[Plaintiff, Appellee]
[Defendant, Appellant] Geosung Unsu Limited Partnership Company (Attorney-in-Fact: Daelim & Aju Law Firm (LLC), Attorneys Kim Jeong-ho and 2 others)
[Judgment Below] Uijeongbu District Court Judgment 2015. 12. 24., Case No. 2014Na4850
[Order]
All appeals are dismissed. The costs of the appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.
[Reasoning] The grounds of appeal (to the extent that the supplementary appellate brief submitted after the deadline for submitting the grounds of appeal supplements the grounds of appeal) are examined.
1. Course of the Case
A. The Defendant is a limited partnership company (합자회사) engaged in the general taxi transportation business, and the Plaintiffs are taxi-driving employees hired by the Defendant who work on an alternating-day system.
B. The Plaintiffs were paid wages under the so-called fixed-quota system (정액사납금제), whereby they paid the Defendant only a fixed amount out of the transportation revenue in the name of a quota (사납금), kept the remaining transportation revenue (hereinafter "excess transportation revenue") for themselves, and received a certain fixed wage from the Defendant.
C. Article 6(5) of the Minimum Wage Act (최저임금법), as amended by Act No. 8964 on March 21, 2008 (hereinafter "the special provision at issue"), took effect from July 1, 2010 in the Paju City area where the Defendant is located, excluding "wages based on output" from the scope of wages included in the minimum wage.
D. On July 29, 2010 and October 27, 2010, the Defendant amended its rules of employment (취업규칙) with the consent of a majority of its taxi-driving employees, sequentially shortening the prescribed working hours even though there was no change in the actual work pattern or operating hours (hereinafter the amended rules of employment are referred to as the "First Amended Rules of Employment" and the "Second Amended Rules of Employment," respectively, and the rules of employment prior to amendment as the "Former Rules of Employment"). As a result, the prescribed working hours were shortened from 209 hours per month to 115 hours per month in the case of the alternating-day system.
E. The Plaintiffs asserted that the provisions on prescribed working hours in the First and Second Amended Rules of Employment, which merely reduced the prescribed working hours without any change in actual working hours, were void as an act in circumvention (탈법행위) of the Minimum Wage Act, including the special provision at issue, and filed the instant lawsuit seeking payment of wages falling short of the minimum wage amount calculated based on the prescribed working hours under the Former Rules of Employment.
F. The court below accepted the Plaintiffs' argument on this point and rendered a judgment partially in the Plaintiffs' favor, and the Defendant appealed against this, filing the instant appeal.
2. Relevant Provisions and Main Issues of the Case
A. Relevant Provisions
Article 32(1) of the Constitution (헌법) provides that "the State shall... implement a minimum wage system as prescribed by law," establishing the implementation of the minimum wage system as an obligation of the State. Based on this constitutional provision, the Minimum Wage Act was enacted "for the purpose of contributing to the sound development of the national economy by guaranteeing workers a minimum level of wages, thereby stabilizing workers' livelihoods and improving the quality of labor" (Article 1).
The former Minimum Wage Act (before amendment by Act No. 15666 on June 12, 2018, hereinafter "the former Minimum Wage Act") provides in Article 6(1) that "an employer shall pay wages not less than the minimum wage amount to workers subject to the minimum wage," and in Article 6(3) that "any portion of a labor contract between a worker subject to the minimum wage and an employer that sets wages below the minimum wage amount shall be void, and in such case, the void portion shall be deemed to have been agreed to pay wages equal to the minimum wage amount prescribed by this Act." This is intended to compel employers to pay workers not less than the minimum wage amount set by the State and, further, to directly recognize a worker's right to claim wages for the difference where wages fall short of the minimum wage.
Article 6(4) of the former Minimum Wage Act and, pursuant to its delegation, [Attached Table 1] of Article 2 of the former Enforcement Rules of the Minimum Wage Act (최저임금법 시행규칙) (before amendment by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor No. 240 on December 31, 2018) prescribe the scope of wages not included in wages under Article 6(1) of the former Minimum Wage Act. However, the special provision at issue, as an exception to Article 6(4) of the former Minimum Wage Act which sets the scope of wages for application of the minimum wage to ordinary workers (hereinafter "comparison wages"), provides that "notwithstanding paragraph (4), the scope of wages included in the minimum wage for workers engaged in driving duties in the general taxi transportation business under Article 3 of the Passenger Transport Service Act (여객자동차 운수사업법) and Article 3, item 2, (c) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, shall be wages prescribed by Presidential Decree excluding wages based on output." The special provision at issue thus excludes wages based on output from comparison wages, limited to taxi-driving workers.
B. Main Issues of the Case
1) Before the special provision at issue took effect, under the fixed-quota system, excess transportation revenue, being wages based on output, could be included in comparison wages in addition to the fixed wage. However, with the enforcement of the special provision at issue, excess transportation revenue could no longer be included in comparison wages, and accordingly employers had to pay wages not less than the minimum wage amount solely with the fixed wage, making the amount of the fixed wage itself significant. Meanwhile, an employer, instead of increasing the fixed wage included in comparison wages in order to pay wages not less than the minimum wage amount, could avoid falling short of the publicly announced hourly minimum wage amount by reducing the prescribed working hours, thereby raising the hourly fixed wage calculated based on the prescribed working hours.
2) The main issue in this case is whether, following the enforcement of the special provision at issue, a provision of the rules of employment amended, with the consent of a majority of the workers, to shorten only the prescribed working hours—without any change in actual work pattern or operating hours—with the intent of avoiding a shortfall of the fixed wage below the minimum wage under the fixed-quota system, is valid.
3. Whether the Provision of the Rules of Employment Shortening the Prescribed Working Hours Is Valid
A. The former Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) (before amendment by Act No. 15513 on March 20, 2018), while regulating standard working hours by providing that working hours per week, excluding rest periods, shall not exceed 40 hours, and working hours per day shall not exceed 8 hours (Article 50(1) and (2)), defines prescribed working hours as the working hours agreed upon between a worker and an employer within the scope of such standard working hours (Article 2(1)(vii)).
A worker bears an obligation to work during the agreed prescribed working hours, and the employer pays wages for the performance of such work obligation; the employer and worker may, in principle, freely agree on the prescribed working hours as long as they do not exceed the standard working hours. However, where there are special circumstances such that the setting of the prescribed working hours can be assessed as being merely a matter of form, or that the prescribed working hours were set with the intent to evade mandatory statutory provisions such as labor-related statutes, the validity of such an agreement as an agreement on prescribed working hours must be denied.
B. Considering comprehensively the content and structure of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Minimum Wage Act, the legislative purpose and history of enactment of the special provision at issue, the purpose of the provisions of the Passenger Transport Service Act and the public nature of the general taxi transportation business, and the circumstances surrounding an agreement to shorten prescribed working hours, it must be held that where, under the fixed-quota system, an employer, with the intent to avoid a shortfall of the fixed wage excluding wages based on output below the minimum wage, agrees with a labor union of taxi-driving workers to shorten only the prescribed working hours without any change in actual work pattern or operating hours, in order to increase the nominal amount of the hourly fixed wage calculated based on the prescribed working hours (hereinafter "the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours"), such agreement is void as an act in circumvention intended to evade application of, among others, the special provision at issue under the Minimum Wage Act, which is a mandatory statute. This legal principle applies equally where an employer amends the rules of employment to shorten the prescribed working hours with the consent of a labor union organized by a majority of taxi-driving workers or of a majority of the workers. The reasons are as follows.
1) The provisions of the Minimum Wage Act, including the special provision at issue, are mandatory statutes established to give concrete effect to the minimum wage system prescribed as a State obligation under the Constitution, in order to actively guarantee the stable livelihood of taxi-driving workers; it is reasonable to hold that an agreement to shorten prescribed working hours made in order to evade this legislative purpose is void as an act in circumvention.
A) Under the fixed-quota system, excess transportation revenue, which has the character of wages based on output, occupied a substantial portion of the total income of taxi-driving workers, yet, being a variable wage difficult to determine in advance, it functioned as a factor rendering the total income of taxi-driving workers unstable. Moreover, under the fixed-quota system, there was also the problem that, where transportation revenue was low, it could be difficult for a taxi-driving worker to secure even the wage level necessary for a basic livelihood. On the other hand, because excess transportation revenue of taxi-driving workers was included in comparison wages, even where the amount of the fixed wage fell markedly short of the minimum wage, this did not violate the Minimum Wage Act, and this brought about the result of entrenching the low-wage structure of taxi-driving workers over a long period.
Accordingly, the special provision at issue was introduced as a means of achieving the original purpose of the Minimum Wage Act and effectively guaranteeing the stability of livelihood of taxi-driving workers, by limiting the scope of comparison wages to more predictable ordinary and basic wages. In other words, the purpose of making it impossible, through the special provision at issue, to include wages based on output such as excess transportation revenue in the minimum wage, is to guarantee that taxi-driving workers can receive wages not less than the minimum wage amount even where transportation revenue is low, by raising the proportion of the fixed wage among the wages received by taxi-driving workers, so that they may lead a more stable life (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Da9261, 9278, decided July 11, 2018; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2008Hun-Ma477, decided August 30, 2011).
As such, the special provision at issue naturally contemplates raising the ordinary and basic fixed wage paid in correspondence to the prescribed working hours previously agreed to as the hours of the obligation to work, to a level not less than the minimum wage; it does not contemplate the artifice of, conversely, merely nominally shortening the prescribed working hours—while the actual work pattern or operating hours remain entirely unchanged—so as to satisfy the publicly announced hourly minimum wage level in terms of hourly fixed wage.
B) In conclusion, it is difficult to recognize the validity of the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours, as it directly contravenes the purpose for which the Minimum Wage Act, a mandatory statute, established the special provision at issue.
2) In light of the legislative process of the special provision at issue, it is not appropriate to develop an interpretation that weakens the practical normative force of the special provision at issue by holding the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours to be valid.
A) At the time of the National Assembly's deliberations for the introduction of the special provision at issue, it was anticipated that excluding excess transportation revenue in calculating the minimum wage would not only enhance wage stability through an increase in the fixed wage, thereby contributing to the stabilization of taxi-driving workers' livelihoods, but would also have policy effects such as simplifying the wage structure of taxi-driving workers, enhancing transparency, and positively encouraging the full management system for transportation revenue (운송수입금 전액관리제). On the other hand, drawbacks were also pointed out, such as increased costs for general taxi transportation businesses, the possibility of labor disputes arising each time the minimum wage is raised, and issues of equity with other industries in which wages are determined based on performance pay. The National Assembly, being aware of these various positive and negative effects arising from the introduction of the special provision at issue, prioritized the positive legislative effect of guaranteeing the stable livelihood of taxi-driving workers, and thereby introduced the special provision at issue.
B) Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept holding the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours to be valid on the grounds that, at the time the special provision at issue was introduced, there were practical limits to raising the fixed wage, as intended by the special provision at issue, in line with each year's increase in the minimum wage amount, given the management circumstances of general taxi transportation business operators or the structure of transportation revenue in the general taxi transportation business, since this contravenes the concrete legislative process and legislative purpose described above.
3) Considering the purpose of the provisions relating to the general taxi transportation business under the Passenger Transport Service Act and the public nature of the general taxi transportation business, the validity of the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours cannot be recognized.
A) The special provision at issue specially regulates the labor relationship between general taxi transportation business operators and taxi-driving workers in the general taxi transportation business. Whether to permit the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours as a matter of private law cannot but be considered together with the normative significance that such an agreement has in the general taxi transportation business.
B) The Passenger Transport Service Act operates a State licensing system in connection with the general taxi transportation business, while also imposing substantial regulation and providing support. This is intended, premised on the public nature of the general taxi transportation business, to establish order in the taxi transportation business and promote the safe and smooth transportation of passengers, ultimately to enhance the public welfare of the people.
C) Considering this purpose of the Passenger Transport Service Act and the public nature of the general taxi transportation business, it can be seen that the special provision at issue, which is intended to enable taxi-driving workers to lead a more stable life, also presupposes the purpose of preventing reckless driving by taxi-driving workers seeking to earn more transportation revenue, thereby protecting the safety of the general public and preventing the impairment of transportation order.
D) Accordingly, the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours constitutes an act whereby parties to a labor relationship, through an individual agreement, evade the legislative purpose substantially intended by the Passenger Transport Service Act and the special provision at issue, such as the promotion of public safety and transportation convenience; it is reasonable to hold that it is void as an act in circumvention.
4) The fact that the taxi-driving workers voluntarily agreed, or that the taxi-driving workers gained an unexpected benefit resulting in a somewhat unreasonable outcome, cannot be invoked to affirm the validity of the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours.
A) The mere fact that the shortening of the prescribed working hours resulted from a voluntary agreement between the parties to the labor relationship cannot render valid an agreement to shorten prescribed working hours made to evade the purpose of the special provision at issue. Such an agreement is nothing other than an act itself intended to evade the purpose of a mandatory statute; to conversely place emphasis on such an agreement and thereby derive the conclusion that it is valid would be to put the matter backwards. The fact that the person intended to be protected has decided to voluntarily waive the benefit protected by a mandatory statute cannot negate the purpose of the mandatory statute and its effect as a norm.
B) If the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours is held to be void, the employer bears the obligation to pay the worker the amount falling short of the minimum wage, while the worker may obtain a benefit not anticipated at the time of the agreement. However, this is an unavoidable result brought about through an act in circumvention that evaded the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue.
The Supreme Court, in a case where taxi-driving workers, having chosen, according to their own will, a "piece-rate" labor contract with no fixed wage at all over a "monthly salary" labor contract applying the former Minimum Wage Act, and having already obtained total income not less than the minimum wage level calculated under the former Minimum Wage Act, later asserted that the piece-rate labor contract violated the former Minimum Wage Act and sought payment of unpaid minimum wages calculated by applying the special provision at issue, affirmed the taxi-driving workers' right to claim wages, and held that such a claim was not disallowed as being contrary to the principle of good faith (the above Supreme Court Decision 2016Da9261, 9278). In light of this precedent, even if the result of holding the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours void has some unexpected or somewhat inequitable aspects, this cannot be invoked to hold that the agreement is valid.
