[Plaintiff, Counterpart] Plaintiff, Counsel Kang Su-rim
[Defendant, Applicant] Korea National Housing Corporation (대한주택공사), Litigation Representative Attorney Kim Su-ryong
[Lower Court Judgment] Seoul Civil District Court, Judgment of July 28, 1989, Case No. 89Na15733
[Order]
The application for permission to appeal is dismissed.
[Reasoning]
1. We examine the first ground of the application for permission to appeal.
The principle that a special law takes precedence over a general law applies where statutes of the same formal type, namely laws (법률), are mutually contradictory or in conflict with one another; and whether laws are mutually contradictory must be determined by comprehensively examining the legislative purpose, the matters regulated, and the scope of application of each law. The Government-Invested Enterprises Management Act (정부투자기관관리법, Act No. 2477 of February 6, 1973, repealed on March 1, 1984 upon the implementation of the Basic Act on the Management of Government-Invested Enterprises (정부투자기관관리기본법)) was enacted for the purpose of prescribing basic matters concerning the operation and management of government-invested enterprises, thereby ensuring the sound development of government-invested enterprises and the rational management of government investment; and the Budget and Accounting Act for Government-Invested Enterprises (정부투자기관예산회계법, Act No. 1119 of August 13, 1962, likewise repealed on March 1, 1984 for the same reason) was enacted for the purpose of prescribing matters concerning the budget and accounting of government-invested enterprises, thereby ensuring rational operation and the establishment of independent accounting. As these laws differ from the Labor Standards Act (근로기준법) in legislative purpose and regulated matters, the above laws cannot be regarded as constituting, in their entirety, special laws in relation to the Labor Standards Act. Moreover, since none of the individual provisions of the above laws contains any special provision, as against the Labor Standards Act, concerning working conditions such as remuneration and retirement allowances of officers and employees of government-invested enterprises, matters concerning working conditions such as remuneration and retirement allowances of officers and employees of government-invested enterprises are likewise subject to the application of the Labor Standards Act.
The lower court's determination on this point, having followed the same legal principle, is proper, and there is no error of misapprehension of the legal principles concerning the respective provisions of the above laws pointed out in the argument. This ground is without merit.
2. We examine the second ground of the application for permission to appeal.
Where the preparation or modification of rules of employment (취업규칙) under Article 95(1) of the Labor Standards Act deprives employees of vested rights or interests and imposes disadvantageous working conditions, the consent of the group of employees who were subject to the previous working conditions or rules of employment, obtained through a method of collective decision-making by that group, is required; and rules of employment prepared or modified without such consent must be deemed invalid unless they can be recognized as having reasonableness in light of social norms (see this Court's Judgments of September 12, 1978, Case No. 78Da1046; May 10, 1988, Case No. 87Daka2853; and May 9, 1989, Case No. 88Daka4277). This point is as pointed out in the argument.
In this case, according to the facts lawfully found by the lower court, the Defendant Corporation amended its Retirement Benefit Regulations (퇴직급여규정) effective January 1, 1981. Under the amendment, while the basic method of calculating the retirement benefit amount—namely, multiplying the monthly salary at the time of retirement by the payment rate under the retirement benefit payment rate table corresponding to the length of service—remained unchanged, the retirement benefit payment rate was adjusted downward from the previous rate, and the meaning of "monthly salary" was also changed (the following changes relate to employees (직원)) so that it no longer meant average wages, but excluded from the monthly salary that formed the basis for calculating the retirement benefit amount various special allowances—such as technical allowances, cashier's allowances, computer allowances, and certified public accountant allowances—that were paid only to certain employees depending on qualifications or department. This amendment to the Retirement Benefit Regulations, in its substance, lowered the retirement allowance payment rate for employees and restricted the scope of wages forming the basis for calculating retirement allowances, thereby resulting in a reduction of the retirement allowance amount payable; it is thus clear that the amendment was disadvantageous to officers and employees. Accordingly, the Defendant Corporation was required, at the time of amending the Retirement Benefit Regulations, to obtain the consent of the group of employees, including officers and employees, who were subject to the pre-amendment regulations, through a method of collective decision-making by that group. Since the Defendant Corporation itself admits that it did not obtain such consent, the amendment to the Retirement Benefit Regulations has no effect as against the officers and employees who were subject to the pre-amendment regulations.
As pointed out in the argument, it is true that the Defendant Corporation, together with other former government-invested enterprises, is a nationally owned enterprise whose remuneration, like that of public officials, is paid from the tax burden borne by the citizens, and that such enterprises had been operated irrationally, incurring deficits every year, thereby ultimately increasing the tax burden on citizens, while nonetheless paying remuneration and retirement allowances far in excess of those of ordinary public officials. Even if the above amendment was made pursuant to a policy adopted by the government in order to remedy this situation and to escape the deficit operation of state-run enterprises, it cannot be considered that there existed reasonableness, in light of social norms, sufficient to dispense with the need to obtain the consent of the group of employees.
Therefore, the lower court's determination, taking the same view and holding that the amendment to the Retirement Benefit Regulations is invalid, is proper, and the argument that the lower court misapprehended the legal principles under Article 95 of the Labor Standards Act is without merit.
3. We examine the third ground of the application for permission to appeal.
Even if the amendment to the Retirement Benefit Regulations was made in accordance with the provisions of the Defendant Corporation's internal regulations, namely the Rules of Employment (Articles 46 and 58), the Articles of Incorporation (정관) (Article 18), and the Board of Directors Operation Regulations (이사회운영규정) (Article 3(1)(10)), such provisions merely prescribe the procedures that the Defendant Corporation, in its capacity as the employer, must follow when enacting or amending the Retirement Benefit Regulations. Accordingly, where the Retirement Benefit Regulations, as amended in accordance with such provisions, are disadvantageous to employees, it is self-evident that the separate consent of the group of employees is required in order for the amended regulations to be binding upon the employees. Therefore, the argument that no consent of the group of employees is required so long as the Retirement Benefit Regulations were amended in accordance with such provisions is without merit.
Furthermore, this Court's Judgment of November 1, 1962, Case No. 62Da479, cited in the argument, differs from the present case in its facts and purport, and is thus inappropriate to invoke in this case; accordingly, the argument on this point is without merit.
4. We examine the fourth ground of the application for permission to appeal.
Article 58 of the Defendant Corporation's Rules of Employment merely provides that "retirement allowances shall be paid to retiring employees in accordance with the Retirement Benefit Regulations." This provision alone cannot be regarded as meaning that the employer and employees of the Defendant Corporation entrusted the authority to amend the Retirement Benefit Regulations to the Board of Directors and agreed to abide by whatever amendments the Board of Directors might make to the Retirement Benefit Regulations. Nor can any other provision delegating such authority in this manner be found in the record, whether in the Rules of Employment or in other internal regulations of the Defendant Corporation. Therefore, the argument that the amendment to the Retirement Benefit Regulations pursuant to the resolution of the Board of Directors is valid on the basis of the existence of such delegation is without merit.
5. As no other important matter concerning the interpretation of laws and regulations can be found to be included in the lower court's judgment, the opinions of the participating Justices being unanimous in dismissing the application for permission to appeal, it is so decided as stated in the Order.
Justice Kim Ju-han (Presiding Justice), Lee Hoi-chang, Kim Sang-won