252-263), the trade union is the party to collective bargaining and the chairperson is in charge of negotiations (Article 60); the collective bargaining committee members are recommended and elected at the delegates' assembly and shall number five or more including the chairperson (Article 61); and the authority to negotiate the collective agreement belongs to the chairperson, and all bargaining committee members shall jointly sign after resolution by the delegates' assembly (Article 63). Thus, the bylaws provide only for the negotiating authority of the chairperson and contain no provision whatsoever regarding the negotiating authority of the bargaining committee members. In light of the foregoing, the party with negotiating authority on the side of the petitioner union must be limited to the said Non-party 1, the chairperson of the petitioner union, alone, and the remaining bargaining committee members must be regarded merely as persons who factually assist the said Non-party 1 in exercising the above authority. Therefore, even if the said Non-party 1 unilaterally concluded the negotiations, disregarding the opinions of the remaining bargaining committee members, and alone executed the said wage agreement, this may raise a separate question of the said Non-party 1's criminal liability and liability under the union bylaws, but it cannot be said that the wage agreement thereby becomes invalid. Furthermore, the purpose of the Trade Union Act's provision requiring that a collective agreement be reduced to writing and signed and sealed by both parties is to clarify the parties to the agreement and to confirm the final intent of the parties, thereby ensuring the authenticity and clarity of the collective agreement, in consideration of the fact that the labor relations governed by a collective agreement are collective and continuous in nature. Even if a signature and fingerprint were affixed in lieu of a signature and seal on the collective agreement, this cannot be deemed to render it invalid. Accordingly, the decision of the court below, which judged to this effect and found that there was no right to be preserved in this case, is justified and acceptable, and it cannot be said that there is an error of misapprehension of the law regarding the authority to negotiate and conclude a collective agreement, or an error of misapprehension of the law regarding the representation in collective bargaining and the form of a collective agreement, as argued. Therefore, this ground is without merit.
3. Judgment on Ground 3
This case seeks to suspend the effect of the wage agreement concluded between the respondent and the petitioner union as of June 4, 1993, and by its nature constitutes a provisional disposition to determine a provisional status. Such a provisional disposition to determine a provisional status is intended to temporarily confer upon the petitioner the status of a rights-holder before the rights are finally determined, for the purpose of preventing a present danger of significant harm or imminent compulsion arising in connection with a disputed legal relationship, and requires, as a conceptual element, the existence of a disputed legal relationship. However, the said collective agreement, whose effect the petitioners seek to temporarily suspend, is one whose effect arises only until May 31, 1994 (or, even assuming no new collective agreement is concluded, until August 31 of the same year). Since the said collective agreement has already lost its effect, it cannot be deemed that the above requirement has been satisfied, and moreover, there can be no said necessity for preservation to suspend its effect. Accordingly, the decision of the court below, which judged to the same effect, is justified and acceptable, and it cannot be said that there is an error of misapprehension of the law regarding the necessity for preservation, as argued. Therefore, this ground is also without merit.
Accordingly, the decision of the court below dismissing the petition for provisional disposition in this case is justified, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the participating Justices, dismissing all of the special appeals.
Supreme Court Justice Kim Seok-su (Presiding Justice)
Justice Jeong Gwi-ho
Justice Lee Don-hee (Justice in Charge)
Justice Lee Im-su