5) If the effect of the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours is interpreted to be valid, unreasonable results as follows may arise, which cannot be accepted.
A) It must be emphasized that there is a concern that this would continue to encourage acts evading the special provision at issue.
If the minimum wage amount publicly announced each year by the Minister of Employment and Labor continues to rise, employers will need to continuously shorten the prescribed working hours in order to avoid violating the Minimum Wage Act. The prescribed working hours for taxi-driving workers working on an alternating-day basis could be sequentially shortened each year until they amount to as little as one or two hours per day.
Ultimately, if the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours is interpreted as valid, this would continuously permit future acts of shortening prescribed working hours to avoid violating the Minimum Wage Act, and it would become impossible to directly hold void, on grounds of being an act in circumvention, even a setting of prescribed working hours that is unrealistic and inconsistent with the actual work pattern or operating hours, which is severely unjust.
B) The Labor Standards Act excludes application of the weekly paid holiday system (Article 55) and the annual paid leave system (Article 60) for workers whose prescribed working hours per week, averaged over four weeks, are less than 15 hours (Article 18(3)), and for such ultra-short-time workers, the Employee Retirement Benefit Security Act (근로자퇴직급여 보장법) exempts the employer's obligation to establish a retirement benefit system (proviso to Article 4(1)). Furthermore, a person whose prescribed working hours per month are less than 60 hours is excluded from the application of employment insurance (Article 10(2) of the Employment Insurance Act (고용보험법) and Article 3(1) of its Enforcement Decree), and is also excluded from workplace-based enrollment under health insurance (Article 6(2)(iv) of the National Health Insurance Act (국민건강보험법) and Article 9(1) of its Enforcement Decree). As such, various statutes recognize significant exceptions to worker-protection provisions and social security systems depending on the setting of prescribed working hours.
However, if the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours is interpreted as valid, then, absent other circumstances, shortening the prescribed working hours below these levels would also be permitted, placing taxi-driving workers in an unstable position in which they may suffer significant disadvantages in the application of the Labor Standards Act and other statutes. Such a result is unreasonable and difficult to accept.
4. Determination as to This Case
Examining the facts set forth above in light of the foregoing legal principles, the portion of the rules of employment concerning prescribed working hours, as amended twice, was amended with the intent of avoiding a shortfall of the fixed wage—excluding wages based on output—below the minimum wage following the enforcement of the special provision at issue, in order to increase the nominal hourly fixed wage calculated based on the prescribed working hours, and is void as an act in circumvention intended to evade application of, among others, the special provision at issue, which is a mandatory statute.
Consequently, the judgment below, which, in the same vein, held void the portions concerning prescribed working hours in the First and Second Amended Rules of Employment, and then calculated the amount falling short of the minimum wage based on the prescribed working hours under the Former Rules of Employment, contains no error, as alleged in the grounds of appeal, of failing to conduct the necessary examination regarding the circumstances of the shortening of the prescribed working hours, or of misapprehending the legal principles concerning the prescribed working hours and the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue.
5. Conclusion
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are to be borne by the losing party, and it is so decided as set forth in the Order. Except for the dissenting opinion of Justice Cho Hee-dae and Justice Lee Ki-taek, the dissenting opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Lee Dong-won, the opinions of the participating Justices are unanimous, and there are supplementary opinions by Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Park Jeong-hwa, and Justice Kim Seon-su, and a supplementary opinion by Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, concerning the majority opinion.
6. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Cho Hee-dae and Justice Lee Ki-taek
A. The gist of the majority opinion is that, premising that the issue in this case is whether the provision of the rules of employment shortening the prescribed working hours with the intent of avoiding violation of the Minimum Wage Act, following the enforcement of the special provision at issue, is void as an act in circumvention, one must examine sequentially whether the provision shortening the prescribed working hours is void as such, and, if void, whether a shortfall from the minimum wage is recognized based solely on the fixed wage received by the taxi-driving worker calculated on the basis of the former prescribed working hours.
However, we cannot agree with the majority opinion's basic viewpoint concerning the interpretation of the special provision at issue, which is the premise for the legal assessment of the provision on shortening prescribed working hours under the rules of employment or collective agreement. The majority opinion has erred in its interpretation of the special provision at issue by failing to properly examine the fact that the special provision at issue and the other provisions of the Minimum Wage Act (meaning the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act other than the special provision at issue; hereinafter "the existing Minimum Wage Act") differ essentially in purpose, and the fact that, under the fixed-quota system, the excess transportation revenue and fixed wage of taxi-driving workers are in a certain mutually correlated relationship, and as a result reveals certain problems, making it difficult to agree with. The detailed reasons are as follows.
B. First, it is necessary to clarify the premise of the discussion.
What is at issue in this case is the interpretation of the special provision at issue. It is a matter of the interpretation of a norm. The norm should not be interpreted on the premise of variable factual circumstances, such as the fact that, in the actual reality of taxi driving work, an individual taxi-driving worker's daily total transportation revenue fluctuates day to day depending on various circumstances, or that a general taxi transportation business operator reduces expenses and lowers the quota, resulting in a coincidental increase in excess transportation revenue, or that the minimum wage amount will continue to rise in the future. Viewed as of a specific point in time, under the fixed-quota system the fixed wage is fixed, and the excess transportation revenue is likewise fixed, and it is necessary to conduct a reasonable normative interpretation of the special provision at issue on this premise.
Moreover, it is also necessary to clarify that the issue is how to interpret the special provision at issue on the premise of the fixed-quota system, which was the main legislative motivation for the special provision at issue. This case, too, concerns a workplace to which the fixed-quota system applies. There is no need to consider other wage systems.
C. As the majority opinion also appropriately mentions, under the fixed-quota system, excess transportation revenue is a variable wage, which has functioned as a factor rendering the total income of taxi-driving workers unstable, and as a result there has been the problem that taxi-driving workers may find it difficult to secure even the wage necessary for a basic livelihood when transportation revenue is low. The special provision at issue was enacted to resolve this problematic situation and to promote the substantive stability of livelihood of taxi-driving workers.
The special provision at issue, having this purpose, takes the form of a provision excluding wages based on output of taxi-driving workers from comparison wages. Accordingly, if the general legal principles applicable to the existing Minimum Wage Act are followed as they are and the provision is interpreted literally, it is not impossible to adopt an interpretation, as in the majority opinion, that under the fixed-quota system, the excess transportation revenue of taxi-driving workers, being wages based on output, must all be excluded from comparison wages, and the shortfall from the minimum wage must be determined on this premise.
However, as discussed below, the special provision at issue is essentially distinguished from the existing Minimum Wage Act in terms of purpose, requirements, and effect of violation. Therefore, without any consideration at all of these characteristics of the special provision at issue, the general interpretive theory applicable to the existing Minimum Wage Act provisions cannot be brought as is and applied to this case, and the special provision at issue must not be interpreted with excessive emphasis solely on its literal text, nor is it appropriate to view the matter with a focus solely on whether there is unpaid wages. Nevertheless, the majority opinion, without any recognition of these particular characteristics, has misinterpreted the special provision at issue, and this is fundamentally difficult to accept.
1) The special provision at issue clearly differs in purpose from the existing Minimum Wage Act.
A) The existing Minimum Wage Act has as its purpose contributing to the sound development of the national economy by guaranteeing workers a minimum wage, thereby stabilizing their livelihoods and improving the quality of labor (Article 1). In accordance with this purpose, the existing Minimum Wage Act provides that an employer must pay wages not less than the minimum wage amount to workers subject to the minimum wage, and also has a provision that any portion of a labor contract between a worker subject to the minimum wage and an employer that sets wages below the minimum wage amount shall be void, and in such a case, the void portion shall be deemed to have been agreed to pay wages equal to the minimum wage amount prescribed by this Act (Article 6(1), (3)). Further, by excluding certain wages from comparison wages and determining whether the minimum wage amount is paid based solely on predictable ordinary and basic wages, it ensures the substantive guarantee of a worker's minimum livelihood (Article 6(4), etc.). Meanwhile, the Minister of Employment and Labor must determine the minimum wage amount each year, considering workers' cost of living, wages of similar workers, and the like (Articles 4 and 8).
Considering comprehensively this legislative purpose and the structure of the provisions, it can be seen that the existing Minimum Wage Act basically promotes the stability of workers' livelihoods by increasing the total amount of workers' wages in accordance with the minimum wage amount determined each year. That is, the existing Minimum Wage Act intends to directly regulate "the quantity of wages," and has a consistent legal structure to achieve this purpose.
B) However, as the majority opinion also acknowledges, the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue is to enable taxi-driving workers to lead a more stable life by guaranteeing that they can receive wages not less than the minimum wage amount even where transportation revenue is low, by raising the proportion of the fixed wage among the wages received by taxi-driving workers (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2016Da9261, 9278). In other words, the special provision at issue does not have as its purpose an increase in the total income of taxi-driving workers, but seeks solely, through an increase in the proportion of the fixed wage, to promote the stability of livelihood of taxi-driving workers.
That is, the special provision at issue is a provision concerning "the quality of wages," specifically regulating the manner of wage payment to taxi-driving workers, and does not at all intend to regulate the quantity of wages.
To give an example, just as a fixed commuting time can be one element of a "good quality job," a wage level that is smooth (평활) due to a small range of fluctuation is an important element of "good quality wages." The special provision at issue is intended to reduce the range of fluctuation of wages by raising the proportion of the fixed wage of taxi-driving workers, and is a provision aimed at smoothing the level of wages. In conclusion, the special provision at issue is a provision that intends to regulate the quality of wages, and it is difficult to find a more accurate expression for this.
Furthermore, the quality of wages cannot be improved through the application of the existing Minimum Wage Act, which is intended to increase the quantity of wages, and the quantity of wages cannot be increased through the application of the special provision at issue, which is intended to raise the quality of wages.
Ultimately, although the special provision at issue, if viewed only formally, contains content determining the scope of comparison wages within the framework of the existing Minimum Wage Act, if the purpose of the special provision at issue is substantively examined, it can be seen that it contains regulatory content entirely different from the overall purpose of the provisions of the existing Minimum Wage Act. Accordingly, the interpretive theory applicable to the existing Minimum Wage Act cannot be applied as is to the interpretive theory of the special provision at issue.
2) The special provision at issue and the existing Minimum Wage Act also differ in their structure in terms of the legal requirements for bringing about legal effects in accordance with their purposes.
A) According to the existing Minimum Wage Act and its subordinate statutes, with respect to ordinary workers other than taxi-driving workers, the following are excluded from comparison wages: diligence allowances paid according to attendance record over a period exceeding one month, seniority allowances paid for continuous service over a certain period exceeding one month, incentive pay, efficiency allowances, or bonuses calculated according to the relevant grounds over a period exceeding one month, annual leave work allowance, paid leave work allowance, paid holiday work allowance, wages and additional pay for overtime and holiday work, additional pay for night work, day-duty and night-duty allowances, family allowances, meal allowances, commuting allowances, and other allowances of the nature of assisting workers' livelihood, and benefits of the nature of welfare for workers, such as meals, provision of dormitories or housing, and operation of commuting vehicles, paid in kind or in a similar form (Article 6(4) of the existing Minimum Wage Act and [Attached Table 1] of Article 2 of its Enforcement Rules). However, among these wage items not included in comparison wages, there is no case in which a certain mutually correlated relationship can be recognized with items included in comparison wages. Each item is mutually independent and unrelated.
B) Meanwhile, under the fixed-quota system, the wages of a taxi-driving worker are divided into the fixed wage received after paying the quota, and the excess transportation revenue that the worker keeps after paying the quota. According to the text of the special provision at issue, the fixed wage of a taxi-driving worker is included in comparison wages, while excess transportation revenue, being wages based on output, is excluded from comparison wages.
However, in order for the employer to raise the fixed wage paid to the taxi-driving worker, the employer has no choice but to increase the quota, which is the substantive source of funds for the fixed wage, and such an increase in the quota inevitably leads to a decrease in excess transportation revenue. Where the total income is constant, an increase in the fixed wage directly leads to a decrease in excess transportation revenue. The two are generally in an inversely proportional relationship.
Furthermore, considering this mutual relationship, the fixed wage and excess transportation revenue cannot be separated and legally assessed independently. As a result, it is not appropriate for the legal effects on the legal relationships concerning the fixed wage and excess transportation revenue to differ from each other.
This mutual relationship between the fixed wage and excess transportation revenue regulated by the special provision at issue is a special feature not found in the area where comparison wages are at issue under the existing Minimum Wage Act, and must necessarily be given significant consideration in the interpretation of the special provision at issue, which excludes wages based on output such as excess transportation revenue from comparison wages. Specifically, since the special provision at issue, which does not intend an increase in the total income of taxi-driving workers, naturally contemplates a decrease in excess transportation revenue in accordance with an increase in the proportion of the fixed wage, it is no different from normatively specifying that only the amount of excess transportation revenue reduced in this manner is to be excluded from comparison wages. Where the taxi-driving worker's total income is maintained, if, due to the mutual relationship between the fixed wage and excess transportation revenue, the taxi-driving worker has received additional excess transportation revenue beyond the excess transportation revenue that the special provision at issue substantively intends to be paid, that additional portion of excess transportation revenue should not also be excluded from comparison wages. This will be explained in detail below by way of hypothetical examples.
3) The special provision at issue also differs from the existing Minimum Wage Act in the effect of violation.
A) Where wages falling short of the minimum wage are paid in violation of the existing Minimum Wage Act, the employer bears the obligation, pursuant to the provisions of the existing Minimum Wage Act (Article 6(1), (3)), to pay the worker the shortfall in wages. This is a natural logical consequence in light of the purpose of the existing Minimum Wage Act, which seeks to increase the quantity of wages received by workers.
