[Defendant] Defendant 1 and 1 other
[Appellant] The Defendants and the Prosecutor
[Defense Counsel] Attorney Kim Yeon-su and 1 other
[Judgment Below] Daejeon District Court Decision 99No816, decided November 19, 1999
[Order]
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Daejeon District Court.
[Reasoning]
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. As to the Prosecutor's Grounds of Appeal
A. Summary of the Facts Charged
The summary of the charge of obstruction of business, of which the court below acquitted the Defendants, is as follows: "Defendant 1, as Vice-Chairperson of the Labor Union (hereinafter referred to as the 'Union') of the Korea Minting and Security Printing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation'), and Defendant 2, as the Union's Organization Department Head, (1) Defendant 1, having received action guidelines from the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (hereinafter referred to as the 'KCTU') to wage a struggle against the government, conspired with union members to do so, and from around 13:00 to around 18:00 on July 15, 1998, and from around 13:00 to around 16:00 on July 16, 1998, caused union members to go on strike and to participate in the rallies hosted by the KCTU titled "Rally to Oppose Unilateral Restructuring, etc. in the Public Finance Sector" held respectively in front of Daejeon Station in Daejeon and in front of Daegu Department Store in Daegu, thereby obstructing the business of the Corporation by the force of a multitude (hereinafter referred to as the 'First Strike'); and (2) although industrial action may only be conducted for the maintenance and improvement of working conditions, and the Corporation's plan to consolidate the Okcheon Minting Plant into the Gyeongsan Minting Plant (hereinafter referred to as the 'Plant Consolidation'), which the Corporation intended to implement as part of its restructuring, was a matter concerning the management of the Corporation and thus not a proper subject of industrial action, the Defendants conspired with union members to conduct a strike for the purpose of forcing the withdrawal of the Plant Consolidation plan, and caused union members to go on strike on 18 occasions from around 08:00 on November 25, 1998 to around 20:30 on January 6, 1999, and held rallies opposing the Plant Consolidation in front of the Corporation's head office and elsewhere, thereby obstructing the business of the Corporation by the force of a multitude (hereinafter referred to as the 'Second Strike')."
B. Judgment of the Court Below
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below (1) found the facts as stated in its judgment with respect to the First Strike, and then determined that each act of industrial action was conducted while the Union, having demanded a wage increase from the Corporation around February 1998 and having commenced collective bargaining with the Corporation, had engaged in six rounds of collective bargaining up to June 8 of the same year without concluding a collective agreement, and thus each act of industrial action was aimed at the improvement of wages, which constitute working conditions, in connection with the collective bargaining; and that there was no evidence to find that, upon receiving action guidelines from the KCTU to wage a general strike against the government, each act of industrial action was in fact intended, taking advantage of the breakdown of collective bargaining, to strengthen solidarity with the KCTU and wage a struggle against the government, such that its main or true purpose was not the maintenance or improvement of wages and other working conditions but rather the struggle against the government, and that the industrial action would not have been conducted but for such struggle against the government; therefore, the court below concluded that the purpose of each act of industrial action was legitimate. (2) With respect to the Second Strike, the court below found the facts as stated in its judgment, and then determined as follows: (a) each act of industrial action was conducted while the Union and the Corporation had failed to reach agreement in the collective bargaining that had commenced around February 1998 and a collective agreement had not been concluded; the Plant Consolidation, which the Union opposed at the time of each act of industrial action, was newly announced by the Corporation during the course of the ongoing collective bargaining after it had proposed wage and personnel expense cuts as part of its bargaining proposal but failed to reach agreement with the Union; and in light of the fact that collective bargaining continued even after the Corporation announced the Plant Consolidation plan, the mere fact that the Union opposed the Plant Consolidation at the time of each act of industrial action cannot be deemed to mean that the purpose of each act of industrial action differed from that of the preceding collective bargaining or industrial action, and each act of industrial action, like the preceding collective bargaining and industrial action, was still aimed at the improvement of wages, which constitute working conditions; (b) further, since the Plant Consolidation would inevitably entail changes in working conditions such as the dismissal of workers and changes in place of work, and since, under the collective agreement in effect at the time of each act of industrial action, the Corporation was obligated to reach prior "agreement" with the Union in the case of dismissal due to abolition of position or surplus personnel resulting from reorganization of the organizational structure and staffing or reduction of budget for unavoidable management reasons, the Union's conduct of each act of industrial action in opposition to the Plant Consolidation was aimed at jointly preventing dismissal and other disadvantageous changes in working conditions that would inevitably follow from the Plant Consolidation, by asserting its position that it could not reach such agreement on a matter that had to be decided by agreement with the Union; and this purpose of opposing dismissal, pursued together with the improvement of wages as a working condition, was likewise legitimate; and (c) furthermore, even if the Union's opposition to the Plant Consolidation constituted an excessive demand that the Corporation could not accept, this was a matter to be adjusted at the stage of collective bargaining, and the mere fact that the Union made such an excessive demand cannot render the purpose of each act of industrial action unlawful; accordingly, the court below reversed the judgment of the first instance, which had found the Defendants guilty of the charges relating to the First and Second Strikes, and rendered a verdict of acquittal.