B) In contrast, since the special provision at issue has the purpose of raising the quality of wages by regulating the manner of wage payment to taxi-driving workers, the form of the employer's legal liability in case of violation of the purpose of the special provision at issue also differs. That is, where, in violation of the purpose of the special provision at issue, the employer pays a smaller fixed wage, thereby infringing the stability of livelihood of taxi-driving workers, which is the direct purpose that the special provision at issue seeks to achieve, the employer bears legal liability such as compensating the taxi-driving worker for the damage incurred.
Meanwhile, where an employer bears the obligation to pay the difference in wages as a result of paying wages falling short of those set by statute, collective agreement, or the like, this is unrelated to the direct effect arising from a violation of the purpose of the special provision at issue. This is substantively no different from a general problem of nonperformance of a monetary obligation.
4) As such, the existing Minimum Wage Act and the special provision at issue differ essentially. Nevertheless, in resolving this case, the majority opinion views the special provision at issue only within the framework of the existing Minimum Wage Act, naturally presupposing that the two have the same legislative purpose, and then interprets the special provision at issue bound only by its literal text, and as a result approaches this case merely as a matter of unpaid wages. It understands the special provision at issue only from the perspective of the quantity of wages, as with the existing Minimum Wage Act, and is indifferent to its fundamental purpose of regulating the quality of wages.
We cannot agree with the majority opinion's interpretation of the special provision at issue, which is the premise for the proper resolution of this case.
D. We will explain in detail, by way of a hypothetical example that simplifies the case, the proper interpretive theory of the special provision at issue that takes into account these characteristics distinguishing it from the existing Minimum Wage Act, and thereby also point out the problems with the majority opinion.
1) Before the enforcement of the special provision at issue, taxi-driving worker Gap's (갑) monthly total income based on the Former Rules of Employment, etc. was 100, consisting of a fixed wage of 50 and excess transportation revenue of 50. With the enforcement of the special provision at issue, Gap's minimum wage amount, calculated on a monthly basis based on the prescribed working hours under the Former Rules of Employment, is 70. Let us assume a case where, after the enforcement of the special provision at issue, the rules of employment, etc. were amended to provide for a fixed wage of 70, excess transportation revenue of 30, and total income of 100 combined, in order to meet this minimum wage amount, but the employer, despite receiving the increased quota accordingly, still paid only the same fixed wage of 50 as before.
A) In this case, the majority opinion is understood to take the position that the employer need only bear the obligation to pay Gap the amount falling short of the minimum wage due to the enforcement of the special provision at issue, that is, the shortfall in the fixed wage of 20 (= minimum wage amount 70 - fixed wage 50). This is a natural conclusion under the majority opinion, which focuses only on the quantity of wages.
However, this conclusion of the majority opinion can be derived regardless of the interpretive theory of the special provision at issue. Even under general civil law principles, Gap could naturally seek payment of the unpaid fixed wage of 20 from the employer based on the rules of employment, etc.
B) In this example, according to the dissenting opinion, which distinguishes the special provision at issue from the existing Minimum Wage Act and understands its purpose from the perspective of the quality of wages, the employer bears not only the obligation to pay the unpaid fixed wage amount of 20, but also separately bears liability for damages arising from having paid only a fixed wage of 50, in violation of the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue that a fixed wage of 70 be paid. That is, where, as a result of such a violation of the special provision at issue or of a contractual obligation modified pursuant to the special provision at issue, Gap was unable to lead a stable life contrary to the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue, the employer bears liability to compensate for the resulting damage.
C) As such, the majority opinion appears to take the position that it is sufficient to be concerned only with the quantity of wages and to recognize only the employer's obligation to pay the amount falling short of the minimum wage. In other words, in the above example, once the minimum wage shortfall of 20 is paid, the employer bears no further liability whatsoever. However, recognition of the obligation to pay unpaid wages and recognition of civil liability for damages arising from a violation of law or contract are entirely separate matters. Where a legal interest that the special provision at issue sought to protect—namely, the stable livelihood of taxi-driving workers, focused on from the perspective of the quality of wages—has been infringed by the employer's violation of the special provision at issue or of a contractual obligation, separate civil liability should properly be recognized.
2) Meanwhile, let us assume a case similar to this case by modifying part of the above example. That is, at the workplace where Gap works, the prescribed working hours were shortened through an amendment of the rules of employment, etc., but the existing wage structure was maintained as is, without raising either the quota or the fixed wage, so that Gap still obtains total income of 100, consisting of a fixed wage of 50 and excess transportation revenue of 50 combined. In this case, it is assumed that the minimum wage amount based on the fixed wage remains the same at 70, due to the enforcement of the special provision at issue.
A) In this case, according to the majority opinion, which places importance only on the quantitative aspect of wages, as in the preceding example, since the fixed wage is calculated to be 20 (= 70 - 50) less than the minimum wage amount of 70 following the enforcement of the special provision at issue, the employer's monetary obligation to pay the unpaid fixed wage of 20 would be recognized.
B) In contrast, according to the dissenting opinion, which emphasizes the substantive legislative purpose of the special provision at issue, seeking to regulate the quality of wages, and the mutual relationship between the fixed wage and excess transportation revenue, the following conclusion is reached.
Considering that the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue does not intend an increase in the total income of taxi-driving workers, while the fixed wage and excess transportation revenue are in an inversely proportional relationship, it is no different to say that the special provision at issue normatively specifies that the employer is to pay Gap only 30 (= total income 100 - fixed wage of 70 under the Minimum Wage Act) as excess transportation revenue. Gap has received an additional 20 (= 50 - 30) of excess transportation revenue. And since only the excess transportation revenue of 30, which is substantively intended to be paid pursuant to the special provision at issue in this manner, may be regarded as wages based on output that the special provision at issue anticipates applying to, only this portion should be excluded from comparison wages. It cannot be interpreted, giving weight only to the literal text of the special provision at issue, that even the additional 20 of excess transportation revenue paid to Gap constitutes wages based on output excluded from comparison wages. Furthermore, according to the content and interpretation of the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act and subordinate statutes concerning comparison wages, since the additional excess transportation revenue of 20 is not excluded from comparison wages, it must naturally be included in the scope of wages included in the minimum wage, and as a result it must be applied to offset the minimum wage shortfall, i.e., the shortfall in the fixed wage of 20. Accordingly, in this modified example, there is no shortfall from the minimum wage.
Of course, as mentioned several times above, according to the logic of the dissenting opinion, which emphasizes the purpose of the special provision at issue to regulate the quality of wages, the employer would separately bear liability to Gap for damages arising from having paid only 50 as the fixed wage, in violation of the purpose of the special provision at issue that a fixed wage of 70 be paid.
Meanwhile, it is difficult to know what position the majority opinion takes regarding the treatment of the additional excess transportation revenue of 20 paid to Gap, as derived from the interpretation of the special provision at issue.
3) In conclusion, as can be seen from these examples, the majority opinion is concerned only with whether a shortfall from the minimum wage is recognized from the perspective of the quantity of wages, and fails to perceive, from the perspective of the quality of wages, a violation of the manner of fixed wage payment regulated by the special provision at issue, and as a result, the majority opinion substantively disregards the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue.
마. The majority opinion is excessively bound by the literal wording of the special provision at issue in this case, engaging in formalistic interpretation and thereby failing to consider the essential differences in legislative purpose between the special provision at issue and the existing Minimum Wage Act (최저임금법), as well as the mutual relationship between the fixed wage and excess transport revenue, both of which the dissenting opinion emphasizes. From the standpoint of the dissenting opinion, it must be pointed out that incorporating the special provision at issue into the existing provisions of the Minimum Wage Act was an error in legislative technique or legislative systematization. The special provision at issue should have been enacted as a separate, independent statute apart from the existing Minimum Wage Act.
As emphasized above, unlike the existing provisions of the Minimum Wage Act, the special provision at issue does not intend to increase the total income of taxi driving employees; rather, the fixed wage, which is included in the wage subject to comparison, and the excess transport revenue, which is not, stand in an inversely proportional relationship to each other. This recognizes a special relationship not seen between ordinary wage items subject to comparison and other wage items, and the effects of violation also differ.
In order to fully realize the legislative intent of the special provision at issue—which seeks to regulate the quality, not the quantity, of wages—and to reflect the particular nature of the mutual relationship between the fixed wage and excess transport revenue under the fixed quota (사납금) system, a separate independent statute should have been enacted—for example, one titled the "Act on the Stabilization of Living for Taxi Driving Employees"—rather than incorporating the special provision at issue into the existing Minimum Wage Act.
Furthermore, such a statute should have provided for raising the proportion of the fixed wage within the taxi driving employee's total income while lowering the proportion of wages based on output, and should have addressed the relationship between the two. Since the increase in tax or social insurance premium burdens arising from raising the fixed wage ratio in accordance with the implementation of the special provision at issue appears to have been one of the causes of the agreement to reduce the prescribed working hours for both employers and employees, it would have been necessary to provide for a grace period of considerable length for the payment of the additional tax or social insurance premium burdens incurred by general taxi transport business operators due to raising the fixed wage ratio, and for the increased tax burden on taxi driving employees resulting from the increase in the fixed wage ratio. Furthermore, it would have been appropriate to include a provision imposing civil statutory damages liability, in addition to the monetary obligation related to the amount of wages, in cases where the employer fails to pay the increased fixed wage calculated based solely on the fixed wage as the basis for the minimum wage amount; and the amount of such civil statutory damages liability could have been set at a fixed sum, taking into account various factors such as the amount of unpaid fixed wages.
바. Meanwhile, in addition to the above problems with the majority opinion that can be discerned through a proper interpretive analysis of the special provision at issue, the majority opinion also has the following limitations, making it difficult to accept the majority opinion as it stands.
1) In determining the validity or invalidity of the agreement to reduce the prescribed working hours, the majority opinion examines whether the reduction of prescribed working hours constitutes an act in evasion of law, primarily based on a comparison with the situation prior to the implementation of the special provision at issue. However, it is unclear how the validity or invalidity of the prescribed working hours provision would be determined for a general taxi transport business newly established after the implementation of the special provision at issue. For example, it is difficult to clearly discern the majority opinion's position on whether the validity of the prescribed working hours provision would be assessed differently between a company that existed prior to the implementation of the special provision at issue and reduced its prescribed working hours from 209 hours per month to 100 hours per month in accordance with the implementation of the special provision at issue, and a company established only after the implementation of the special provision at issue that newly set its prescribed working hours at 100 hours per month—and if they are to be treated the same, what the basis for that would be.
2) Moreover, the standard by which the majority opinion determines that an act constitutes an evasion of law and is therefore invalid is also unclear. It is impossible to know to what degree the prescribed working hours reduced through a new collective agreement or rules of employment must differ from the previous prescribed working hours or actual working hours in order to be deemed invalid, or at what percentage of reduction invalidity would result. For example, it is difficult to clearly discern the majority opinion's specific position on whether a reduction of even one minute from the previous prescribed working hours renders the provision invalid, or whether setting the prescribed working hours below 90% of actual working hours would render it invalid.
3) Following the logic of the majority opinion, which interprets the agreement to reduce prescribed working hours as invalid, in cases where a minimum wage shortfall is found, the fixed wage provision becomes invalid, while the legal relationship concerning the excess transport revenue taken by the taxi driving employee remains valid. This conclusion appears to proceed from the premise that the fixed wage and excess transport revenue can be legally evaluated separately. However, as mentioned above, in relation to the interpretation of the special provision at issue, the fixed wage and excess transport revenue cannot be separated and legally evaluated independently of each other due to their mutual relationship. It is not appropriate to legally evaluate one as invalid and the other as valid with respect to the legal relationships concerning the fixed wage and excess transport revenue, which are substantially two sides of the same coin. The majority opinion merely borrows the interpretive theory of the existing Minimum Wage Act without considering the relationship between the two, and misapplies it.
사. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of these legal principles, the lower court's determination—which judged whether the Defendant was obligated to pay the minimum wage shortfall based solely on the validity or invalidity of the prescribed working hours provisions in the First and Second Rules of Employment—contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning the special provision at issue, which affected the judgment. Therefore, the judgment below should be reversed and the case remanded to the court below.
For the foregoing reasons, we state that we cannot agree with the majority opinion.
7. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung
가. Prescribed working hours refer to the working hours that an employee has agreed to bear a duty to work, and simultaneously, the working hours for which the employer has agreed to pay wages. Prescribed working hours without a duty to work or an obligation to pay wages are meaningless. If, in establishing a prescribed working hours provision in a collective agreement or rules of employment, the employer and employee had no intention to be bound by that provision and no normative force was intended to arise, then no duty to work or obligation to pay wages arises under that provision. Therefore, absent special circumstances, a provision in a collective agreement or rules of employment that formally reduces only the prescribed working hours, while the employer and employee do not intend to change the actual work pattern or working hours, must be deemed invalid in light of the above concept of prescribed working hours.
The majority opinion's conclusion that a rules of employment provision, changed to reduce only the prescribed working hours in order to avoid the fixed wage falling below the minimum wage following the implementation of the special provision at issue under the fixed quota system, while the actual work pattern or working hours remain unchanged, is invalid, is reasonable. However, the reasoning differs from that of the majority opinion in that such a provision is invalid without any need to examine whether it constitutes an act in evasion of law.
나. When the rules of employment provision on prescribed working hours is thus invalid, the question arises as to how the prescribed working hours should be determined.
The typical case to which the minimum wage legal regime applies is one in which the employee has fulfilled the duty to work, yet the employer has paid wages falling short of the minimum wage; in such a case, it suffices to order payment of the difference between the minimum wage and the wages actually paid. However, where the prescribed working hours in the amended rules of employment are invalid, the validity of the fixed wage and quota (사납금) provisions linked thereto also becomes an issue, and not only may the employer's obligation to pay the minimum wage shortfall be recognized, but the employee's obligation to pay an additional quota amount may also be recognized. Herein lies the difficulty of this case.
If the prescribed working hours provision in the rules of employment is invalid, would the employee have intended to provide labor and fulfill the corresponding obligation to pay the quota in accordance with the prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment? Would the employer have intended to pay the fixed wage in accordance with the prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment? Is there any basis for requiring that, where the prescribed working hours under the amended rules of employment are invalid, the prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment must apply? Neither the Minimum Wage Act nor the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) contains any provision on this matter. Therefore, the question arises as to how to fill the regulatory gap concerning prescribed working hours between the employer and employee.
The court below takes it as an obvious premise that the prescribed working hours in the previous rules of employment should serve as the standard, but this logic is difficult to accept. If the rules of employment provision concerning prescribed working hours is invalid, the principle is to resolve the matter on the premise that no such provision exists, and a separate basis must exist to recognize different prescribed working hours. If a person seeking to claim wages or quota amounts based on prescribed working hours fails to present such a basis, the claim cannot be accepted in accordance with the principle governing the burden of proof. This case involves a particularly difficult problem because the prescribed working hours provision and the fixed wage/quota provisions are interlinked. If the minimum wage is determined in accordance with the prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment without presenting any reason, simply because the amended rules of employment provision concerning prescribed working hours is invalid, this amounts to accepting the Plaintiffs' claim without basis, which not only contravenes the parties' intentions but also produces a result contrary to equity as between the parties.
In this case, since the prescribed working hours provision in the rules of employment, amended with the consent of a majority of the employees, has become invalid, it is necessary to ascertain the prescribed working hours that the parties to the employment relationship would have intended had they known of the invalidity, and to make the determination on that basis. The valid amount of the fixed wage or the quota amount must likewise be determined by considering the parties' hypothetical intent as to the effect they would have desired. The detailed reasoning is as follows.
1) Where some provisions of the rules of employment are invalid due to violation of mandatory statutory provisions or the like, it must be determined whether the invalidity of that portion affects the validity or invalidity of the remaining portion. A portion that is inseparable from the invalid portion may naturally be regarded as invalid as well; however, a provision that can be separated from the invalid portion retains its effect if it is recognized that the remaining provision would have been established even without the invalid portion. However, where the portion cannot be separated from the invalid portion, or where it is difficult to view that the remaining provision alone would have been established, that provision, too, is in principle invalid; provided that, where it is recognized that the employer and employee would have intended to establish a different provision had they known of the invalidity, the legal relationship must be deemed to be formed in accordance with such hypothetical intent as to the effect desired. Here, the parties' intent as to whether they would have established a different rules of employment provision refers to the hypothetical intent as to the effect they would have desired had they known, at the time of amending the rules of employment, that the provision was invalid; it means what the parties would have decided in light of labor practice and in accordance with the principle of good faith, assuming they were placed under the same specific circumstances as at the time of amending the rules of employment. This is to be determined by comprehensively considering the circumstances of the amendment to the rules of employment, its purpose and content, the grounds for invalidity, the legislative intent of the mandatory statutory provision, and the like; however, the result must not unilaterally disadvantage one party or contravene common understanding in transactions and equity.
In the case of rules of employment, there are aspects that are less clear than in the case of collective agreements when determining such hypothetical intent, but the content of the rules of employment must inevitably be determined by considering the employer's hypothetical intent together with the employees' hypothetical opinion or consent.
2) In workplaces adopting the fixed quota wage system, the implementation of the special provision at issue creates a need for the employer to increase the quota amount, which serves as the principal source of funding for the fixed wage; on the other hand, from the standpoint of taxi driving employees under the fixed quota system, even if the fixed wage is raised to some extent, an increase in the quota amount leads to a decrease in excess transport revenue, such that total income does not necessarily increase. As a result, both the employer and the taxi driving employees develop an incentive to reduce the prescribed working hours in exchange for raising the proportion of the fixed wage within the taxi driving employee's wages. Under these circumstances, the rules of employment were amended to reduce the prescribed working hours with the voluntary consent of a majority of the taxi driving employees belonging to the company. In the process of amending the rules of employment following the implementation of the special provision at issue, the employer, instead of raising the fixed wage and the quota together, adopted the method of reducing the prescribed working hours, and the taxi driving employees, not wishing for an increase in the quota accompanying an increase in the fixed wage, likewise consented to the employer's reduction of the prescribed working hours.
In light of the circumstances, purpose, and content of the reduction of prescribed working hours under the rules of employment, the relationship between the prescribed working hours provision and the fixed wage/quota provisions, and the grounds for invalidity of the provision reducing prescribed working hours, it is appropriate to conclude that where the prescribed working hours provision in the amended rules of employment becomes invalid, at least the fixed wage/quota provisions in the amended rules of employment, which are closely related to such prescribed working hours, likewise become invalid, and that had the parties known of such invalidity, they would have intended to amend the rules of employment with content entirely different from the prescribed working hours and fixed wage/quota amounts under the amended rules of employment. Ultimately, the prescribed working hours and fixed wage/quota amounts recognized in accordance with such hypothetical intent as to the effect desired become valid as new rules of employment provisions and apply to the employment relationship, and the specific amounts of the prescribed working hours and fixed wage/quota must be determined through individual and specific examination based on various relevant circumstances, including the work pattern and operating hours of the workplace concerned, the annual rate of increase in the fixed wage and quota, and the costs associated with increasing the fixed wage.
Ordinarily, had the parties known at the time that the reduction of prescribed working hours was invalid, it is to be judged that they would have set prescribed working hours consistent with the taxi driving employees' work pattern and operating hours, differing from the content of the amended rules of employment, and then, on that premise, would have increased the fixed wage in accordance with the purpose of the special provision at issue under the Minimum Wage Act, and would likewise have intended to adjust upward the quota amount, which serves as the source of funding for the fixed wage; accordingly, the rules of employment provision embodying such hypothetical intent as to the effect desired becomes valid.
Of course, this legal principle applies equally to cases in which the employer, a general taxi transport business operator, reached an agreement to reduce prescribed working hours through a collective agreement with the taxi driving employees' labor union in order to avoid violating the Minimum Wage Act following the implementation of the special provision at issue.
3) Such an interpretation does not contravene the purpose of the special provision at issue, nor does it unilaterally disadvantage taxi driving employees or contravene equity.
가) If it is interpreted that, had the parties known that the provision reducing prescribed working hours in the amended rules of employment was invalid, the parties to the employment relationship would have intended to adjust the fixed wage and quota upward together, then, for taxi driving employees, despite the increase in the proportion of the fixed wage within total income, total income may nevertheless remain the same due to the increase in the quota.
However, the purpose of the special provision at issue is merely to guarantee stable livelihoods for taxi driving employees by raising the proportion of the fixed wage within total income; it does not have as its direct legislative purpose the increase of taxi driving employees' total income. Ultimately, it is clear that ascertaining the parties' hypothetical intent as to the effect desired, and deeming valid the rules of employment provision to be determined in accordance with such intent, does not contravene the purpose of the special provision at issue.
나) Ascertaining the parties' hypothetical intent as to the effect desired, when the provision reducing prescribed working hours becomes invalid, in fact produces a result more consistent with equity.
If the hypothetical intent as to the effect desired regarding the increase in the quota is recognized, the employer would be able to claim payment from the taxi driving employees of the difference between the validly increased quota and the quota under the provision of the rules of employment prior to amendment. However, since the fixed wage would likewise increase for the taxi driving employees, it cannot be said that, with respect to total income, this results in a unilateral disadvantage or contravenes equity. Conversely, if the hypothetical intent as to the effect desired regarding the increase in the quota is not recognized, the employer may bear an obligation to pay the minimum wage shortfall, while, on the other hand, having lost the opportunity to appropriately increase the quota without knowing that the reduction of prescribed working hours was invalid, and it would be difficult to recognize any remedy allowing the employer to claim payment of the quota that could have been increased—a result that is, if anything, contrary to equity.
4) This interpretation of the dissenting opinion is also reasonable in light of the concept of prescribed working hours.
As seen above, prescribed working hours are, in essence, the hours that the parties to the employment relationship have agreed the employee shall bear a duty to work. Where the setting of new prescribed working hours becomes invalid, it is an interpretation faithful to this concept to regard as the valid prescribed working hours those working hours that the parties would have intended and agreed upon had they known of the invalidity.
5) The view emphasizing the hypothetical intent as to the effect desired by the parties to the employment relationship also has the advantage, unlike the majority opinion, of being able to uniformly govern the legal relationship in cases where the prescribed working hours provision in the amended rules of employment becomes invalid.
Under the majority opinion, it is clear that, in determining whether wages falling short of the minimum wage have been paid, the prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment apply; however, it is unclear what fixed wage/quota provisions should apply to the parties to the employment relationship where the prescribed working hours provision in the amended rules of employment becomes invalid. It is difficult to clearly determine whether the fixed wage/quota provisions under the previous rules of employment apply, or those under the amended rules of employment. It is questionable whether it can be said that either the employee or the employer had even a hypothetical intent to follow the fixed wage/quota provisions of the previous rules of employment or those of the amended rules of employment.
However, as seen above, if it is interpreted that the rules of employment provision in accordance with the parties' hypothetical intent as to the effect desired—which they would have intended to have applied had they known that the prescribed working hours provision in the amended rules of employment was invalid—is valid, then the prescribed working hours and fixed wage/quota amounts determined by ascertaining such intent will validly govern the employment relationship of the parties concerned. A consistent and unified interpretation is thereby made possible with respect to such an important working condition for taxi driving employees under the fixed quota system.
다. The majority opinion, while judging with excessive particularity whether the prescribed working hours provision in the amended rules of employment is invalid, presents no basis whatsoever for the legal relationship resulting from such invalidity—that is, its effect—and simply proceeds on the premise of the prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment.
1) Where the prescribed working hours provision in the amended rules of employment is invalid, there is room to consider, taking into account the parties' hypothetical intent, that the prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment revive; however, there is a greater likelihood that the prescribed working hours would be determined at some point between the prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment and those under the amended rules of employment. With this possibility left open, it is necessary to determine the prescribed working hours that the parties to the employment relationship would have intended had they known that the provision reducing prescribed working hours in the amended rules of employment was invalid.
2) Furthermore, once the valid prescribed working hours are derived through the process of ascertaining the hypothetical intent that the parties would have intended, the legal relationship of the parties must be determined on that basis. That is, based on such prescribed working hours, the employer's obligation to pay the fixed wage and the employee's obligation to pay the quota, corresponding to the employee's hours of obligation to provide labor, must be determined, and the obligation to pay unpaid wages under the Minimum Wage Act must be determined accordingly; in some cases, the employee's obligation to pay an additional quota amount to the employer may also be recognized.
3) Although it is not an easy task for the fact-finding court to ascertain such hypothetical intent of the parties, where it remains unclear, the matter must be resolved in accordance with the principle governing the burden of proof. Reverting to the prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment on the ground that it is not easy to determine new prescribed working hours where the prescribed working hours in the rules of employment are invalid produces an unreasonable result in this case, where the prescribed working hours and the quota/fixed wage are interlinked with each other.
4) Accordingly, the judgment of the court below, and the majority opinion which accepts it as is, err in too readily concluding that, where the prescribed working hours provision in the amended rules of employment becomes invalid, the prescribed working hours provision in the previous rules of employment remains valid as a matter of course. This is no different from concluding that, when an amended statute is invalid due to unconstitutionality or the like after a statutory amendment, the previous statute revives.
라. The grounds for the view that, where the prescribed working hours provision in the rules of employment is invalid, the prescribed working hours must be determined by ascertaining the hypothetical intent, may be found in the legal principle of conversion of a void act and in the supplementary interpretation of juristic acts.
1) First, one may doubt whether the legal principle of conversion of a void act can be applied or applied by analogy in the field of labor law, as in this case. However, given that labor law employs the concepts of validity and invalidity, and further affirms partial invalidity, which is similar to conversion of a void act, the legal principle of conversion of a void act cannot be entirely excluded; moreover, disallowing it may produce unreasonable results for the parties to the employment relationship.
가) Precedent recognizes the doctrine of partial invalidity in the field of labor law.
Article 15, Paragraph 1 of the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) provides that "an employment contract that sets working conditions falling short of the standards prescribed by this Act shall be invalid only as to that portion," and Paragraph 2 provides that "the portion invalidated pursuant to Paragraph 1 shall be governed by the standards prescribed by this Act." This is intended to actually maintain minimum working conditions for employees by preventing, through the form of individual agreements between labor and management, employees from being made to accept working conditions falling short of the standards set by the Labor Standards Act, in order to achieve the purposes of the Labor Standards Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81523, decided November 29, 2007; Supreme Court Decision 2011Da27110, decided August 25, 2011, etc.). This provision is a special provision as against Article 137 of the Civil Act (민법) concerning partial invalidity, but since the other portion of the employment contract that does not violate this Act must be deemed valid, it takes as its natural starting point the doctrine of partial invalidity.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has, in many cases, taken as a natural premise the doctrine of partial invalidity even where some portion of a collective agreement or rules of employment is invalid due to violation of mandatory statutory provisions or the like (see Supreme Court Decision 92Nu15765, decided April 9, 1993; Supreme Court Decision 93Da62126, decided June 14, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 95Da49233, decided February 28, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 2017Du38560, decided September 13, 2018, etc.).
In this manner, it is affirmed that even where some provisions of a collective agreement or rules of employment are invalid, the other provisions continue to exist as valid. This shows that the legal principles of partial invalidity or conversion of a void act under the Civil Act may be applied or applied by analogy to collective agreements or rules of employment.
나) Where a collective agreement or rules of employment do not set prescribed working hours, or such provision has no effect, a matter essential to an employment contract is left as a gap. In such a case, the matter must be resolved through supplementary interpretation of the contract. Since this is a matter of supplementing the juristic act with the parties' hypothetical intent, rather than ascertaining the parties' actual intent to the employment relationship, the prescribed working hours must be set in accordance with the intent to make a fair adjustment of interests that is objectively inferred in light of the purpose of the contract, labor practice, the content and purpose of labor-related statutes, the principle of good faith, and the like (see, regarding juristic acts, Supreme Court Decision 2005Da13288, decided November 23, 2006, etc.).