C. Judgment of the Supreme Court
However, the above fact-finding and determination by the court below cannot be accepted.
(1) Whether to implement corporate restructuring, such as layoffs for managerial reasons or consolidation of business organizations, is a matter that falls within the highly discretionary managerial decision of the management entity, and in principle cannot be a subject of collective bargaining; and unless there are special circumstances, such as the restructuring being pursued with improper intent without urgent managerial necessity or reasonable grounds, if a labor union substantially engages in industrial action for the purpose of opposing the implementation itself, then even though changes in the workers' status or working conditions inevitably accompany such implementation, the legitimacy of the purpose of such industrial action cannot be recognized. Meanwhile, where industrial action pursues multiple purposes and some of them are improper, the propriety of the purpose of the industrial action must be determined based on the propriety of the main or true purpose, and where it is found that the industrial action would not have been conducted had the improper demands been excluded, the entire industrial action must be deemed to lack legitimacy (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Nu5204, decided January 21, 1992).
(2) First, as to the First Strike, examination of the record reveals that, while the Union outwardly put forward a wage negotiation proposal and conducted collective bargaining with the Corporation while refraining from striking, it in fact initiated each act of industrial action in line with the KCTU's general strike guidelines and schedule; and according to various leaflets published by the Union (Union bulletins, action guidelines, etc.) submitted by the prosecutor, it can be seen that, in order to force the withdrawal of the government's unilateral restructuring policy, the Union kept pace with the KCTU's struggle policy and schedule, while putting forward the wage negotiation proposal merely in order to conduct the industrial action within a legally permissible framework (according to the intelligence and rally trend reports prepared by the police and labor authorities, the rallies attended by union members at the time of each act of industrial action were rallies hosted by the KCTU, in which not only members of the Corporation's Union but also members of the labor unions of Daedong Industrial, Hyundai Asan, the Medical Insurance Cooperative, and Korea Telecom jointly participated in solidarity, and at that gathering Defendant 1 delivered a struggle speech stating, "Let us unite with the KCTU and fight against the current government's layoff policy"). Considering comprehensively the circumstances leading up to such industrial action and the situation at the time of the industrial action, it is evident that the early conclusion of wage negotiations, which the Union put forward at the time of the industrial action, was merely a subsidiary purpose to legitimize the industrial action, and that the main purpose of the industrial action was the struggle against the government to oppose the government's layoff policy; in light of the aforementioned legal principle, such industrial action lost legitimacy as to its purpose.
Nevertheless, the court below reversed the judgment of the first instance, which had found the Defendants guilty of this part of the charge, on the ground that the purpose of the said industrial action was legitimate, and rendered a verdict of acquittal; this constitutes an error of misapprehending the facts in violation of the rules of evidence, which affected the judgment, and the prosecutor's ground of appeal pointing this out is well-founded.
(3) Next, as to the Second Strike, examination of the record reveals that the Planning and Budget Committee under the government prepared, around May 1998, a management innovation plan including the Plant Consolidation of the Corporation as part of the restructuring of public corporations; that the Corporation, in an attempt to avert this through a 50% reduction in personnel expenses, negotiated with the Planning and Budget Committee while explaining these circumstances to the Union and persuading it to accept the Corporation's wage negotiation proposal, but the Union persistently insisted only on its previous unreasonable wage negotiation proposal, which the Corporation could not accept; that ultimately, on August 4 of the same year, the Planning and Budget Committee finalized and announced the Corporation's restructuring plan, which included completion of the Plant Consolidation by 2001; that the Corporation, being an entity wholly funded by the government, having reached a stage where agreement on wage negotiations with the Union was impossible, resolved on October 2, 1998 to adopt a restructuring plan for early completion of the Plant Consolidation by March 1999; and that, following this, the Union, which had continued collective bargaining without any particular strike since the strike of July 16 of the same year, suddenly resorted to industrial action. Furthermore, according to the various leaflets published by the Union referenced above, it can be seen that the Union instructed its members to go on strike if the Corporation failed to accept the Union's demands, namely "nullification of the Plant Consolidation" and "withdrawal of disciplinary action against union officials," by November 24 of the same year, and to go into an immediate strike even before that date if the Corporation forcibly proceeded with removal of equipment for the Plant Consolidation (according to the aforementioned intelligence and rally trend reports, at the strike of November 26 of the same year, Non-Indicted Person, the Head of the Union's ○○ Branch, delivered a struggle speech stating, "Let us exert pressure on the county governor and the National Assembly member to obtain a firm commitment to block the Plant Consolidation," and at the strike of November 28 of the same year, Defendant 1 delivered an opening address stating, "Our struggle is not against wage cuts but against the Plant Consolidation"). Considering comprehensively the circumstances leading up to such industrial action and the situation at the time of the industrial action, it can be amply recognized that the main purpose of the industrial action constituting the Second Strike in this case was to achieve nullification of the Plant Consolidation of the Corporation being pursued as part of the restructuring of government-affiliated public corporations, and it is clear that the court below's fact-finding that the purpose of the industrial action was also the improvement of wages and other working conditions was erroneous in violation of the rules of evidence.