2) It cannot be said that, on the ground of the normative character of rules of employment, the prescribed working hours provision under the previous rules of employment applies as a matter of course where the prescribed working hours provision under the amended rules of employment is invalid. For example, where a particular statutory provision or presidential decree provision forming part of the national legal system is amended, but the amended provision is unconstitutional and invalid, it generally cannot be the case that the previous provision remains valid as is. Finding, in the normative character of the rules of employment, the basis for the proposition that where the amended rules of employment provision is invalid, the previous rules of employment provision remains in effect, amounts to recognizing what is called a "multi-layered structure of norms," which is unwarranted.
If the basis for the proposition that the prescribed working hours provision under the previous rules of employment remains valid is thus found in the normative character of the rules of employment, a strange situation could arise in which, as in the case of a newly established corporation where no previous rules of employment exist, an employment relationship without any prescribed working hours would have to be affirmed.
3) It is necessary to seek a basis for applying legal principles concerning juristic acts to collective agreements or rules of employment.
Unlike the National Assembly's act of enacting statutes, in connection with a disadvantageous amendment to rules of employment, there exists a meeting of minds between the employer's intent to amend and the employees' consenting intent to the amendment. This intent of the parties to the employment relationship provides a theoretical basis on which the legal principle of conversion of a void act or the supplementary interpretation of juristic acts may be appropriately modified and utilized. Moreover, in the case of collective agreements, since there exists a clear meeting of minds between the employer and the labor union, there is no particular issue. Furthermore, where it can be viewed that a collective agreement or rules of employment lack a provision on prescribed working hours, the prescribed working hours must be determined through supplementary interpretation of the employment contract. Where there is no basis for determining prescribed working hours in a case where the prescribed working hours provision in the amended rules of employment is invalid, the employee's wage claim would have to be dismissed. In such circumstances, the legal principle of conversion of a void act or the supplementary interpretation of juristic acts provides a basis for setting prescribed working hours so as to enable the receipt of the minimum wage, and allows an appropriate solution to be found as between the parties to the employment relationship.
By contrast, when the majority opinion states that the agreement to reduce prescribed working hours is invalid, "invalidity" is no different from invalidity under the Civil Act, and the concept of an act in evasion of law cited as the basis for invalidity is likewise no different from the concept of an act in evasion of law under the Civil Act. As seen above, the doctrine of partial invalidity set forth in Article 137 of the Civil Act may still apply even where some provisions of the rules of employment or collective agreement are invalid. Of course, Article 15 of the Labor Standards Act and Article 6, Paragraph 3 of the Minimum Wage Act set forth the doctrine of partial invalidity in a manner different from the provisions of the Civil Act. Even so, borrowing the general concepts or legal principles concerning invalidity under the Civil Act, while asserting that only the legal principle of conversion of a void act or the supplementary interpretation of juristic acts does not apply where some provisions of a collective agreement or rules of employment are invalid, lacks any particular basis and is unpersuasive.
The supplementary legal principle that prevents the parties to the employment relationship from falling into confusion as some provisions of a collective agreement or rules of employment become invalid is the legal principle of conversion of a void act or the theory of supplementary interpretation of juristic acts. Prior to the supplementary interpretation of juristic acts, the matter should be resolved by applying the legal principle of conversion of a void act, which has an express basis in the Civil Act. As seen above, considering the particular features of this case, in which the prescribed working hours provision and the fixed wage/quota provisions are interlinked, the interpretive approach that takes into account the parties' hypothetical intent can prevent unforeseen results from arising for the parties.
마. Meanwhile, although the Defendant, in the grounds for appeal in this case, expressly disputes only whether the prescribed working hours provisions under the First and Second Rules of Employment are valid, such argument naturally includes the assertion that, in determining whether the Defendant paid wages falling short of the minimum wage, the prescribed working hours provision under the previous rules of employment should not be applied. Ultimately, where it is determined that the prescribed working hours provisions under the First and Second Rules of Employment are invalid, the Supreme Court must clarify which prescribed working hours provision is valid, and if there is an error in the lower court's determination on this point, the judgment below must be reversed accordingly.
바. Ultimately, the court below should have examined the prescribed working hours that the parties to the employment relationship would have intended had they known that the prescribed working hours provisions under the First and Second Rules of Employment were invalid, and then, based on those prescribed working hours, determined whether the Defendant paid the Plaintiffs wages falling short of the minimum wage amount.
Nevertheless, the court below determined whether the Defendant paid the Plaintiffs wages falling short of the minimum wage amount on the premise that, where the prescribed working hours provisions under the First and Second Rules of Employment are invalid, the prescribed working hours provision under the previous rules of employment is naturally valid, and made its determination accordingly. The lower court's determination contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning prescribed working hours and the Minimum Wage Act. Therefore, the judgment below should be reversed and the case remanded to the court below.
For the foregoing reasons, we state that we cannot agree with the majority opinion, which is premised on the proposition that where the prescribed working hours provision in the amended rules of employment is invalid, the prescribed working hours provision under the previous rules of employment applies as a matter of course.
8. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lee Dong-won
가. It is difficult to agree with the logic of the majority opinion, which holds that the provisions of the rules of employment or collective agreement, amended to reduce prescribed working hours following the implementation of the special provision at issue, constitute an act in evasion of law and are therefore invalid.
Even assuming that the employer had, to some extent, an intent to avoid violating the Minimum Wage Act in connection with the implementation of the special provision at issue, so long as the reduction of prescribed working hours resulted from a voluntary agreement between the parties to the employment relationship, and absent the special circumstance that, following the reduction of prescribed working hours, the taxi driving employee's total income falls short of the wage amount under the Minimum Wage Act, it cannot be said that the provision reducing prescribed working hours under the rules of employment or collective agreement is invalid. The specific reasons are as follows.
나. An act in evasion of law refers to an act that does not directly violate a mandatory statutory provision, but that substantially realizes, through means of avoidance, what the mandatory statutory provision prohibits. Whether a given act constitutes an act in evasion of law and is therefore invalid must be determined strictly and carefully, comprehensively considering the purpose of the relevant mandatory provision, the content of the means of avoidance, the circumstances and purpose of the act, and the related social and economic circumstances.
With respect to the principal issue in this case, considering comprehensively the circumstances of the reduction of prescribed working hours and the intent of the parties to the employment relationship, the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue and the existence or absence of substantial disadvantage to taxi driving employees before and after the reduction of prescribed working hours, the particular nature of prescribed working hours in relation to taxi driving work, and the normative limitations inherent in the special provision at issue, it cannot be concluded that the provision reducing prescribed working hours under the rules of employment or collective agreement constitutes an act in evasion of law and is therefore invalid.
1) Examining in detail the circumstances of the reduction of prescribed working hours and the intent of the parties to the employment relationship, it is necessary to interpret strictly whether the provision reducing prescribed working hours constitutes an act in evasion of law and is therefore invalid.
가) At the time of the amendment of the rules of employment or the conclusion of the collective agreement reducing prescribed working hours, general taxi transport business operators were experiencing considerable business difficulties, due not only to the overall economic downturn but also to causes such as an increase in taxi supply. If, despite the implementation of the special provision at issue, the existing prescribed working hours were maintained as is, the fixed wage amount that the general taxi transport business operator would have to pay to taxi driving employees would rise sharply, making it difficult to avoid deficits under the fixed quota system; accordingly, the only alternative the general taxi transport business operator could consider to resolve this problem was to increase the quota amount. On the other hand, taxi driving employees under the fixed quota system, while accepting the unavoidable situation of an increase in the quota due to the substantial rise in the fixed wage, could not necessarily regard a fixed wage increase accompanied by a quota increase as more advantageous, since, even though the fixed wage might rise to some degree due to the quota increase, excess transport revenue would inevitably decrease, which in turn raised the concern of a decrease in total income.
As the interests of both sides converged with respect to whether to increase the quota, the general taxi transport business operator, seeking to overcome the problem of violating the Minimum Wage Act without increasing the quota, and the taxi driving employees, seeking to maintain excess transport revenue at previous levels while avoiding an increase in the quota, reached, as a result, a voluntary agreement between the parties to the employment relationship on a provision reducing prescribed working hours.
Ultimately, the provision reducing prescribed working hours is the result of a reasonable solution voluntarily agreed upon by both labor and management, in order to avoid on their own the disadvantages that would otherwise arise for both sides following the implementation of the special provision at issue, and cannot be said to be so unlawful, or to possess such marked anti-social or immoral character, as to warrant denying its effect under private law.
나) Meanwhile, the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법), established to guarantee employees' three labor rights under the Constitution, recognizes the autonomy of collective bargaining between an employer and a labor union (Articles 29, 33, etc.), and the Labor Standards Act recognizes the employer's authority to amend rules of employment, subject to certain involvement on the part of the employees (Article 94). From the perspective of maximally guaranteeing such autonomy of collective bargaining or private autonomy between labor and management, an equal and autonomous agreement reached in connection with the reduction of prescribed working hours should be respected to the greatest extent possible. In other words, it is desirable that courts refrain, as much as possible, from retroactively denying the effect of such voluntary agreements between the parties to the employment relationship and actively intervening in the wage structure, which is to be autonomously determined. Even where an intent to evade a mandatory statutory provision is confirmed to some extent, the excessive restriction on the autonomy of collective bargaining or private autonomy between the parties to the employment relationship, resulting from denying the effect of such an agreement on the ground that it constitutes an act in evasion of law, cannot but be given full consideration.
다) In light of these circumstances, it should not be concluded that the provision reducing prescribed working hours constitutes an act in evasion of law and is therefore invalid.
2) Absent an exceptional case such as one in which the taxi driving employee, following the reduction of prescribed working hours, fails to be guaranteed the minimum wage level under the Minimum Wage Act based on total income, its effect under private law should not be denied merely on the ground of an intent to somewhat evade the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue.
가) In light of the purpose of the doctrine of acts in evasion of law, which seeks to regulate acts violating mandatory statutory provisions by denying the effect under private law of acts that evade such provisions, the effect of such an evasive act can only be discussed after fully considering the social harm that such an act entails.
Of course, although the purpose of the special provision at issue is to guarantee stable livelihoods for taxi driving employees by raising the proportion of the fixed wage within their total income, it does appear to be a fact that, through the reduction of prescribed working hours, the fixed wage of taxi driving employees was not actually raised, such that the legislative purpose was not properly realized.
However, as mentioned above, in exchange for not increasing the fixed wage, the quota amount, which is one of the very important working conditions for taxi driving employees under the fixed quota system, likewise was not increased, and as a result, the total income, combining the fixed wage and excess transport revenue, was maintained without significant change. Comparing the total income of taxi driving employees, it appears that, even based on the previous prescribed working hours, the minimum wage level under the Minimum Wage Act was exceeded, and thus no result contrary to the basic purpose of the Minimum Wage Act—to guarantee a minimum level of wages and thereby ensure the stability of employees' livelihoods—arose.
나) Ultimately, the provision reducing prescribed working hours, viewed comprehensively and substantively, was not disadvantageous to taxi driving employees, and can be said to have possessed objectively acceptable reasonableness and appropriateness; on the other hand, it is difficult to specify what specific and clear social harm resulted from the reduction of prescribed working hours. Placing excessive emphasis solely on the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue itself, and thereby hastily denying the effect under private law of a reduction of prescribed working hours autonomously agreed upon by labor and management, does not squarely fit with the overall system of the Minimum Wage Act.
3) Whether the provision reducing prescribed working hours constitutes an act in evasion of law and is therefore invalid cannot but be determined by fully considering the particular nature of prescribed working hours in relation to taxi driving work.
가) Under Article 2, Paragraph 1, Item 7 of the former Labor Standards Act (before amendment by Act No. 15513, March 20, 2018), the employer and employee may, in principle, freely agree on prescribed working hours within the range not exceeding the statutory standard working hours, and therefore an agreement between the employer and a taxi driving employee to reduce prescribed working hours is naturally possible. Moreover, it need not be the case that prescribed working hours and the actual working hours during which the employee actually provided labor necessarily coincide in order for an agreement on prescribed working hours to be valid.
However, taxi driving employees' work is performed outside the workplace, and there are certain limitations on the physical equipment that can readily and accurately measure working hours; moreover, since taxi driving employees, after receiving dispatch, autonomously operate the taxi under their own responsibility, supervision and direction by the employer is not easy. Furthermore, in the case of the fixed quota system, it cannot be denied that a considerable portion of the taxi operating time is characterized as being devoted to securing the taxi driving employee's own excess transport revenue, in addition to the quota paid to the employer.
Accordingly, this can be regarded as a case where the operating time from vehicle dispatch to return does not coincide with working hours in the substantive sense under the Labor Standards Act, and thus it is difficult to deny the effect of an agreement reducing prescribed working hours merely on the ground that there exists a certain difference between the reduced prescribed working hours and the actual working hours.
나) Moreover, for ordinary employees, prescribed working hours function to fix the hours of the duty to work agreed upon between the parties to the employment relationship, and to serve as a standard for distinguishing whether labor provided by the employee constitutes overtime work. However, for taxi driving employees under the fixed quota system, due to the particular nature of taxi driving work and the wage structure discussed above, prescribed working hours appear, in substance, to actually function merely as the hours for wage payment, serving as the standard by which the employer pays the fixed wage rather than the excess transport revenue, rather than functioning as the agreed hours of the duty to work. Ultimately, since there is a circumstance in which even the prescribed working hours under the existing rules of employment or collective agreement can hardly be said to actually reflect the working hours subject to the duty to work, there is also an aspect in which it is difficult to conclude that a partial reduction thereof constitutes an act in evasion of law and is therefore invalid.
4) Since the special provision at issue inherently has certain normative limitations, it should not be readily concluded that, merely because the purpose of the special provision at issue was partially evaded, the provision constitutes an act in evasion of law and is therefore invalid.
가) In the general taxi transport business, the wage system for taxi driving employees is a wage system based on transport revenue, which is, in essence, a wage system based on output; it cannot be denied that calculating the minimum wage while excluding wages based on output itself inherently carries certain normative limitations.
And it should be understood that, in a situation where the rate of minimum wage increase was far greater than the general rate of wage increases, it was realistically difficult to expect the taxi industry—which had trouble keeping pace even with the average wage increase rate across all industries—to keep pace with the minimum wage increase rate based solely on fixed wages. Even if fares were raised due to a decrease in taxi passengers, etc., there was almost no increase in transport revenue, so raising the quota amount and increasing the fixed wage each year in accordance with the annual minimum wage increase, as intended by the special provision at issue in this case, appears to inevitably have certain practical limitations. In particular, in regions with low transport revenue or regions that had been paying relatively low fixed wages based on low quotas, a larger increase in the quota amount was necessary in order to implement the new minimum wage system pursuant to the special provision at issue in this case, but there were various circumstances that made it difficult for the taxi industry to raise quotas so drastically.
나) It appears that both labor and management in the taxi transport industry recognized this situation and reached an agreement to shorten the prescribed working hours, and therefore the validity of the provision shortening prescribed working hours should be judged with full consideration of these normative limitations.
5) In conclusion, if the shortening of prescribed working hours was based on a voluntary agreement between the parties to the employment relationship, and if the total income of taxi driver employees after the shortening of prescribed working hours exceeds the minimum wage level under the Minimum Wage Act (최저임금법) even when calculated based on the previous prescribed working hours, then even if the employer had some intent to evade the purpose of the special provision at issue in this case, this constitutes a mutual search for a reasonable alternative in order to avoid the disadvantages that would befall both parties to the employment relationship due to the normative limitations inherent in the special provision at issue in this case. Since the total income was maintained for taxi driver employees because the quota was not increased, this is not disadvantageous to them, does not contravene the concept of prescribed working hours, and is not contrary to the legislative purpose of the Minimum Wage Act; thus it cannot be said to be of a degree warranting denial of its private-law validity.
다. Following the majority opinion's determination that the provision shortening prescribed working hours in the rules of employment or collective agreement is void as an act circumventing the law leads to a significantly inequitable and unreasonable result between labor and management, and is thus difficult to accept.
1) As mentioned above, under the fixed quota system, the parties to the employment relationship, recognizing that an increase in the quota was unavoidable due to the implementation of the special provision at issue in this case (which sought to increase the fixed wage), themselves chose, as an alternative, the method of shortening prescribed working hours in order to prevent an increase in the quota, and a specific wage system was established and implemented within individual workplaces on this basis.
It is difficult to see that any employer recognized that a provision in the rules of employment or collective agreement providing for the shortening of prescribed working hours was void as an act circumventing the law, and that, as a result, they would subsequently have to additionally pay the shortfall in minimum wage under the special provision at issue in this case. Moreover, it cannot be said that employees, believing that such a provision in the rules of employment or collective agreement was void and that they could claim the shortfall in minimum wage additionally before the statute of limitations expired, reached the agreement in bad faith.
Nevertheless, if the court were to hastily determine, after a considerable period of time has passed, that the provision shortening prescribed working hours is void, employees would be able to additionally receive the difference in wages falling short of the Minimum Wage Act calculated based on the previous prescribed working hours, while employers would suffer the disadvantage of being unable to recover at all the increased quota amount that they could have additionally received from employees in order to pay a fixed wage not falling short of the minimum wage amount pursuant to the implementation of the special provision at issue in this case. In other words, this would allow employees an unexpected substantial benefit not anticipated at the time of the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours, while imposing on employers a new financial burden entirely unforeseen at that time, which could cause serious managerial difficulties or even threaten the survival of the enterprise.
2) Such a result is clearly significantly inequitable between the parties to the employment relationship and is difficult to accept as is. This situation cannot be dismissed by saying that ignorance of the law is not excused, or that it is a result the parties brought upon themselves.
라. Therefore, even if the Defendant, as employer, had some intent to increase only the nominal amount of the hourly fixed wage calculated based on prescribed working hours, since the shortening of prescribed working hours through a series of amendments to the rules of employment was based on the voluntary and genuine intent of the majority of the Defendant's taxi driver employees, and absent special circumstances such as the total income of taxi driver employees after the shortening of prescribed working hours falling short of the minimum wage level under the Minimum Wage Act, it is reasonable to view the prescribed working hours provisions in the first and second rules of employment as valid.
Nevertheless, the court below determined that the prescribed working hours provisions in the first and second rules of employment were void, having been amended for the purpose of evading the Minimum Wage Act, a mandatory statute, so as to formally and superficially appear to pay at least the minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Act.
This determination by the court below contains an error of misunderstanding the legal principles concerning prescribed working hours and the special provision at issue in this case under the Minimum Wage Act, which affected the judgment. The Defendant's ground of appeal pointing this out has merit. Therefore, the judgment below should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to the court below for further hearing and determination.
For the foregoing reasons, we express our dissent from the majority opinion.
9. Concurring Opinion of Justices Park Sang-ok, Park Jung-hwa, and Kim Seon-su Supplementing the Majority Opinion
We supplement the majority opinion as follows with respect to the issues raised through the dissenting opinions.
가. The majority opinion, as an interpretive theory faithful to the text and purpose of the special provision at issue in this case, cannot be said to have ignored the special provision's distinctive characteristics.
The dissenting opinion of Justices Cho Hee-dae and Lee Ki-taek (hereinafter "Dissenting Opinion 1") criticizes the majority opinion for failing to recognize that the special provision at issue in this case has essential differences from the remaining provisions of the Minimum Wage Act excluding the special provision (referred to by Dissenting Opinion 1 as the "existing Minimum Wage Act"), and thus wrongly developing an interpretive theory of the special provision. However, this criticism by Dissenting Opinion 1 is difficult to accept for the following reasons.
1) As emphasized by Dissenting Opinion 1, the special provision at issue in this case has as its legislative purpose the increase of the fixed wage ratio within the total income of taxi driver employees.
However, the fact that the special provision at issue in this case does not directly and actively intend to increase the total income of taxi driver employees cannot be interpreted to mean that it mandates the maintenance of total income. Moreover, in order to increase the ratio of fixed wages, the ratio of transport revenue that general taxi transport business operators directly and substantially manage will inevitably increase more than before, and if the situation in recent years—where the rate of minimum wage increase exceeds the rate of increase in general taxi sales—continues, an effect of increasing taxi driver employees' wages can be expected in the long term (see Constitutional Court Decision 2008Hun-Ma477).
Ultimately, although it is difficult to clearly understand the meaning of the concepts of "quantity of wages" and "quality of wages" used by Dissenting Opinion 1, to borrow its expression, it cannot be said that the special provision at issue in this case governs solely the quality of wages and has nothing to do with the quantity of wages, nor can it be interpreted as being entirely different from or essentially distinguished from the existing Minimum Wage Act provisions governing the quantity of wages. As examined in the majority opinion, the legislative purpose of the special provision at issue in this case cannot be so narrowly limited. Therefore, Dissenting Opinion 1's position—premised on a different view that the special provision at issue in this case must be interpreted differently from the existing Minimum Wage Act provisions—is difficult to readily accept.
2) Dissenting Opinion 1 asserts that under the fixed quota system, the fixed wage and the excess transport revenue are always in an inversely proportional relationship, and that the special provision at issue in this case must also be interpreted on the premise of this relationship.
However, under the fixed quota system, the total income of a taxi driver employee consists of the fixed wage and the excess transport revenue, and since the excess transport revenue fluctuates daily and is not of a nature that can be fixed by collective agreement, etc., the total income of a taxi driver employee cannot remain constant before and after the implementation of the special provision at issue in this case. Furthermore, if it is not premised that the total income of a taxi driver employee remains constant, an increase in the fixed wage may not necessarily lead directly to a decrease in the excess transport revenue. After the implementation of the special provision at issue in this case, the quota was increased along with the fixed wage, but overall transport revenue may also increase due to an increase in taxi passengers, etc., such that the excess transport revenue may not decrease. Above all, while it may be typical for an employer to increase the quota, which serves as the source of funds, in order to increase the fixed wage, this is not necessarily inevitable. There may be cases where, in implementing the special provision at issue in this case, an employer increases the fixed wage while reducing company expenses without raising the quota, and in such cases, an increase in the fixed wage cannot necessarily be said to result in a decrease in excess transport revenue. Ultimately, Dissenting Opinion 1's logic, premised on the assumption that under the fixed quota system the fixed wage and excess transport revenue are always in an inversely proportional relationship, is incorrect.
3) Meanwhile, Dissenting Opinion 1, which understands the purpose of the special provision at issue in this case as governing the quality of wages, affirms the employer's obligation to pay damages to taxi driver employees where the fixed wage falls short of the minimum wage amount under the Minimum Wage Act.
However, this case is one in which the Plaintiffs, taxi driver employees, seek payment of unpaid wages based on the Minimum Wage Act, and is not a case in which a civil claim for damages is being made. From the standpoint of the majority opinion, it is not necessary to specifically address the question of whether the employer bears civil liability for damages in resolving this case. The fact that no determination was made regarding the recognition of liability for damages does not mean that the majority opinion's interpretation of the special provision at issue in this case is erroneous.
As mentioned in the majority opinion, the Minimum Wage Act recognizes the employer's obligation to pay wages where the wages used for comparison, among the wages actually paid, fall short of the minimum wage amount, and the special provision at issue in this case, as a provision limiting the scope of the wages used for comparison, is an important part of this system under the Minimum Wage Act. In other words, the special provision at issue in this case forms part of the formula for determining how much of the wage falls short of the minimum wage. If, as a result of the provision shortening prescribed working hours—enacted to evade the Minimum Wage Act—being rendered void, the wage paid by the employer falls short of the minimum wage calculated by applying the special provision at issue in this case, the employer must naturally bear the obligation to pay the unpaid wage. Discussing the employer's obligation to pay damages without recognizing the employer's obligation to pay unpaid wages, despite having paid wages falling short of the minimum wage, does not accord with the systematic position and legislative purpose of the special provision at issue in this case.
4) Meanwhile, Dissenting Opinion 1 criticizes the majority opinion by raising the issue of newly established corporations. The issue of newly established corporations raised by Dissenting Opinion 1 is premised on factual circumstances entirely separate from this case, and it is not appropriate to present a general legal principle and resolve the matter based on this issue in this case. This cannot be used to say that the majority opinion's logic is erroneous.
Of course, if a newly established corporation sets prescribed working hours in a collective agreement or rules of employment with the intent to evade violation of the Minimum Wage Act contrary to the purpose of the special provision at issue in this case, the issue of validity due to an act circumventing the law could equally arise. And if the initially set prescribed working hours provision is void, since there would be no valid pre-existing prescribed working hours provision under which the employee agreed to bear a duty to work, it would be necessary to determine the time during which the employee actually bears a duty to work, within the scope of the statutory standard working hours, in light of the taxi driver employees' work patterns and working hours, etc., establish this as the prescribed working hours, and then determine whether wages exceeding the minimum wage were paid.
나. Where a provision shortening prescribed working hours in a collective agreement or rules of employment becomes void, it must be determined whether wages falling short of the minimum wage were paid based on the previous prescribed working hours provision.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Kim Jae-hyung (hereinafter "Dissenting Opinion 2"), while determining that a prescribed working hours provision in a collective agreement or rules of employment that merely shortens prescribed working hours—without any actual change in work patterns or working hours—with the intent of evading violation of the Minimum Wage Act following the implementation of the special provision at issue in this case is void, nevertheless argues that, on the premise of such invalidity, the prescribed working hours that serve as the standard for determining whether the employer paid wages falling short of the minimum wage must be determined by considering the hypothetical intent of the parties in accordance with the legal principle of conversion of void acts under the Civil Act (민법), and should not be based on the previous prescribed working hours provision. However, where a prescribed working hours provision in a collective agreement or rules of employment is void, it is reasonable to view that, in relation to whether the minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Act was underpaid, the previously established prescribed working hours provision continues to have effect between the parties to the employment relationship, and the hypothetical intent of the parties should not be interpreted based on the legal principle of conversion of void acts under the Civil Act. The reasons are as follows.
1) First, as Dissenting Opinion 2 also presupposes, whether wages in violation of the Minimum Wage Act were paid must be examined based on the wages actually paid, not based on the fixed wage amount under a valid fixed wage provision. What constitutes a valid fixed wage provision is irrelevant to the resolution of this case, and further, what constitutes a valid quota provision is likewise irrelevant to the resolution of this case. Whether wages falling short of the minimum wage were paid can be determined by deriving the wages used for comparison based on the wages actually paid, and then comparing this against the hourly minimum wage amount based on the valid prescribed working hours provision. In other words, where a prescribed working hours provision in a collective agreement or rules of employment is determined to be void, the only issue in this case is which prescribed working hours provision should be applied in relation to whether wages falling short of the minimum wage were paid.
2) In light of the special nature of the grounds for invalidity in this case, the general case law principles regarding the loss of effect of collective agreements, and the normative character of rules of employment, it should be held that, where an agreement to shorten prescribed working hours is void, the previous prescribed working hours provision remains valid, and the legal principle of conversion of void acts under the Civil Act should not be applied.
가) This case concerns a situation in which, through an amendment to the rules of employment, prescribed working hours alone were formally shortened with an intent to circumvent the law, without any change in actual work patterns or working hours, such that the setting of such prescribed working hours is void. In such a case, it is reasonable to interpret that the parties to the employment relationship continue to bear a duty to work corresponding to the prescribed working hours under the existing rules of employment, rather than the amended prescribed working hours which have no effect. Since the working hours that can reasonably be interpreted as those during which the taxi driver employees belonging to the relevant workplace continue to bear a duty to work are the previous prescribed working hours, it is appropriate to convert the wages used for comparison into hourly wages based on these hours, and the resulting wages should be compared against the hourly minimum wage.
나) Case law takes the position that the so-called normative portion of a collective agreement—the part concerning working conditions and other treatment of employees—remains, absent other circumstances, as part of the content of the individual employment contracts of employees who were subject to the collective agreement, and continues to govern the employer and employees even after the collective agreement loses effect (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da13747, decided June 9, 2000; Supreme Court Decision 2011Da33825, decided June 26, 2014, etc.).