If so, then, absent special circumstances such as that the Corporation's policy of early implementation of the Plant Consolidation was decided without managerial necessity or reasonable grounds, the purpose of the Second Strike likewise cannot be recognized as legitimate under the legal principle set forth above.
Meanwhile, the court below determined that, since the collective agreement in effect at the time of the said industrial action provided that the Corporation was obligated to reach prior "agreement" with the Union even in cases of layoffs for managerial reasons, this industrial action was intended to assert the position that such agreement could not be reached, and thus its purpose could be recognized as legitimate. However, where there exists a provision in a collective agreement stipulating that the employer shall "agree" with the labor union in deciding or implementing a matter that falls within the essence of managerial rights and thus cannot be a subject of collective bargaining, one should not readily find, by focusing solely on that provision, a partial waiver or material restriction of the employer's managerial rights; rather, the meaning of "agreement" as stated in that provision must be interpreted by comprehensively examining the circumstances and situation under which such collective agreement was concluded, its relationship with other provisions of the collective agreement, and whether, based on the principle that responsibility accompanies authority, the labor union also shares responsibility for management. According to the record, Article 28, Item 3 of the collective agreement concluded between the Corporation and the Union, which was in effect at the time of each act of industrial action, provides: "In the case of dismissal of employees due to layoffs for managerial reasons or consolidation of business organizations, prior agreement shall be reached with the Union." However, Article 21 of the same collective agreement provides: "In the event of organizational restructuring or changes in staffing of the Corporation, the Corporation shall consult in good faith with the Union in advance," and Article 22, Paragraph 1 provides: "The Corporation shall establish and operate a rational and fair personnel system so as to ensure fairness in the personnel management of employees; provided, however, that if the Union has an objection to the result of personnel decisions, it may submit its opinion." In light of these provisions, and considering that, at the time the said collective agreement was concluded, the Corporation was a public corporation wholly funded by the government and was not in a situation where it could set a policy of having labor and management jointly manage the Corporation by sharing even managerial responsibility with the labor union, as well as the circumstances and situation under which the collective agreement was concluded and the overall structure and content of the collective agreement, it is reasonable to interpret Article 28, Item 3 of the said collective agreement not as meaning that prior consent of the Union is an absolute requirement for the Corporation to make managerial decisions such as layoffs, but rather as embodying the intent of "consultation," whereby the Corporation gives the Union an opportunity to present necessary opinions in advance regarding the criteria for dismissal, etc., and the Corporation is to give sincere consideration to the Union's opinions, thereby ensuring the rationality and fairness of the restructuring. Therefore, in this case, where, as noted in the facts set forth above, the Corporation made repeated efforts to persuade the Union of the unavoidability of the Plant Consolidation and to consult with it regarding the resulting dismissal issues, but the Union nonetheless proceeded with industrial action while insisting solely on nullification of the Plant Consolidation, the legitimacy of the purpose of this industrial action cannot be conferred by the provision of Article 28, Item 3 of the said collective agreement either.
2. Judgment on the Defendants' Appeal
The Defendants also appealed against the judgment below; however, since the petition of appeal contains no statement whatsoever regarding the grounds of appeal, and since the Defendants and their defense counsel failed to submit a brief stating the grounds of appeal within the statutory period, the Defendants' appeals cannot all be accepted.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the acquitted portion of the judgment below cannot avoid reversal, and while the Defendants' appeal against the guilty portion is without merit, since each of the offenses found guilty by the court below and each of the offenses of which it rendered a verdict of acquittal are in a relationship of concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act (형법), the entire judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. This judgment is rendered as set forth in the Order by the unanimous opinion of the Justices participating in the decision.
Justice Park Jae-yun (Presiding Justice), Seo Seong, Lee Yong-woo (Justice in charge), Bae Ki-won