Likewise, if the prescribed working hours provision, which is the normative portion of a newly concluded collective agreement, is void from the outset as an act circumventing the law, the normative situation is no different from a case where the previous collective agreement has lost effect due to expiration of its term, etc., and a state of no agreement between labor and management continues; therefore, the above case law principle can, in principle, be applied as is to a case such as the present one.
Ultimately, from this perspective as well, it is reasonable to view that the prescribed working hours provision under the previous collective agreement validly governs the individual employee's employment relationship, and thus the prescribed working hours provision under the previous collective agreement also applies when determining the amount of wages falling short of the minimum wage.
다) The conclusion is the same even where prescribed working hours are set by rules of employment.
Rules of employment are prepared by the employer to uniformly and consistently establish standards for employees' service discipline and working conditions within the workplace, and the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법), based on the reality of subordinate labor relations, mandates their preparation and confers normative character upon them for the purpose of protecting and strengthening the position of employees, who are substantively in an unequal position, thereby protecting and improving their basic livelihood (see Supreme Court Decision 77Da355, decided July 26, 1977).
Given that a provision of rules of employment—which has the character of a legal norm governing the collective legal relationship between labor and management—has become partially void, considering the normative character of such rules of employment, it should be held that, without any need to explore the hypothetical intent of the parties, the previously valid legal norm, namely the prescribed working hours provision under the previous rules of employment, continues in principle to apply to the parties to the employment relationship.
Although not concerning a case identical to this one, case law also takes the position that where an employer changes working conditions set forth in the rules of employment to the disadvantage of employees without obtaining the consent of the employees required under the proviso to Article 94(1) of the Labor Standards Act, the amendment does not take effect as against existing employees whose vested interests are infringed by the amendment, and the previous rules of employment remain in effect as is (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da45165, decided December 22, 1992, etc.).
Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the prescribed working hours provision under the previous rules of employment validly governs the individual employee's employment relationship, and thus it is appropriate to rely on the prescribed working hours provision under the previous rules of employment when determining whether wages falling short of the minimum wage were paid.
3) Dissenting Opinion 2, which instead seeks to interpret the hypothetical intent of the parties based on the legal principle of conversion of void acts and thereby govern the employment relationship on this premise, is difficult to accept, as it has the following limitations as well.
가) Under Dissenting Opinion 2's approach of exploring the hypothetical intent of the parties to the employment relationship, in relation to this case, there appears to be the distinctive conclusion that it may be possible to determine a validly increased quota provision and thereby allow the employer to claim the difference in the appropriate quota against taxi driver employees.
However, setting aside the question of relevance to the issue in this case mentioned above, in light of the content of the relevant statutory regulations and the resulting characteristics of labor-management relations, the view that seeks to determine the hypothetical intent that labor and management would have intended, premised on the legal principle of conversion of void acts, is not appropriate.
(1) Let us first examine the case of collective agreements. The Constitution guarantees workers the three labor rights, and the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (노동조합 및 노동관계조정법) guarantees the parties' free bargaining in the process of concluding a collective agreement governing collective labor relations, and provides for collective exercise of force through labor union strikes and other industrial actions for the purpose of asserting one's will, and even affirms lockouts as a countermeasure available to employers. In light of these circumstances, the theory of conversion of void acts—which seeks to determine the hypothetical intent of the parties in order to maintain a contractual relationship where a legal act contains a partial ground for invalidity, in general individual transactional relationships where private autonomy takes precedence—cannot be applied as is to the process of concluding a collective agreement between labor and management, where even collective exercise of force is normatively affirmed.
(2) Moreover, the authority to prepare and amend rules of employment lies, in principle, with the employer, so the employer may prepare and amend rules of employment according to its own intent; however, pursuant to Article 94(1) of the Labor Standards Act, the employer is subject to the restriction of having to hear the opinions of the employees, and in particular, of having to obtain their consent where the amendment is disadvantageous to employees (see the above Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da45165). Considering these characteristics of rules of employment, it is difficult to say that the theory of conversion of void acts—which seeks to respect the principle of party autonomy to the maximum extent between parties to a transactional relationship—applies as is to an employer's act of amending rules of employment, which have normative character within the workplace.
나) Furthermore, the decisions concerning partial invalidity that Dissenting Opinion 2 relies upon as grounds for its argument that the theory of conversion of void acts can be applied in the field of labor law are neither cases exploring the hypothetical intent of the parties nor cases recognizing, on that basis, the validity of the act as a different legal act.
(1) Article 15 of the Labor Standards Act explicitly excludes the application of the principle under the main text of Article 137 of the Civil Act, under which partial invalidity results in total invalidity; a collective agreement, rules of employment, or employment contract that sets working conditions falling short of the minimum standards set by the Labor Standards Act is void (paragraph 1), and the void portion is supplemented by the standards set by the Labor Standards Act (paragraph 2). In labor case litigation practice, the application of Article 15 of the Labor Standards Act is frequently at issue, and in such cases, there is no need to explore the hypothetical intent of whether the parties would have engaged in the legal act absent the partially void portion, or whether the parties would have engaged in a different legal act had they known of the partial invalidity. The cases of Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81523 and Supreme Court Decision 2011Da27110 cited by Dissenting Opinion 2 are also such cases.
(2) Moreover, no cases have been identified in which case law, in relation to the partial invalidity of a provision of a collective agreement or rules of employment, actively explored the hypothetical intent of the parties and, on that basis, recognized the validity of the act as a different legal act. Such application of the theory of conversion of void acts in the field of labor law is clearly unfamiliar.
다) Meanwhile, the ground on which Article 138 of the Civil Act recognizes conversion of void acts lies in the parties' intent that they would have intended to engage in a different legal act had they known of the invalidity; in relation to such intent of the parties, the court must exercise caution so as not to arbitrarily infer hypothetical intent and thereby unreasonably compel, in the name of a contract, a legal effect that the parties did not intend (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da50308, decided July 15, 2010).
Dissenting Opinion 2 argues that, based on various relevant circumstances such as the annual rate of increase in fixed wages and quotas and the costs associated with increasing fixed wages, it is possible to explore the intent of the parties and specifically identify a valid quota provision. However, even considering these factors, it is by no means easy to specifically identify the quota that the employer and taxi driver employees would have hypothetically intended. As a result, the determination of hypothetical intent through judicial review appears inevitably to result in unreasonably compelling one party or the other. Meanwhile, although Dissenting Opinion 2 states that where the hypothetical intent of the parties is unclear, the matter can be resolved according to the legal principles of burden of proof, it is unclear what prescribed working hours would apply in the event proof fails.
Ultimately, by requiring the exploration of a hypothetical intent that is difficult to readily determine in a collective labor-management relationship, Dissenting Opinion 2 leads to unreasonable results or fails to provide a final solution, and as a result, there is even concern that it may fail to function as a behavioral norm, causing nothing but confusion for the parties to the employment relationship. The increased burden of hearing placed on the fact-finding court must also be pointed out.
4) In addition, the conclusion of Dissenting Opinion 2 is difficult to accept in relation to the resolution of this case as well.
The Defendant has consistently argued only that the prescribed working hours provisions under the first and second rules of employment are valid as grounds for appeal, and has not explicitly contested, as a ground for appeal, which prescribed working hours provision should apply if these provisions are void. This is also the reason why the majority opinion did not address this point in detail. It is not appropriate to reverse the judgment below—which was based on the previous prescribed working hours provision—for the purpose of hearing the hypothetical intent of the parties, when the parties are not disputing this point.
다. The majority opinion holds that an agreement to shorten prescribed working hours for the purpose of circumventing the application of the special provision, etc., under the Minimum Wage Act, a mandatory provision, must be regarded as void as an act circumventing the law.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Lee Dong-won (hereinafter "Dissenting Opinion 3") holds that even if the employer had some intent to evade violation of the Minimum Wage Act in connection with the implementation of the special provision at issue in this case, the provision shortening prescribed working hours cannot be held void in light of various circumstances. However, this interpretive theory of Dissenting Opinion 3 is difficult to accept as is, for the following reasons.
1) First, Dissenting Opinion 3, by placing excessive emphasis solely on the parties' agreement to circumvent the special provision at issue in this case, belatedly raises issues with circumstances already considered during the legislative process of the special provision at issue in this case, thereby denying the normative force of the special provision; this ignores the mandatory nature of the Minimum Wage Act and is at odds with the fundamental ideology of the labor law system, which seeks to protect employees.
2) The collective bargaining autonomy or private autonomy emphasized by Dissenting Opinion 3 is also inevitably subject to limits under statute. As mentioned in the majority opinion, Article 32(1) of the Constitution imposes on the State an obligation to implement a minimum wage system, which presupposes that the regulation of wages, a working condition, cannot be left entirely to collective autonomy between labor and management, and grants the legislature authority to regulate this matter mandatorily; accordingly, the legislature established the special provision at issue in this case under the Minimum Wage Act. Nevertheless, to hold valid, on the ground of collective bargaining autonomy or private autonomy, an act intended to evade the purpose of the special provision at issue in this case does not accord with this regulatory system and purpose.
3) Even if there was no change in the total income of taxi driver employees after the shortening of prescribed working hours, such that there was no substantive disadvantage, or even if the total income exceeds the minimum wage level under the Minimum Wage Act when calculated on a total income basis, such circumstances cannot support the validity of the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours.
The special provision at issue in this case anticipated, through its implementation, that the fixed wage would be at least the minimum wage based on the prescribed working hours previously agreed as the hours during which the duty to work was owed. Nevertheless, contrary to this, through the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours, the hourly fixed wage was only formally and nominally increased without any substantive increase in the fixed wage actually taking place, and as a result, the legislative intent of the special provision at issue in this case—to ensure a stable livelihood by enabling employees to receive wages of at least the minimum wage amount even where transport revenue is low—was circumvented. As a result, taxi driver employees did not obtain the benefit of an increased fixed wage and the resulting livelihood stability anticipated by the special provision at issue in this case, etc. The fact that excess transport revenue did not significantly change, or that total income did not decrease, before and after the shortening of prescribed working hours cannot mean that taxi driver employees suffered no substantive disadvantage.
Moreover, the special provision at issue in this case, under the fixed quota system, excludes excess transport revenue—wages based on production output—from the wages used for comparison, and provides that whether wages of at least the minimum wage amount were paid should be determined based solely on the fixed wage. Nevertheless, examining whether the minimum wage level is exceeded based on the total income including excess transport revenue of taxi driver employees, in relation to determining the validity or invalidity of the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours, directly contradicts the textual content of the special provision at issue in this case and the purpose for which it was established. It is inappropriate to hold valid an agreement circumventing a mandatory statute, using as grounds a method explicitly prohibited by the mandatory Minimum Wage Act.
4) Even considering the special characteristics of taxi driving work in relation to prescribed working hours, the agreement to shorten prescribed working hours cannot be held valid as Dissenting Opinion 3 holds.
가) Dissenting Opinion 3's point that the validity of a provision shortening prescribed working hours in a collective agreement or rules of employment cannot be denied merely because there is a discrepancy between the shortened prescribed working hours and actual working hours appears to be reasonable. However, the majority opinion did not determine invalidity based on such a logical premise either.
(1) Prescribed working hours—the hours during which an employee agrees to bear a duty to work and for which the employer agrees to pay wages for the performance of that duty—are used as a tool concept for calculating ordinary wages, which serve as the premise for calculating overtime allowances, etc., under the Labor Standards Act, for converting comparison wages into hourly wages under the Minimum Wage Act, and for determining the existence of the obligation to establish a retirement benefit system under the Employee Retirement Benefit Security Act (근로자퇴직급여 보장법).
On the other hand, case law holds that "working hours" as set forth in Article 50 of the Labor Standards Act refer to the hours during which an employee provides labor under the employment contract under the direction and supervision of the employer, i.e., actual working hours (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da14406, decided October 9, 1992, etc.). That is, with respect to actual working hours—the hours an employee actually works under the employer's direction and supervision—the Labor Standards Act regulates this by establishing standard working hours per day or week, while at the same time affirming the obligation to pay additional wages for actual working hours exceeding these standard working hours (Articles 50, 53, 56, etc.). Of course, an employee may, in principle, prove actual working hours regardless of the setting of prescribed working hours and seek payment of wages and additional wages from the employer.
As such, prescribed working hours and actual working hours are conceptually distinct, and it cannot be said that an agreement on prescribed working hours is valid only if the two quantitatively coincide exactly. For example, even if prescribed working hours are set at eight hours per day, an employee may, depending on circumstances, work an additional hour of overtime beyond the eight hours, or may actually work only seven hours due to personal circumstances; such a setting of prescribed working hours cannot, in principle, be held void.
(2) However, as mentioned in the majority opinion, where there are special circumstances such that the setting of prescribed working hours can be evaluated as reaching the point of being merely formal, or where prescribed working hours were set with the intent of circumventing mandatory provisions such as labor relations statutes, the validity of the agreement on prescribed working hours must be denied. That is, where the time during which a duty to work is actually owed, as recognized in light of the substance of the employment relationship, diverges from the prescribed working hours to the extent that the setting of prescribed working hours can be evaluated as merely formal; or where an employer, with the intent of reducing the burden of paying additional wages calculated based on ordinary wages under the Labor Standards Act, sets as prescribed working hours a period during which no duty to work exists, thereby rather inflating the prescribed working hours; or conversely, as in this case, where prescribed working hours validly reflecting a duty to work had previously been set, and there has been no substantive change in the hours during which a duty to work is owed—there being no change in work patterns, garage entry/exit times, rest periods, etc.—yet prescribed working hours were shortened in order to evade violation of the Minimum Wage Act, such a setting of prescribed working hours must be held void when considering the inherent and external limitations of the concept of prescribed working hours.
The majority opinion, based on this logic, denied the validity of the provision shortening prescribed working hours in the collective agreement or rules of employment, and is entirely appropriate.
나) Furthermore, contrary to Dissenting Opinion 3's assertion, it cannot be said that, under the fixed quota system, the prescribed working hours under the collective agreement or rules of employment prior to the implementation of the special provision at issue in this case were not hours during which the parties owed a duty to work.
The Supreme Court has held that, under the quota system, excess transport revenue—left to the free disposal of the individual taxi driver employee in consideration of the special characteristics of the form of labor and convenience of calculation—is, by its nature, wages constituting compensation for labor (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da36192, decided December 24, 1993, etc.). This case law principle is understood as naturally presupposing that the driving hours spent earning excess transport revenue also constitute working hours. Furthermore, considering statistical data generally cited regarding the actual driving hours of taxi driver employees, prior to the implementation of the special provision at issue in this case, actual working hours—including all hours spent earning excess transport revenue—exceeded the statutory standard working hours.
Accordingly, it appears that the employer and the labor union, considering that under the fixed quota system the actual working hours of taxi driver employees included working hours spent earning excess transport revenue, that direction and supervision by the employer over taxi driving work was not easy in some respects, and the standard working hours set by the Labor Standards Act, set the prescribed working hours within the range of total actual working hours, and in some cases agreed on overtime allowances premised on this.
Considering these circumstances, it cannot be said that the prescribed working hours provided for in the previous collective agreement or rules of employment did not, contrary to their concept, actually reflect the hours during which taxi driver employees owed a duty to work, nor can it be said that they do not constitute prescribed working hours that can serve as the standard for calculating the minimum wage amount.
Indeed, examining the Defendant's previous rules of employment, based on the established prescribed working hours, starting and ending times of work were set, and taxi driver employees were required to arrive before the starting time to prepare for work and stamp the attendance record, and were also imposed with an obligation to give notice of absence or early departure. Looking at the regulatory content based on the prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment in this manner, it cannot be said that the setting of prescribed working hours under the previous rules of employment did not actually reflect the hours during which a duty to work was owed.
Ultimately, Dissenting Opinion 3's logic, premised on a different view, is not persuasive.
라. From the perspective of the full establishment of the total transport revenue management system under the Passenger Transport Service Act (여객자동차 운수사업법) and the inducement of an appropriate wage system for taxi driver employees, the validity of the majority opinion must be re-emphasized.
1) Both Dissenting Opinion 1 and Dissenting Opinion 3 have the limitation of treating the fixed quota system as a fixed and unchangeable premise and developing their interpretive theories on this basis, which makes them difficult to accept.
2) 가) Formerly, the former Automobile Transport Business Act (자동차운수사업법) (as amended by Act No. 4780 of August 3, 1994), for the purpose of preventing the harms of the quota system in general taxi transport business, first introduced the so-called total transport revenue management system, under which general taxi transport business operators were required to receive the full amount of transport revenue from taxi driver employees (Article 24(3), Article 33-5(2)), and imposed administrative fines on general taxi transport business operators and taxi driver employees who violated this (Article 75(1)(3), (4)). That is, because the quota system made it impossible to expect a monthly wage sufficient to guarantee a livelihood from general taxi transport business operators, thereby destabilizing the living foundation of taxi driver employees, and because negative social phenomena arose such as reckless driving and refusal of passengers in order to secure income beyond the quota, thereby undermining public safety and transport order, the legislature implemented the total transport revenue management system to remedy these problems inherent in the quota system (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 97Hun-Ma345, decided October 29, 1998, etc.). Subsequently, the former Passenger Transport Service Act, enacted as Act No. 5448 on December 13, 1997, likewise provided for this total transport revenue management system, and the former Passenger Transport Service Act, partially amended by Act No. 6240 on January 28, 2000, in order to induce the early establishment of the total transport revenue management system, provides that administrative dispositions such as revocation of license or qualification may be imposed in certain cases on general taxi transport business operators or taxi driver employees who violate this (Article 22(1), Article 28(2), Article 76(1)(9-2), Article 78(1)(3-2), Article 85(1), (3)).
The special provision at issue in this case was likewise enacted recognizing these problems with the fixed quota system, with the aim of promoting the livelihood stability of taxi driver employees by increasing the fixed wage, thereby enhancing public safety and transport convenience; in order to continue increasing the fixed wage ratio, the ratio of transport revenue directly and substantially managed by general taxi transport business operators inevitably increases beyond what it was before, and as a result, the total transport revenue management system is inevitably substantively implemented. During the legislative process of the special provision at issue in this case, it was also discussed that the introduction of the special provision at issue in this case could have a positive effect on inducing the total transport revenue management system under the Passenger Transport Service Act.
나) Moreover, although labor and management may consult and autonomously determine the wage system for taxi driver employees within the scope that does not violate the total transport revenue management system, considering substantively the various harms of the quota system discussed above and the purpose for which the Passenger Transport Service Act introduced the total transport revenue management system to prevent these harms, it requires no further elaboration that a monthly salary system, rather than a quota system, is the appropriate wage system in the taxi driving employment relationship. It is also difficult to deny that the special provision at issue in this case, likewise introduced due to the harms of the quota system, has an aspect that aligns, in context, with the introduction of a monthly salary system as the wage system, by substantively inducing the total transport revenue management system.
다) Ultimately, considering the problems inherent in this fixed quota system and the regulatory purpose and content of the Passenger Transport Service Act and the special provision at issue in this case aimed at eradicating these problems, what is required, in relation to the validity of acts seeking to evade the purpose of the special provision at issue in this case, is not an interpretive theory that entrenches the fixed quota system, but rather an interpretive theory that can fully establish the total transport revenue management system and, further, induce a monthly salary system as the universal wage system.
Dissenting Opinion 1 and Dissenting Opinion 3, failing to recognize or deliberately disregarding the problems of the fixed quota system, ultimately amount to a position that leaves the fixed quota system as it currently stands, which is undesirable. Under the majority opinion, by holding void the provision shortening prescribed working hours in the collective agreement or rules of employment and thereby emphasizing the purpose and normative force of the special provision at issue in this case, there is the advantage of consequently being able to induce the establishment of the total transport revenue management system and the introduction of a monthly salary system. In light of this as well, the majority opinion is correct.
We hereby express the foregoing supplementary opinion to the majority opinion.
10. Concurring Opinion of Justice Ahn Cheol-sang Supplementing the Majority Opinion
[Concurring Opinion]
가. The special provision at issue in this case (hereinafter "the special provision of this case") is a provision created through a legislative policy decision by the legislature to resolve a special problem concerning the guarantee of minimum wage under the wage system existing in the general taxi transportation business sector. Therefore, in determining whether to recognize the validity of an agreement to shorten prescribed working hours, consideration must be given to the public-service or licensed-enterprise character of the general taxi transportation business, which has a strong public nature. That is to say, while the special provision of this case governs the employment relationship between a general taxi transportation business operator and a taxi driver employee, it should be noted that it also has the purpose of promoting the public welfare of the citizens by regulating the operation of the licensed enterprise of a general taxi transportation business operator who, although a private person, may be regarded as bearing a public duty by obtaining a transportation business license.
나. 1) The State or a local government may operate, either by itself or through a public enterprise, public services that provide goods and services essential to the daily life of the people, such as water, electricity, gas, and transportation (transport), or it may have such services operated by private persons by granting them an operating right over the business. Such an administrative act of granting a private person the right to operate a public service is, in academic terms, referred to as a "license for a licensed enterprise (특허기업 특허)."
The Passenger Transport Service Act (여객자동차 운수사업법) provides that a license must be obtained from the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in order to operate a general taxi transportation business. A passenger transport service license, while imposing strong regulation on matters such as the qualifications and conditions of the business operator and the manner in which the business is conducted, also, on the other hand, restricts excessive competition among operators and supports operators through methods such as entry regulation, tax benefits, and subsidy support, thereby creating a special legal status for operators of transport businesses with strong public character. It is thus a discretionary administrative act granting rights, and constitutes a license for a licensed enterprise as described above.
2) It is common for strong statutory regulation to be imposed on operators of licensed enterprises in order to maintain the public nature of the licensed enterprise. The general taxi transportation business is likewise a licensed enterprise with strong public character, forming one axis of public transportation, and it can be said that there is a strong need to restrict the freedom of contract and freedom of business of transportation business operators in order to guarantee the quality and continuity of service, and to regulate the operation of the transportation business in a direction that stabilizes the livelihood of taxi driver employees and improves their working conditions. The ultimate purpose of such regulation is to promote the public welfare of the people.
3) The working hours and wages of taxi driver employees are not merely matters related to the private interests of general taxi transportation business operators or taxi driver employees, but are directly connected to public safety in society and the interests of the general public who use taxis. If taxi driver employees suffer from long working hours and low wages, safe driving cannot be guaranteed under conditions of fatigue, and moreover, violations such as speeding, reckless driving, refusal to pick up passengers for short distances, and carrying multiple unrelated passengers together may increase due to the intent to increase transportation revenue, which could collapse the order of taxi transportation. For this reason, the legislature has, on the one hand, introduced and implemented measures to establish order in taxi transportation, while, on the other hand, continuously paying attention to stabilizing the livelihood of taxi driver employees and improving their working conditions. In this context, the special provision of this case was introduced in order to guarantee that taxi driver employees could receive wages of at least the minimum wage amount even in cases of low transportation revenue, by raising the proportion of the fixed wage among the wages received by taxi driver employees. Ultimately, it can be said that the special provision of this case also has, as a substantive purpose, the public welfare goal of enhancing the public's transportation convenience through the establishment of order in the taxi transportation business.
다. Realizing the legislative intent of the special provision of this case—that is, resolving the instability of wages through the guarantee of an appropriate fixed wage for taxi driver employees, thereby establishing order in taxi transportation and enhancing the public's transportation convenience—can be said to be one of the public goods that must necessarily be achieved in order to raise the concrete quality of daily life in our society. As ownership of private vehicles becomes more common, it becomes all the more urgent, from the standpoint of ordinary citizens who do not own their own vehicles, to have access to a means of public transportation such as taxis that can be used as conveniently and easily as one's own vehicle when necessary. Even for those who own private vehicles, there exist numerous circumstances that unavoidably require the use of taxis due to various conditions such as safety, time, and convenience. In a society where the best public services are provided for the people, everyone should be able to use taxis freely and comfortably whenever necessary, trusting in safe driving, without concern for refusal of service or speeding and reckless driving on grounds of travel distance, destination, or time of use.
라. In order for such an ideal form of taxi transportation service to be provided, it is essential to guarantee the stability of the livelihood of taxi driver employees through the establishment of an appropriate wage system. If the legislature, instead of employing the means of completely prohibiting the fixed-amount quota system (정액사납금제) itself, which is used in the taxi industry, introduced the special provision of this case with the intent of continuously increasing the proportion of the fixed wage under the fixed-amount quota system, then the special provision of this case must be thoroughly complied with, and the courts must not recognize the validity of private agreements that have the effect of circumventing such legislative intent, nor develop statutory interpretations premised on the maintenance of the current wage system, which is in great need of improvement.
Of course, it is true that, following the implementation of the special provision of this case, there is a very high possibility that general taxi transportation business operators will, for the time being, choose to increase the quota amount in order to raise the fixed wage, and in such a case, taxi driver employees would still need to increase transportation revenue in order to pay the increased quota, so there exists a realistic concern that the ultimate legislative intent of enhancing the public's transportation convenience through the prevention of excessive driving may not be properly realized. However, if the courts, on the grounds of such practical problems, attempt an interpretation of the law that disregards the legislature's intent to promote the establishment of an appropriate wage system in the general taxi transportation business—such as the gradual increase of the fixed wage and the inducement of a full amount management system for transportation revenue—then institutional improvement will become remote, and the public good of securing the livelihood of taxi driver employees, and thereby establishing order in taxi transportation and enhancing transportation convenience, will forever remain unachievable. It is by the courts presenting, within the legal order, an interpretive approach that respects the legislature's legislative purpose and intent and allows the purpose of the special provision of this case to be realized, that the problems of the current wage system in the general taxi transportation business can be gradually improved, and that the progressive change sought by the legislature through the introduction of the special provision of this case can become possible.
Given that the legislature has already, through a legislative policy decision, introduced the special provision of this case in order to stably guarantee the minimum wage of taxi driver employees, and that, by realizing the purpose of the special provision of this case, the manner of operating the general taxi transportation business, which is a licensed enterprise, can be improved and developed in a direction that enables the provision of the ideal taxi transportation service that the people should enjoy in a modern welfare society, the courts too should, out of respect for the normative weight of the special provision of this case, adopt a statutory interpretation that maximizes the realization of its legislative intent, and there is no reason to develop an interpretive theory that weakens the normative force of the special provision of this case.
마. In conclusion, considering comprehensively the purpose for which the Minimum Wage Act (최저임금법), a mandatory statute, established the special provision of this case, together with the legislative process of the special provision of this case, the public-service or licensed-enterprise character of the general taxi transportation business as discussed above, and the effect that the guarantee of livelihood stability for taxi driver employees, as intended by the special provision of this case, has on the public welfare of enhancing the public's transportation convenience, an agreement to shorten prescribed working hours for the purpose of evading the special provision of this case must be deemed invalid, and since an agreement made to evade the Minimum Wage Act is invalid, if the wages paid by the business operator fall short of the minimum wage calculated by applying the special provision of this case, the business operator must naturally be deemed to bear the obligation to pay the unpaid wages.
Finally, I would like to add one further point: the State, too, must not leave unaddressed the problems or negative effects that may arise from the implementation of the special provision of this case in accordance with the above statutory interpretation, given the realistic conditions of the general taxi transportation business, and I wish to state that there is a need and duty to devise active support measures for taxi transportation business operators and taxi driver employees, so that the stable wage structure for taxi driver employees and the desirable wage system for the general taxi transportation business, which the special provision of this case seeks to realize, can be practically introduced into our society and firmly take root.
The foregoing sets forth the concurring opinion supplementing the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Kim Myeong-su (Presiding Judge), Justice Cho Hee-dae, Justice Kwon Soon-il, Justice Park Sang-ok, Justice Lee Ki-taek, Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Park Jung-hwa (Presiding Justice for the Opinion), Justice Ahn Cheol-sang, Justice Min Yu-sook, Justice Kim Sun-soo, Justice Lee Dong-won, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, Justice Kim Sang-hwan